Khe Sanh Veterans Association Inc.

Red Clay
Newsletter of the Veterans who served at Khe Sanh Combat Base,
Hill 950, Hill 881, Hill 861, Hill 861-A, Hill 558
Lang-Vei and Surrounding Area

Issue 49     Spring  2001

Memoirs

Home
In This Issue
Notes from Editor and Board   Operation Gold Star   Incoming
Short Rounds   Health Matters   In Memoriam   
A Sprinkling of your Poetry   Charlie-Med    Reunion 2001

    Frequently through the tears and always through a veil of tears, I've thought of those brave men who set aside their life so that others might have an opportunity to know freedom and peace. In seeing my own children being born grow and now having my grandchildren, I often think of the children who never came to be because so many young men bled out their lives before their time. Their children would be the same ages as my children, but they are not present. I see kids in a classroom or in a children's choir or playing soccer or going to the prom, and I can see the ones who are not there, as if they too shared the desks and the uniforms and laughter and joy of life. I thought of them again when my sons took wives for themselves and there, too "they" 'were among the missing in the rehearsal dinners and the beautiful wedding parties.

    Then came the grandchildren (and I thought children were a blessing). To see youth again, what a joy. My wife's eyes are warm and tender and encouraging. Is she trying to see in there, into that secret place that even I don't know? Dear God, how many wonderful ladies waited and had no one to come home to them and take up where they left off? Do they now sit at tables alone and imagine what it would be like to share with their lover the excitement of the kids and birthdays, the new house, and anniversaries and... ? How big a hole can an empty heart support, anyhow?

    Of course, there are Moms and Dads whose "kids" lie in graves marked with military information, all too neat and all too uniform and all too final and all too early. Over the years, my tears have fallen freely but only on the inside. For two years now (after 31 years had passed), I have started to find enough courage to allow those tears to flow on the outside where they can be seen. I even have been brave enough to look at my official documents and records and, for the first time, allow others to see that I was awarded the Bronze Star for valor.

    I never have felt like a hero, then or now. Why is this courage so needed? It's not because I still think I'm bulletproof; my Purple Heart and my limp testify that I'm not. I think maybe it's because we were one, even though we were in different branches, doing different jobs, in different parts of the land and in different years, and yet we were one. The pain comes from having such a huge piece of our innocence ripped away, and the intense pride is from the same wound, causing us to stand tall enough to easily see over the tallest trees and look deep into our collective soul.

    My wife surprised me last Christmas with a set of U.S. Marine Corps Dress Blues. I sat on the floor and cried quietly, not wanting to spoil the festive time for all the family. This is the first set of "Blues" I have ever had. I'm sure she cannot comprehend how great a treasure she placed in my hands that day. I've had them tailored, and the bright, colored chevrons put on, and purchased my medals, and tried it on a piece at a time. What an honor to have the right to wear this uniform. I feel unworthy, it mystically transports me to 1775, Tun Tavern, PA, when the Marine Corps was born. It joins me with the newly graduated recruit who woke up this morning to hear his drill instructor address him for the very first time as "Marine."

    The entire uniform is striking and carries a great dignity. But, it's that long, blood-red stripe on the trousers that starts at the waistline and runs all the way down that grabs my heart and makes me feel like it has been jerked out all the way down to my socks. This too, is a unique honor, knowing that this represents your blood and mine mingled together with every Marine's blood-shed in violence while searching for peace.

    Today, I arrived at The Wall. Alone. My first visit. I think it was good to come alone this time. My wife really wanted to come along but couldn't, and, my oldest son and youngest also couldn't come. I think this was in a much greater plan than ours. This is a day filled with simultaneous joy and pain, pride and grief. I can only think of 10 of the names I want to look up. I forgot my list and left it lying at home, perhaps because I was a little too anxious about coming here. There are clear images of friends who are gone (since 1966 and 67) as well as merciful brain fog that allows me not to have to think. Much of my time has been spent biting my lip and hoping that I wouldn't completely dissolve with my tears and painful labored breathing.

    I'm thankful for the goodhearted volunteers who try to help where there is no help, making the hurt a little less painful with a touch or a smile or a kind word, or, sometimes a tear of their own. Perhaps, they have their own ghost to deal with. How brave of them and kind. I've gone away and came back four times today. Spoken with other "blood brothers" and was doing pretty well until I saw a pretty white vase stuffed full of beautiful American flags and colorful roses with neat writing on the side that said, "Robert E Coady, Grandpa, from Scotty, 9 years, and Alex 7 years." I never new him, but I found his name on panel 34W Line 31. Wow! Is this going to start all over again, seeing those kids with no grandfather to know or touch or laugh with or be proud of them? How extraordinarily close we all came to occupying an assigned place on the wall with them. Knowing this makes each simple joy in life even more sweet and a greater treasure.

    The terrible truth is, it will never end. It is part of the price. Each time a person in uniform gives up his or her life, it's like a huge down payment with regular installments to be paid from now on in missed memories at holidays, birthdays and special occasions and, just regular days when it would have been fun to have them present to enjoy living with. Payments are made by those who knew them and loved them and by those who should have had the opportunity to.

    With a heart full of gratitude and thankfulness for giving up your lives, I salute you, all my fallen brothers and sisters. You could never know how desperately we miss you and how much we long to just spend another hour with you, to touch you again at least for a moment, except we would never want to let go. Thank you for the huge down payment you made. I just stopped today to make another installment payment because I want to, even though it is costly. I'll come back when I get another payment together. Oh yes, our men and women in uniform are doing a great job. I've been to see them, you'd be proud. God bless you, weary warriors: at ease, rest in peace. WE REMEMBER!

Ira Johnson
M CO 3/9 2ND PLT

Top Side

***

    I have many memories of fear, confusion, and the bravery of young, dedicated friends...

    Crouched in a ditch by the revetments, briefing a medevac mission, watching our '46 take holes from small arms; wondering if it will be safe to fly... Running like hell towards the command bunker entrance... dodging rounds from snipers... Getting grateful looks and thumbs-up from troops "in the back" after a rescue or a re-supply... Watching our crew help to load body bags with dead Marines "in the back"... waiting for the mortars to hit the matting, praying. ..a lot. Crying often and without embarrassment...

In the cockpit
Michael R. Mullen
Orange County, CA

ED NOTE: There it is.

Top Side

***

    I wanted to comment on a letter you printed from Robin Morgan about the KC-130 that crashed at Khe Sanh on Feb 10, 1968. He had a few small errors in his memory of the incident. I am a member of your Association and was assigned to VMGR 152 in 1968 as an aerial navigator and was at Danang when the news came in that our plane had been shot down at Khe Sanh. From my archives I have recovered the following information: The plane tail number was BH813, not QV897. As a matter of fact, I flew on 897 a year later at Cherry Point after I returned. The pilot, CWO Henry Wildfang, the copilot, and navigator survived. The co-pilot was Major B. White, and the navigator was Cpl. Stan Rank. I saw Stan with his ears burned off towards the end of 1968 in Okinawa when he returned on a flight from E1 Toro. The radio operator, LCpl. David Devik, was killed in the crash. Also the first mechanic, LCpl. Jerry Ferren, was killed. There were also several passengers that did not make it, but I failed to record their names.

    Henry Wildfang is living in Oklahoma now and very active with the Marine Corps Air Transport Association of which I am also a member. He is one hell of a guy. My first flight ever on a C-130 was with him as the plane commander. I flew with him often, both before the shootdown and after. A side note: 813 was one of 3 C-130's we lost in Vietnam. The first was lost on Feb. 1, 1966 it disappeared and was believed shot down over Hainan Island, then 813, and then 814 was lost in a mid-air collision near Phu Bai on May 18, 1969 when it went down with 3 F-4's during a mid-air refueling mission. I lost several friends on that one too. From a book called The End of the Line by Robert Prisor in 1982,  I found that General Westmoreland banned C-130's from landing at Khe Sanh on Feb. 13, 1968. On February 17 and 18 in poor weather, eighteen C130's parachuted 279 tons of supplies into the base. NVA artillery knocked out the ground control radar system on Feb. 19 and thus no deliveries were made that day.

    Amazingly, I vividly recalled making an attempt to land at Khe Sanh in rotten weather sometime in February after 813 was shot down. We were all scared shitless because no C-130 had gone in since that day. We were ordered to make an attempted landing on the base, and were told that the radar had been knocked out. We got to the base, made two approaches with instruments in thick fog and got to 1/4 mile and still had zero visibility, so we had to turn back. The date was Feb. 19th. No other C-130 landing was ever attempted at Khe Sanh by the Marine Corps. To this day, I cannot remember what it was that we were carrying into the base that was so important that they would have risked it under those conditions. They could have landed a C-130 the day before when the radar was working had they wanted to, but they didn't. I have a sense that we were carrying bladders of AVGAS, but I am not certain. My pilots on that flight were Major Aschenbeck and Major Clayson, and it was the last flight of the day as we had made 10 take-offs and landings that day from Da Nang. Two to Dong Ha, two to Phu Bai and one to Chu Lai. It was getting dark by the time we got to Khe Sanh.

By the way, if that is a Marine C-130 propeller they have exhibited at Khe Sanh, it will have 4 blades and be silver with white and red wing tips.

Semper Fi,
Don Diamond

Top Side

***

    Many of us may believe that we are put on this earth by our Creator for a purpose. ALL of us are aware of the impact Ray Stubbe has had on our lives because of his spiritual guidance at Khe Sanh and in establishing The Khe Sanh Veterans Association. The Creator has given us a special human being in Ray. Because of his efforts and the dedication of those who have toiled to make our association what it is; because of the current technology that allows us to communicate via The Khe Sanh Veterans Home Page (a labor of love and a first class operation), we are able to bring understanding, fellowship, and closure to each other as needed. But greater yet, we are able to help the friends and relatives of our brothers better understand our Khe Sanh experience and, when appropriate, bring understanding and closure to their lives as well. I recently had the opportunity to communicate, via the internet and our home page, with relatives of a Marine KIA at Khe Sanh 33 years ago.

While checking the home page message board, I found the following posting dated 10 Jan 01:

"I would be interested in finding more about 'the ghost patrol.' My father was very close to his cousin, Randy Stuck, who was KIA on February 25, 1968. Our family would appreciate any information.

Thank you and God Bless, Rose."

    As you can imagine, several responses were sent to Rose by the likes of Dan Burton, Sandra Hill, John Kaheny, Tom Laderoute, Larry McCartney and myself. Most encouraged her to find a copy of The Final Formation in that it may have some information. As it turned out, I was the only one that had the "real story."

My response dated 16 Jan 01:

"Rose- I was Randy's platoon commander at the time of his death. The circumstances surrounding his death are as stated by others. During the sometimes sporadic and sometimes intense incoming artillery, you never knew for sure where the rounds would land. As I recall, this was such a day when we got barrages of incoming, and then nothing for a while. As Randy was walking in the trench line with his helmet and flack jacket on, a round landed quite close to him. Since our trenches were not too deep at the time, he was hit about chest high and probably killed instantly. I'm sure he never heard the round until it was too late. Had he lay down in the trench, he would have survived but as I said, the rounds often came out of nowhere and this was the case. I last saw him moments before his death. Although I did not witness the removal of his body, I do recall he was serving 'bad time' and was talking to Rev. Ray Stubbe about it. His infraction causing the bad time happened before I took over the platoon and I never knew what the cause was. I do remember his being upset about having to stay in RVN longer and that, at least, he could be sent to the rear to finish his time. He was real upset about that. However, he was liked by the other men and got along well with them. He was also a good Marine and not afraid of combat. There isn't much more to say. If interested, I have a photo of Randy and some of his friends taken in January 1968. Would be happy to have a print made and send it to you. We lost too many young men. My condolences albeit 33 years later."

In a response dated 17 Jan 01, Rose emails:

"I cannot express how grateful I am for your reply. I am very interested in the picture you have of Randy. I would be more than happy to pay for any of the expense for this too. Thank you for clearing up our assumption that Randy was KIA on the ghost patrol. Since I began to investigate the circumstances concerning his death, we were starting to draw the conclusion that the ghost patrol was a different incident. I never met my cousin Randy--he died about 6 months before I was born. But he was close to my dad and so Randy is special to me. My Dad has often wanted to try and contact Rev. Ray Stubbe, but I think he has been reluctant to have someone go back to those memories in Vietnam. This is why I am so grateful to you for sharing your information. Thank you again. I look forward to hearing from you. Sincerely, Margie Rose."

 In a related email dated 17
Jan 01, Randy's cousin and
Margie Rose's father sends:

 

"I am writing after reading your reply to 'Rose' on the Khe Sanh message board. Rose is my daughter, Margie, who through her caring about her Dad, began an inquiry about Randy Stuck's death in Vietnam. Margie was born the year Randy was killed, and she only has the stories of the family to know about him and some of the tears of her Dad who loved Randy as a brother, but we were really first cousins. Randy and I were both simple country kids raised in a small town of 1,000 people in Southern Indiana. The town is named Farmersburg. Randy's people still live there, although his mother and now father have passed away.

"I deeply appreciate, and in no small way, your response to Rose's inquiry in this matter. I am sure it is not and has not been an easy thing to respond to such inquiries. God Bless you.

"In March of 1968, approximately two weeks after Randy's death, our family related details of his death, which would have indicated that he was the point man for what we now know is B Company. It was not known that he was at the north perimeter. I have been under the impression that his company had been on patrol under Lt. Don Jacques.

"A major had delivered the news to my family and may have either received some erroneous information or either the family, due to shock, may have assumed a difference. At this time a news story had played on the news and it was of the account of what we now know was Don Jacques 'Ghost Patrol.' Regardless, your account does make a difference. A heartfelt thank you."

(The next section of the email explained Randy's bad time. I do not feel it necessary to share the details in this writing.) Randy had two scholarships awaiting him when he got out of the service (basketball).

"You have given me peace of mind, that he was a good Marine and did his duty in combat. I can tell you Randy was not a coward and as a 'kid' would stand up to face any bully. I appreciate your offer to send photos of Randy and his friends to my daughter. When they arrive we are going to forward them to Randy's sister who lives in Farmersburg. She and her brothers will be touched, especially coming from you, Nick."

"On a final note, I would like to tell you that Randy's Marine escort and honor guard detail were beautiful and something that simple people from a small town will never forget. I recall the day as a young beat policeman in Indiana. The sun was shining as the whole town walked to the cemetery, and those Marines in green stood tall as Private Ransom Lee Stuck was laid to rest. God Bless you. Terry Stuck, Ocala, FL."

In an email dated 21 Jan 01 and posted on the KSV Home page:

"Thank you again to all the kind folks that have helped our search. Our family now knows that my cousin, Randy Stuck, was not a part of the ghost patrol. This is what we were told 33 years ago and have always believed. The posting by Nick Romanetz is what really put all the pieces together for us. Thank you Nick. I have been able to locate two books, The Final Formation and another book by Eric Hammel which my Dad was unaware of. This Friday, the 26th, marks the 33rd anniversary of Randy's passing. That day will be a final conclusion to our search. We can now put this to rest. Thank you and God Bless. Margie Rose"

The following are excerpts from an email sent to my home by Randy's cousin Terry Stuck. The posting is dated 25 Jan 01:

"Glad to hear from you. Thanks for the response to my daughter and myself. I have called Randy's sister in Indiana and told her of the response you made. She was really deeply touched Nick. She is now 50 and married to a minister. She is just recuperating from a suspect lung surgery. This news came just at the right time to lift her spirits.

"Randy was given an open casket funeral. He was reconstructed by an absolute artist. Marines presented him in dress blues which was very touching. I know of the injuries he sustained. However, as I would say again he was reconstructed and presented almost as if he was merely asleep. Amazing.

"Hard for me to now believe that he would be almost 54. 1 noted that your birthday had just occurred and when this was all going on you were only 23 as a 1st Lt. Now at 56, and a lifetime on the police force, which I retired from after 32 years, I realize what a terrible responsibility both he and you had, for being such kids. I guess it took my retirement to help me get some of the answers I wanted, and of course a loving daughter. If there is anything I can ever do for you, please do not hesitate to contact me. You're a special person to my family and me. God Bless You."

    Terry Stuck and his daughter, Margie, received pictures of Randy and other members of 2nd Plt C CO 1/26 on February 5th. A copy of that photo and identification of the men are included with this article. The photo was taken in our old sector behind the ARVN lines, near the ammo dump. We were staging to move to our new position north of the runway in the Blue Sector. On about 14 February, I received a card from Margie Rose

"Thank you for the picture, your time and your memories. Your kindness has been a true blessing to my family. I know that Randy's sister and brothers are grateful, as well. As I had mentioned earlier, Randy and my dad were like brothers. I believe now that there is peace now for my dad concerning cousin Randy."

    As a postscript to this story, I received an email at home from Margie, Posted 15 Feb 01. It brought to closure a story within a story. Margie stated that her dad was in Vietnam with the Air Force as an MP about four years prior to Randy's service. Margie writes: "My dad was a person who can express his feelings, but he has chosen not to discuss Vietnam with me... Our search about Randy and hearing from you and receiving the picture has been a positive ground to speak about Randy and Vietnam between my dad and I."

    My closing thoughts on this event go back to Ray, our association and web page. Where would the Stuck family and other people be without what Ray and many of you are responsible for? I felt honored to share information with Randy's family. Fortunately, after 33 years we had an opportunity to share the truth and bring closure for family members because of the tireless work and dedication of a few. To all of you, this is what we are about. Semper Fi...

Nick Romanetz
C CO 1/26 2ND PLT

Top Side

***

Copyright c 2001
By Ray Anderson
and Peter Brush

    In 1993 a monument was dedicated in Arlington National Cemetery to the Marines who fought at Khe Sanh, arguably the longest and most bitterly contested battle of the Vietnam War. This formally acknowledged the enduring relationship between Khe Sanh and the Marine Corps. However, it was not only Marines who faced the North Vietnamese Army. The defense of Khe Sanh was very much both a joint and combined effort by various American and South Vietnamese forces.

    The combination of air support and firepower provided the key to the defense of Khe Sanh. Before the siege was over, aircraft of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marines, as well as planes of the South Vietnamese Air Force dropped over 100,000 tons of bombs. To the forces on the ground, however, air support meant more than the massive numbers of B52 and tactical bomber sorties. Aerial supply was crucial to the defense of Khe Sanh. This article describes how U.S. Army Quartermaster Air Delivery (AD) units played a vital role in the defense of the Khe Sanh Combat Base.

    The mission of the AD units was to provide parachute packing, storage, and rigging of supplies for drop by aircraft of all services as well as assisting in loading and ejecting of these supplies. In 1955 personnel of the 109th QM participated in the development of a new air delivery technique. This low-altitude parachute extraction system (LAPES) required cargo planes to fly a few feet above ground level. A parachute was released, pulling the palletized cargo out of the aircraft and onto the drop zone. A related system was the ground proximity extraction system (GPES) in which the cargo was yanked from the aircraft by a hook, which snagged a cable traversing the runway.

    In 1965 General William C. Westmoreland, the commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam requested the deployment of an air delivery unit. In May 1965, 64 men were assigned from the 109th QM (Air Delivery) at Ft. Lee Virginia to form the 383rd QM Detachment. The 383rd was sent to South Vietnam and the 109th QM was sent to Fort Campbell, Kentucky, under the operational control of the 101st Airborne Division. LAPES/GPES training continued.

    In June 1966 the 109th QM received overseas movement orders. On July 23, the unit embarked onboard the USNS General John N. Pope at Tacoma, Washington. The main body arrived at Cam Ranh Bay, South Vietnam, on August 12 1966. By November 7 the 383rd moved from Saigon to Cam Ranh Bay and was attached to the 109th. The 623rd QM Company with resources to repair air delivery items also shared the 109th QM Company facilities. The establishment of the 109th's operational area was complete; General Westmoreland now had the air delivery assets in place that he requested the previous year.

    The summer and fall of 1966 saw the buildup of large North Vietnamese Army (NVA) units in the area along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). In response, General Westmoreland ordered Marine units northward to meet this threat. Positions were established just south of the DMZ to act as blocking forces to impede NVA infiltration. Khe Sanh was the western anchor of this defensive line.

    General Westmoreland stated, "There is no more important airfield in Vietnam from a tactical standpoint than Khe Sanh." Navy Seabees were ordered to undertake a crash program to upgrade the base's airstrip. Still, Khe Sanh was proving difficult to resupply. During December and January there were only six days when the weather was good enough for aerial re-supply. Rations and fuel occasionally were reduced to less than one day's needs. Rain made road travel almost impossible. April 1967 saw bitter fighting around Khe Sanh between the Marines and NVA forces, illustrating the seriousness with which both sides viewed the area.

    In the second half of 1967, American Intelligence learned that large numbers of NVA were deploying into the A Shau Valley and the area around Khe Sanh. To help meet this threat, a heavy drop platoon composed of men from both the 109th and 383rd AD units stationed in Danarig men undertook airdrops to supply the Navy Seabees at Khe Sanh with materials to rebuild the airstrip.

    To meet the threat in the A Shau area an offensive into the valley was planned for early 1968. The plan called for the 1st Calvary division to be supplied by airdrops for the first three days of the offensive. This operation would require seven hundred short tons a day of air delivered supplies. To accomplish this more riggers were needed. In December 1967 the 1st Logistical Command ordered the 383rd QM Detachment to Bien Hoa to establish another separate Air Delivery Unit.

    Since the 383rd was but a single platoon, it was augmented with a platoon of riggers from the 549th QM Company (Air Supply) in Japan, a platoon of riggers from the 173rd Airborne, and another platoon from the 101st Airborne. An additional platoon of 101st airborne riggers joined the 109th to replace the 383rd platoon of men lost during their move to Bien Hoa.

    General Westmoreland estimated the forces size around Khe Sanh at between fifteen and twenty thousand men. This buildup caused the U.S. command to conclude that reinforcing Khe Sanh was the only feasible alternative to abandoning it. Westmoreland ruled out abandonment because a presence at Khe Sanh blocked the ability of the North Vietnamese to circumvent the DMZ barrier and bring the war into the populated coastal plain.

    In fact, General Westmoreland wanted to fight the North Vietnamese. The area around Khe Sanh was relatively unpopulated by civilians. This would allow unrestricted use of U.S. firepower and further the U.S. strategy of attrition by killing large numbers of enemy soldiers. By January the allied force at Khe Sanh totaled about 6,000 men.

    Before the offensive into A Shau Valley could be implemented, the siege of Khe Sanh and the 1968 Tet Offensive began. The large number of riggers accumulated for the A Shau offensive soon became fully engaged supplying Khe Sanh and other isolated outposts. Consequently, the offensive into the A Shau Valley had to be delayed until April of 1968, after the end of the siege at Khe Sanh.

    On January 21 1968, the NVA began their attack of Khe Sanh. At approximately 0530 hours that morning Communist gunners scored a hit on the main ammunition dump. Ninety-eight percent of the dump's mentions (1,500 tons) were destroyed in the ensuing explosions. This caused an immediate request for emergency air supply. Available U.S. aircraft included C-130's plus smaller C-123's and C7A's. The C-130's were the logical choice to quickly replenish ammunition stocks. However, the fact that shrapnel from the ammunition dump explosion covered half the runway precluded their use. C-123's delivered 130 tons of supplies in the next 36 hours, even flying and unloading at night by the light of Marine artillery flares. By January 23 the runway was cleared of debris, permitting the return of the C130's.

    Through February 10, gunfire or shrapnel hit even Air Force C-130's. Air Force commanders felt these airplanes, at $2.5 million each, were too valuable to risk unnecessarily. C-123's and C-7A's were used instead, but proved unable to deliver a sufficient volume of supplies. Enemy gunners and bad weather simply would not permit a sufficient number of landings of these aircraft. In order to survive, the Marines would have to be supplied in the same manner as the French at Dien Bien Phu by parachute. Initially, bulk cargo such as ammunition, rations, and fuel was delivered using the container delivery system. A C-130 could transport 14 to 16 of these loads. Ar a height of 600 feet over the drop zone the restraints holding the loads were cut. The pilot raised the nose of the plane and applied power to the engines. The cargo moved rearward on floor rollers and then out of the plane. A large cargo parachute carried the one-ton bundle to the ground. Riggers often flew with the cargo planes to ensure proper delivery. Several 109th personnel landed at Khe Sanh in order to retrieve parachutes for future use.

    The 109th was rigging supplies at Danarig and Cam Ranh Bay. The 383rd and its attached platoons were rigging supplies at Bien Hoa. Cam Ranch Bay was the safest of these locations, as Danarig and Bien Hoa were frequently under rocket or mortar attacks. Riggers often worked during the night, using floodlights in order to rig loads for aerial delivery. The 383rd rigged CDS (Container Delivery System) while the 109th rigged both CDS and extraction systems (LAPES and GPES). The riggers of the 109th QM geared up to meet the challenge posed by events at Khe Sanh. Initially, riggers at Cam Ranh Bay worked three days and two nights continuously without rest. This was followed by shifts consisting of 24 hours on duty followed by a six hours rest break. Similar schedules were followed by the 383rd.

    These loads were not dropped within the main base perimeter. To do so would necessitate the complete closing of the airstrip during drops. The area chosen for the drop zone (LZ) was a small area beyond the end of the runway. Supplies were parachuted into this LZ with good accuracy. Still, some drops missed the LZ and drifted into enemy territory. These loads were destroyed by air strikes or Marine artillery to prevent their utilization by the enemy.

    The constant enemy shelling forced the Marines to dig underground for protection. To further this move, the Marines requested an emergency supply of large timbers for bunker construction. Because of the size and handling difficulties involved, low level extraction was chosen over air land or container delivery.

    On February 16 a C-130 loaded with timbers flew down the long axis of the Khe Sanh runway. The pilot maintained airspeed of 130 knots at an altitude of five feet. A parachute, constrained to a 48" diameter, was attached to the load and projected out the rear of the cargo door. Upon reaching a precisely calculated point, a crewmember fired a device that allowed the parachute to open to a diameter of 28 feet. This sudden force broke the restraints attaching the timber load to the floor of the aircraft. The plane continued, essentially flying out from underneath the palletized timbers, which coasted to a stop close to the proposed bunker construction sites. This was the first of 52 LAPES missions as perfected by the 109th QM. Larger scale use of LAPES was not possible due to the lack of sufficient LAPES components as well as concern over damage to the runway by the heavy LAPES pallets. Logistics specialists then turned to the ground proximity extraction system.

    On March 30 a C-130 began rolling down the runway at Khe Sanh. Attached to the cargo pallet was a boom with a hook at the flee end. The rear cargo door was open. The airplane rolled across the arresting cable, which traversed the runway and was moored to the ground at each end. The cable rose, engaged the hook, and yanked the cargo out of the plane. The pilot applied power and took off. In all, 15 loads of cargo, mostly construction materials, were delivered to Khe Sanh using the GPES.

    American logistics personnel showed impressive ingenuity and versatility in accomplishing the airlift to Khe Sanh. The combination of air land, container drop, parachute and ground extraction delivery techniques meant the garrison could hold out indefinitely. Large-scale Communist infantry movements were constantly disrupted by allied air and artillery firepower.

    During the period from January 21 until April 8, 1968, Air Force C-130's made 273 landings at Khe Sanh, 496 container drops, 52 LAPES and 15 GPES deliveries. These accounted for over 90 percent of the 12,430 tons of supplies delivered by the Air Force. Over 8,000 tons of the total amount were delivered by parachuting, as early as March 15 the number of supply drops into Khe Sanh exceeded the total for all of Vietnam up to that time.

    On April 1, Army airmobile units working in concert with Marine infantry and engineers began Operation PEGASUS to reestablish the overland supply link to Khe Sanh. This force linked up with the base on April 6. The Marine logistics support area was allowed to deteriorate. By July 1968 the base has dismantled and abandoned.

    Army riggers continued supporting U.S. military operations in Vietnam. The 109th supplied the Cambodia invasion and also rigged the extraction of captured enemy supplies and weapons. The 109^th QM rigged 350 tons of fuel, rations, and ammunition for the 1971 invasion of Laos. The 549th Quartermaster Company, by now in Okinawa, sent 76 men TDY (Temporary Duty) to Vietnam to aid in dropping 4,853 tons of supplies in 369 sorties into An Loc during the 1972 Easter Offensive. Like Khe Sanh before it, the defenders at An Loc held their ground. The US Army riggers pioneered the use of fuel air explosives by rigging 55 gallons drums of aviation fuel onto skids of which were then loaded onto C-130's. Each of the 16 skids consisted of two barrels of aviation gasoline (AVGAS) and two barrels of jet fuel (JP4) The skids would free fall with smoke grenades attached to assured they would ignite upon ground impacted. In terms of destructive power, these drops compared to napalm drops but at one tenth the expense. The 109th and 383rd both rigged the famous 15,000-pound "Daisy Cutter" bomb used to clear helicopter landing zones.

    In general, the Army favored delivery by helicopter over delivery by parachute. But Khe Sanh was a special case. The advent of cheap surface-to-air missiles meant the situation would not repeat itself. Before 1968 the Communists had never concentrated their forces to the degree they did at Khe Sanh. The base garrisoned a large number of U.S. personnel. The siege lasted eleven weeks. It would have been impossible to re-supply the base solely by using slow-moving helicopters. Once encircled by the North Vietnamese, there was nothing the Marines could do except dig in and fight. Certainly there was no quick way out: the overland supply route was cut again in mid-1967.

    Supply levels at Khe Sanh are better described as adequate for survival rather than abundant. The Marines sometimes went weeks without hot meals. Rations were frequently limited to two meals per man per day; some Marines ate one meal per day for several days at a time. Artillery firing patterns were also affected. Initially, the Marines tried to prevent NVA forces from getting too close to the base. Overwhelming volumes of artillery could have blocked them. It was not possible to air deliver this volume of artillery shells. Consequently, the enemy was allowed to move in close to the base in order to provide more concentrated targets for the shells available to Marine artillerymen.

    It would not have been possible to evacuate the American garrison overland. According to General Philip B. Davidson, Jr., Westmoreland's intelligence chief, a single reinforced Marine regiment cannot fight its way on foot through two or three NVA divisions when the latter have the initiative, superior numbers, and every terrain advantage. Emergency evacuation by air would have resulted in a sacrifice of half the garrison. It was the flexibility, technical expertise, and untiring efforts of aircrews and logistics personnel such as the Army air delivery units that enabled the Marines to successfully resist the Communists' best efforts: the ongoing attacks against the Khe Sanh Combat Base during the Tet Offensive of 1968.

    As the defense of Khe Sanh was a joint effort, so too is the writing of this article. Ray Anderson, who served with the 109th Quartermaster Company in Vietnam, provided much of the research upon which this article is based. Peter Brush was with a Marine heavy mortar battery on the ground at Khe Sanh during the siege. Versions of this article previously appeared in Army and Vietnam magazines.

Top Side

***

Vietnam Journal

By Toby Rushforth

30 October 1967, at 2145:
    Took off at 1215. John Egger was lead (and I was no. 2 in the flight. ) We started NW of Con Thien (just south of the DMZ.) I had a photographer with me. We were looking for NVA field artillery (FA) pieces that have been firing at the Marines at Con Thien, Gio Linh and Dong Ha. Weather was from 200' to 2000' ceiling. Just as we arrived in the area where the NVA FA seemed to have been shooting from... Bam! Barn! "F--k me!" Not again, and really close on the first volley? (Anti-aircraft guns, AAA, firing at John and me.) We got out of there. The weather was too bad. We couldn't have worked fighters or artillery in that weather anyway.

    We went over to Mui Lai Point on the NVN Coast;--about 12 miles North of the DMZ where the weather was better and put in two flights of fighters on NVN field artillery positions, no AAA. Ahh, there's another good "spot" (target) that looks like an FA position. Chain 149, a flight of A-4s, was on station, John marked with smoke rockets... "perfect hit 'one' "(first A-4). "Two is in" (second A-4 beginning his attack) "Here it comes." (37mm AAA tracers and airbursts fired at John, the A-4s and I.) So many rounds were fired that it looked like sheets of red rain coming up at us. Airbursts formed an extensive white cloud well above us. "Shit, there they are in the tree line, take 100 (meters) right #2." Bluey! Just a tad right, man are they hosing us down! The tree lines are clouded from the smoke of the many 37mms firing at us. None of us hit! A-4s or us. A-4s made two more passes and got a bunch of them, great work. Coveys 64 and 67 took over for us. We're out of gas and have to head back to Danang.

3 November 1967 2120:
    John Egger was shot down this afternoon off Mui Lai Point. The plane exploded on impact with the water. He never had a chance. Lt. Col. Hall was up with him and saw it all. John was on a rocket-marking run on an AAA site. He received heavy automatic weapons fire from a village we've been avoiding (trying to avoid killing innocent civilians. ) Lt. Col. Hall shouted three times, "63 you're on fire pull off!" John finally answered, "No I'm not, I can't see it." The radios Were then quiet for a short time as John turned his aircraft to head out to sea and survey whatever damage Lt. Col. Hall was talking about. Lt. Col. Hall explained that at that time, John was trailing smoke and flames from his right boom. After John got out over the water, maybe a half mile, he seemed to lose control of the aircraft (flight controls probably destroyed), as it entered a nose low spin and crashed into the water, seeming to explode upon impact. It sank immediately. In a very short time, there was little sign it ever happened except a small "oil slick" that was visible for about 15 minutes then "no sign of anything at all."

    Paul Martel and I relieved Lt. Col Ward on station, looking for signs of life, anything, it all looked the same as yesterday, except for that weird and dread knowledge that John and his twisted aircraft lay on the bottom of the rolling green sea, right there under my left wing.

    Sorrow, tears, hate, so many things churn inside you at a time like this. "Those innocent villagers!" We put 5 flights of fighters on the village, bombs-cluster bombs rockets, 20mm strafe. Jerry Sellers (killed 25 Dec. '67) and Cooper continued with 5 more flights on it and another nearby "village." They no longer exist. I have no remorse about that. I hope we killed everyone in the place. They had to be military. That's where the shooting came from. No one else would be living on that terrain. War rears its ugliest face in front of me. This is the beginning. Play fair? Be nice? Bull Shit! We'll either kill them or break their spirit.

 November 1967 2215:
    At 1515, took off with Lt. Col. Hall (Covey 75) and went up the coast to Mui Lai Point again. Signs of lots of activity. Got some F-4s with cluster bombs to go after NVN in general area where John was fired at and hit on the 3rd. All of a sudden about 18 37mm AAA guns opened up on the fighters and us. Got six more flights to go after them. "Misty 31" was a great help. Man! Were they shooting! There were about 100 tracer rounds, then air bursts on just one fighter's pass. Then 75 said "watch it 65, they're coming after you." The tracers were sweeping back and forth in front of my windscreen. I jammed the nose down hard to begin evasion from that one volley, then pulled into a hard diving turn, everything in the airplane flew all over the place (camera equipment, rifle, 200 rounds of ammo, grenades (smoke/frag), etc. What a mess! They missed! I was badly shaken, then angry! Two 750 lb. bombs obliterated that one site of 4 guns. What a hit! I figure we got about 10 sites, killed 30-50 of the bad guys. Don't know how they missed, but neither of us FAC aircraft nor any of the fighters got a scratch. As the sun went down through the clouds in the west, we disengaged, things got quiet again. All of the cloud layers which had formed above us, were probably made in the USSR. The number of 37mm and probably some other AAA we couldn't see so prominently were truly awesome.

    The flight back to Danang was not a time to relax, bad via enroute, and back at the field had to fight vertigo radar vectors lost briefly, then broke into the clear for visual landings, strange elation at the club that night. Felt exuberant to the point that I had an impulse to break something, things, anything. Nervous energy. I must've had a year's worth of adrenaline to burn off and here I was at the Danang club bar having a couple of drinks.

    I carried a Nikon with telephoto on most missions. Most hot missions, I didn't dare pick it up for fear I'd be preoccupied whilst someone, like a fighter or me, got their butt shot off. It was 7 Feb 68, the night and morning that the Special Forces Camp at Lang Vei (on the Laos Border west of Khe Sanh) was overrun. It is quite a long story and a number of books have featured the battle (latest I read was Night of the Silver Stars.)

About the "photo "part of the story:
   Covey 688, from Ubon I think, was running A-ls under the low overcast to blow the NVA off the Tac Ops Center containing about 11 Special Forces survivors. What a sight. I circled overhead getting up to speed, because 688 was low on gas and would have to leave soon). A number of PT-76 tanks (first time use in Vietnam) had been used in the attack and air and defenders killed some. As the clouds broke open to reveal the smoldering Camp--the TOC containing the survivors and the dead tanks--I shot a roll of film from about 2000 ft. (just above 688's and A-l's maneuvering space.) I did take over when 688 left and worked the situation for a couple of hours, as did some other FACs. In the end and not without some acrimonious events, the TOC survivors were rescued (though some others were not). As I just read recently, the 24 Special Forces (with some CIDG) troops on the ground were awarded a total of 1 Medal of Honor, one Distinguished Service Cross, 19 Silver Stars and three Bronze Stars with Combat V. Members of the rescue force received one DSC, two SSM, seven BSM w/V device. But I digress.

    I flew back to Danang and called in my report to 7AF operations. I reported that the tanks we had been reporting for over a week (they were used to overrun a Laotian outpost as well on 25 Jan) had indeed been key factors in the fall of Lang Vei. The Colonel on the other end of the line said incredulously, "Tanks! They don't have tanks out there!" He was acting as though he, or I, had just landed from Mars? I tried the logic about the tracked vehicles with the turret on top with the long tube sticking out of it. He refused to believe me? And now to the point: When I, with great satisfaction, told that @!! %&** that I had photos to prove the point, he said: "You've got pictures? Get them over to the photo lab right away! We'll have a T-39 diverted in to pick them up within the hour!" And there you have it. I did, and he did. The T-39 was there just as the pictures were done and away they went (but not before I got copies, heh, heh)! They probably had the pictures at 7AF Ops at about the time the rescue operation was kicking off.

    Post log,
    Think any of us FACs ever saw or heard about those pictures again? Not to my knowledge. We supposed that they made some staffer's day, the one that got to show them to some real important folks.

Post-post log,
    I got to share the pictures and some of my diary info with one of the survivors from the Camp recently (who had spent 6 years in the Hanoi Hilton.) It was a special time and special thing to do.

Cheers,
Toby Rushforth
Trail 67, Covey 152/252/65
Hue Citadel, Danang '67-'68

Top Side

***