Trial Report: Forty-Nine

This report covers the period Friday 27 July - Wednesday 1 August 2001

Friday 27 July 2001

Basson was invited by defence counsel Jaap Cilliers to tell the court about the Co-ordinating Management Committee’s decision to accelerate the incapacitant programme. This is pertinent to charges 18 and 19 against Basson relating to the alleged purchase of 500kg of methaqualone (Product M) from Croatia.

Basson said that from the end of 1991/beginning of 1992 it became clear that because of political change, weaponisation of incapacitants was to be fast-tracked, and the target for completion was set at 1994. This, he said motivated the swopping of the peptide synthesiser for 500kg of Product M, since a ton of methaqualone would be needed to take the weaponisation to the pre-production stage. Basson said that the acquisition of BZ, or the BZ varient used by the SADF also had to be accelerated.

Note: BZ (a -hydroxy-a -phenylbenzeneacetic acid, 1-azabicyclo[2.2.2]oct-3-yl ester, 3-quinuclidinyl benzilate) is an incapacitating agent. Approximately 30 minutes after exposure to a BZ aerosol, symptoms appear such as disorientation with visual and auditory hallucinations. The symptoms peak in four to eight hours, and may take up to four days to pass. Other symptoms can include distended pupils, dry mouth, and increased body temperature. The action of BZ on the central and peripheral nervous systems resembles that of atropine. Like atropine, BZ binds to muscarinic acetylcholine receptors.

Basson said that BZ is an alcohol compound which, when ingested, affects "rational emotional actions" in different ways, depending on which variant is used. He gave the example that a victim could become totally passive – a troop might sit down and start reading a book in the heat of battle – or abnormally aggressive, causing a soldier to turn his weapon on his own comrades. Asked by Cilliers why Coast had needed three incapacitants – BZ, M (methaqualone/mandrax) and Baxil (Ecstasy) – Basson said each one was required for a specific use and specific type of crowd control. Security forces could not use the same tactics each time they came up against riots.

Basson said that Project Baxil (the production of MDMA/Ecstasy) was under control, but Delta G was not in a position to manufacture BZ or any more methaqualone, for which basic experimental models for weaponisation had been completed. He claimed to have entered negotiations with the Russians and the Swiss intelligence service for what would be a joint operation in 1991.

Basson claimed that BZ was used by Iraq/Iran, Cambodia and Afghanistan. He also said that a BZ variant tested in South Africa on laboratory animals, had been dumped because it was found to cause "permanent" damage to the test subjects. Basson claimed he has "good reason" to believe that America used a BZ variant against Iraqi troops during the Gulf War.

According to Basson, Project Coast's BZ was acquired through Abul Razak who in turn acquired the raw materials in Hong Kong. He said that 5 tons of BZ were delivered to a warehouse in Basel with the assistance of Dr David Chu. According to Basson, all except 980kg of BZ was weaponised by the SADF between June and December 1992.

Basson explained the deal in which he said Swiss Intelligence and Jurg Jacomet had negotiated for 500kg of methaqualone to be purchased from Croatia. He said that this deal was a small part of a larger deal which he believed involved the Swiss authorities purchasing nuclear material. He said that the methaqualone was flown into South Africa on 23 December 1992. The next day he said he received a phone call from Gen Knobel informing him that he had been dismissed from the Defence Force by order of the President, FW De Klerk.

Basson said in January 1993, he, Ben Steyn and Gen Knobel had briefed the Minister of Defence, Eugene Louw, about Project Coast. Louw ordered that all the incapacitants, apart from the tear gas (CR) be destroyed and that all research be stopped. He allowed for the continued research into the foam delivery of the CR.

Basson said that Louw feared that South Africa might need the chemical agents again in the months ahead and therefore wanted the records and production facilities to be shut down in such a way that the project could be re-activated at short notice, if needed. Basson said he explained that this would not be possible, and that once shut down, it would take years to resuscitate Coast. Louw, said Basson, also issued orders that the existence of CR be denied, "until someone can prove that we have it".

Basson said that at the next meeting of the CMC, a decision was taken that the secrecy surrounding Coast was to be maintained despite the fact that South Africa was poised to sign the international non-proliferation treaty. Since this treaty banned CR weapons, the CMC decided to apply a "technical maneuver". The canisters containing CR would be removed from the shells in which the substance had been weaponised, and stored separately, since the treaty allowed possession of CR, but not in weaponised form. Basson said the CMC’s approach was to "play with the truth" – and Basson says he believes this was also the government’s approach. He was ordered not to divulge any information to anyone, but to focus on shutting down the project.

Basson said that following Louw’s January 3, 1993 instructions to destroy all incapacitants, the CMC met to discuss the implications. A decision was taken to destroy all stocks of products B, M, C (cocaine derivatives), Baxil and V [Note: this is the first time that a substance code-named "V" has been mentioned and no explanation was provided by Basson] as well as a number of CBW mortar bombs and other weapons. Various options were explored, including chemical destruction and fire, and eventually it was decided the best would be to dump the chemicals in the sea. The SA Air Force was ordered to arrange a flight and a military intelligence officer observed the event.

Basson explained that the Croatia deal had resulted in the loss of Project funds. He said that while dealing with the Croats, he had "run into" a Danish "spy" named Hendrik Thomsen who operated in the Ukraine. Basson said it was a well-known fact that Croatia was using the Vatican to fund its war effort, through bonds issued as security for bank loans, which would never be repaid. At some point, Thomsen sought Basson out and told him he had intercepted Banco di Napoli bonds worth $100-m which were intended for use by the Croats. Basson saw this as an opportunity to sort out his problem and informed the Croats that he would hand over their bonds on condition they paid over the lost funds in Jacomet’s account. Basson claims that he was then advised to cash the bonds to make up his loss. So he and Jacomet, along with Thomsen and bonds with a face value of $5-m, went to a bank in Zurich. The bank was willing to grant a loan, but required security – so Basson offered the Five Nations Golf & Country Club.

Shortly thereafter Basson was captured by the Swiss police for questioning and released the same day. Some time later he was again arrested by Swiss police who had discovered that the bonds were forged. Basson said that while he was under arrest Swiss intelligence warned him that the British and American intelligence services wanted to question him in jail. Basson notified "South Africa" and Christopher Marlow was despatched to Switzerland, and the SADF paid Basson’s bail.

A sub-account named "Golf" was opened and the banker informed that as soon as the $2-m or $2,5-m was paid into this account, it was to be made available to Basson immediately.

In June, Jacomet was scheduled to go the bank in connection with the bonds. However, he professed to be too busy on the day, and asked Basson to go instead. Basson insisted that Jacomet furnish him with a letter of authority before he took the bonds to the bank. On returning to Jacomet’s office he found Swiss police at the premises. Much later, Basson realised that Jacomet and the police had conspired against him and that the entire episode was part of Jacomet’s plan to get Basson off his back about the money he still owed.

Basson named Swiss intelligence chief, Peter Regli as having been involved in the deal with the Croats. He said that his version of events was confirmed by Regli in 1994 when Regli came to South Africa to discuss the matter with Gen Knobel.

Cilliers said the court might find it strange that Regli had come to SA to talk to Knobel about this deal and asked why had this occurred. Basson said that when he was unable to get the missing funds from Jacomet, he placed "enormous" pressure on "Regli’s people", eventually threatening to disclose everything he knew about the Swiss end of the deal unless Regli set matters right with the SADF. Regli begged him not to expose the nuclear deal, promising he would prevent the British and American intelligence agents from questioning Basson in jail, and would travel to South Africa to set the record straight. Regli, said Basson, kept his word – explaining the situation to both Knobel and General Ernst Nieuwoudt, head of counter-intelligence at the time. Basson was not present at their meeting.

Basson testified about the documents which were recovered in trunks at a colleagues home after his arrest. He said that he does not know how the documents came to be in the trunks and denied that the trunks were his.

Monday 30 July 2001

Judge Hartzenberg ruled that he would allow both state prosecutors to cross-examine Basson setting a precedent in South African courts. His ruling is conditional on both advocates being present in court throughout the proceedings, they may not both cross-examine on the same issues and must decide between themselves who will conduct cross-examination on points which are germane to both the commercial and human rights sections of the case. Albeit with "great reservation", Hartzenberg granted the State request because he believes this arrangement will expedite proceedings, and in the end, that will be to the advantage of the accused.

Basson resumed his testimony in chief by telling the court that "very early" during operations Modular, Hooper and Packer (August 1987-March 1988) reports were received from UNITA about chemical attacks, and from SADF troops about "funny" smoke. Basson said he was instructed by his SADF commanders to "seek donations" for defensive garments and equipment for UNITA since the SADF had limited resources at its disposal for this purpose.

Basson said that in his search for donations to UNITA, he tapped into all his contacts world-wide. Basson said that because of all the help he had given in the past to Abdul Razak, the Arab contacted Basson late in 1989 and said he was willing to make a "large" donation to the resistance movement(s). Basson claimed that the donated suits arrived by sea and were distributed by Armscor. By that time, said Basson, the CBW threat to UNITA had in any event largely disappeared, since the surrogate forces had withdrawn from Angola.

Basson claimed that all documents produced by the State in connection with the sale of the NBC suits are false.

With regard to Charge 20 – personal financial interest in more than 40 companies in the WPW/Wisdom group – Basson said the only two in which he ever had a personal interest were the Aries Trust and Waag-‘n-Bietjie Boerdery, and there was no onus on him to disclose this. He said that the Surgeon-General Nicol Nieuwoudt knew from the start about the WPW Group, and after receiving his initial authorisation for the arrangement, Basson was never again expected to report back to the SADF on it. He said that neither the Aries Trust nor the farming operation had anything to do with Project Coast, and no project funds were involved in either.

Turning to the human rights violation charges, Basson denied ever attending a meeting with Theron, Mr K and General Fritz Loots, which according to Theron’s testimony, took place in 1979/80, or attending any meeting at which the elimination of prisoners-of-war was discussed, or being approached by anyone to supply substances for this purpose. He said that any medication he supplied to Special Forces was in the normal course of events or as part of medical support for military operations, or in line with "special" requirements, for example when an undercover agent had to cross a border, he might need tranquillisers to calm his nerves.

He said that on two or three occasions he supplied "disorienting" medication for use during cross-border abductions. He said such requirements would come to his attention during the operational planning stage, and the medication might be administered to a border guard or to the subject of abduction, in order to render him incapable of raising the alarm or opening fire on his abductors. Two or three times, Basson also supplied medication that could be used to sedate an abductee in transit.

Basson said that experiments were being conducted at Delta G Scientific on quick-acting substances that could cause disorientation, such as BZ and piperidine derivatives. This was because substances such as Valium and Ketelaar "took too long" to be effective. Basson claimed he never received a request from anyone for any lethal substances, nor did he ever supply any to anyone.

Basson denied ever visiting the Operational Area with Theron in order to demonstrate how lethal injections should be administered.

He denied ever issuing orders to any of the doctors under his command to supply Theron with any medication.

He denied ordering Dr Kobus Bothma to report to Theron for the operation in Dukuduku (charges 39 - 44).

He denied handing a vial of poison to Phaal at Air Force Base Waterkloof for use at Ondangwa. He said he never gave Phaal anything designed to kill anyone. His diagnosis, based on Phaal’s description of what happened to the man in the detention barracks, is that he must have been severely assaulted overnight, or fed pieces of glass.

Basson said he does not know what Theron is talking about regarding the burning of the body in the furnace at Speskop. The SADF had contracts with various funeral undertakers, and if a body needed to be cremated, there were channels to follow. This also applied to patients from Angola, who might die in 1 Military Hospital. There were procedures for returning their remains or ashes to their country of origin.

Regarding the foetus hung at Archbishop Desmond Tutu’s home, Basson denied ever requesting one from Andre Immelman for the purpose of intimidating Tutu or anyone else.

He said he has no idea what Theron is talking about in reference to the proposed distribution of poisoned beer at Eastern Cape taxi ranks. He was aware – through his contact with "the generals" - that during the period concerned (August 1991-February 1992) dissident Civil Cooperation Bureau members were engaged in litigation against the SADF, and were threatening to expose covert operations. He also knows that Phaal was a member of this group.

On charge 63, Basson denied ever entering into a conspiracy with anyone to eliminate enemies of the state. At all times, SADF policy was that operations inside South Africa were the domain of the Security Police, and that externally, any operations carried out by the SADF were against legitimate military targets. He said he knew of no "plans" to rid the SADF ranks of members who had become security risks.

Basson said he never gave any substance to Trevor Floyd for use against Peter Kalangula in Ovamboland.

On the subject of special applicators (assassination weapons), Basson claims the SADF Chief had heard that such devices were in use internationally, and ordered him to investigate whether they could be manufactured. Mr Q was placed at Basson’s disposal for this purpose and, working from home, produced a range of applicators – screwdrivers, umbrellas and walking sticks with a variety of loading mechanisms. Basson sent the items to RRL for testing on "biological tissue", gave the test results to Liebenberg and also turned some of the applicators over to him. He said he knows of no use by the SADF of such devices, but would have had no moral qualms about their use by an operator on a foreign mission.

Basson said that at some point he was called to the SADF Chief’s office and ordered to help the Security Police, who were experiencing problems in relation to incapacitants. Basson decided to introduce three Security Police members – Chris, Gert and Manie – to Immelman, as he had access to all the substances tested for Delta G, and knew the properties of each. Basson was "too busy" to deal with the Security Police, but for security reasons, arranged that Immelman should meet with Chris, Gert and Manie in his office in future. However, Basson claims he was never told what Immelman gave them, or what the intended use was. Basson did not know of the existence of the Sales List, and never saw it before being confronted with it during his bail application. He cannot comment on the contents of the list, except that the items against his own name would have been needed either for Basson’s personal research, or for training purposes.

He said that substances that could be used as effective lethal weapons were certainly available – both Delta G and Roodeplaat Research Laboratories made toxins that could cause death "within minutes". Cyanide, too, was available. Basson said he delivered a batch of cyanide capsules to Special Forces. Cyanide, he says, would be far easier to administer, and far more effective as a lethal substance than Scoline or Tubarine. It was far quicker-acting. Given Scoline, for example, a victim could remain alive, though suffocating, for six to nine minutes.

Basson testified about his relationship with Grant Wentzel. He said that at some point, Sol Pienaar, Jerry Brandt and Wentzel set up the company Global Management. Wentzel, he said borrowed money from Basson to purchase his shares in the company. Basson said that during 1996 he and Wentzel saw each other regularly because Wentzel was involved in arms deals and frequently sought Basson’s advice. Basson said there were two deals, one with Mozambique, the other with Pakistan. Basson acted as technical adviser to Wentzel.

In late 1996/early 1997, Wentzel became involved in an Armscor deal which he told Basson was for the sale of 40mm grenade launchers to Pakistan, and included the ammunition. Later, Basson realised that Pakistan was merely the front country, and that the weapons would actually go somewhere else. Because of his knowledge of the weapon, Basson advised Wentzel that the only ammunition to buy, would be that of Swartklip Products. Wentzel was anxious about the implications of sanctions.

Basson also said Wentzel would regularly deliver boxes of the wine to him.

Basson said that about a month before his arrest on January 29, 1997, Wentzel had telephoned and they had seen one another. Then, late on the Monday afternoon before the arrest Wentzel called again, dialling direct to the ICU at HF Verwoerd Hospital where Basson was on duty. Basson testified that Wentzel said he had some wine for Basson, the arms deal was going well, but he had a few things to discuss with Basson about it. They agreed to meet around 6pm at a coffee shop near Brooklyn Circle. When Basson arrived, Wentzel was already in the parking lot.

Wentzel allegedly told Basson he had received a better offer for the 40mm ammunition from South America. Basson said this was not a good idea, and that he was sure the South American suppliers would "tell the Jews" about the sale. Wentzel put two or three boxes of wine in the boot of Basson’s car, and they parted company. Basson said the next morning he removed the boxes from his boot and noticed they were not sealed. He opened it further, and saw that three bottles of wine were missing, and that a black refuse bag was stuffed into the cavity. He left the boxes in his garage, and went to the hospital.

During the course of the day, Wentzel called again, to tell Basson he had the money he owned him. Basson, in turn, mentioned that there had apparently been some mistake with the wine. Wentzel assured him the wine was, indeed, his to keep, but that he would fetch the black bag from Basson. They arranged to meet later that day, then Wentzel changed the appointment to 7am on the Wednesday, then changed it yet again, to 9am. Basson drove to Magnolia Dell to meet Wentzel. The two men met and had a brief conversation. Basson opened the rear car door and Wentzel placed an envelope on the back seat. Then they walked to the boot and Basson gave Wentzel the black bag.

Basson says at no time did Wentzel approach him in connection with supplying drugs, and nor did Basson supply him with any drugs at any time. He said he never discussed Delta G Scientific with Wentzel during their association, but since Wentzel evidently threatened Niel Knobel, in the Global Management offices, that he would "tell everything he knew", Basson assumes he must have known about Delta G, and what was made there.

Tuesday 31 July 2001

Anton Ackermann, SC, began cross-examination by asking Basson to tell the court who – excluding SADF generals – he had not misled about Project Coast. No one, said Basson, had ever been misled or deceived in order to capitalise on their disadvantage. The Reserve Bank had been deceived in regard to the true purpose of certain foreign funds and certain information had been withheld from the Auditor-General, but these had not been deliberate attempts to mislead them, merely the consequence of following the SADF Chief’s orders to protect sensitive aspects of the project.

Basson admitted that many of the people associated with Project Coast had been misled about the details of the Project. Others he misled are: David Chu, Bernard Zimmer, David Webster, Jane Webster, Charles van Remoortere, Wynand Swanepoel, Philip Mijburgh, Roger Buffham, Patricia Leeson, Jan Lourens, Sol Pienaar and members of the CBW Mafia, who believed he was a businessman, arms smuggler and international wheeler and dealer.

But, Basson agreed, the biggest deception was the 12-year campaign to hide the project from such international intelligence agencies as the CIA and MI6, which he could only have done with the help of the South African government. Basson said European intelligence agencies – including those of Russia and East Germany – had also been successfully deceived. He claimed that from 1982 to 1993, Coast was never compromised or identified by any intelligence agency in the world.

Basson said that he had withheld information from the National Intelligence Agency in accordance with his military orders. Information he had not supplied to NIA included details of the project, the research done, the results of the research, procurement and financial channels used and his contacts with Libya and Eastern Bloc countries. He said that the orders not to disclose such information had been issued by both Kat Liebenberg and later, in 1994, by his successor as SADF Chief, Georg Meiring. Minutes of Co-ordinating Management Committee meetings filed with the court showed that those orders were still in place up to 1995. Basson said Meiring had been aware of his links with Libya from 1988.

Testifying about his information gathering, Basson said he used a direct approach saying it was "easy" to deceive the Americans, and he had no problems obtaining the information he needed.

Ackermann produced a document headed Project Novex, which contains security guidelines for the SADF’s CBW project. Basson had never seen the document before, but said on scanning it that it appeared to be fairly recent, since it makes mention of verification teams. Ackermann pointed out that the document also mentions Project Academic, and Basson agreed that it thus most likely dates from the 1990s. The document had been provided by either Niel Knobel or Ben Steyn, said Ackermann. Basson said he could not say that Project Coast security applied the same guidelines.

According to the Novex document, training is provided in the creation of cover stories, which "should only be considered after being subjected to a thorough security investigation, must be as simple and as close to the truth as possible, so as to ensure that undercover agents can both remember and, if needs be, expand on their cover stories". Basson said the document was clearly designed as a guideline for the inexperienced military officer making his first trip abroad. No, said Ackermann, Project Novex had been specifically aimed at supplying guidelines for cover stories for those involved in the CBW project. He asked if Basson would agree that a cover story should include both a credible and realistic explanation for the purpose of the agent’s travels? Basson did agree.

Basson had testified that in support of the cover stories of people like Webster, Bernard Zimmer and Buffham documents filed with the court were false, but might contain elements of the truth. He said that there was a stage, while involved with Coast, when he would even have been prepared to lie under oath if necessary to protect the project – and had done so.

Asked by Ackermann when he decided he would no longer lie under oath, even to officers of the court, Basson said it was in late 1997 after consultation with his legal representatives.

Basson testified about his arrest in Switzerland in June/July 1993. He said that he believed the arrest was the result of a conspiracy between Jurg Jacomet, the Swiss police and the Croats. He said that he had taken the Banco di Napoli bonds to the bank for Jacomet and on returning to the office, found the Swiss police waiting for him. The Croats were there too, and he was informed by the police that they wished to question him in connection with the bonds, which were forgeries. He was taken away for questioning and released later that afternoon.

Basson said he returned to Pretoria as soon as he could, but shortly afterwards, was ordered by the CMC to go back to Croatia and Switzerland to sort out the problem of the missing funds. That was when, unbeknown to him, the Swiss police had issued a warrant for his arrest. Basson said the Office for Serious Economic Offences and Knobel knew about the warrent but failed to inform him.

He said it was after his second arrest in November 1993 that he realised a great many things did not make sense. Basson said he "heard" that Jacomet had lied – to him, to Knobel and to the SA military attach� in Bonn. He said it had occurred to him that the arrest was the result of a set-up involving corrupt Swiss policemen. Basson said that during his first interrogation, he told the Swiss police he had a letter stating that the bonds belonged to Jacomet, and that they did not belong to him. He told them nothing else, except that he had merely acted as a courier. The interrogation was in German. He said that his next arrest was on November 29, 1993. Held in Basel over the weekend, he was transferred by prison train to Zurich. This, Basson assumed, was a real arrest, while the earlier experience was merely a brief interrogation. He was held for two or more weeks in Zurich.

In response to a question from Ackermann, Basson said that he had been questioned by the Swiss police about the Banco di Napoli bonds, which had turned out to be forgeries, and the role he had played in trying to cash them. Basson claimed he never read the statement he had made earlier. He said he had a cover story to protect Cost and would have said "anything" at the time to protect the project. Furthermore, he had been advised by his legal representative not to mention arms deal of any kind. He has no memory now of the cover story he presented. He said he probably told the Swiss authorities he was a brigadier in the SADF, emphasising his seniority without compromising the project.

After confirming that the last time Basson had lied to an officer of the law was on March 22, 1994, Ackermann moved on to the poisoning of Sam Bosch. Basson explained the circumstances surrounding the incident. Ackermann challenged Basson's version of events saying that the medical records revealed that the doctor who examined Bosch had not reached the conclusion that Bosch had been poisoned.

Ackermann questioned Basson about the VABN account. Basson said he operated on the fringes of this deal, which was actually run by Corrie Meerholz (Special Forces operator now deceased) as a covert operation involving shebeens in the neighbouring homelands. Meerholz asked Basson to take care of the money – dirty, banknotes. Viljoen was instructed to open a bank account into which the bags of cash were deposited, and from which withdrawals were made on behalf of Meerholz. This line of questioning led to Ackermann asking Basson about an organogram in Basson's handwriting which had been retrieved from David Webster. Basson said he has "no memory" of drawing this document up, and entered into an argument with Ackermann about whether the bottom half of the diagram, headed FINANCING, is in any way at all linked to the top half. For example, he said, the details listed under FINANCING are not true. Ackermann pointed out that the aspects which Basson claims are not true represent the basis of the entire State case against him.

Asked about an annotation: "KR" on the document, which Ackermann said could refer to Kruger Rands, Basson said that Kruger Rands were an extremely popular form of currency with The Principals, who liked using the coins when they wanted to draw funds for personal use. He said he was involved in five or six Kruger Rand deals on their behalf. He would buy the coins and give them to the Principals, or they would give coins to him to sell and he would give them the cash. The maximum number of Kruger Rands he handled at a time would be between 100 and 200. He said he bought the coins in Europe, mainly, where they are cheaper, and gave them to The Principals, or asked Zimmer to make purchases. He cannot remember how many times he asked Zimmer to do so – Zimmer had testified about one deal only, but it was actually probably about three. He said he gave the Kruger Rands to Abdul Razak.

Basson also testified about the castle at the Five Nations Golf & Country Club at Mean, in the Ardennes, which featured a bomb shelter and a labyrinth of secret tunnels.This said Basson was owned by "a well-known Arab arms dealer" and the tunnels offered endless enjoyment to visitors. The custom was to "play around" in them after sundowners. Basson said he had suggested that this property could be a great asset to various intelligence agencies. After spelling out the potential of the property to Gen Kat Liebenberg (since deceased) he was told to go ahead and get involved.

He said the property was ideally situated from an intelligence point of view – at a point where the borders of five European countries meet, hidden in a forest, yet linked to the outside world by technology. Agents would not only have been able to operate from there in safety, but would be able to keep fit by running through the forest, and the terrain was perfect for training exercises. SADF agents from both Military Intelligence and Special Forces would most certainly also have made use of the facilities, but the property also offered ideal accommodation for the Principals. Liebenberg is the only person Basson can name within the SADF who knew of the plans for the Five Nations Club. Basson was told Liebenberg would "handle the SADF" side of things, and Basson was to go ahead and do the rest. Plans by the SADF to use the property fell victim to political change, and as soon as the property was identified by the media, the Principals simply "walked away" from their investment, on the grounds that it had been compromised.

Basson was asked when had he first met the CBW Mafia. He said it was in 1984, but that he did not really get involved in their meetings until 1986. Before going on his staff course for the whole of 1985, he attended only a few of the CBW Mafia meetings.

He said the CBW Mafiosi saw him as a businessman, sanctions-buster and arms dealer. He said he met Blucher first, and was gradually admitted to the inner circle. The few meeting he attended in 1984 convinced him that the group was extremely valuable. During 1984, he also met Russian, German and Chinese members of the group – but he could not recall their names.

Basson testified that since Blucher was in the business of manufacturing defensive NBC equipment, Basson was introduced to the group as a buyer of such gear. Meetings were held at different venues each month. The first meeting Basson attended was at the Hotel Barolac, on Lake Zurich. He also remembers a meeting at Blucher’s home in Muren, on the way to Interlaken. The Principals were not present at any of the three or four meetings Basson attended in 1984. Meetings Basson attended during 1986 were held at Blucher’s office in Dusseldorf, France, Marbella and Germany. Whoever was invited by Blucher, was in attendance. Asked to name fellow Mafiosi, Basson named Dreier, Razak, Peurra and Virobyov whom he thinks he first met in 1984, but it could have been as late as 1986. He also named Chong, who was also in the group from 1984.

The Principals had chosen Basson to entrust with their not inconsiderable funds because "Blucher endorsed me", said Basson. Blucher (since deceased), Ackermann established, was a very wealthy industrialist, specialising in defensive CBW and other military equipment. Basson said Blucher was an industrial giant, whom he claims was a descendant of (Marshal Gebhardt von) Blucher, who played a decisive role in the defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo. Basson said that after the war, Blucher was taken to America along with Werner von Braun – a family member, as it happens – and only returned to Europe in 1950, to build the family fortunes anew. Basson said Blucher had factories "all over", including one in Israel, which Basson visited.

Basson said Derek Griffiths had introduced him to Blucher, in Dusseldorf. On his next visit to Blucher, Basson took Lothar Neethling along, and the two formed an immediate bond. He said that when he first met Razak, Basson saw him as a Libyan intelligence agent engaged in a CBW programme. Only some years later did he learn that Razak was a colonel. They met a couple of times in Tunisia as well as in Libya itself, where Razak was "clearly at home". Basson told Razak he was a South African sanctions-buster. Basson said Razak's sphere of operations was the US, South America, part of Europe and, later, Southern Africa, where he was both a businessman and intelligence agent attached to the Libyan Directorate Special Tasks. In time, Basson learned from Razak’s superior that his job was very similar to Basson’s own.

Basson said Project Coast procurements in which Razak played a role were the purchase of BZ, equipment for the Speskop laboratory and the peptide synthesiser. Mechanical equipment for the project was chiefly supplied by the Germans, but Razak made it clear that he could supply chemicals through Libyan front companies all over the world. He said the BZ, for example, was obtained through Pharma 150 in Hong Kong.

Asked if Libya had no qualms in 1986 about supplying the SADF with equipment to combat the CBW threat posed by the Russians, Cubans and Angolans, Basson said he would never have told Razak that he was buying CBW equipment for South Africa, or that he was an SADF officer. Blucher knew that Basson was a military officer, and that Neethling was an SAP general. No one else within the CBW Mafia, however, knew that Basson was a member of the SADF. A few might have thought he was a policeman, however, as this was one of his facades.

Roger Buffham, said Basson, worked for the East Germans, and as an ex-British secret service member, "stole their secrets" and sold them to Basson. When he retired, Buffham set up his own business, and operated as a double agent. Basson was originally given Buffham’s name by Dreier, then found the Englishman was already known to the SA military attach� in London.

Wednesday 1 August 2001

The first thing Anton Ackermann put to Basson was that CBW proliferation, particularly in regard to states such as Libya and Iraq, was an extremely serious crime. Basson claimed this was not the case when was dealing with small amounts of substances, and said this was only the case since 1989.

Basson said he had "no idea" what the 1995 demarches were about, except that Britain and the US insisted they wanted to know from President Nelson Mandela what Project Coast had entailed. Basson’s feeling was that these two countries actually did not want the information to "end up in the hands of the ANC".

Ackermann said that Blucher, a man steeped in the defensive CBW industry, must surely have known how sensitive CBW is, and the members of the CBW Mafia must have trusted him implicitly. Basson agreed saying that the members were all handpicked by Blucher himself.

Asked whether among the members, there could have been at least one who was a spy? Basson said agreed. Basson "has no idea" which intelligence agency Dreier was working for, but says both he and Abdul Razak attended CBW Mafia meetings in their official capacity, as far as he knows. But surely, said Ackermann, the members were running a huge risk of exposure? What about the risk to Blucher himself? The supply of technology through members played only a small role, said Basson. The meetings were mainly a forum in which information on developments in the CBW field could be shared.

Asked whether, as a trained agent, Dreier would have tried to establish the bona fides of the newcomer and take steps to find out who Basson was, and if he really was an arms smuggler and sanctions-buster? Basson said Dreier never questioned him, so Basson assumes he must have accepted he was who he said he was.

Asked for his definition of a Principal, Basson said a Principal is someone who issues financial instructions and makes the decisions on how funds are to be distributed. In retrospect, he came to realise that Blucher never was The Principal, since all such instructions were issued by other people. Basson named the Libyans in the groups as being Achmed Hasnavi, Abdul Tawil and Ramadan Interis as technical people. Much later, in 1988/89, he also met Yusuf Murgham – after WPW had been set up in the Caymans for the Libyans. The Libyans also used cover stories as businessmen, and Basson accepted this.

Basson was asked in which of the charges against him, Libyans were involved. He said there had been joint projects, in which the Libyans and the East Germans were involved – along with companies like Japan Steelworks and Transtechnic Muller. After some deliberation Basson said that the only Project Coast transaction in which the Libyans were directly involved, was the purchase of BZ – which is not in the indictment but which Basson claims explains the expenditure in Charge 18. Basson also said that certain "cultures" in which peptides could be grown had also been supplied by the University of Tripoli.

Asked if Basson could give an accounting to the Libyans/East Germans/Russians on how much money they had invested in South Africa, he said he did not know the answer but speculated that it could amount to about R20 million.

Basson said he was authorised to pass information selected by himself "and the government" to Razak and Murgham about the defensive CBW programme. Basson claimed they were interested in the results of the Protechnic research, as this company had developed technology that Basson said was unique in the world, since no simulants were used during tests.

Asked what he had to say about Libya’s support for the terrorists who were identified as the SADF’s enemies at that time, Basson said the South African government had been identified as "one of the biggest terrorist organisations in the world". But said that was not his problem.

Ackermann questioned Basson on his version of events as he described in his bail application hearing shortly after he was arrested, in an attempt to find discrepancies between his versions. He also asked Basson about his relationship with Sol Pienaar and Yusaf Murgham. He testified that he had visited the Mandela home on a number of occasions with Pienaar.

Basson claimed Knobel knew of his contact with Libya, but has no idea exactly what Knobel knew. He said he had provided details once only of the plan to deal with the Libyans/East Germans/Russians, and "assumed" that Knobel would have been briefed accordingly by his predecessor. Basson said he told Knobel nothing himself about the Libyan connection, because Knobel "did not want to know". Basson said he never briefed Knobel on any of his pre-1993 contacts with Libya.

When debriefed by NIA in January 1994, Basson said, he deliberately misled NIA, because those were his orders. It did not seem to him that NIA wanted to know anything about his Libyan links, and he was asked no questions about Murgham. When he told NIA he had met Murgham through Pienaar, and that their dealings were of a purely business nature, it was a lie, in line with his orders. He did not reveal his much earlier contact with Murgham, as this would have been "sensitive" information. He said he also lied when he told NIA that he saw Murgham as his passport to business contacts in Libya, and that although Murgham might earlier have been linked to intelligence work, he was now nothing but a businessman.

He said it was true that he told NIA – when asked if Nelson Mandela was to play any role in these business deals – that he hoped to put Mandela and Ghaddafi together. That related to the Lockerbie situation, and from time to time, Basson said he met with the Libyan Foreign Affairs Minister on the same matter. Basson testified that the SADF had played a role in getting a letter from Ghaddafi to visiting British prime minister John Major, in which Ghaddafi proposed that Mandela be appointed to mediate in the Lockerbie affair, and undertook to abide by any proposals Mandela might make in order to break the deadlock.

Ackermann asked why Basson lied to the NIA instead of telling them that certain information was too sensitive and that he was not at liberty to disclose it. Basson said how he dealt with NIA in the context of his orders, was entirely up to him: "I was not a corporal, I was a brigadier."

Asked what role he had played in answering questions by the Parliamentary Sub-Committee on Public Finances in 1996, Basson said that a committee had met and decided what answers would be given. He said the meeting was attended by the SADF Chief, Chief of Staff Finance, Chief of Staff Intelligence, and others. He said the Official Secrets Act was firmly in place and it was decided that full details about Project Coast would not be disclosed, specifically in respect of sensitive aspects. He said he had no memory of any specific questions he was required to answer.

One of the questions, said Ackermann, was: On what dates did Wouter Basson travel to Libya, what was the purpose of his visits and did he meet Colonel Ghaddafi while he was there? And the SADF answer had been: At the time he visited Libya, Dr Basson was not employed by the SADF or engaged in SADF business. He travelled to Libya as a private citizen, and the SADF has no knowledge of the purpose of his visits or who he met. This was not true, said Basson, he was paid by the SADF throughout – from the time he was dismissed, until he was reappointed. [Note: Knobel previously testified that Basson's contract expired on March 31, 1993, and his reappointment was in October 1995.]

This report has been prepared by Chandré Gould and Marlene Burger. Chandré  Gould is a research associate at the Centre for Conflict Resolution working on the Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. Marlene Burger is monitoring the trial  as part of the CCR Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. The Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project is funded by the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Norwegian Government.

Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: [email protected]