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Natural language (nalg) and formalization:
Possible views:
1. nalg is good as it is, it can be bun asa cum este, it can be precisely formalized
2. nalg cannot be precisely formalized, therefore it is bad
3. nalg cannot be precisely formalized, but it is good as it is

If logic is normative, then why not also sentences like "no green point is yellow"?

The great question: why doesnt Wittgenstein accept rules of inference in TLP?

�81 seems to suggest that we should not ascribe unconscious rules. (Tentatia de a atribui reguli inconstiente vine din compararea ln cu un ideal). Fii atent ca in uG el pare sa accepte reguli inconstiente (propozitiile mooriene) Ce e rau in modelele ideale pentru limbaj? De vreme ce in fizica exista asemenea modele, de ce nu si asupra ln? Raspuns: Regulile ln sunt prescriptive -> modelele ideale ar fi reguli pentru altceva. Bleah.

Ce il deranjeaza pe Wittg in ideea ca logica e normativa? Il deranjeaza ca logica (lui Russell) ar trebui respectata in vorbirea curenta? Sau il deranjeaza ideaa ca ln ar fi supus unor norme?

Evident ca el accepta ca ln e guvernat de norme. Si atunci de ce nu e bine sa schimbam logica?

Tezele lui TeGu.:

  1. Nu exista un sistem complet de formule de reguli (RF)
  2. Orice RF poate fi misunderstood
  3. Unele RF determina un curs unic de actiune, altele nu si totusi sunt indispensbile, nu trebuie sa le inlocuim prin RF care sa determine un curs unic.
  4. Nu exista reguli ci RF si aplicatii regulate (RA), pentru ca nu exista nici un gap intre RF si RA si nici un proces intermediar (interpretarea) intre RF si RA. ("ontologia nominalista a lui Wittg"). Kertesz nu e de acord ca nu exista reguli; asta ar insemna extensionalism, vide �151.

Wittgenstein exclude posibilitatea ca cineva sa aplice corect o FR, sa se justifice invocand-o si sa nu o urmeze. Lui Kertesz nu ii e evident

Reguli si dubiu Tot asa cum exista dubiu legitim si dubliu nelegitim, exista indeterminare legitima si indeterminare nelegitima -> conexiune cu problema scepticismului

Reguli si reconstructie rationala Filosofia traditionala fata de ln:

Wittgenstein ca 2. se reduce la 1., iar 1. nu e admisibila.

PRIMA APORIE:
TEZA: Exista FPA despre reguli (RFe, sau conexiuni intre RF si RA): Atunci cand ma justific invocand o anumita FR, eu chiar acelei reguli incerc sa ma supun - si nu alteia. Desigur, asta nu inseamna ca o urmez corect.
ANTITEZA: Nu exista FPA despre reguli. Daca cineva crede sincer ca incearca sa se supuna unei FR, eu pot totusi sa descopar ca el a incercat sa se supuna altei FR.

Pentru TEZA: �81PU- nu pot atribui cuiva reguli pe care nu le poate invoca pentru a-si justifica actiunea. (Nu exista temeiuri inconstiente).
Corelare cu "intentionalitatea e infailibila"(Zettel). Daca ma gandesc/il astept pe N., chiar pe N. il vizez. Gandeste regula (RF) ca pe un om care imi va spune la fiecare pas ce trebuie sa fac - chiar daca nu stiu dinainte ce imi va spune. Daca sunt infailibil in identificarea obiectului intentional vizat, de ce nu si identificarea RF?

Pentru ANTITEZA: �54PU (si uG): observand comportamentul lor, putem deduce regulile pe care ei le urmeaza, sau pe care vor sa le urmeze.

Solutia lui TeGu.: E necesar ca eu sa-mi pot justifica actiunea invocand o RF pentru ca sa mis e atribuie acea RF. Dar eu nu sunt infailibil cu privire la aplicatiile corecte (de catre mine sau altii) ale regulii.
Eu am FPA despre RF pe care o vizez (intentionez sa o urmez). Dar nu despre corectitudinea aplicarii ei de catre mine. Daca eu cred ca fac tot ce-mi spune oracolul, poate ca ascult de oracol corect sau prost; dar sigur de oracol (si nu de altceva) ascult.

Ontologia regulii. Nu exista reguli, ci RF si RA. Nu exista nici un fapt (mintal, abstract, behavioral) care sa determine corectitudinea unei aplicatii, prin care sa se poata determina ca o aplicatie e aplicatia corecta sau incorecta a unei reguli.
Contraargument: poate ca exista RF niciodata respectate

Wittgenstein si comunitarismul. Comunitatea e esentiala pentru ce inseamna a urma o regula; ce fac eu trebuie sa poata fi justificat in fata celorlalti (varianta mai blanda a imperativului categoric kantian). Comunitatea decide cum trebuie inteleasa RF. Dar comunitatea nu decide pentru fiecare aplicatie in parte daca e corecta sau nu.
Comunitatea are o type-authority, nu insa o token-authority asupra aplicatiilor corecte. (ce am vrut sa zic?). Eu nu trebuie sa fac ce fac ei, dar trebuie sa inteleg la fel ca ei ce trebuie facut.
Asta presupune ca a intelege o regula nu inseamna deja a face ceva . Wittgenstein si akrasia.

SAU: Comunitatea are autoritate semantica, dar nu normativa asupra mea. Obiectie: asa presupui ca semantica nu e normativa si ea. Evident, e vorba de alte norme. "In germana la masa se spune Tisch" e norma daca vorbesc germana, dar e un fapt empiric daca vorbesc alta limba.
Si daca ei au autoritate semantica, de ce nu si normativa-in-sens-nesemantic?

Refuzul logicii ca standard al ln <-> refuzul reconstructiei rationale. Ce are Wittgenstein impotriva logicii?

  1. Nu exista un ideal de exactitate. Exactitatea e o Familieahnung (�88 s)
  2. Daca logica s-ar modifica pentru a reda intuitiile din ln, atunci nu ar mai putea fi standard.
  3. Daca logica ar fi un model al ln, atunci ea (ca model) ar trebui sa fie intuitiva.
  4. Daca logica ar fi un model al ln, atunci ea ar trebui sa apartina competentei speakerilor --> nu ar mai putea fi normativa.

Oare aici vezi conceptia arhaica a lui Wittgenstein despre logica? (Precum Kant, el a crezut ca logica nu mai poate face progrese. Cum se poate sa fi gresit atit de mult? Ce e valoros in aceasta greseala?

Ce relevanta are discutia despre logica pentru discutia despre reguli?

  1. Toate propozitiile logicii sunt reguli
  2. Regulile sunt normative; or logica e normativitatea sui generis

APORIA A DOUA:
TEZA: All sentences of logic are rules
ANTITHESIS: Logic (with capital L) is not the logic of nalg. Does this mean that we break the rules of Logic (i.e. we understand Logic, but do not respect it), or that we misunderstand them (i.e. they are not intuitive)?

Regulated = rationally reconstructed (or standing in no need of rational reconstruction)

�143: the first aporia. When exactly do we say that the child understood the rule? And if he didnt understand it, when exactly do we say that there is a random/systematic mistake ? There is no clear-cut distinction between systematic/random mistake, if we are based only on behavior

�144 is meta-Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's intended reader is like the child in �143, who needs to be converted (whose ability to learn has limits).

�146: Perhaps "understanding a rule" means competence-as-mental-state?
Now, you have two posssibilities:

  1. either this mental entity (state, disposition) is accessible to us and then we can misunderstand it
  2. or this entity determines us mechanically, and then this has nothing to do with obeying a rule, but with a natural law.
Therefore, Understanding a rule is a performance, not competence. (its criterion should lie in performance, not in competence). �146: the last sentence ("The application is still a criterion of understanding) boils down to the extensional and behaviorist-cum-contextualist view of rule understanding.
What does "criterion" mean? Necessary, or necessary-and-sufficient condition ? (If nec-and-suf, then we lose FPA).

�147 : the one who lost FPA about rules argues: "The history of applying the rule cannot be a criterion for understanding the rule, because only an infinite history could be such a criterion. We would need an infinite number of applications, therefore understanding is not a practice but an event.
Wittgenstein replies: "No, you dont need an infinite history".
Wittgenstein polemizez with three opponnents:


The Evenimentialist is, now, a Mentalist - but he could be behaviorist as well if he said "understanding means a specific behavior, a privileged application, experimentum crucis". Wittgenstein sounds to Kertesz as a Rylean, disposisionalist about behavior

�149 "neural reconstruction". Wittgenstein attacks the Evenimentialist again. The third-man argument: if behaviour does not solve something, then nothing mental could solve it.

from �151 on, Wittgenstein's thesis boils down to "undersanting cannot be identical with facts"

�151-62: Wittgenstein seems to become intensionalist

  1. Two series (doua siruri) of applications can be identical, yet they exeplify different rules. (several RAs for one RF).
  2. It is not enough to think of RF, i need to understand it. (�152), to recognize ti as the RF that acts here, that is applied here.

Mie imi vine sa zic: "i need to grasp the RF under a certain aspect". And in my (kertesz') ontology, senses are aspects (ways how things, facts appear).

What does "Intensionalist" mean? An intensionalist, for me, is one who grasp something as something; who is sensitive to as - and reifies the something in "as something"; i.e. the aspect is a thing. (the path from the RA to the RFs, from word to thing, is itself a thing).
Wittgenstein cannot be extensionalist, because two series of RAs , no matter how long, may coincide and yet instantiate different RFs. Cred ca Tegu ar zice ca atunci ele chiar sunt aceeasi regula.
Witgenstein cannot be intensionalist either, because the path is not a thing. (The highway is not a station).

THIRD APORIA
THESIS: It is only from RAs in a certain context that you can realize if the RF was understood or not - �154-6.
ANTITHESIS: Any series of RAs , no matter how long,, in no matter what context, is compatible with several incompatible RFs.
The solution seems to be: correct RAs are tokens, not types. There are tokens of "understanding a RF", but not types.
Kertesz' questions/remarks: the meta-rule: which rule do i instantiate when i say that someone understood the rule (RF)?" Let's say: the correct RAS of a RF are a family-resemblance.
We can change our minds ("i thought he had understood the RF, but now i can realize that he hadn't").
Circumstances (token-situations) are useful to tell apart between "He follows another rule/he follows this rule wrongly" But circumstances (token-situations) cannot authorize us to ascribe the correct understanding of a rule to anyone. Neither can circumstances (token-situations) together with the correct continuation of a series of RAs.

Third aporia: we realize if he correctly applied the rule based on the context. But any context is compatible with his failure to obey that rule.

FOURTH APORIA:
THESIS: Understanding a word is identified by the rules of correct using it.
ANTITHESIS: Speakers cannot defent themselves, nu se pot justifica, (constient) for talking the way they do by appeal to the grammar RFs they learnt in school. ==> there are no rules in nalg. (RFs of grammar have no RAs). But this is a very implausible conclusion.

�181: when exactly do we diagnose a systematic/random (intamplatoare) mistake?
"He understood the rule" is 

 

        Legi           /  Norme
        Cauzalitate    /  Intemeiere

Let's say this: if a natural law (a hypothesis) is falsified one time, we cannot stay calm: we need to change it.
But if a rule is disobeyed one time, we don't need to change it. someone can make a mistake and we still trust him. (How many mistakes are enough for us to withdraw our trust in him?)

To hold the difference between laws and rules, one can say: "Laws cannot be disconfirmed randomly, but rules can". What does "randomly" mean? Without a cause? With small frequency?

I cant understand the last sentence in �183!!!!!!!I can only understand that Wittgenstein clarifies the difference between understanding a norm/ being in a causal dependence.

PASSiM: Cauzalitatea intre stari, competente: "el merge pentru ca are picioare". De obicei se discuta despre cauzalitatea intre evenimente. A il cauzeaza pe B il implica pe B->A ??

Yet, Wittgenstein can be accued of being oblivious of the distinction cause/sufficient condition.(the conjuction of necessary conditions).

EU:
�184 makes me ask:
"Acum stiu sa fredonez melodia; dar daca nu lasi sa o fredonez, peste 5 minute nu voi mai sti (o voi uita)".
The problem of rule is relevant for "Wittgenstein and meta-Wittgenstein": Wittgenstein doesnt know what he will write in the future. The end of PU is not given in the beginning. (Wittgensteins commentators do).

"All the steps are already taken": perhaps yes in a logical sense. �189: o ecuatie e diferita de o inecuatie. But from here one cannot go to the psychological sense. The example of epistemic logic. Logic shouldnt be enshrined (erijata) in super-fapt psihologic.

�193: Connexions are constraints, taught ideally. (the blueprint, schitza), norma. Whereas the norm is a super-fact - as Logic, which is an ideally logical language, shall be a super-language. Correlate with criticism of Logic as ideal model of nalg. Logic is for nalg what the schita masinii is for masina. (din schitza nu poti vedea greselile).
Logic like a god, or sun covered by psychological clouds. Logic as God's blueprint for making the world.

�194 fascinates me: How do i know that the state-of-affairs Mp is the possibility of p and not of other state-of-affairs? Anyone should answer that Mp is not a state-of-affairs; Mp in this world is the sign of p. Cineva ar zice; "All sentences uttered, or utterable, by someone in one's lifetime, are potentially existing in one's brain as the seeds from which past/present/future sentences have/do/will grow". How do you know that from a certain seed only a certain sentence - and not other - can grows?
Adica: de ce sa invoci semintele enunturilor, de vreme ce ele conduc la scepticism? Eu (Wittgenstein) nu sunt ssceptic, tocmai de aia nu invoc posibilitati.
Posibilul reificat este (gresit) inteles ca