Trial Report: 20b

This report covers the period Thursday 25 May - Thursday 1 June, 2000.

Thursday 25 May 2000

The court moved to Speskop, headquarters of the South African Defence Force's Special Forces during the 1980s and early 1990s - and home of the Civil Cooperation Bureau - for an inspection in loco.

Back in court Dr. Schalk Van Rensburg continued his testimony. Van Rensburg met Basson in 1983 during a visit by Basson to the Medical Research Council, where Van Rensburg worked, to discuss the problems of biological warfare. On August 1, 1984, Van Rensburg joined Roodeplaat Research Laboratories, where he thought he would be engaged in research on various micro-toxins being used as weapons by Russian and Cuban troops in Angola. At that stage, Van Rensburg believed there was a very real threat of chemical warfare being used against South African security forces, and despite the fact that he never supported apartheid, had no reservations about working for a military laboratory dedicated to the protection of South African troops and development of countermeasures to the dirty tricks being used against them.

Van Rensburg said that Basson was the undisputed external director of research, who identified priorities and supplied guidelines for research. Van Rensburg himself was actively involved in only one project, as adviser to the team working on an anti-fertility vaccine. The idea for this came from Basson. He told the court there was no or little defensive work done by RRL, with the exception of projects designed specifically to protect RRL's own employees or agents handling bio-weapons in the field.

According to Van Rensburg, Basson's highest priority was the search for a substance that would kill in a way that made death appear from natural causes and would not be readily detectable during post-mortem forensic tests. Both Basson and Swanepoel repeatedly urged RRL scientists to find such a substance.

During cross examination, Van Rensburg was challenged on his claim that RRL conducted only offensive biological work and that defensive work was "done elsewhere". In response, Van Rensburg quoted a breakdown of the work done for the Defence Force. Of the products delivered by RRL to the SADF, 36% were lethal toxins, 36% were applicators, 18% were pathogens "that could cause severe illness", 10% were irritants and 3% were psychogenic agents. Within weeks of joining RRL in mid-1984 it had dawned on Van Rensburg that RRL was an offensive plant, he said, and throughout his tenure, only about 6% of all RRL projects were not offensive.

The court adjourned until 29 May.

Monday 29 May 2000

Former director of research at Roodeplaat, Dr Andre Immelman began his testimony. Immelman served for 10 years on the Veterinary Control Council and joined RRL in January 1984, having been recruited by a former student, Dr James Davies.

Immelman said RRL had "outstanding" animal facilities and in this and other respects, was not only the leading laboratory in South Africa, but compared favourably with numerous international facilities.

Immelman said he was responsible for the planning of the Compression Laboratory at RRL and had planned it with products like Sarin, Tabun and VX in mind.

Immelman testified that he initially believed the Defence Force project was entirely defensive, in response to a CBW threat identified by the military. Immelman knew Basson as the SADF contact man and expert, who supplied RRL with guidelines for research. CBW was a virgin field of research for the RRL scientists and they were almost totally dependent on Basson to identify projects. Immelman and Basson met regularly, Basson being a frequent visitor to RRL. Immelman and Basson continually discussed projects, and Basson could veto any project if he did not believe it to be in the SADF's interest, or request research on a specific substance or application options.

Projects at RRL consisted of identifying toxins and establishing how they worked, whether or not they could be traced through forensic examination, what their stability was when added to food and various drinks and which routes were suitable for application - oral, inhalation, skin, intramuscular or intravenous.

Lists of "hard" or SADF projects were filed with the court. The 1985 list of 10 projects includes toxicity of paraoxon in baboons and ionophore antibiotics. (EXHIBIT 63 R) The 1986 list contains 40 projects, including paraoxon synthesis, toxicity tests for Brodifacum, data bases for organophosphates and psychotropic substances and evaluation of the anti-fertility potential of various substances. (EXHIBIT 63 S) At some point, H projects became R projects and EXHIBIT 63 T lists 197 of them. Immelman said there were "cases and cases" of pathogens in the microbiology laboratory, where in addition to "hard" projects, research was also done into antibiotics on behalf of pharmaceutical companies. Both bacteria and yeast cultures were present.

According to the witness, the synthesis of paraoxon was an ongoing project and there was always "plenty" available. EXHIBIT 63 U (1) outlines the most effective use of paraoxon, one of RRL's earliest projects. Immelman explained that parathion is an organophosphate commonly used as an agricultural insecticide, which only becomes toxic - highly toxic - when metabolized in the body to form paraoxon.

RRL synthesized paraoxon as an active ingredient because it was "reasonably easy" to make, required a fatal dose of 1mg per kilogram of body weight which was quickly absorbed and, if detected post-mortem, could always be attributed to parathion, and because research into paraoxon offered an ideal cover for establishment of the laboratory in which research would be done on Sarin, Tabun and VX, since the same stringent standards applied for work on the poisons as on the nerve gases.

Immelman believed the parathion research could result in a new way of treating organophosphate poisoning through hydrolysis, and when this was achieved, RRL scored a world breakthrough. Every organophosphate Immelman could find was exposed to the process and the only one on which it did not work was Microtox.

Paraoxon was added to lip balm, shampoo and roll-on deodorant, RRL not having the facility to place it in aerosol containers. Kobus Niewenhuisen was involved in the toiletries project while Klaus Psotta (his predecessor as head of the chemical department) carried out research on paraoxon mixed with tobacco. Paraoxon - a thin, oily substance in its natural form - was also mixed with alcoholic beverages.

Immelman told the court Basson had access to all pathogens and toxins produced by RRL and several of them were delivered to Basson by Immelman. Deliveries that predate the 1989 Sales List and which he can remember are:

• About 2ml of paraoxon (a lethal dose) taken to Basson's office at SAMS headquarters. Basson was not there, so Immelman left it with Wynand Swanepoel.
• Thallium, delivered more than once.
• Thallium-laced beer and whisky.
  Immelman said the substances were only returned to him by Basson on a few occasions, either for further tests or to be destroyed.

  Some time after the mid-80s, Immelman began to question the legitimacy of the work being done by RRL and voiced his doubts to Basson. He was assured that all projects had the approval of the State Security Council. He was also reminded, during this period of doubt, by David Spamer that, at some point, Basson had said his defence was that an arms dealer could not be held liable for the irresponsible use of a weapon by someone.

  After taking over as managing director of RRL, Swanepoel frequently reminded Immelman of the importance of maintaining good relations with Basson. Immelman found himself realizing more and more that the toxins he supplied were probably being used against people, and became resigned to the fact.

  Towards the end of 1988, Basson introduced Immelman to three "colleagues" - Chris, Manie and Gert. From a number of photographs shown to him by the prosecutor's investigation team, Immelman subsequently identified Chris as security police officer Chris Smith.

  Immelman had been told by Basson to use the codename Willem in order to protect his links to RRL. He adopted the cover of a farmer, supplying the toxins on a part-time basis in return for money. Immelman thought Chris, Gert and Manie were attached to 7 Medical Battalion, like Basson, who told him to "give them anything they want". Later, Basson also introduced him to Koos, with the same instruction. Nothing, says Immelman, left RRL without Basson's approval.

  Prior to delivering paraoxon to Chris, Gert and Manie on April 4, 1989, they had discussed at length with Immelman how best to apply it to clothing. He explained that garments which would be in direct contact with the skin should be used and that the poison should be spread over the widest possible area. The most sensitive areas for absorption would be the scrotum and eyelids, hence underwear, a shirt collar or waistband of pants were suggested. Some while after making the delivery, Immelman read in the newspapers about the poisoning of Frank Chikane and asked Basson directly if paraoxon had been used. Basson replied that no one knew, "not even the Americans".

  Some of the items handed to Basson or the other four people introduced to Immelman included, three cans of beer with Botulinum which were delivered to Basson on June 21, 1989; Vibrio Cholera handed in Schott laboratory flasks to Koos on August 4 and 16 and September 8 1989; six containers of orange juice, each containing 200mg of Aldicarb, delivered to Chris, along with 2g of Vitamin D3 on April 7, 1989 (a fatal dose would be three to four grams). Some time during 1990/91, at Basson's request, Immelman supplied him with about three one-litre bottles of soft drink to which E-Coli had been added.

  Immelman said that during 1984, while in America doing research, he was approached in a laboratory by someone he believes was a CIA agent. He was asked pointed questions about a South African CBW programme but denied all knowledge and vigorously protected RRL's existence. Nevertheless, one day, his host told him he had to attend a meeting, and suggested Immelman spend time in the laboratory library. He was shown to a smallish room and soon realised that every title on the shelves and every publication dealt with CBW. On returning to South Africa, Immelman spoke to RRL's security staff and urged them to train employees on how to handle such situations when abroad.

  Tuesday 30 May 2000

  Cross-examination of Dr Andre Immelman began with him confirming that he could not say with certainty that any of the toxic substances supplied to Basson or anyone else on the Sales List were used to murder people. At best, he had strong suspicions that this could be the case, particularly in regard to the Rev Frank Chikane, but he never actually knew.

  Immelman said he would have expected the FBI's forensic investigation of the Chikane affair to identify the presence of Paraoxon in his clothing, and through blood tests, though if the quantity was small, it would be difficult to trace. The FBI report produced by defence counsel Jaap Cilliers notes that Chikane was hospitalised three times in the US and that tests on his clothes proved negative for the presence of Paraoxon, as did blood tests. A urine sample was taken at the University of Wisconsin Hospital and did show the presence of DEP (diethylphosphate), an indicator of Parathion being present, but not Paraoxon. Immelman pointed out that the presence of paranitrophenol in Chikane's urine was actually an indication that Paraoxon was present - in the metabolised form of Parathion. The debate continued for some time, with Judge Willie Hartzenberg eventually suggesting that Immelman go away and research the subject fully and return, in time, as an expert witness on the subject. He will do so.

  In response to a question about his former colleague, Schalk Van Rensburg, Immelman said he had grave doubts about him after Van Rensburg begged his fellow directors never to let his wife know that RRL was a military front company and because Van Rensburg asked him "many" questions about the Chikane incident. His suspicions were reinforced when during the final planning stage of the P4 laboratory in 1987/88, he discovered that, without his knowledge, Van Rensburg had appointed consultants from Porton Down in England on the project. Immelman confronted Van Rensburg and accused him of wanting to blow RRL's cover. Van Rensburg responded that Porten Down had been privatised and that the consultants were from the private sector.

  The next witness was Eric Kennelly, who served as second-in-command to Johan Theron at Special Forces Head Quarters, Speskop. He said that some time during 1981, he was told by Theron to be at a hangar at Lanseria airport early one morning. On arrival, he found Theron, Trevor Floyd, Mr K and another SADF member whose name he cannot remember, at the aircraft in the hangar. Two black men dressed in SADF army "browns" were seated on the hangar floor. Theron told the two men they were going for a trip in the aircraft, but since turbulence was expected, he would give them each a sedative. Kennelly saw him inject first one then the other man intravenously. They both keeled over almost immediately. The men were then stripped naked and loaded into the aircraft.

  Theron gave Kennelly the syringe, needle and one or two empty glass ampoules, with instructions to destroy them. Kennelly drove back to Speskop, took the equipment to a far corner of the property and crushed it into the ground with his heel. He saw ampoules similar to those he destroyed on several occasions when he was in Theron's office and the door to the walk-in safe was open.

  At some point prior to the Lanseria incident, Theron had told Kennelly there was a top secret project, Dual, designed to eliminate certain people with chemical substances. Theron said the Dual file was in his office safe, and would stay there permanently, unlike all other files, which had to be returned to the classified registry office every night. Kennelly believes Theron told him about Dual, and had him go to Lanseria, as insurance, so that if Theron should be transferred, Kennelly would be able to carry on with the Dual work.

  Wednesday 31 May 2000

  Delta G scientist Dr Gert Lourens returned to the witness box, briefly, after testifying early in the trial about the manufacture of methaqualone. He testified about "a small number" of methaqualone derivatives produced at Delta G, chief among them being Theolodine, a liquid, and Antranyl Acid, a powder, of which "a few hundred kilograms" were made.

  At the request of Delta G Managing Director, Philip Mijburgh, Lourens also became involved in a non-official project making derivatives of silicon and phosphate. One of these, synthesised by Lourens, was Paracholorophenyl Silatrane - not available in South Africa at the time and highly toxic. Lourens gave the powder to Mijburgh, who sent it to Roodeplaat Research Laboratories for tests. Later, Lourens was asked to conduct tests himself, specifically regarding the solubility in water of Silatrane. These were done in conjunction with Dr Andre Immelman, whom Lourens was introduced to when Mijburgh took him to RRL.

  Lourens confirmed the test results outlined in EXHIBIT 54D, namely that intramuscular injection of Silatrane resulted in the death by suffocation of adult baboons within 15 minutes. The substance could not be detected post-mortem.

  The next witness was Stephanus Andre Redelinghuys, administrative director of Delta G Scientific from May 1982 to April 1993. Redelinghuys, formerly employed at the Special Forces technical lab, EMLC, testified briefly about the nature of work at the two facilities.

  The next witness was Mr C, who may not be named in terms of a court order, for fear of reprisals. Mr C was a Selous Scout from 1970 to 1980, specialising in pseudo operations. After joining the SADF's Special Forces in 1980, he spent another 10 years conducting pseudo operations and also joined the Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB).

  Mr C says he first met Basson "in passing" in then Rhodesia in the late 1970s. This happened in the communal mess at the Selous Scouts Head Quarters outside Harare. Basson was in a group of South African security force members who had gone to Rhodesia to take part in joint operations with the Selous Scouts. From 1980, Mr C was stationed in Nelspruit, conducting pseudo operations and working for the CCB. However, he was also involved in pseudo operations in Namibia and regularly visited the detention barracks at Fort Rev where Swapo captives were held. He confirmed earlier testimony about the nature of the interrogation facilities there.

  During the run-up to the Namibian elections, Mr C was told by his colleague, Pieter Botes, to take a box wrapped in paper to Namibia by road. On arrival in Windhoek he handed the parcel to Botes, who in turn gave it to an operator named Jose Daniel. After they returned to South Africa, Botes told Mr C that the operation had not been successful, "as the cholera did not work".

  In cross-examination, Cilliers told Mr C Basson denied being in Rhodesia in the late 70s and it was in fact impossible for him to have been there, since he was a full-time medical student until 1981.

  The fourth and final witness of the day was Calla Botha, who quit the South African Police in May 1988 to join the CCB's Region 6 along with Staal Burger, Slang van Zyl and Chappies Maree. During his inaugural training course at Speskop, Botha learned that eliminations were the chief objective of the CCB. He confirms the definition of Red and Blue plans given by previous CCB agents and that poison was specified as one of the weapons that could be used to eliminate enemies of the state.

  This report has been prepared by Chandr� Gould and Marlene Burger. Chandr� Gould is a research associate at the Centre for Conflict Resolution working on the Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. Marlene Burger is monitoring the trial as part of the CCR Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. The Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project is funded by the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Norwegian Government.

  Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: [email protected]