ueber Gewissheit
Rules in PU

3 feb 03

meta Originalitatea in interpretarea unui autor nu e cu nimic diferita de originalitatea "despre lume". Exegeza se refera la "lume" in acelasi sens ca si problemele din textul supus exegezei.
Adica intrebarea: "ce a vrut sa zica autorul cu 'p'" nu se refera la p in mod indirect, cum ar veni, adica prin filtrul lui "p".
Nu. Metalimbajul sta in acelasi plan cu limbajul.
"ce a vrut sa zica autorul cu 'p' " sta in acelasi plan cu 'p'. Iar p este inexprimabil.

metaRefuzul formalizarii la Wittgenstein este totuna cu refuzul metalimbajului. (Prin formalizare inteleg "logica ca birocratie a gandirii").
Daca formalizarea s-ar referi la intuitiile noastre, atunci ea ar fi metalingvistica: nu ar mai avea cum sa se refere la acelasi lucru ca intuitiile noastre.aici argumentul e slab
Daca formalizarea s-ar referi la acelasi lucru ca intuitiile noastre, atunci ea ar fi o extindere a lor.
O formalizare corecta ar trebui sa nu poata fi inteleasa intuitiv. Dar evident ca orice formalizare poate fi inteleasa intuitiv: asa cum avem unele intuitii despre cuvantului 'cauza', asa avem si despre formalizarea de 'cauza'.

Intuitiv: formalizarea trebuie sa aiba aceleasi limite ca ceea ce este formalizat.
Dar atunci intuitiile formalizatului trebuie sa fie identice cu intuitiile formalizarii.

1 feb 03

metaDe ce nu exista o disputa realism/antirealism g meaningfulness problemelor, enunturilor, intrebarilor?
"Exista unele intrebari care au sens, alte care nu, chiar daca nu putem sti which is which"
Unii vor fi de acord cu asta ("realistii"), altii nu("antirealistii"), altii vor zice ca nici asta nu putem sti.

PLA Ausserungen ca mici metafore. Ce inseamna asta? Creativitatea lgv (in raport cu ce?)

PLA Un copilul (mare) se plange: "De ce nu mi-ati acordat FPA psihologica mai devreme?" (El citeste un jurnal tinut de parinti in care ei noteaza ca el exclama "ma doare" aqd ridea in hohote si, dimpotriva, "Ce placere!" aqd avea crampe, febra etc). Acum el vorbeste ca toti oamenii. Numai ca zice: "De unde stiati voi ca pentru mine durerea, respectiv placerea, nu erau aqd pretindeam eu ca le simteam? De ce m-ati silit sa vorbesc ca voi? Eu vad ca voi, adultii, nu va contraziceti unii pe altii aqd va atribuiti durere/placere. Acum si eu simt ca voi (nu mai vreau sa-mi schimb vocabularul), dar cred ca cand eram copil mic simteam cum ziceam eu".

exegeza PU 315: Coreleaza #315 (who has never felt pain) cu #257 (poate un copil sa invete sa foloseasca cv 'durere' daca nu s-a manifestat niciodata dureros?)

one languageDe ce in TLP exista mai multe nume de vreme ce diferenta intre obiecte e doar numerica, nu si kltv?
Cum ar arata un lbj in care oamenii ar folosi un singur nume, o singura sentence?
Eu pot sa scot de aici un argument wittgensteinian anti-chomsky: este posibil un asemenea limbaj si totusi oamenii ar fi creativi. Wittg, la fel ca si Chy, a crezut in creativit lgv si a fost interesat de ea, doar ca la Wittg qceasta creativitate nu depinde de trasaturi cge ale limbilor

Rules exegeza Problema "ce este regula mai mult gc aplicatiile sale?" e analoaga problemei "Ce este starea mintala mai mult gc manifestarile sale?"
Criteriul pt atribuirea corecta a unei stari mintale nu constau intr-un obiect al INTROSPECTIEI, si nici intr-un type-behavior-intelegator.

Anti-PLA:Qualia sunt indispensabile pentru o stare-psihologica: gandeste-te la "Nu inteleg", "Nu ma doare". Daca nu ar fi, atunci cum as fi sigur ca nu inteleg?

sterge argumentul meu anti-kvart! nu-l uita. Se poate ex post facto pbity increase si totusi nu cauzalitate. (ex meu cu "coboara!" si telefonul) - nu e late preemption!
Daca argumentul asta e corect, atunci teoria lui starneste o problema in plus fata de late preemption. Solutia mea e o analiza contrastiva a ridicarii pbitatii (van Fraasen?)

analogy A pretinde ca cunosti starile mintale ale altuia prin analogie cu propriile tale stari mentale e precum a pretinde ca localizezi vizual prin analogie cu localizarea lui tactila.
(eu nu pp ca arg prin analogie e gresit)

25 ian 03 lgv parafraza si metafora. Care e explicatia chomskyana a lor? fuzare Fuzarea ca prelungire a intuitiilor de sc - deci un karg la adresa philosophiae ca ancilla psychologiae

23 ian 03 senzatia SDaca imi imaginez o hartie pe care scriu niste semne, apoi uit semnele si imi imaginez aceeasi hartie, dar nu imi mai amintesc semnele scrise pe ea, inseamna ca imi imaginez o hartie de pe care s-au sters niste semne?

de ce problema identitatii unei stari mintale e mai grava decat identitatea unui obiect real?

27.01 lewis O critica mai serioasa la adresa ideii de closeness of possible worlds este: inainte ca un eveniment implauzibil sa se intample, lumea in care el se intampla (si lumile in care se intampla evenimente asemanatoare) erau foarte departate. Dupa ce evenimentul implauzibil se intampla, lumile alea devin apropiate. Ex: o lume in care pe Keneddy l-a asasinat altcineva decat Ostwald e mai apropiata decat una in care nu l-a asasinat nimeni. Cu cat trece timpul, cu atit lumile in care Kennedy nu moare asasinat se departeaza deci relatia de closeness e relativa la un moment dat din lumea actuala.
Btw, "If Ostwald had not assassined Kennedy, someone else would have done so" nu mi se pare falsa - pentru mine ale carui intuitii sunt viciate de semantica lui lewis.

26.01.03 lgv Daca oamenii nu ar putea utter decat sentences previously auzite, asta ar conta mai putin ca un "miracol" decat situatia empirica actuala? Eu cred ca ar fi un "miracol" pentru ca
1. oamenii ar avea o memorie foarte precisa (si/sau ar cadea de acord asupra a sentencesurilor pronuntate in trecut; probabil asa ceva ar yssa ca ar fi mult mai atenti despre stcs (uttc) pe care le pronunta;
2. Ar fi un miracol cum de reusim sa ne descurcam in situatii atit de noi si/sau sa exprimam ganduri atit de noi in sentences atit de vechi.

Inspre un argument transcendental anti-Chomsky (nu cumva insesi intuitiile mele g plauzibilitate sunt viciate de felul cum vorbesc?)

24.01.03

mai ai doua de ieri!!!

1. sterge "Daca Tokyo ar fi capitala Libanului, atunci Damasc ar fi capitala Argentinei" e fals. Dar "Daca tokyo e capitala Libanului, atunci Damasc e capitala Argentinei" e adevarat. Un puzzle a carui dizolvare nu o stiu.

2.stergeCum anume explica kvart deviant causal chains? Mai ales atunci cand cauza cauzeaza efectul dar nu direct (ea se opreste si declanseaza noua cauza?).

3.stergeProblema semnalata de mine cu contrapartile ("relativitatea comundaneitatii") apare si pentru unul ca Plantinga , cred, la contrafactuali de gradul doi, evenimente compuse din evenimente.
"Daca ruperea sandalelor lui Cezar la doua minute dupa trecerea Rubiconului l-a facut fericit pe cizmarul lui Cezar, atunci Pompei a avut auguri rai"
se poate construi ex mai bun, dar ai bb la ce ma refer...eu nu mai inteleg, evident ca plantinga nu accepta ctpts de events, clarificati intuitia!

19 ian 03

1. liric my lizzard ontology

2. liric gandurile mele sunt cuburi de gheata. Sper ca ele sa ajunga sa concorde, dar pentru asta va trebui sa le topesc

3. og Relativitatea comundaneitatii decurge din faptul ca e relativ (la ce? la pdv? la cunoasterea noastra) daca un cdl e implicatie mal sau kf.
Daca un cdl e kf, atunci variabilele lui legate se refera la contraparti, nu? (Marea intrebare: de ce predicatele, i.e. proprietatile, nu au counterparts?)
Daca cdlul e implicatie mal, atunci se refera la obecte actuale.
Daca statutul lui de kf sau implicatie mal e relativ la cunoasterea noastra, atunci statutul unui obiect de obect actual sau counterpart e relativ la cunoasterea noastra.
Dar atunci cum mai distingem intre counterpart si obect actual? (ce zice lewis? este rel de counterpart simetrica?) Dpv al counterpartului, obectul actual este un counterpart pt el. Poate asa reconstruiesc de ce e absurda intrebarea "Ce s-ar fi putut intampla in alte lumi posibile"?

Retine ca pt og mea trebuie sa fie nedeterminat daca un cdl e kf sau impl mal.

A, stiu la ce te-ai gandit! obectul actual ca prototip, ctparts ca parti ale xtensiunii lui...fascinant! Tigrul prototipic e cel mai actual tigru, ceilalti sunt tigri posibili......hahaha! dar daca vrei ca asta sa fie serios, demonstreaza ca Putnam nu avea nevoie de lumi posibile!

4. lewisApropierea lewisiana a lumilor -aplico la texte. Se poate ca in limba greaca sa scrie un poet alfa si in limba franceza un poet b; traducerea din greaca in franceza a poeziilor lui alfa este mai apropiata de poeziile (proaste) ale lui b decat de poeziile originale ale lui alfa. (ce inseamna mai apropiata? in opinia cui? a grecilor sau a francezilor? sau a traducatorului? sau a criticilor traducatorului?)

5. prostie "Acesta este un text pe care e foarte bine sa-l scrii, dar foarte rau sa-l citesti"

6. fuzare Formalizarea ca masurare.
Poate exista o pata neregulata care sa fie egalmente apropiata de un cerc si de un patrat?
Aceasta idee mi-a venit auzind intrebarea "Ce forma are fatza ta? Eu am fata triunghiulara, tu cred ca o ai ovala". Poate exista o fatza la fel de apropiata de un triunghi si de un oval?
(intrebare de filos stiintei): De ce se inventeaza noi marimi fizice? (sau psihologice?)

7. A cunoaste un obect e evident o chestiune graduala.
Dar a cunoaste/sti o prop e strict (ori ba ori da). Daca nu e strict, doar il believe.
Ce ar insemna analogonul lui a crede un obiect? Il stiu partial?

8.pla&empathy"eu nu pot sa exprim/descriu in cuvinte ceea ce simt". Daca a exprima/descrie in mod corect o stare mintala inseamna a o declansa in mintea alocutorului, atunci de unde stii ca NU ai declansat-o?
Poate atunci ajung la politie lingvistica: in loc sa spui "nu pot descrie in cuvinte" trebuie spus "nu pot fi sigur ca am descris in cuvinte".

9. Ideile (Gedanken fregeene) ca idealizari ale starilor mintale. Ce e rau in asta?

10. Putnam si plopul Faptul ca Putnam nu poate dtge intre un ulm si un plop -->el nu resimte lipsa unui cuvant in plus daca l-ar avea doar pe unul --> la limita, noi nu resimtim nio in mod absolut lipsa unor cuvinte --> lbjul e mereu complet (ca viata, care e meru completa: deci intelege viata ca producere de noi cuvinte).
Ca la Darwin: daca doar englezii ar exista pe pamant, ei s-ar repartiza uniform pe toate continentele in toate zonele locuibile. Asa si cuvintele.
Cuvintele sunt vii - animalute care lupta pentru supravietuire (ca amintirile)

De aici mai rezulta ca orice completare a limbajului meu cu cuvinte noi este o traducere.
(Eu vreau sa redau cumva intuitia ca a invata un limbaj stiintific, formule etc e precum a invata o lb straina. Qa intuitie e foarte importanta -ea trebuie justificata. (imagineaza-ti confirmare psihologica chestii)

1. How is it possible to remember

• what someone said, without remembering in which language he spoke?
• the language he spoke in, but not what he said

2. Someone who cant help writing when he has a piece of paper. He will never ask for one; but if he gets one, it will immediately become full of meaninguful sentences. If he must say something, he will wait until he gets a sheet of paper

3. I typed www.haaretdaily.com instead of www.haaretzdaily.com and the computer didnt realize the mistake, although many humans would have. (Well, he can only make systematic mistakes). As it were, the computer lacks the feeling of context

4."It's only now that i realize how small my house is". Did I know it before? "Well, you saw/entered other houses as well, and you noticed their sizes". "Yes, but I didn't notice the relation between their sizes and the size of my house".

5. Is my visual field the totality of what i see, or what i look at? What i look at is "smaller" than what i see. But then how can i find what to look at? (See Witgenstein's remarks on "concentrate your attention on a part/point of your visual field")

I can see two screens on which two movies are played. But I cant look at two movies simultaneously.

6. For any piece of music, play the falsest interpretation of a musical piece, i.e. the wrongest, the farthest from the "good" interpretations, yet the farthest to be recognized as an interpretation of that particular musical piece.

7. Define the concepts: openess of mind; originality. The link between them

8. Where are my memories when i dont remember them? (the problem of attention)

9. The principle of linguistic incompletness: For any language and any rules of deriving well formed-formulae in that language, there will be some wrong formulae still recognizable as informative by the speakers of that language. (the tone of voice, the facial expression - "circumstances") - am i original in formulating this principle?

10. "All the books that were written might have not been written". (The empirical a priori). Similar to "this sentence might have not been utterred".
"Yes, but then a sentence with an identical meaning should have been utterred/books with an identical message should have been written".

11. The concept of losing. When is an object lost? When I am convinced that it is lost? Then "I only though I had lost it" would be meaningless. I panic about not knowing where my papers are and I exclaim "I lost my documents, I lost them!". Then I find them in my pockets and say "I hadn't actually lost them, I only thought I had lost them".

12. Losing and forgetting. Which of these should be reduced to the other?

13. "To lose something = to lose the hope of finding it". We decide when we lose an object.

14. "Don't you realize you lost it? It's pointless to look for it!". I mean: It's very unlikely that what you are looking for will appear before your eyes as an effect of your looking for it. If it appears and you recognize it as-the-object-looked-for, this will be a matter of chance.

15. "The field of my memory is a part of the totality of the past, as my visual field is part of the world". What's wrong with that? (Kinesthesia: how do I know that what i see and what I touch are the same object; how do I know that what i remember and what-I-learn-that-has-happened-in-the-past are the same event? I.e., I read in the newspapers about events that happened which I witnessed and say "This is indeed what happened; the others need to read in the newspaper about this, but I only need to read my memory")

16. "I couldn't have lost the coin in my pocket; just moments ago it was there. When I wanted to take it and didn't find it, it only seemed to me that I had lost it".

17. For some of the thoughts which come out of my mind, I suppose they were thought by others before me; for others I think noone thought them. (Originality as "coming out of one's mind, not from books/other people"; or as novelty- objective originality)

18. How can I realize I forgot something? I compare my mind with the reality and/or other people's minds, and see there are empty places in my mind. Why don't I have the feeling of continuity? (i.e., why don't we say "If I can't remember it, then can't imagine I experienced it, it did not happen with me as a witness of it")

19. Wittgenstein's stlye Why, after Wittgenstein, writing in short paragraphs did not become the academically accepted way of writing philosophy papers - this despite Wittgenstein's influence and his being recognized as "the greatest philosopher of the 20th century? "Well, we take seriously Wittgenstein's ideas, not his style"

20. "For any book, there could have been a book that should express the same ideas in a better style" (perhaps replace "better" with "clearer"). What does this mean?

21. "Can we think without words"? The analogy between expressing the ideas in a poem, versus its words. Bad poetry is often thesist, i.e. it says too explicitely what could be suggested. Is this the same as the relation between thoughts and words?

22. Can there be thoughts without words? This is somehow analoguous with "do things exist when i dont notice them?". If I can think without words, it is possible that i am wrong with respect to my words; that I should discover how i should express my thoughts; to say "It's only now that i realize what i really thought". Organize the debate around "there is thought without words"
Any context that fits this intuition? Perhaps "The bang was softer than i expected".

23. Can an utterance be non-metaphorically for the utterrer and metaphorical for the hearer? (depressive language "cancer of the soul"; synesthetic language)

24. A person who can always tell the time without looking at any watch. "See, I don't like to wear a watch because, if I want to tell the time by looking at it, I forget how the way the dots are to be interpreted, or i forget the time immediately; that's why i trained myself to know always what time it is by heart". (When asked what time it is, his answers are always correct).

25. If mental pain can be worse than physical pain, why punishment for causing mental pain (mental injury) is not as tough as for causing physical pain (injury)?
Type-token. There are tokens of mentally painful situations. (Mental pain arises because humans are different; physical pain because they are similar)

26. "Logic/mathematics as a sun surrounded by the clouds of psychology" (the last sentences of uG). Correlate with "I realize he is smarter/wiser than I; he can understand more than I can" - how can I mean such a thing? If I am more stupid than him, how can i realize this? By saying that I am more stupid than him, I make a compliment to my ability of understanding what "smartness" is, and I don't deserve such a compliment. Likewise, "I always follow the rules of logic" is a compliment not only to logic/mathematics, but also to my ability to understand logic/mathematics - why do i deserve such a compliment?
Any time I appreciate something, I also appreciate my ability understand it. (I appreciate the relation between it and myself).

27. Psychiatric medication can cause you feel some way - but not give you a ground for feeling that way.

28. Empaty I cannot doubt "that I feel a headache", "I feel like going to sleep". What about "I feel like L.W."?

27.09.02
29. There are no type causal relations between feelings and causes of feelings. But there are type moral judgments. This can induce a moral puzzle (norms over what feelings should be caused) - i mean such norms could not be applied.
"You are allowed to be jealous, but not to act on your jealousy". How do you know in advance what "to behave jealously" means?

30. Why is it moral (a right, an obligation) to make one's thought public? (This is the main problem of philosophy)

31. If a person does wrong to other person, is the victim obliged to allow/encourage the wrongdoer to atone for his sins?

32.God will speak to me after i dieIf there are objective moral laws, it is necessary that their ground might be unknown to people. (LMp). But it is necessary that they will be known - because it is immoral for an authority to ask someone to obey a norm without offerring him the ground why he should obey it.

November and December 2002:

1. When you are in a tunnel at whose end you can see no light, beware of the temptation of turning on the artificial light - you won't even notice the tunnel's end if you find it, or you will even forget you were looking for it

2. Can someone have the ability to make plans but no ability to fulfill them ?

3. Can someone be blamed for what he would do if p were the case? It seems not. Moral luck. (Such a person is lucky that p did not become actual) Dec 2002

4. What is "relativity of co-mundaneity"? (analogy with relativity of simultaneity)?

5. A good (psychological) reason for not wanting to do the good from an anonymous position is that you risk doing the evil in the face of others. (I am so moral that I want to do the Good even if nobody applauds me <--> I don't need to justify my behavior in face of others).

6. If spatio-temporal stages can form one and the same object, why counterparts (counterfactual parts) cannot? (If counterparts cannot, why can spatiotemporal parts?)
What is the counterpart of the relativity of simultaneity?

7. "I can value smart things stupidly; I can value stupid things in smart ways". See the final paragraphs of uG (if i accept mathematical statements as certain, i can accept empirical statements as well for certain).
This is yet not the same with "It means the same for me if a stupid person tells me i am smart, or if a smart person tells me i am stupid". The latter case more complicated - why?

8. Can any piece of music be played at any instrument? (By that i mean that some instruments may be unable to play certain notes; they may be able to play additional notes - or not. Yet is there something as "the closest piece of music that can be played on this instrument"?

9. from Tegu THE MORAL VALUE OF PREEMPTIVE/REDUNDANT CAUSATIONHow to transform the moral value of my enemy's actions by redundant causation? Ii fac rau cuiva care oricum imi va face raul meritat (de mine), astfel incat raul facut de el mie va aparea ca razbunare -> i result in a better off morally situation. Write about this an essay for Kvart (thanks to Tegu) ! Exemplu: cineva e beat si stiu ca ma va bate. Atunci il jignesc astfel incat fapta lui (ma bate) va aparea inca si mai grava (e supradeterminata cauzal, sau poate betia e preempted de la a actiona cauzal)

10. Nonsense versus absurdity Nonsense: Un cersetor care cere in autobuz doarbilet pentru calatoria actuala.
Absurd: Un cersetor care cerseste bani pentru calatoria actuala (i.e., presupune ca trebuie sa coboare si sa cumpere pt acea calatorie care se va termina prin coborarea lui).
Meta and trans linguistic

Relativism and psychological terms 11. Asta ar fi o mare problema pentru PLA: ce se intampla cu o limba care are alti termeni psihologici gc ai nostri? De exemplu, o lb in care "ridiculous" si "suicidal" sunt exprimati prin uac cuvant? Sau - ca sa complicam exemplul - o lb in care nu exista termeni psihologici, ci doar morali. (De ex, nu exista cuvant pentru "ridiculous", ci doar pentru "perhaps guilty, or guilty for no obvious reason

Is the distinction between conceptual and empirical statements a conceptual or an empirical one? (Correlate with "phenomenologically phenomenal").

Menon "I would recognize it if i saw it, but i cannot recall it"
Correlate with "I know this has no value, but i don't know how it would be if it were better"

Why do we need to believe rather than to doubt? This is our meta-form of life. (uG) Even if i imagine some forms of life where wholly different things are believed, they would still believe something.

Much more difficult to make people think when they don't want to think, than to make them be right when they are wrong.

6.1.03 - despre intenstionalitate si DDO/DRE:

What about salva-veritate substitution of predicates in intensional contexts?
"A thinks that Fb; F=G;/.'. A think that Gb"

Why Venus is Venus is analytical? After all, how do i know that the first occurence of the name means the same (and has the same sense) as the second?

Singular counterfactuals (din Gugiu) "Daca pisica mea este vertebrata atunci balenele sunt mamifere" e adev; "daca pisica mea ar fi (fost) vertebrata, balenele ar fi (fost) mamifere" e intuitiv fals. In fuzarea lui Lewis trebuia sa iasa insa adevarat, fiindca lumea actuala e cea mai apropiata de lumea actuala, deci (A --> B) --> (A > B). Or (vide supra) nu prea e intuitiv

intensionality and causation If and only if causation is intensional, properties can be causally effective (a-as-F caused B, but not a-as-G, where Fa and Ga). (verifica dacaiasa) Home 30.12.2002

1. "I only give rewards to people who don't look for rewards". This is an inconsistent position, because it leads to a secret ethics. I.e., the criteria for which i value people/their deeds shouldn't be known to them. (Classify it along with other similar moral situations).

8. An expert in an area where i am not an expert is a theoretical term. (If "theoretical term" means: something that may stand for something, or perhaps for nothing at all, but i duno for what

9. My remarks are possible thoughts; seeds of thoughts; imperatives.

10. Searching for a logic of causation is an obvious example of "logic as bureaucracy of thought".
What drew my attention was the following: an intuition (counterfactual dependence) is formalized. Then the question arises: how to express in plain language the negation (or any other function) of this formula?
I.e., we climbed a ladder, then we mettailim lemala, then lo iodyim eich laredet. Isn't it funny?

11. Asta ar fi o mare problema pentru PLA: ce se intampla cu o limba care are alti termeni psihologici gc ai nostri? De exemplu, o lb in care "ridiculous" si "suicidal" sunt exprimati prin uac cuvant? Sau - ca sa complicam exemplul - o lb in care nu exista termeni psihologici, ci doar morali. (De ex, nu exista cuvant pentru "ridiculous", ci doar pentru "perhaps guilty, or guilty for no obvious reason").

12. whether arguments should be coercive (Nozick) Rousseau a crezut ca da - asta e explicatia lui "on le forcera d'etre libre". DE ASTA E NEvOIE SAL FORTEZI PE ALA SA FIE LIBER: ALTFEL TEAR FORTA EL PE TINE, HE COULDNT HELP DO THAT. DECI - DACA VREI SA IESI DIN ROUSSEAU - AR TREBUI SA ARGUMENTEZI PENTRU CARACTERUL NECOERCITIV AL CONVINGERILOR POLITICE. ROUSSEAU AR FI CONSIDERAT PESEMNE IMORAL/NEAUTENTIC/IPOCRIT/BLEAH CA CINEVA SA GANDEASCA CA STATUL TREBUIE SA FACA CUMVA SI IN ACELASI TIMP SA NU FACA TOT POSIBILUL SA DETERMINE STATUL SA FACA ASA. PROBLEMA LUI "VREAU P, DAR NU FAC NIMIC CA SA PROUC P".
cele de mai sus pot fi intelese doar tinand cont de extinderea eului si omogenizarea eului la rousseau (Adica de asta ar face ala asa, ti-ar baga pe gat parerile lui)

Evident, corelatie cu "why need my thots be public?"

13. my idea for essay on kvart psychological causes preempt neurological causes

obs: acum imi dau seama ca este o tampenie. chiar daca nu ar fi fost manios ar fi actionat in felul cum a actionat.
deci nu am nici o idee pentru eseul pt kvart.

acum (ian 2003) mi se pare ca ideea nu e o tampenie, era o idee buna...adica sa ppm (trivial) ca dorinta de a bea un pahar cu apa = excitarea neuronului no. 3456, atunci se poate ajunge la o situatie in care ala chiar vrea sa bea apa desi neuronul 3456 nu e excitat, ci neuronul 6543. Dar neuronul 6543 nu provoaca in mod tipic dorinta de a bea apa. daca 6543 nu ar fi fired, 3456 ar fi facuto.

14. cztMarea mea problema: cum e posibil sa declansezi causal o dsz fara sa declansezi manifestarea ei? Fa in asa fel incat acest obiect sa devina solubil, dar nu il dizolva!

15. cztCa sa ma pun la mintea lui Lewis, trebuie facuta dreptate intuitiei ca uneori A nu poate fi cauza lui B, fiindca in absenta lui A C l-ar fi produs. Lewis sar apara zicand ca asta e sibatiut meiuteret; nu, eu vreau sa fie preemptie, si totusi ppc e cauza. Poate fi aici o problema de individualizare a cauzei/efectului (fragilitate...nu ma duce mintea sa explorez aceasta intuitie).
Ex: "am citit despre o idee in autorul A. Dar si daca nu as fi citit in A, tot mi-ar fi venit ideea asta (sunt eu asa de destept). Prin urmare, ideea e originala (a mea).
Ceea ce pare sa dovedeasca q ex e ca nu pot in practica distinge intre cauza eficienta si ppc
Aplicatie in eutanasia:"Si daca nu l-ai fi omorit (pe muribund) el tot ar fi murit". Cumva sugestia e ca ar fi murit foarte repede dupa ce te-ai fi abtinut sa il omori, cum ar veni hamattat qesed este cauza mortii lui, dar nu "foarte cauza". Formalizeaza intuitia ca ceva poate fi mai cauza sau mai putin cauza....

16. cztleaga cu intuitia mea ca trebuie distins intre ppc care ar fi putut produce efectul daca cauza nu il producea (avea mari sanse sa il produca) si ppc care sigur l-ar fi produs. Cred ca Lewis accounts for this (asa, orice event este un ppc pentru orice efect in lumi suficient de departate).
Marea problema cu Lewis este ideea lui de closeness. Eu nu o vad intuitiva

17. czt Exemplul lui Gugiu cu daca e vertebrata atunci nu e balena, dar daca fals ca daca ar fi fost vertebrata atunci ar fi fost balena. Este o critica foarte grava la adresa lui Lewis. Tot ce poate face Lewis e sa ne iluzioneze: sa ne modifice intuitiile f( fuzarea lui, astfel incat eu chiar sa cred ca orice contrafactual A>B suporta "materializare" in A --> B pentru ca lumea actuala e cea mai apropiata de lumea actuala.
O alta solutie a lui Lewis ar fi sa zica ca relatia de apropiere e antisimetrica (i.e., nici o lume nu poate fi apropiata de alta lume)...ma intreb la ce dificultati ar conduce un asemenea epiciclu.

La fel si relatia dintre inteles si forma scrisa/pronuntata a cuvantului.

Analogia intre limbaj si orice altceva e impura, fiindca ea trebuie exprimata in limbaj. Chomsky analogheaza limbajul cu mersul pe bicicleta. Ce e rau in asta? Faptul ca el se exprima in limbaj ca sa formuleze aceasta analogie. (nu inteleg de ce e rau...) Apoi, ce ar fi daca singura maniera de a te exprima in limbaj ar fi sa desenezi litere pe asfalt cu rotile bicicletei? Am sentimentul ca o asemenea posibilitate trebuie ruled out, de ce am acest sentiment?

didactic Ce e intelectul la Kant?

1. spontaneitatea
2. facult conceptelor
3. facult regulilor

26. Analitic/sintetic Eu acum (10 ian 2003) sunt perfect de acord cu Quine ca distinctia an/sint e o prostie.
Pentru un astronom contemporan, care a invatat in manual ca Hesp e Fosf, enuntul Hesp=Fosf este chiar analitic. Pentru un copil "Venus e Venus" e sint; la fel pentru cineva din jungla a carui limba nativa nu mentine referinta constanta a tuturor ocurentelor unuia si aceluiasi termen. (de unde stiu eu ca primul 'Venus' are aceeasi Bedeutung ca al doilea 'Venus'?)
Dar cel mai bine iti dai seama de asta daca te gandesti la o poza a unui om la 15 ani si poza aceluiasi om la 50 de ani. Pentru un specialist in maturizarea fetselor umane, identitatea de Bedeutung dintre cele doua este analitica (nu are nevoie decat sa se uite la poze); pentru altcineva ea e sintetica.