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Trial Report: Twenty-One

This report covers the period 2 - 8 June, 2000

Friday 2 June, 2000

The court did not sit on Friday 2 June, the hearing resumed on Monday 5 June.

Monday 5 June, 2000

Bio-chemist Jan van Jaarsveld, who graduated from Pretoria University with a BSc in 1982 and has since obtained a doctorate in theology, was called to testify on the manufacture of new generation CR teargas. Recruited while still a student by Professor Nic Vermeulen and Dr Willie Basson to work at EMLC - a top secret project designed to equip SA with a defensive CBW capability - Van Jaarsveld was one of the pioneers in EMLC's chemical division. This division, which was to change venue and name, ultimately was called Delta G and was based in Midrand.

Van Jaarsveld initially did nothing except study all available literature on incapacitating agents. Van Jaarsveld said CR was 20 times more potent, but less toxic, than the existing CS teargas and the CR project moved ahead fairly rapidly. During the interim phase between research and full production, 20 litres at a time were being made. Before going into full production, additional equipment had to be bought and tests conducted. All purchases were channelled through Gerald Cadwell and Dr. Gerrie Rall and paid for the Delta G budget.

Van Jaarsveld told the court he had never heard of the Technical Work Committee before being called as a witness. Nor, in fact, had he ever known he was part of Project Coast. Up to the time he resigned from Delta G in 1993, he had never been told there was any committee which identified the needs of scientists in respect of equipment and chemicals, or that such requirements had to be approved by surgeon-general Gen. Niel Knobel. Gen. Knobel previously testified that the Technical Working Group was a sub-committee of the Co-ordinating Management Committee responsible for determining the direction of scientific research and identifying the needs of the front companies.

With regard to laboratory facilities at Special Forces headquarters, Van Jaarsveld said initially, there were two laboratories at Speskop, A and B, but in due course, the wall between the two was demolished to accommodate large-scale CR production. At the time of the move, the maximum production was 50 litres at a time. Van Jaarsveld said Basson placed the order for CR with Delta G and at one point, he delivered a 5 litre sample of 95% pure CR to Basson. He testified that he was aware that tests were done at Speskop with the teargas by spraying if from aerosol containers into a room and monitoring how long it took before those in the room were forced to flee the area. Van Jaarsveld's feedback was that the tests had been satisfactory.

Van Jaarsveld said that sanctions had not presented a problem to Delta G in acquiring the scientific apparatus and chemicals needed. Delta G was to all intents a private company, and able to get whatever it needed, even if it sometimes took a little time. He said Delta G obtained equipment from various chemical companies: Schott in Germany, whose SA agent was Labotec, Buchi in Switzerland, Corningware in England, among others.

Asked about the peptide synthesizer he said he knows what a peptide synthesiser looks like, having been shown a photograph of one by the prosecution, and having seen one in the analytical laboratory at Delta G in Midrand. However, throughout his time at Speskop, there was never a peptide synthesiser, nor would this equipment be required for CR production.

Van Jaarsveld told the court that at the height of production, Delta G was delivering a ton of CR a month to "the Phantoms" - as the staff called the mystery clients, whom they knew had "an SADF or Armscor connection" although they were never really sure which. Delta G was selling CR at R1 000 a kilogram and hence generating an income of R1million a month.

Tuesday 6 June, 2000

The next witness was Dr Graeme Gibson, now an anesthetist, who joined the SADF as a national serviceman in January 1983 and the Permanent Force in August 1984. He volunteered for the Special Forces Medical Special Operations unit in April 1983, working out of the Special Forces Headquarters (Speskop) under the command of Basson.

Gibson said that in 1986, he was put in charge of an HIV-AIDS research project - or surveillance study - designed to evaluate the strategic effect of HIV on both the South African Defence Force and on the conventional warfare capacity of neighbouring states. The project entailed taking blood from troops attached to various neighbouring fighting forces, including Unita. Gibson's task was to collate the data and documentation and submit it to the Chief of Staff Planning, who in turn submitted it to the State Security Council. His reports were based on blood tests, information gathered and literature. Numerous blood samples were collected and analysed during the project, which was run in conjunction with the departments of Foreign Affairs, Health and Correctional Services.

Gibson told the court that the medical stores at Speskop were chiefly used to repack supplies for Unita after all South African identification had been removed. This operation fell under the control of Basson or, in his absence, Wynand Swanepoel. Initially, supplies for this purpose, at or near the use-by date, were obtained from provincial hospitals or pharmaceutical companies but later, at the request of Unita, all supplies came from the SAMS Medical Base Depot near Defence Headquarters in Pretoria.

Gibson left the SADF in February 1989. On leaving he was asked by Basson to set up a front company to continue certain SAMS projects covertly. In March 1989, Lannius Consultants cc was formed, with the knowledge of both Basson and Gen. Knobel. The purpose was twofold: to conduct the Hypoxis project, which was a search for a cancer cure, and to conduct anti-viral HIV research. It was intended that Gibson would report to Gen. Knobel and Basson at six-weekly intervals, but the project never got that far.

A document entitled A Critical Analysis of the Original Proposed Study and a Motivation for the Conducting of an Initial Pilot Study, sub-titled A Draft Pilot Study Protocol for the Testing of Thym-uvocal in HIV-1 Seropositive Patients was supplied by Gibson and filed with the court. Appendix A of this document contains the initial proposal given to Gibson by Basson, which would assess the efficacy of Thym-uvocal as an anti-HIV drug. The project was supposed to run over six months and would compare the effects of Thym-uvocal against those of AZT. Basson also proposed that the project would probe whether or not AZT tolerance could be improved by the simultaneous administration of Thymus peptides, of which Thym-uvocal was one. However, Gibson has no idea what Thymus peptides are. He never conducted any research on peptide synthesis and DNA and RNA probes fall outside his field of interest and he has never used them. Gibson revised Basson's proposal and submitted his version. Basson was not in the country at the time and he was told to fax the document to Dr. David Chu, of Medchem Forschungs, in Switzerland. That was the last he ever heard of the project.

Bio-engineer, Jan Lourens appeared briefly to complete his cross-examination.

Lourens agreed with Adv. Cilliers that the chemical filters manufactured in South Africa were considered the best in the world at the time of the Gulf War, and that "everyone" involved in that conflict wanted them. Lourens said he had never been involved in the commercial side of the filters and did not know which Gulf War forces had benefitted from them, although he was aware that Rooikat armoured cars and G6 self-propelled artillery pieces fitted with the filtration systems had been exported to Middle Eastern countries. The greatest advantage, he said, was that the filters had been tested in desert conditions using real rather than simulated chemical agents. None of the competition on the market at the time had undergone these practical field tests.

The last witness of the day was Major-General HAP Potgieter - still a serving SA Air Force officer. Potgieter joined the SAAF in 1961, spent three years in the operational area during the mid-1980s and is a qualified fixed-wing and helicopter pilot. In 1987, he was posted to Speskop to succeed Matie van der Linde as Senior Staff Officer Air Support.

Shortly after arriving at Speskop, he was briefed by Van der Linde that he would be responsible for planning of all Special Forces airborne operations, and might be required to take part in some "unorthodox" operations. Van der Linde said he had been ordered to do so in the past and if asked to fly an aircraft from which "terrorists" would be thrown, Potgieter should first make sure the orders had been approved at top level. Potgieter refused point blank to take part in such flights and informed the Special Forces commanding officer accordingly.

Potgieter said his tasks ranged from planning air support for Special Forces to flying covert operations, cross-border operations and assisting the Civil Cooperation Bureau. He said he met Basson in 1987 and had to obtain his permission for use of the Piper Seneca, which was under Basson's control. He met Johan Theron in 1983 when he was called by Van der Linde to arrange an official SAAF aircraft for Theron for a flight from Air Force Base Swartkop to, Potgieter thinks, Bloemfontein. On arrival at the air base, Potgieter saw Theron and an unknown man help two individuals, who were "obviously" drugged, into the aircraft.

Potgieter testified that one Saturday morning, he was ordered by Gen. Joep Joubert (officer commanding Special Forces) to fly a helicopter to Phalaborwa and to meet Theron there. Joubert had told Potgieter he was to take a Mozambican man back to Mozambique, dropping him five to seven kilometres beyond the border. The pick-up was at the 5 Recce shooting range. When Potgieter landed there, Theron and Drew helped a third person, dressed in a white overall, to the helicopter. Potgieter said the man was ashen-faced when he was loaded into the back of the helicopter and as soon as Theron settled into the co-pilot's seat, he asked if the man was still alive. Theron said yes. They flew to the prearranged landing site, where Theron removed the passenger from the helicopter and laid him on the ground. Potgieter and Theron spent the night at the Coach House in Tzaneen before Potgieter returned to Grand Central the next day, December 13, 1987.

During cross examination, Potgieter said that in 1990 he had to acquire an aircraft with which to conduct cover reconnaissance operations for the SADF. The aircraft was registered in the name of an American front company which Basson and American attorney David Webster had arranged. Potgieter said Webster was the company director/shareholder. Basson told Potgieter that Webster could be of assistance as he was extremely pro-South Africa and the former Rhodesia.

Potgieter travelled to the United States to meet with Webster regarding the establishment of the front company for the aircraft - a normal subterfuge in the world of intelligence and espionage, according to Adv. Cilliers, since an American-registered aircraft would have easier access to American and European airfields and draw less attention from customs officers than a South African-registered one.

Wednesday 7 June, 2000

The prosecution team called Floris Laubscher, a qualified chemist and physicist and 22-year veteran of pyrotechnical projects at Denel subsidiary, Swartklip Products, who was in charge of CR weaponisation from 1987 to 1994.

Laubsher said the top secret project was officially ordered by Armscor, which supplied Swartklip with the CR powder to load into 11 966 hand grenades, rifle grenades, 81mm mortar bombs and 1 373 155mm G5 projectiles. The powder was transported from 91 Ammunition Depot at Naboomspruit in the Northern Province to Swartklip's factory at Phillippi on the Cape Flats at regular intervals. Hand and rifle grenades were routinely filled by Swartklip and the CR weapons were created from their own stock. The mortar shells were provided by Armscor and 155 mm projectiles normally loaded with smoke by Swartklip were used.

The project began with research into the most suitable delivery methods for CR and erection of two special buildings for the project. Over the seven-year lifespan of the project, known at various times as Newly, Keyboard and Cargo, hundreds of pyrotechnical tests were carried out before weaponisation of each batch. According to Laubscher, Swartklip has been the leading pyrotechnical test facility in South Africa for the past 50 years and even now, there is no other facility that can match it.

Pyrolytic tests, however, could not be done at Swartklip, and because of the top secret nature of the project, CR powder was compressed into tablet form and given to Enslin Smit, who arranged that these tests be conducted elsewhere. Laubscher said the tests were so sophisticated that it had been necessary to buy equipment from the East Germans and Libyans at a cost of R5,5-m in 1985 (Charge 1).

Laubscher said he met Basson only once, for about 10 seconds, at Swartklip. After this, however, he had some telephone contact with Basson, usually enquiring when the next batch of 81mm mortars would be ready for delivery. On one occasion, Laubscher said, Basson told him he was sending an aircraft to Ysterplaat to pick up the consignment and Laubscher arranged that the mortars be loaded there.

According to Laubsher, the G5 projectiles loaded with CR had to be destroyed after South Africa ratified the international treaty on weapons of mass destruction in 1997. The irritants were removed and replaced with smoke.

Laubscher said that in 22 years at Swartklip, he never saw or received a single pyrotechnical report from the Special Forces laboratories at Speskop. There was no reason he can think of why Swartklip should not have weaponised other substances - such as incapacitants - as well. An SADF test range at Macassar was used to test irritants away from populated areas and this could as easily have been done in respect of substances such as methaqualone.

In cross-examination, Laubscher confirmed that Swartklip was never involved in weaponisation - to prototype stage - of methaqualone, BZ or amphetamines. He also conceded that weaponisation of CR was an extremely sensitive matter and that the supply of CR weapons to Unita would have been even more sensitive.

Thursday 8 June, 2000

Clinical toxicologist Dr Gerbers Muller of Stellenbosch University was called as the next witness.

In addition to being an anesthetist, Muller also has a doctorate in pharmacology and lectures on the subject. He is widely published - especially on the subject of antidotes and treatments - and set up the Tygerberg Poison Information Centre in the 1980s, and continues to serve as the head of the centre, which offers a nation-wide 24-hour poison service. Muller's special fields of interest are biological toxins, the effects on humans of chemical poisons from sources other than agricultural or household substances and snake venom. He has also studied traditional medicine in the African context, analgesic poisoning, scorpion, snake and spider poisoning and benzodiazepines (e. g.valium). Practical experience has included treatment of arsenic poisoning and accidental poisoning by organophosphates.

Muller compiled a comprehensive report on the substances that make up Andre Immelman's Roodeplaat Research Laboratory Sales List for the prosecution and gave additional testimony on the substances Tubarine, Scoline, Vesperax and Ketamine/Ketelaar. Muller said that he had little success in finding information about Silatrane since there is virtually no literature about the substance which was synthesised at Delta G Scientific.

Muller provided an short outline of the effects of all the toxins and drugs mentioned in court thus far. He told the court that the items on the Sales List are all toxic, some extremely so. Administration of some items would be untreatable, since even in minimal doses, they are potentially lethal.

In cross examination by defence counsel, Adv. Jaap Cilliers, Muller agreed that in order to test the efficacy of a given toxin in different food or drink, various dietary items would have to be tested. He could not, however, see a place for super toxins in normal biological research - Vitamin D3, for example, has no therapeutic use in overdose. According to Cilliers, however, it is used in immunological research, specifically related to cancer. Muller dismissed Cilliers' suggestion that Cantharadine is used in research on skin blisters - Muller has never encountered such research and says it would be highly irresponsible to apply even a small amount of Cantharadine to the skin for any purpose.

 

This report has been prepared by Chandr� Gould and Marlene Burger. Chandr� Gould is a research associate at the Centre for Conflict Resolution working on the Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. Marlene Burger is monitoring the trial as part of the CCR Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. The Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project is funded by the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Norwegian Government.

 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa
Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: [email protected]

 
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