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As the words Y2K, revolution, revolt, war, insurrection, etc make the rounds and people start preparing for the worst; what is actually going to happen? Is an SKS and cammies going to do any good or is a black powder gun more appropriate? The answers can be explored to some extent, at least to the extent that improbabilities can be identified. This is a first world developed country, and the world has not yet seen a successful revolution in this type of country - whatever happens, it will make history. The past does give some clues if we can extrapolate successfully.
It is much easier to eliminate the improbable ( I hesitate to call anything impossible). Since even in the most backward countries enough modern arms have been found, I doubt that technology will regress to the point where we have to individually make our own gunpowder. Likewise, the SKS and cammies crowd will be disappointed when they find that the only targets in their woods are themselves. While it is certainly possible for a small number to hide in the woods (as Rudy) they could not bring down a government by doing so. Any action large enough to be noticed would quickly see the government bring out the tanks and gunships. Even the communists realized that they could not have a "war of liberation" from a stronghold in the country in America. They planned to wage their war inside the cities so they would be too close for heavy military firepower to be usable. It is also a lot easier to hide from helicopter gunships and Infra red when you are in a crowd of innocent people.
Any successful insurrection goes through 3 rough phases; the initial (which is the only part being considered in this paper) with few participants, the intermediate when more resources are availiable to consider larger targets, and the final when it becomes obvious that the revolution will succeed and even politicians clamor to join the bandwagon. The discussion in this paper is limited to the initial phase because (1) if the initial phase does not succeed the insurrection fails and is of limited historical significance, and (2) because the initial phase will set the tone for all that follows. It is only after the initial phase is demonstrated to be successful that significant numbers of volunteers will want to join, and that brings its own set of problems which might be addressed in a future paper.
Any insurrection would have to start out small, so small as to be invisible to the government, or it would be quickly infiltrated and neutralized. Only much later, when the government is too weak to do much of anything (or when its own troops are deserting) would infantry action be feasible. How any such revolt proceeds has a lot of bearing on our preparations and even our investments.
The smallest possible revolt is by one individual, and we have a recent historical example; the Unabomber. Although one might not agree with his goal, he in fact did seem to cause a certain fear of death and destruction on his 'enemy' and tied up large amounts of feds for decades. After all, if the government can drop bombs from an airplane and 'accidentally' hit a hospital, why should delivery via mail be considered morally different? Rudy is also an example of a man acting alone and tying up massive amounts of feds for a long time, and there are others. These people can be considered successful as soldiers because of the resources they tie up, which is always the criterion that guerrillas are judged by. However, there is no hope that they can bring down a government, and their methods are not easily duplicated or expanded.
OTOH, a very small insurrection targeting at high value political positions could have a large effect in proportion to their size. Note that neither targeting a president nor targeting low level bureaucrats would have much effect; there are too many low levels to ever make a dent, and too many politicians willing to take the risk to be President (guarded by a large Secret Service contingent). High value political targets with low level bodyguards would be more productive. This is similar to the policy started by Brzezinski, Carter's national security advisor; he targeted two nukes at each member of the politburo so they would know they would personally pay the price if they voted for war. In domestic terms that would be equivalent to assigning two assassination teams to each member of Congress in case they violated the Constitution. One might also guess that if there were such hit squads, they would target bodyguards at the same time as political targets, and would consider retired targets as well. It has been said that a worker (even a politician) is more loyal to his pension than his salary, so if a government 'worker' realizes that his pension stands a good chance of being cut short he will modify his behavior to make his life long pension last longer. Ex Presidents have a MUCH smaller secret service bodyguard contingent, so their pension could also be less secure than they might imagine. Those in politics who think that they are secure from insurrections after they retire might consider what effect the assassination of retired politicians would have on those still in office. Make no mistake, the politicians really want to collect the generous pensions that they voted for themselves.
When available resources make larger political targets a possibility, then political fund raisers, political headquarters, and even political conventions may make it to the target list.
At first thought, it would seem that such an insurrection would be a boon to bodyguards. OTOH, a bit of further thought indicates that the bodyguard himself would be target #1 in order to make it easier to assure results on the main political objective and escape. If bodyguards were indeed so targeted, they would be rare and expensive. Another downside to bodyguards is that when a politician has too many of them it is easier for the opposition to infiltrate their own armed men into close proximity.
The American Republic got its first big boost when the order was given to shoot for the officers. Although the British thought that unsporting, it WON! It has become an American tradition, with snipers always aiming at the officers - the higher the better. It is but a slight historical extrapolation to predict that in the next American revolution the 'snipers' will target the political officers who are the actual power and who direct the government. Simple arithmetic shows that the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the federal government are actually controlled by 1 + 100 + 435 + 9 = 545 people, and those 545 people can move or eliminate any bureaucrat and change any policy at the federal level. State policy usually mirrors that of the feds, but there are relatively few people at the state level who control policy. In any case, there are only 50 governors. The governors have extensive 'bodyguards' but there might be a question whether they are guarding THE body or procuring additional bodies for pleasure.
In ancient Roman times a legion was considered decimated and of no military value when it had suffered 10% casualties. Would the 545 politicians have more fortitude, and react more bravely to the sight of their fallen comrades, than a trained Roman legion? Or would a mere 60 casualties change their nature and willpower to resist?
An expected difference between normal wars and the next American revolution would be the age of the combatants. 18-21 is usually an excellent age for infantrymen, used by the present and past and other governments. I would expect a somewhat older age range in the next conflict for several reasons.
1) The 18-21s are either in school or have recently left, with all the pro-government propaganda fresh in their minds. It will take a few years in the real world to reeducate them.
2) The younger soldiers are more vigorous, but specialized talents will be required to fight an underground war. It is the more mature hunters that make the better snipers. Also history would suggest that the war will be fought as a series of seemingly unconnected ambushes, where each battle would last only a minute and often only seconds. Physical stamina would be less in demand than cleverness and experience.
3) After a 'battle' the participants would quickly melt into the general population to escape. A muscular 18 year old would stand out more than a middle aged man with his 'wife'.
4) There are a lot of older people who remember what America used to be like, and have little to lose in fighting for it.
It would seem to follow that the weapons requirements would also be different. An army needs common weapons in common calibres, but a war fought in micro-ambush mode has more need for specialized tools, especially if the action is over before there is a need to reload. Specialized tools could include very long range sniping weapons, shorter range suppressed rifles and pistols, chemical and biological agents, and explosive devices as well as electronics and unmanned vehicles. Traditionally, an assassin likes to get close enough so that missing the target is unlikely; 1000 yard shots would be too chancy except for presidential type targets which are a poor choice anyway. Since collateral damage (bodyguards, political advisors, contributors, family) is not necessarily undesirable, it follows that explosive devices would be the weapon of choice in many instances. The social effect of a potential target's associates keeping 50 feet away due to fear of bombs would be chilling to say the least.
In a shooting assassination, suppressors would be especially useful so escape can be initiated before the alarm is sounded. If the casualty falls where the body is unlikely to be found for some minutes (rest room, motel room, etc) then a suppressed concealable handgun type weapon would be useful. OTOH, if the action occurs in a public place (sidewalk etc) where the body will be noticed immediately a longer ranged suppressed device would allow the shooter a head start, especially if a "bang" is clearly heard in the opposite direction. Obviously, if a bomb were used the escape could be effected before the blast.
WRT explosive devices, recent history has shown the superiority of 'smart bombs' and one would expect any successful insurrection to learn from this. A simple fuse or timer just won't cut it much of the time. Radio control would be much better, but a programmed device would be superior. To illustrate, suppose that the terrorists decided to blow up a certain car. Planting a physical bomb on the target car risks it being discovered too soon. Planting the bomb under the road conceals it better, but even radio control may not be precise enough for a car doing 60 mph. OTOH, if the device were programmed to react to the next vehicle after a trigger signal the timing would be more precise. A smart bomb would even include a 'window' so that if no vehicle came within 30 seconds it would conclude something went wrong and would deactivate. Such a device could 'sleep' for months, using the emf from passing cars to keep its batteries charged, waiting for the right coded signal. "Smart bombs" might even include radio or computer controlled model airplanes with a TV and/or warhead.
The armed forces are trained so they sweat now instead of bleeding later. The advent of smart bomb technology will enable the insurgents to work long hours building a device that may have a useful life of only minutes. With a small target list it becomes economical to invest man-years in developing a unique device that may only be used once, due to the high value of the expected target.
Yet another possible variation might be in the "revolutionary manifesto". The Unabomber case made it clear that publication of the manifesto can provide important clues to the identity of the writer. This problem might be avoided initially by not publishing a manifesto at all; actions speak louder than words and no 'manifesto' would be taken seriously unless it were preceded by action. The action itself can speak clearly without offering extra clues. For example, if some extremists targeted Schumer, Lautenberger and Feinstein, what would you imagine they are trying to say? OTOH, the radicals might choose targets with an ambiguous message deliberately, for example choosing those in favor of abortion AND gun control. Who gets the blame and the investigation, the anti-abortionists or the anti-gun control crowd? Sometimes the unknown can be more terrifying than a known enemy.
Continuing this line of thought, the radicals might have an unpublished manifesto for internal use, with those receiving a copy cautioned not to circulate it. There might even be a number of different versions so that if one were leaked then it would be easier to track down who leaked it. Obviously internal security and disinformation would be highly valued by any underground insurgent forces. There can be value in a hidden hand.
But if these insurgents really wanted to change things, how could they do that without an above ground contact? After all, even the IRA has the Shin Fein political arm. If you look at the "5th Column", they seem to have tried that, with the result that Chuck Hayes was tried, convicted and jailed on strange charges and effectively silenced. The extrapolation would seem to be that a successful movement would have NO front man to negotiate until the opposition at least publicly conceded a couple of points. This is similar to the familiar communist ploy of preconditions to negotiation; they did not agree to talk until the bulk of their demands were met. If non-contact communications were required, it could be met with a simple letter (response by newspaper ad or newsgroup posting) or a short (very short) phone call to a selected contact.
The really interesting conclusion to the above suppositions is that such a "civil war" could be easily concealed from the general population. The "war" might be raging for years with the general public in the dark; any assassinations could be reported as car accidents or heart attacks, and even any concessions could be attributed (somewhat accurately) to a shift in political winds.
It is axiomatic that any war costs money. With no tax base, insurgents must find some other source. The traditional methods involve either bank robbery or foreign (communist) money. Neither would work for a Constitutional insurrection, and in any case recent news about a SLA member make the disadvantages of bank robbery obvious; there is too little money, too many cameras, too many silent alarms and too many guards and police. Any viable insurrection must have a better source of cash. However a plausible method exists. Consider counterfeiting as one of many plausible methods. It illustrates in microcosm the problems the bureaucracy created for itself because it is too big, too clumsy, and too introverted. The feds made a big mistake with the "new" currency because the new anti-counterfeiting methods require a microscope. It is thus easy for the secret service to spot bogus $ but nearly impossible for the average citizen. This opens a window of opportunity for small scale printers. Obviously, large scale money operations are inferior to small scale because of security considerations in this context.
While Xerox is a bit too crude, scanning and laser printing is quite a bit better. Further refinement by bitmap correction and a subprogram to assort serial numbers would fit a computer disk easily, so that anyone with a computer and a laser printer should be able to print up some good looking bills.
Of course, the printing is only a small part of the problem; passing the bogus bills would prove a red flag if done directly. Insurgents could solve THAT problem by selling the bills one at a time for 1/2 price. Consider the number of elderly SS recipients; how many believe they are entitled to more money? It is the nature of entitlement programs to create a constituency that demands more. If someone whispered in their ear that if they send $10 cash and a SASE to a certain address they will receive $20 back, how many would try it? If it worked, how many others would follow like a buffalo stampede? (Is that Presidential morality?)
For those who would consider this method impossible, consider breaking it down into small steps;
1) The initial salesman makes the offer, possibly by showing 2 bills with the same serial number; one must be bogus but which one? The salesman cannot be prosecuted for possessing ONE bogus bill, and cannot be prosecuted for selling if no cash or merchandise trades hands.
2) The person who initially receives envelopes containing $10 bills cannot be persecuted because they did not solicit the money and are not required to return it, and they certainly would not send out $20 bills by return mail.
3) The person who mails the SASEs with $20 bills cannot be found, he just drops them in a mailbox and has never left a print on the envelope, nor licked a stamp, nor written anything on the envelope.
4) The envelopes cannot be detected in transit since they would all look different, and might well be reused envelopes with a return address of some junk mailer.
5) The person who receives the envelope will instantly recognize it among a pile of junk mail since they addressed it themselves. They cannot be prosecuted as long as they only have ONE bogus bill. Along with the bill there is an address to send the next $10 bill. If questioned by the feds, they just do nothing and no more new $20s would appear in their mailbox.
6) I would expect that defective addresses would be the norm. For example, if you sent $10 and a SASE to Dick Null, 2702 Kimbertl Rd, Lenoir City TN 37772 the Post Office would deliver it to me despite the errors in the address. Just don't expect to ever see the SASE or $$ again.
The purpose of this paper is to explore the nature of an insurrection in an advanced country. Any actual insurrection should not be expected to follow the points presented, but insurgents would have to use similar logic and thus some broad similarities would emerge. The bottom line is that revolution in an advanced country is possible but must be structured much different than a third world insurgency. Most likely the rebels will keep a low profile, so low that most people will be unaware of a civil war in progress for years. It will be at the transition point, when the war progresses from microscopic ambushes to broader popular action, that will bring the hostilities to the attention of the public. Of course some of the public will notice the increasingly harsh crackdown on dissidents in the early stages.
Nick Hull, < [email protected] >
Secretary, Committees of Correspondence
2702 Kimbrell Road, Lenoir City, Tennessee 37772
865-856-6185
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