Trial Report: Forty-Eight

This report covers the period Monday 23 July - Thursday 26 July, 2001

Monday 23 July

Before Dr Wouter Basson took the stand to testify in his own defence, the prosecution brought an application seeking permission for both Anton Ackermann and Torie Pretorius to cross-examine him. The trial has been conducted in two distinct parts, evidence relating to the human rights violation charges has been presented by Pretorius and evidence regarding the fraud charges by Ackermann. The defence legal team led by Adv. Jaap Cilliers opposed the application. The Judge said he will rule on this matter at the end of Basson's evidence in chief.

Cilliers then brought an application to have the transcript of the conversation taped during Basson’s arrest at Magnolia Dell, declared inadmissible. The defence does not concur with the State's transcript, and the tape itself was inaudible in many places. The judge made it clear that the transcript was an aide, and that the actual tape was the evidence. The judge said, if necessary, he would listen to the tape to settle any disputes on the contents. The transcript remains evidence.

Basson began his testimony with a brief description of himself and his qualifications. He testified that in March 1981, after qualifying as a specialist physician whilst a member of the South African Defence Force, the Surgeon-General, Nicol Nieuwoudt, called him to a meeting in his office, and said there was a need for the SADF to launch a CBW research programme. He claimed that intelligence had indicated a real threat of chemical and biological weapons being used against South African troops in Angola and the Operational Area.

Basson said the "enemy" was identified as the Angolan forces and their surrogates, the Cubans, East Germans and Russians. Basson was informed that the Cubans, East Germans and Russians all had chemical weapons, and was given examples of these having already being used against UNITA. Nieuwoudt asked if he would be interested in the CBW research project. He told Nieuwoudt the CBW project sounded like a "most interesting mental exercise" and, if South African troops were under threat, it would be an honour and a privilege for him to serve in this capacity.

Basson said that a few days later he was called to a meeting with the head of the SADF, Constand Viljoen, Chief of Staff Intelligence, Lt-Gen Pieter van der Westhuizen, Commanding Officer of Special Forces Fritz Loots and the Surgeon-General. At this meeting, it was clearly said that the SADF had no ability to defend itself against chemical or biological weapons. According to Basson, it was agreed that he would be to gather as much information as possible about chemical and biological warfare so that a decision could be made about what direction the SADF project should take.

Basson said that from the beginning, it was implicit that the project had to include plausible deniability and that the SADF could never be linked to his operation. Whatever funds he needed would be made available, and no restrictions were placed on how he went about his task, but it was made clear that South African diplomats abroad, for example, should only be contacted by him if he found himself in absolutely dire straits.

Basson said he realised that he would find the most information in the United States. So in April 1981, he traveled to the US, presenting himself as a draft dodger to the various organisations with which he needed to make contact. He claimed that over a two-month period, he learned the names of government officials who had access to the official data banks, and made contact with them – including a librarian in the Library of Congress, through whom Basson gained access to both open and classified information.

He said he found the European "peaceniks" far less effective than their American counterparts, but did discover two other European groupings which were of enormous value. The Stockholm International Peace Institute, he said, was actually a Russian front – funded from Moscow and a mine of useful information. He claimed that in England, he discovered that retired military officers and scientific researchers were eager to share their information.

Basson said Project Coast as such was launched in July, 1981. He said from the information he had gathered, he realised that there was a very real threat that the Eastern Bloc countries would supply the Angolan surrogate forces with chemical and/or biological weapons.

He said that the SADF considered all chemical substances, chemical weapons. He said some countries classify chemical substances produced in a biological laboratory, such as Clostridium, as non-chemical, but this was not the case in South Africa (Note: all internationally accepted definitions draw a clear distinction between chemical weapons and biological weapons, no explanation was given for why South Africa did not adhere to these distinctions).

Basson claimed that the most recent technique, developed by the Austrians with South African help after visits to Iraq and Iran, is based on the same principle as a powder fire extinguisher, and directs the toxin straight to the lungs.

Basson explained the management structure of Coast and the starting phase of the programme which involved the establishment of Delta G Scientific and the recruitment of staff. He said that the first project was the production of the irritants – CS and later CR. He said these products were carefully chosen as a way of easing the scientists into the demands of working safely with toxic substances.

He said that if one has to work with a tasteless, odourless, colourless substance, by the time an error is realised, it is likely to be fatal. He claimed that when he was in an Iraqi mustard gas factor between seven and 10 workers died on average each week due to accidents and negligence. He said this did not seem to matter to the Iraqis, "who have lots of people to man their plants" and that South Africa could not afford such negligence.

Basson testified that soon after Delta G was set up, Roodeplaat Research Laboratories was established to test all chemicals produced by Delta G. He said the animal experiment centre was where all CBW substances were tested. Every substance ever made at Delta G, said Basson, was tested at RRL. He claimed that a genetic engineering and tissue culture division was responsible for viruses and cultures. (Note: scientists who worked at RRL have repeatedly claimed that no viruses were worked with at RRL because the facility was not equipped for work on viruses and the scientists were not suitably trained.) Basson said the official cover for Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises was development of a super guard dog for such organisations as the SADF, SAP and Eskom, but RBE actually provided the perfect cover for genetic engineering.

Basson claimed that the microbiology division of RRL was responsible for producing cultures and for "enhancing" them, so that benign germs could be turned into lethal ones that would resist all known treatments and antidotes.

He said that Andre Immelman’s section had control over the other four divisions of RRL and that Immelman liaised directly with him (Basson).

Basson spoke about the production of CR at Delta G Scientific and said that CR was loaded into projectiles at the Denel subsidiary, Swartklip Products. Asked if any of these CR projectiles were ever used operationally by the SADF, Basson said they have been used during the final attack of operations Modular-Hooper-Packer at Tunqu in Angola where Angolan forces had laid a minefield. He said a weapon had to be devised that would allow the SADF troops to disengage under covering fire if they found themselves trapped by the minefield. A number of 81mm CR mortars were prepared, under such conditions of secrecy that not even the army’s CR project officer, Roelf Louw (who did testify) was allowed to know about them. This was done on the orders of the SADF chief by Basson and Enslin Smit, using Brazilian steel and empty projectiles imported from Israel. Once filled, they were issued to "a certain unit" for use by tanks if they became trapped. Basson said this was a covert operation, during which he led a special unit from 7 Medical Battalion to Angola to be on hand when the mortars were deployed. He claims that the CR projectiles were fired.

Basson said that in 1984, he and Lothar Neethling attended a conference hosted by Aubin Heyndrickx in Belgium. There he said he met an Englishman, Derek Griffiths. Through Griffiths, Basson and Neethling met Herr Blucher, who knew or was soon made aware that Basson was engaged in sanctions-busting for the South African security forces. Basson claimed that Blucher had what was known as a "CBW Mafia" – a group of experts in the field who met monthly to exchange ideas and information and discuss the latest developments in the field. Members of the group included Russians, Chinese, Americans, Swiss, and others. Basson said that through this group, he realised that the world was convinced that Russia planned to use Angola as its next testing ground for CBW.

On returning to South Africa, Basson informed the Surgeon-General and Military Intelligence’s Chief Director Counter-intelligence about this group. Both authorised him to attend the monthly meetings. He said it soon became obvious to him that each member of the CBW Mafia had access to the CBW secrets of his own country.

Basson dismissed Heyndrickx an agent provocateur, a mercenary and propagandist for the Russians and East Germans, who presented himself as the representative of the non-existent UNIDO-TIAFT. Basson said that through the CBW mafia he met a German, (Dieter) Dryer - "clearly" an intelligence officer ; a North Korean named Chong, an Austrian whose name he could not recall, an Arab intelligence colonel named Abdurazak and unnamed Italians. (Note: these names were not spelled for the court and their spelling in this report is phonetic.) Basson said it was clear that the monthly meetings offered ideal opportunities to acquire both clandestine information and equipment.

Around the middle of 1986, Basson said he realised that Dryer and another man, Simon Peurra "had a man in England". Basson said he reported this to Military Intelligence, who passed it on to the military attach� in London, who reported back that the man was Roger Buffham, known to the attach� already. Basson met with Buffham. He said he met David Chu in 1988/89 when Dryer asked Basson for help in laundering $250 000.

Basson said Dryer and Jurg Jacomet (now deceased) worked together often, but he met Jacomet in 1986/87 when he and Lothar Neethling went to Europe for another conference.

Cilliers asked Basson if he had ever travelled to Iran in connection with infectious diseases. Basson said he had done so in the mid-70s. He said the potato crops on Iran’s northern border with Russia were hit by a deadly microtoxin and several thousand people died from necrotising entero-colitis. The only other country in the world where this fungus occurs naturally, is South Africa – specifically the Koue Bokkeveld area, so Basson was sent by the Surgeon-General to Iran to help.

He also claimed that about a year later, he was sent on a mercy mission to help the American government. He said he was flown to a secret laboratory in the jungle of Zaire, where American scientists had fallen prey to their own experiments with haemmorhagic fever. The sick scientists were treated first at the secret laboratory, then flown to 1 Mil for further treatment, and once recovered, back to the US.

Tuesday 24 July

Defence counsel Jaap Cilliers began by asking Basson to explain his earlier mention of the use of "red" and "blue" plans as a quality control measure when substances manufactured by Delta G Scientific, were tested by Roodeplaat Research Laboratories. The court had heard, said Basson, of the Civil Cooperation Bureau’s red and blue plans. In practical terms, Basson said he used the strategy when evaluating measures designed to protect SADF members and VIPs. RRL’s team, for example, would be instructed to come up with a plan to eliminate a target in a specific location and situation, while Delta G’s team would be given the same scenario, but had to come up with ways to avoid elimination. Basson would then evaluate both plans and draw specific conclusions which could be incorporated into the VIP protection plan.

Basson said he used some samples to train agents on how best to take care of themselves when abroad. They were also taught basic rules of survival against a CBW assassination bid. He said the problem with these exercises was that "most" of the scientists had an entirely different perception of the "war games" because none of them had a military background, and the "games" were thus open to misinterpretation.

Basson said both RRL and Delta G were "typical" military front companies, fully owned and funded by the state. This was the model used in the early days of Coast, mainly due to lack of experience in the field. Later, Basson said he realised that the model presented an exceptionally high security risk, as such front companies were inclined to attract undue attention regarding the invisible source of funding.

Gradually, he said Coast began to move in the direction of partial or semi-front organisations, where a specific individual appeared to be the owner – as in the case of Organochem – but where 99% of the work done, was for the state. In the end, he said he found that the best front companies were those that were "hijacked" for covert use. This entailed finding a willing collaborator, then turning the company/organisation in which such person was involved into a military-oriented one, without the person concerned ever realising that this had happened.

Basson explained the structure and function of the Co-ordinating Management Committee of Project Coast.He said that when Gen AJ (Kat) Liebenberg (now deceased) became SADF chief, CMC meetings typically took the form of two or three sub-sessions. Liebenberg would ask certain committee members to leave the room briefly, while specific aspects were discussed. Minutes of such sub-sessions were retained by Liebenberg himself, while Niel Knobel was the keeper of the "normal" minutes, which would only be distributed to members 15 minutes before the next meeting, and in the venue of the meeting itself.

Apart from the orders he received from the CMC or as Commanding Officer 7 Medical Battalion, Basson said he had another chain of command. Liebenberg was the longest-serving CMC member – as CO Special Forces from 1982, Army Chief from 1985 and later as SADF Chief. Liebenberg tended to treat the CMC members as his personal soldiers, and was given to engaging Basson in one-on-one sessions during which specific personal operational orders were issued, which were never shared with the CMC.

The only examples he can now recall are:

During the last stages of SADF support for Unita, Basson was ordered to get involved in a 120mm mortar project. Certain equipment had to be acquired, such as specific fuses for the CR-loaded mortars. Basson was told by Liebenberg to buy them, despite budget constraints. From time to time, Coast assets were sold to fund further aspects of the project, so Liebenberg told Basson to sell a certain number of NBC suits to the Army to obtain the funds for the fuses. This is the so-called Karko transaction.

On another occasion, Liebenberg told Basson that the special applicators (assassination weapons) were being used in the international arena, and wanted to know if the SADF had them. He ordered Basson to manufacture a number of items – like the screwdrivers, umbrella and walking stick – for the purpose of conducting tests and training agents about what items they should beware of.

By 1986, Basson had already made good contacts through members of the CBW Mafia, who saw him as a sanctions-busting businessman and arms smuggler. A few small deals had already been done with CBW Mafia members, and there was the promise of many more. He said the CBW Mafia members he dealt with did not want payment in their own countries. They wanted their money laundered and available in countries of their choice, and asked Basson if he was prepared to arrange this on their behalf.

Basson cleared this concept with Surgeon-General Nicol Nieuwoudt (now deceased). He said he consulted Wilfred Mole saying he was keen to be of help to the CBW Mafia, but the money-laundering had to be done in a way that could not be traced back to them and asked Mole how should he go about doing so.

Basson said he was dealing with three groups – Libyans, East Germans and Russians, all of whom he had met through Blucher’s CBW Mafia, and all of whom were potentially valuable suppliers of equipment for Project Coast. Basson said Mole told Basson that David Webster would be able to establish a suitable money-laundering operation based in either Hong Kong or the Cayman Islands. Mole had set up a meeting with Webster.

Basson said Webster was waiting in the Caymans for he and Mole. Basson said he told Webster he was involved in purchasing sensitive equipment for the SA security forces and sanctions-busting, but made it clear from the start that all payments were to be laundered on behalf of the suppliers. Basson did not use his military rank at the meeting, and was introduced to Webster as Dr Basson. He claims he has no idea what Mole had told Webster, but after a day or two, Basson and Webster found themselves talking about military matters, comparing US and South African weaponry.

Basson said Webster explained that in order for the scheme to succeed, he would have to set up plausible front companies, with cover stories. But he would need the name of an individual with whom he could conduct future dealings, and the name of a real person, of good reputation, as a believable figurehead in the event of an intelligence probe. Since not one of the mysterious principals could be linked to the scheme by name, Basson suggested that Webster decide who the nominated office-bearers and directors should be. Shortly afterwards, Webster informed Basson that he had listed himself as president of the WPW Group, and that in his opinion, Basson’s was the best name to feature alongside his own.

Basson said he was initially taken aback by this decision, but he realised it was a good idea, and one he could exploit to his own advantage on his international travels, since his cover story was that of a medical doctor and international businessman – or CBW arms dealer, depending on who he was dealing with. Basson said he returned to South African and reported back to Nieuwoudt and General Roux on what had transpired in the Caymans.

Basson said Coast was ready to launch the purely defensive leg, but the necessary research could not be done at Delta G. At the same time, the principals had indicated that they wanted an independent research and test facility in a "neutral" country which later resulted in SRD. Basson said it made sense to "hijack" the WPW Group’s structures, use them as his personal business cover while simultaneously channelling the SADF/Coast deals through them, without the Principals being aware that he was doing so.

The next step, says Basson, was to set up the European operation, starting with Luft and Charburn. This, said Basson, dovetailed neatly with the needs of the East Germans in particular. (Dieter) Dryer had specifically requested that facilities be set up there. Basson did not know Bernard Zimmer as yet, but in 1986, when he met Jean-Pierre Seynaeve at Aubin Heyndrickx’s conference, the Belgian industrialist had held a long talk with Basson and Neethling, and indicated that he "had a man" in South Africa – Charles van Remoortere.

Basson said he made contact with Van Remoortere in 1986 and told him what the SADF needed in respect of protective gear. Van Remoortere first discussed getting involved with Seynaeve, and on returning from Europe, told Basson that all the technology needed, as well as defensive clothing, gas masks, gloves etc, would be obtained from Seynaeve. Basson testified that in December 1986, he and Lothar Neethling went to Europe to meet Zimmer. He said the company, Luft, was set up on behalf of the Principals and Charburn as a joint venture between Van Remoortere and Zimmer for the transfer of technology by Seyntex.

Basson claimed that the large sums of cash laundered by Dr David Chu also came from the principals and had no connection to Project Coast.

Basson said that from March 1986, Coast had been at a critical stage of development, unless they could proceed to weaponisation, all the work would have been in vain. This meant that a pyrotechnical capacity had to be acquired. He said that at the time, methaqualone was being manufactured at Delta G in laboratory-scale amounts only, but the plant was geared to move to large-scale methaqualone production, and the next step would be weaponisation. He said that Swartklip Products did not have a facility where pyrotechnical development and weaponisation could be done. Basson said he was ordered by the CMC to a suitable facility.

He said his first task was to find out what equipment was needed. All of it would have to be acquired by clandestine means, since the sanctions covered even dual-purpose equipment. Basson consulted Dryer who he claims was an East German intelligence agent. Basson said Dryer set up a meeting for Basson in Leipzig with a technical expert, and he obtained a full explanation of what was needed for the new laboratory. He then met with Roger Buffham. Basson said Buffham was able to help Basson design the new lab.

Basson said it was decided that the laboratory should be at Speskop (Special Forces Headquarters). He said he understood that Roger Buffham was working for the East Germans in return for financial reward, and also had close links with the Russians, for whom he also worked. Basson said that some components for the new laboratory were to be acquired from East Germany, others custom-made in England via Buffham. The reactor glass were obtained from Russia. Delivery of the various components took place over some months at the end of 1987/beginning of 1988.

Basson said he led the research which was done with the help from a Special Forces member, Hekkies van Heerden (Note: a soldier in the Reconnaissance division of Special Forces who is deceased) and Bill Grieves.

Basson said the development of the methaqualone progressed to the pre-production stage and "hundreds" of pre-production models were turned out. Basson said Knobel, who testified that only the prototype stage was reached, evidently did not understand the various stages of production.

Basson denies that there is any substance to the State suggestion that funds from sources other than the Coast budget – such as the Army, Special Forces or Armscor – were used to buy actual equipment in some instances, and that the Coast funds allegedly used for this purpose, were misappropriated.

Basson said instructions to Zimmer to move funds were based on the wishes of the principals. Buffham was used as a middleman. Documents showing the purchase of share capital in Buffham’s company are all false, said Basson. He claimed that Buffham created false documentation as a matter of routine. He said that most, if not all, of the documents presented by the State were specially created to protect both the front companies and the compilers of the documents – all of whom, says Basson, were engaged in activities which, if admitted to, would have dire consequences for them in their home or other countries. Any public admissions that they had been engaged in sanctions-busting, money-laundering, even international espionage, could result in lengthy jail sentences.

He said his request in a letter to Webster that the lawyer "do your usual thing" refers to the fact that Webster was skilled at generating documents. Basson said Zimmer's talent lay in balancing books and Chu’s talent was that he could locate chemicals which no one else had been able to acquire.

Basson denies that he ever had a personal interest in or gained financially from the WPW Group or the European companies. He was reimbursed only for specific expenses incurred on behalf of the Principals. He said the Principals indicated at some point that they wanted to acquire a property in England, which could serve as a type of safe house. Basson offered not only to make the purchase, but to manage the property. In return, he would have the use of it, and arranged with the Commanding Officer of Special Forces that operators could also use it. It was ideally situated for their purposes.

Wednesday 25 July

Invited by defence counsel Jaap Cilliers to explain to the court precisely how he regarded his principals, Basson said it was important to bear in mind that he actually had two sets of principals – the group which supplied the start-up funding for the WPW "option", and the SADF, his "operational" principals. He said the financial principals were a dynamic group. In the beginning, it was his impression that Dieter Dryer and Simon Peurrer were the leaders of the group, of which other members were: a Russian by the name of Verobian, Abdurazak (or Abdul Razak, as Cilliers pronounces the name). He said that he later he came to realise Abdurazak was "running the show".

Basson said it was clear to him that the SADF enjoyed the greatest benefit from the arrangement. He said the financial principals received the information passed on to them, by Basson, about research done by Protechnik, in return.

Basson said the aircraft owned by the financial principals were "welcomed everywhere" and claimed that he landed at British military bases in them. He said that with Savimbi on board, an aircraft was also able to land at Brooks Air Force Base, Washington DC which was a location used to smuggle out classified documents.

Basson claims he met Yusuf Murgham in the late 1980s through Abdurazak, shortly after Aeromed was set up. Basson said that Abdurazak was a member of Libya’s military intelligence. Abdurazak’s sphere of operations, Basson said, was the United States, South America and part of Europe, and Murgham was his deputy. Basson’s perception of both, at the time, was that they were military intelligence agents, and this, he said, was confirmed during his subsequent visits to Libya.

Cilliers made the point that although three corporations had been set up in the Cayman Islands, WPW Investments Inc appeared to have become the sole operating company quite soon afterwards. Basson explained that he had realised during his initial discussions with the financial principals that they comprised three distinct groups. This motivated him to set up three different corporations – one for the Libyans (WPW), one for the East Germans (MCI) and one for the Russians (PCM).

Regarding the charges against him of gaining financial benefit from privatisation of Delta G and RRL by failing to disclose his "friendship" with Swanepoel and Mijburgh and the relationship between Mijburgh and Defence Minister Magnus Malan, Basson denied that there was any misrepresentation in any of the documents pertaining to the privatisation process. He said Swanepoel and Mijburgh were colleagues, with whom he had a "friendly" relationship. Basson denied ever having any personal financial interest in the WPW Group. He also denied that WPW ever had a financial interest in Delta G through Medchem Consolidated Investments.

Basson claimed that because RRL included a P4 laboratory there was "virtually no chance" of any buyer being found for the facility. (Note: testimony from the scientists who worked at RRL was that RRL had a P3 facility and that plans to develop a P4 facility were scrapped). Basson said that Swanepoel placed RRL in voluntary liquidation – but a final dividend would be paid, "so that the shareholders would at least get something". The highest offer for the facility was R850 000, so RRL was scheduled to go under the auctioneer’s gavel over a weekend. Basson claimed that a day or two before the auction, an official from the Department of Agriculture happened to drive by RRL and, seeing the For Sale sign, drove in and asked the price. On being told between R8-m and R9-m, he made an offer to buy the facility on the spot.

Basson said the large number of companies in the WPW Group can be ascribed to the fact that a new company had to be set up each time an asset or interest in a going concern was acquired. Webster, he said took all the decisions about establishment of subsidiaries.

Basson said that SRD was the forerunner of Protechnik, which was the defensive chemical research unit responsible for testing raw materials and protective garments in terms of an SADF contract. Basson had SADF authorisation to feed the research results – except where these were of strategic importance to South Africa – to the Principals.

Thursday 26 July

Proceedings began with Basson explaining that Profincor, run by Tjaart Viljoen, was used for "second-level" channelling of funds invested by the Principals. Basson said that when Waag-‘n-Bietjie Boerdery [Chance-a-bit Farming] was set up, Basson was one of the "front men" who invested R1 000 in the company and whose name appeared in the shareholders’ register. Less than a year later, the money was paid back to him. He said the Principals requested that farms be bought, as they were seeking access to the agricultural sector in South Africa. Basson said this was important to the Principals, because certain fungi and animal diseases occur only in South Africa, and research was to be conducted on the important role they could potentially play in CBW.

Regarding Merton House, Basson said the original request from the Principals was to acquire a high-class guest house for periodic use by guests of WPW. Like the properties in the UK and Belgium, a caretaker would look after Merton House when no one was in residence. He denied ever having a personal financial interest in or intention to live at Merton House.

Basson said the frequent changes in shareholders and directors of companies in the Wisdom Group was to be expected given that all these companies were fronts, and that none of them was ever intended to be commercially viable. Individuals whose names appear in the company records, were shareholders/directors on paper only, and have no bearing on the real owners.

Basson said the Tygerberg Zoo was drawn into the Wisdom Group as a result of the shared objectives of Project Coast and the Principals regarding research into chemical substances such as heavy metals, elements and pheromones. He said Project Coast’s research in these fields was carried out at various South African universities, with payment for the work being channelled through Swartklip Products. He said the pheromone research was part of the quest for effective crowd control measures, since certain pheromones can raise stress levels and the first principle of crowd control is to break the cohesion.

Asked if Florida attorney David Webster ever met any of the Principals, Basson said yes. He said that early in 1987, when he arranged that Dr David Chu fly to Orlando to meet with Webster regarding structuring of Medchem Forschungs, Dieter Dryer accompanied Chu. About a year later, Basson also introduced Webster to Abdurazak in a London hotel as "one of my European colleagues".

Basson claimed that he undertook a trip to Iran with Aubin Heyndrickx during which he obtained samples of shrapnel from chemical weapons. He said that during the trip he met a young intelligence officer by the name of Hashemi. Hashemi turned out to be the son of the man who would later be involved in the convoluted Blackdale-Copperdale-Tagell deal.

Testifying about the deal Basson said that by that time, Coast was reasonably far advanced, but ordinary members of the SADF were still largely ignorant about CBW. After a few false alarms, Nieuwoudt called a meeting, attended also by Liebenberg, the Commanding Officer SWA Territorial Forces and Chief of Staff Operations, in Windhoek. Basson said the briefing identified the urgent need to acquire CBW detection equipment, especially since there was "no money to issue NBC suits to Unita as well". Basson said Chemical Agent Monitors (CAMs) were the only appropriate detection equipment for the conditions under which South African troops were fighting. Basson claimed he was ordered to obtain 25 CAMs and 150 wet detection kits, which would be issued at platoon level.

Basson said he already knew that Heyndrickx had access to one or two CAMs. He said the deal was controlled by Dryer and Simon Peurra and Basson understood that they also had people on the Graseby payroll who would help. He explained the delivery of the CAMs took place in two batches, he had expected the first batch to contain more CAMs, so paid the higher amount, deducting the difference from the second payment. Basson picked up the first CAMs himself, and shipped them to South Africa on a freight aircraft from Luxembourg. On arrival, they were cleared by Armscor’s freight agents. He said the second batch were secreted in TV sets and shipped from Heathrow. The wet detection kits were packed in cardboard boxes and shipped by Mole as agricultural test kits.

To the evidence that a CAM cost considerably less than he claims he paid for them, Basson’s response is that the need for the CAMs was urgent, and the SADF was willing to pay any price.

Basson said the CBW software/computer programme which is at issue in Charge 7 was a vital component of defence against a chemical attack, which would indicate precisely when protective garments should be donned by troops in the field. He said NATO had developed a computer programme which could offer accurate predictions for a variety of scenarios. He said the data base had been developed at Porton Down in England, while the SADF’s engineers had designed an South African topography program, on which Coast could superimpose the CBW data. He said that through "his colleagues" at Porton Down, Buffham obtained the software for South Africa, and was paid �65 000.

He said the CMC was not specifically briefed about this program, as it formed part of the global defensive package. Basson specifically denied that the CMC proposal contained any misrepresentation in regard to equipment mentioned in charges 1 to 6.

On charges 8 and 9, he said the services rendered for which Buffham was paid �40 000, were the periodic supply of information, sensitive documentation, introductions to people who could facilitate future procurement, even the supply of false export permits and "general handling" of agents and spies.

Regarding the large amount of cash (�50 000) handed to Buffham by Patricia Leeson at Heathrow Airport, Basson says Buffham also worked for Special Forces, and was paid through the same channels as Project Coast helpers. He said Buffham was paid in cash for the weapons or whatever he acquired for Special Forces.

On Charges 11-13, the Blackdale-Copperdale-Tagell deal, which is also the first attempt to obtain the peptide synthesiser, Basson said he was contacted by Mole early in 1989. Mole, he said, had been contacted by the Iranian Defence Force procurement agency to ask if he could supply them with a large number of NBC suits. Mole knew about both SRD and Protechnic, and had, indeed, been one of the first major investors in SRD. Mole thus knew that the SADF had a defensive CBW plan, and asked if Basson would talk to the Iranians. A meeting was set up, and to Basson’s surprise, one of the delegates was the young Hashemi.

Basson said only then did he learn that Hashemi’s father ran Tagell, which seemed to Basson to be a front company for Iranian arms purchases. Basson told Hashemi about the time when he had solved the toxic potato problem in Iran. Basson said he learned that the disease had meanwhile spread across Iran’s border into Russia, and that the Russians, in cooperation with the Communist Chinese, had a huge interest in peptide research – the single most dangerous field of CBW research. Basson said that by the middle or late 80s, scientists already knew that man is merely the sum of his natural peptides, and that if a way could be found to control the metabolism of the brain, you could control the human race.

He said CBW laboratories throughout the world were looking at peptide research at the time because it would prove to be useful against AIDS, since even the immune system is controlled by peptides. He said that ideally, a peptide has to be injected in order to cross the blood brain barrier. He also said it was already known that one of the most important peptides was Thymus, the hormone which controls growth and ageing.

Basson said he made an attempt to launch peptide research in South Africa, but that Delta G’s scientists had neither the time, knowledge or ability to conduct such advanced research. The CMC, however, ordered Basson to find a place and people who could research the offensive application of peptides. At that time, said Basson, veterinarians were quite far advanced in peptide research, with such conditions as Feline AIDS having long since been identified. Basson said there were, of course, no human test farms in South Africa, but he did go to one in Russia, and was offered 250g of a specific natural peptide. He claimed that later, he calculated that to harvest that amount of the peptide in its natural form, would have required 300 000 corpses – and they must have been in Siberia, since that is the only place one would find so many.

After the initial meeting with young Hashemi, Basson said he asked Hashemi to set up a meeting with the technical people, and in due course, a Russian defector met with Basson in 1989. According to Basson's testimony Project Coast also acquired the services of some Russian defectors at a later stage. Basson said that during talks with the Russian, he realised that the Russians had discovered the use of peptides in CBW, and found that the most effective method of administration was through biological agents. He said he realised that germs could be used to administer peptides, and it did not take long before he also realised that the Iranians had already reached that point.

Cilliers asked why another peptide synthesiser had to be bought, since Delta G already had a peptide synthesiser. Basson said it was because the scientists at Delta G knew nothing of this new field for South Africa. (Lucia) Steenkamp and (Hennie) Jordaan, he said, were good in their field, but this proposed research was way beyond their abilities, and the equipment needed was not available on the open market. The equipment would have to be able to make 30 or 40 peptides at a time, have a built-in analytical ability and be linked to the bio-production process which would create the germs. Elements of the process were computer-driven, and in the early 1990s, general computer capacity was minute in comparison with the military capacity. In South Africa, this was even more the case. A computer was needed with a capacity that was simply not available at the time from any single supplier in the world. It would have to be custom-built by a dedicated research team.

It took Basson between six weeks and two months to get hold of the specifications and gain agreement that Hashemi’s people would supply the equipment. He said the question now was how to hide the deal. The Iranians were keen to include their purchase of NBC suits in the transaction. He said Mole advised him that during previous deals, he had learned from Webster to use a performance bond, and this seemed to be a good idea.

Basson said Webster and Mole drew up all the contracts involved in the dual deal. Neither Zimmer nor Van Remoortere was given details, but Basson said they were both aware that an entirely separate deal was hidden within the NBC suit transaction. He said that Webster was drawn in because Mole had told Basson that performance bonds were one of the American lawyer’s best financial tricks, and Basson did not want to risk any glitches at the banks. Basson said the arrangement was that as soon as the peptide synthesiser and all its components had been delivered to neutral territory for Basson to inspect, payment would be made in full.

Asked what went wrong with the deal, Basson explained that he learned from Hashemi, that within Tagell there were people – and Basson assumes they included Hashemi senior – who had stolen funds from the Iranian government. The culprits were recalled to Iran from London and the ringleader was publicly beheaded. Basson said he believes the Iranians would have liked to do the same to the elder Hashemi, but Basson then learned from the son that his father was actually a triple agent, working for the British, Americans and Iran, and had even been involved in the Iran-Contra deal with Oliver North. Basson claims he confirmed all this later from US intelligence documents.

Basson said the deal kept changing in regard to exactly what Iran would deliver, and at what price. In the end, all Basson could get out of the Iranians were the probes, which were to be used during the biological process. Later, he established that they were actually of Chinese origin. He took them because, even if no peptide synthesis research could be done, the probes could be used by the tissue culture research unit at RRL.

Basson said the negotiations between himself, young Hashemi and the Russian defector continued. Meanwhile, Basson also told David Chu what was needed, who spoke to the Russians, with whom he was in contact through Dryer. He said it became the norm that when key Russian scientists went to Switzerland on holiday, they would smuggle out with them 5g of vital CBW cultures/substances, then lodge the contraband with Swiss lawyers to sell which gave rise to a huge black market in CBW.

Basson claimed that Med-Alfa, was a front for the Russian scientists and eventually became a kind of CBW "flea market". He said he knew that Chu had access to Med-Alfa, and Basson wanted the Thymus peptide, which was of vital importance in the treatment of AIDS patients. Chu got the peptide, and soon afterwards, the performance bond balance was repatriated to the account of D John Truter in South Africa. Basson insists that the $101 000 which Zimmer claims was the first repayment on the $325 000 loan Basson had advanced during the Blackdale-Copperdale-Tagell deal, was interest earned on the performance bond deposit, and there never was a loan to Zimmer and Van Remoortere.

Asked to explain how $250 000 of the MCI funds had been used to secure a loan to buy the Jetstar, Basson said he had already received approval for the purchase of the peptide synthesiser through Dryer and the Russians after the collapse of the Iranian deal. The equipment became available unexpectedly, during 1990, while MCI funds were already lying in one of Chu’s accounts, waiting to be sent back to South Africa. However, when the peptide synthesiser became available, Coast was experiencing a cash flow problem. The funds set aside for the earlier peptide synthesiser deal had been repatriated, but not kept in reserve for the replacement equipment, and had been used for "something else" in the interim. So it was decided to pay Dryer from the funds which had already been sent abroad. But this was $2,4-m, as opposed to the original amount of $3,2-m authorised for the peptide synthesiser, Cilliers pointed out - $800 000 less than the original price. Basson explained that Mijburgh agreed that since Delta G was not in dire need of funds, the funds that should have gone to MCI could be used in the meanwhile to pay for the peptide synthesiser.

Regarding Charge 15, payment of another $154 000 to WPW, Basson says he knows absolutely nothing about this transfer.

On Charge 16, he says the purchase of the Jetstar had been discussed for some months with the Principals, who needed an aircraft that could be used for long-haul international flights. When the peptide synthesiser loan was paid off, therefore, the funds were used to buy the Jetstar. He said the peptide synthesiser was brought to South Africa and installed in the two ground-floor laboratories at Speskop, because people outside of Project Coast were to be brought in to do the research. Basson said part of the deal with Dryer was that an operator was to be at his disposal for a year. He claimed that the Mais Corporation in Basel was another Russian front for scientists willing to work as mercenaries, and payment for the services of a Bulgarian had been included in the price for the peptide synthesiser.

Basson said the peptide synthesiser was used for two years. Two brain peptides were made, he said. But in 1992, it became apparent that Coast was going to fall victim to budget cuts, and that the biological component of the project would be scrapped in its entirety. Peptides were no longer a priority – incapacitants were. So it was decided to get rid of the peptide synthesiser. Basson spoke to the Principals, and via Jurg Jacomet and a Swiss colleague of his, the equipment was swopped for 500kg of Product M (methaqualone/mandrax).

Basson said all the methaqualone made at Delta G from 1986 had been used during the first weaponisation effort, which had a "huge" wastage rate. By the end of 1988/beginning of 1989, it was all gone. But Coast was poised to weaponise, with some 100 prototypes on hand, and a ton of Product M was needed urgently to take weaponisation to the pre-production stage. Delta G could make no more methaqualone, as the company was already at the stage of privatisation. The 500kg of methaqualone obtained, Basson said was stored at the Surgeon-General’s headquarters. Some, he said was used for weaponisation, the rest dumped in the sea in January 1993.

But, pointed out Cilliers, the drug destruction certificate states that 1 000kg of Product M was destroyed. Correct, said Basson another 500kg had been obtained from Jacomet in the Croatia deal.

This report has been prepared by Chandré Gould and Marlene Burger. Chandré  Gould is a research associate at the Centre for Conflict Resolution working on the Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. Marlene Burger is monitoring the trial  as part of the CCR Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. The Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project is funded by the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Norwegian Government.

Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: [email protected]