Some Comments About 'Faith', Part II

The primary theme of my post is the examination of Jackson's claim that reason and faith are compatible, and that there is such a thing as "rational faith." One of the more important points which I attempt to emphasize is the fact that the definition of 'faith' given in Hebrews 11:1 is insufficient to define the term as it is used in the gospels.

There are 21 sections in this post (the section titles are new to this edition):

Subj: Re: [jaberz] Some comments about 'faith'

Date: 7/19/02 8:47:27 PM Pacific Daylight Time

From: [email protected] (Carubemil Jex)

To: [email protected]

Hi RAZA. Thanks for your time and effort responding to my many questions. Since the text portions of this thread are getting long, I have broken up my response below into numbered sections. I'm anticipating that this will make future responses in this thread easier to develop.

One of the more important themes which I see coming out of this dialogue is my emerging conclusion that Heb. 11:1 does not adequately define the idea of faith as it is employed in the gospel stories. Heb. 11:1 seems to want to make faith a form of certainty (if we go with the NIV translation), while the examples in the gospels suggest that those who have faith are endowed with the ability to control nature and rewrite reality, essentially to perform magic, thus indicating that faith is much more than simply a form of certainty.

SECTION 1: Faith as a Power to Conform Reality to One's Consciousness

RAZA wrote:

"Faith IMHO is a state od mind, tha is - it is 'being certain of things hoped for, sure of things unseen'."

First of all, in comparing the KJV version of Heb. 11:1 ("faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen") with the NIV version of the same verse ("faith is being certain of things hoped for, and sure of things unseen"), it's curious to note that the former version (KJV) defines 'faith' in terms of other nouns ("substance" and "evidence"), while the latter version (NIV) defines 'faith' in terms of adjectives ("being certain" and "sure"). I think it would be more grammatical to have the NIV to read "faith is *the state of* being certain… and sure…" since 'faith' is used as a noun, not as an adjective. In one of the sections below, we'll find that the preponderance of English translation shows the terms in Heb. 11:1 to be nouns.

Anyway, let's move on.

RAZA, would you say that faith, as a state of mind, is the product of some kind of prior reasoning or mental process? It should be clear that you reject the KJV translation of Heb. 11:1 since you don't seem to think that faith is either a "substance" or an "evidence." I don't blame you, because I think that at least the use of the term "substance" is quite problematic. I wonder how your view (that faith is "a state of mind" comprised of a form of certainty) can be plausibly integrated with the many passages of the NT which urge people (audiences of sermons or readers) to "have faith." Many believers have told me, after they've exhausted their attempts to argue for their religious beliefs, that it all comes down to whether one has faith or not. But if faith is "being certain of things hoped for, sure of things unseen" (i.e., a form of certainty), this urgency makes faith out to be quite arbitrary. Such believers seem to be making out certainty to be responsive to one's desires: "just have faith, and everything will be all the better…" But the mind does not work this way (if one is honest, of course). If one is not certain about something, he does not become genuinely certain by wishing it or by obedience to commands.

I also think it would be imperative for any proposed definition of faith in the biblical sense to apply to the many examples of faith in action throughout the gospels. For instance, in Matt. 14, Jesus appears walking on the waters of the sea (cf. v. 25). The disciples are astonished by this, and yet Jesus asks Peter (v. 27) to join him (No, he doesn't say "jump in, the water's fine"). Peter, of course, is understandably hesitant; he knows from firsthand experience that water will not support him if he tries to walk on it. But Jesus insists (v. 29) and Peter indulges him, taking his first steps on the water, but begins to sink (v. 30). Then Jesus scolds Peter (v. 31) saying, "O thou of little faith, wherefore didst thou doubt?" This suggests that faith is more than simply being certain of something, since one can think that he's certain on something, and still be wrong. Does faith have some kind of power to override the identity of objects such that they behave differently if we are "certain" that they will? That is what this example surely suggests.

What's of special note here is that RAZA's preferred definition of faith still makes faith dependent on one's hopes ("faith is being certain of things hoped for…"). But nowhere is it explained what hopes have to do with certainty or, more importantly, truth, or how this hopeful certainty can alter reality (as in the example of Jesus and Peter walking on water above). This is an area which I think most believers tend to overlook in their explanations of what faith is all about in the attempt to make their Christian beliefs seem reasonable. Indeed, at one point RAZA had confessed that he had never really thought about it until I pointed it out to him in this forum (see post #510). Yet still he wants to defend this view (and in my view, this action confirms Richard Robinson's points about faith - see point No. 4 in my post #545). Faith is "explained" as simply a matter of certainty in one's hopes, which is problematic enough; but many examples of faith in action in the Bible suggest the faith endows the believer with magical powers. This is obviously the stuff of legends.

Look at the example about Jesus and Peter walking on water again: Jesus scolds Peter apparently for not having sufficient faith. What was this faith supposed to do? How was faith supposed to overcome Peter's supposition that he was going to sink in the water? How was faith supposed to overcome the fact that non-buoyant objects that are more dense than water will sink in water? Was Peter supposed to simply hope that he would be able to walk on water, and if he were certain of his hope he would not sink in it when he put his feet upon the water? Are hopes sufficient to overcome the law of identity? Is being certain of what one hopes for sufficient to overcome the law of identity? That's basically what this passage in Matthew is suggesting if we read for faith "being certain of things hoped for, and sure of things unseen." If faith is so easy for believers to understand (and I can only suppose that it is, for believers great and small present themselves as experts on the notion quite matter-of-factly in my experience), then why don't we see believers walking on water today?

I don't think the view of faith which is implied in passages like Matthew 14 is precisely the same view which is suggested in Heb. 11:1 if we take RAZA's preferred definition. Being certain of "things hoped for" does not make them a reality. This is an explicit primacy of consciousness view in an explicitly primacy-of-existence reality. It doesn't work, it cannot work, it never will work, and belief that it does is clearly irrational. It is the view that one's consciousness has the power to overcome the nature of objects just by wishing or hoping. This is what is modeled in the Bible's examples of faith, regardless of how one wants to translate the definition that Heb. 11:1 gives for the term. I submit, therefore, that the definition in Heb. 11:1 does not adequately define the notion employed in such examples as Matt. 14. For Heb. 11:1 to apply to Matt. 14, one would have to argue that "being certain of things hoped for, and sure of things unseen" is sufficient to perform magic feats.

Another pertinent example is found in Mark 5. In that chapter, we read the story of the daughter of a man named Jarius. This young woman had been suffering from an ailment which needed healing. As she touches the hem of Jesus' garment as he passes among a crowd, she was magically healed of her ailment. In Mark 5:34 Jesus says to her, "thy faith hath made thee whole." I can see how some might think this confirms that faith is a kind of "substance" since certain substances are known to help the body (such as the chemicals in an aspirin might relieve a headache, or antibiotics might clear up a skin rash). Do you think that faith in this example is rather "being certain of things hoped for, and sure of things unseen"? How does such certainty heal someone?

In Mark 2:5, we read "When Jesus saw their faith…" I can see how some might think this passage confirms the notion that faith is "the evidence of things unseen." But should we say that Jesus saw their certainty? Or, would we read this as meaning that Jesus saw in their actions the expression of their certainty?

My point here is that, any explanation of the notion of 'faith' which Christians offer must, I would think, cohere not only to the purported definition of 'faith' found in Heb. 11:1 (depending on whichever translation is preferred), but also to the many examples of faith given in the New Testament, particularly in the gospels (since the majority of the words about faith which we find in the gospels are attributed to Jesus). It is significant that all the glorified examples of faith in Heb. 11 are examples of action, not of "belief."

I had written:

"Since both Rob and Raza (and I would be willing to assume many other Christians) are in agreement with each other in that they do not accept Bev’s conception of faith as an act of will (i.e., to act *as if* something one does not believe is true) as an accurate portrayal…"

RAZA had responded:

"It cannot be because John 3:16 says 'For God so loved the world that He gave His only Son that whoever *believes* in Him should not perish but have eternal life.' So belief is a requirement of salvation, just like faith."

I then commented:

"Two things here. First, this does not explain why we should not view faith as Bev does. You say that Bev's conception of faith cannot be an accurate portrayal of what faith is in the biblical context, but John 3:16 is not an argument sealing this conclusion. You will have to explain its relevance in the context you have in mind here."

Now RAZA writes:

"Bev AFAIK believes that faith and belief are not related and cannot be realted."

And if faith is an act of will, then I would tend to agree with Bev. But this is a problematic area if we go by what the New Testament says. Note that in Mark 5:36, the author of the gospel has his Jesus say "Be not afraid, only believe." I can only interpret this passage as meaning that beliefs are thought to respond to wishes or commands. But it should be obvious to any thinker that the mind does not operate in this manner. One cannot simply decide to believe that cows can jump over the moon. One can *say* he believes this, and one can surely *act as if* this were the case, but unless one has some kind of process of reasoning or some contrivance of sorts, I don't think one can truly believe this. As we had discussed in the past (cf. Jaberz posts 421, 449 et al.), 'belief' is understood as a degree of confidence in a statement or idea. Confidence in an idea requires context, and this context cannot be supplied by wishes, hopes or conscious inventing. That is why I tell Christians that I would have to be dishonest to myself if I said I believed the gospel stories. Also, confidence in false ideas is usually diminished when those ideas are shown to be incoherent or incorrect, assuming one is honest to himself.

One's beliefs do not respond directly to one's will. Belief lies at the end of a long chain of inferences integrating "data sets" (Bev's term) which one cannot simply wish into existence or know by means of hoping. One can only work with the data sets he has, and if they are found insufficient to meet the desired task (e.g., figuring one's taxes, balancing a checkbook, designing the cooling system for an aircraft engine, etc.), one must take action in order to enlarge the available "data sets" by supplementing the relevant data needed. Thus, I'm in agreement here with Bev when he stated that "Nothing can change a belief but new evidence or new analysis" (Jaberz post #481).

According to many of the explanations I've heard from Christians, faith is some kind of magic goo that simply "fills in the gap" (RAZA's term; see post 593) when it comes to religious belief. It has no use or relevance when it comes to practical knowledge. But when it comes to fantasy and play acting, then I suppose faith is appropriate. Faith is essentially indistinguishable from pretending that a god exists and refusing to acknowledge that this is a pretense.

RAZA wrote:

"But the bible protrays both as related (need both for salvation)."

But the Bible never comes out and says that faith and belief are the same or that they are related, does it? What exactly is the relationship you have in mind here? Keep in mind those examples in the gospels which illustrate faith as a means of controlling nature. Can one control nature by simply believing?

I wrote:

"Second, it should be noted here that you are distinguishing belief and faith such that the two terms do not refer to the same thing. This may become pertinent at a later time."

RAZA wrote:

"Yes, I make such a distinction. But they are definitely related."

Can you elaborate on what you think that distinction is? If you have more to add, don't hold back.

I wrote:

"Not only is faith not defined in this manner, these partitions are in no wise even suggested by the Bible. The Bible nowhere speaks of rationality; the term does not appear in any of my translations, nor do I even recall the concept of rationality even implied in what the Bible does say."

RAZA wrote:

"The bible gives us a definition of faith, that is not incompatible with rationality, so it is logical to make these distinctions."

If faith is "a state of mind" - that to "have faith" is to "be certain of things hoped for, and sure of things unseen," what does this have to do with rationality? Rationality is the recognition and acceptance of reason as one's only means of validating knowledge. This virtue is in no way implied in what I read in the Bible. (Perhaps you have a different view of rationality?) Note that rationality (that is, the rationality which I have in mind) does not operate on hopes or wishes, nor is it claiming certainty when there is no awareness of facts supporting that certainty. So I don't see how faith "is not incompatible with rationality"; indeed, assuming either the definition which the Bible gives in Heb. 11:1 or the examples given throughout the NT, there is no compatibility whatsoever. My comments here take into account the biblical definition of faith found in Heb. 11:1 according to the translation which you prefer. But I also keep in mind the many examples of faith in action found throughout the New Testament, examples which make faith out to be a faculty for performing feats of magic, not simply a matter of certainty (which only suggests to me that Heb. 11:1 - however it is translated - is an insufficient definition).

As I mentioned, I don't recall the concept of rationality even implied in what the Bible does say. Nothing you say here has pointed to any instance in the Bible which leads to an understanding of rationality. Thus, I suspect that the partitions which you have suggested ("rational faith", "irrational faith" and "arational faith") are an invention promoted with the express purpose of rationalizing faith (i.e., to make it *seem* rational, when in fact it is not). But as should be clear, it is not rational to suppose that men can walk on water.

If both faith and rationality are said to be "a state of mind," then the former is a state of mind based on hopes, while the latter is a state of mind based on reason. Reason and hopes are not the same.

I asked:

"How are these partitions suggested by Heb. 11:1? Can you elaborate on this please? I think this would be very interesting to see (if there is anything here)."

RAZA wrote:

"Sure - The definition of faith that is given Does not tell us *why* the person is certain."

On the contrary. Heb. 11:1 strongly implies that one's hopes are why the person is supposedly "certain." The hope element must be reckoned with if we are to make any sense of Heb. 11:1, but it's not surprising that this element is frequently overlooked in explanations of what faith is supposed to really mean. It's also not surprising that the examples of faith in action throughout the gospel stories are also overlooked in the explanations I've seen. Christians typically want to make faith seem rational or at least not so antagonistic towards reason, but in so doing they compromise the ideas of the New Testament itself. As I mentioned above, it is not rational to suppose that men can walk on water.

RAZA wrote:

"Thus it is merely a matter of logic to suggest there are 3 possibilities - they are certain because of they are rational or because they are irrational or because they are arational."

But if you review my question, you should see that I asked how these partitions which you have proposed are suggested in Heb. 11:1. You say "it is merely a matter of logic to suggest there are 3 possibilities," but you do not show how this ties to anything stated in Heb. 11:1. You simply assert it here. Unless you asserted that these partitions are related to Heb. 11:1, I would have no way of knowing that either had anything to do with the other. As I had mentioned before, your suggestion of the three partitions you describe is unique in my experience; no other believer that I know of has apparently ever used the same logic you say you're employing here to extract these distinctions from Heb. 11:1. It's not clear to me how these partitions are suggested in Heb. 11:1, and in no way do I think they are.

But if you have more to say on this, I'm definitely interested.

RAZA had written:

"…and the *false* dichotomy between faith and reason."

I then responded:

"It's interesting that you continue to maintain that the faith/reason dichotomy is a false dichotomy, especially when, just below this point, you yourself wrote that 'faith is not the same as reason…'"

RAZA now writes:

"Yes, just because they are not the same does not mean they are unrelated.

"Consider

RAZA wrote:

"The set of reason and the set of faith can be intersecting sets, and where they intersect that is rational faith."

That's a cute diagram, RAZA.

But I think what the diagram illustrates is in conflict with what you had stated earlier. You stated that faith is "a state of mind" while I know reason to be a process. Here you place reason and faith alongside each other, and call the overlap "rational faith." By placing faith alongside reason in this manner, are you suggesting that faith is now a process rather than a "state of mind"?

I wrote:

"If they are not the same, then you should clarify how they are distinguished one from the other, and explain how they are compatible."

RAZA responded:

"When something is rational but certain then it does not need faith (to be certain), eg. I exist in some form. When something is rational but uncertain then to be certain it needs faith. Eg. The sun will rise tomorrow."

What does the faith part do in these cases? If one is not certain of something, what justifies one claiming certainty, thus calling it an instance of faith? You see, this is still very troublesome, and I'm not sure how you can explain this without compromising what the New Testament says about faith, both its definition and the many examples of faith given in the Bible (which are all examples of actions, not belief mind you). This is where faith takes on the quality of some kind of indefinite goo which "fills in the gap," as RAZA put it in one of his earlier posts.

You say, "When something is rational bunt uncertain then to be certain it needs faith." But why not simply admit at this point that you are not certain, and leave it at that? There is no crime in being uncertain, you know. And if one claims that he is certain when in actually he has no rational warrant to do so, he is then being dishonest to himself. Apparently that's what faith is needed for.

As for the sun rising, we've covered that a number of times. One need not appeal to mysticism to be assured of the sun's "rising."

RAZA wrote:

"ok well I'm not sure what *your* understanding of 'reason' is."

I wrote:

"When I use the term 'reason' I am referring to the means by which the mind works in its effort to achieve knowledge of reality. Rand basically holds that reason is the faculty which identifies and integrates what the senses provide. Rand was very clear that, since knowledge is knowledge of reality (i.e., the realm of existence), reason begins with the senses (i.e., reason begins with the objects of our awareness) and identifies what these objects by means of concepts, and integrates those concepts by means of logic, logic being a regulated (i.e., principle-driven) process of non-contradictory identification."

RAZA wrote:

"But the biblical definition of faith does not say that the evidence for a faith based belief cannot *begin* with the senses, as long as the 'final product' is 'unseen'."

Indeed, the Bible's treatment of "spiritual knowledge" seems quite unconcerned with specifying any means of perceiving that which it supposes to be the "evidence" substantiating that alleged knowledge. That is one reason why the whole matter of faith is so dubious to begin with: it appears to be knowledge by *no* means. This means that biblical knowledge is literally nonsense.

And, if one wants to be technical (and I see no reason why one should not), the definition we find in Heb. 11:1 does not indicate that the "thing unseen" can never been seen; on my reading of Heb. 11:1, it suggests that the "thing unseen" is simply not seen at the time when one has awareness of the evidence in question. For instance, when I hear the sound of a car which I do not see, I have "evidence of a thing unseen" (namely, the sound of the car). But this in no way stipulates that I cannot go outside my house and see the car, which earlier was "unseen." It seems that the definition given in Heb. 11:1 was offered simply to rationalize the notion of faith, since it steers clear of elucidating the examples of faith in action which we find in the gospels (e.g., men walking on water in Matt. 14). By ignoring those examples, Heb. 11:1 distances itself from the incredible and attempts to make the matter of faith seem more personal to the reader (by aligning it with his hopes), and therefore more accessible. I see this as a grand equivocation on the part of the author of Hebrews.

RAZA wrote:

"But for me, rational faith is not the same as reason because,"

I responded:

"Indeed, faith is not what I understand reason to be by any stretch. Reason will not lead to god-belief, and faith will not enable rationality."

RAZA wrote:

"heh begging the question."

How is this begging the question? If, as you have stated, faith is "a state of mind," then you're implying that faith is not a process, but the end (i.e., result) of a process. If that's the case, then, as the end of a process as opposed to being a process as such, it does not lead to further ends. Thus, while reason does not lead to god-belief, faith does not make rationality possible. As you had stated above, "When something is rational but certain then it does not need faith (to be certain)." And below you write that "rational faith" requires reason, not the other way around. Thus, reason and the commitment to reason (i.e., rationality) does not need faith.

So I don't see an instance of begging the question here at all.

RAZA wrote:

"…to have rational faith in X it is a necessary (but not sufficent) condition of having reasons to believe X is true."

I responded:

"I've read and re-read this statement a number of times, and it is just as unclear to me on the sixth reading as it was the first time I read it. Needs work!"

RAZA now states:

"To drive a car it might be neccessary for the car to have fuel, but this is not a sufficent condition (that is the car will need oil, etc as well) Similarly rational faith, requires reason, but this is necessary but not sufficent."

RAZA had written:

"I know I exist in some form, and this is reasonable, but it does not require faith because it is certain knowledge."

I responded:

"Here you are saying that the knowledge that you exist 'does not require faith because it is certain knowledge'. Thus, you seem to be saying that faith is not needed when one has achieved certainty by means of reason (and I agree completely with this; see above). Thus, you seem to be affirming the very dichotomy ('faith vs. reason') which you reject above. You also imply that faith is needed when reason does not lead to a desired conclusion (which again I agree with)."

Now RAZA writes:

"It is true that in this instance faith and reason are seperate, but I had to show this to show that they were different. But this does not mean that they do not overlap."

To understand how they "overlap" I suppose you need to explain what the faith part does. So far, it seems like a goo which one can arbitrarily trowel into a gap in order to "fill it" and thus rationalize one's claim to certainty on a matter, when in fact reason does not support that claim to certainty. You'll note that my characterization here is taken precisely from your own statements about faith in this thread. The more we go around about faith, the more nebulous and incomprehensible it seems to become.

RAZA had written:

"Consider this example

"'Now faith is being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see.' Hebrews 11:1 (NIV)"

I responded:

"Note this translation. While the KJV states 'Now faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things unseen', the NIV substitutes the KJV's 'substance' with "being sure of" and the KJV's "evidence" with '[being] certain of'. At both points, the NIV is a radical departure from the KJV (for "being sure" is not a 'substance', and 'being certain' is not 'evidence'). It makes no difference which one is used, but the very fact that the two definitions are in such disagreement here is significant, IMO."

RAZA wrote:

"ok a comment about translations. KJV is in old english, noone today speaks old english and hence IMHO it is best not to be used. NIV translates for meaning of the text, while NASB translates more literally. Amplified translates by expressing certain words by more than one english word."

Okay, that makes sense. Thanks for pointing out these distinctions. It may come in handy at some point. But it is curious to me that the different translations are at such odds with each other. As I stated, however, it really makes no difference to me which translation is used, since I am not an advocate of faith anyway. The way I personally see it is that, if one has reason, he has no need for faith. Rationality as I am using the term, you'll recall, is the recognition and acceptance of reason as the *only* means of validating knowledge. Thus, any other alleged means will be met with suspicion, especially if sincere efforts to make heads or tails as to how it supposedly works prove unsuccessful.

I wrote:

"Being sure of something is the end of a process of some sort. What process does Heb. 11:1 have in mind here? It implies that hoping is what gives the believer surety, but this is irrational. Hopes are not a means of cognition. If faith basically amounts to a state of being"

RAZA wrote:

"No it does not. Hoping is what one is sure of, not the process of *how* one is sure of it."

If that's the case, then where does the Bible enlighten us as to *how* one acquires the certainty which is said to make up faith? What do hopes have to do with it? How does this "certainty" assure us that we do not arrive at contradictory results? The Bible does not speak of reason as an epistemological method; indeed, the only place where I can understand the Bible truly referring to reason is in I Cor. 2 where Paul condemns "men's wisdom." I take that only to refer to reason, since that is literally "men's wisdom" - i.e., the means by which men arrive at their knowledge. So, if in answer to my question here (how does the Bible recommend we secure certainty in hopes?) you state "by means of reason," then I think you speak amiss.

What is so important about being certain of what one hopes for anyway?

 I wrote:

"Thus, belief apart from evidence [is] thought to be praiseworthy. Essentially, it amounts to saying 'Believe because it's written here', even though what's written there is what needs to be proved. Thus, in this sense, faith seems to be nothing more than confusing a claim with its own proof. But a claim is not its own proof, so again, I conclude that it is irrational."

RAZA wrote:

"But you'll also remember that Thomas asked for evidence, *and it was given to him*."

That may be, and we should note what that "evidence" supposedly was: wounds in Jesus' hands. Where are Jesus' hands now?

But again, that's besides the point. The point is that the Bible praises such examples of belief apart from evidence. It is examples like these which must be reckoned with if one wants to defend faith as a form of certainty. So far, I've seen nothing which takes such examples into account. The words of Jesus to Thomas in that example make faith out to be blind belief, belief apart from evidence, belief apart from reason, belief based on nothing more than hearsay. That is precisely the lesson in John 20. John 20:29 states, "blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed."

RAZA had written:

"(by definition of faith in Hebrews 11:1 - He is sure of his hop[e]…"

I responded:

"He can be sure that this was his hope, but what does hope have to do with what really happens? What does hope have to do with discovering and identifying what really happens?"

RAZA now writes:

"The hope is in a God who does not lie. Most people place their hope/faith in those they trust."

"…but hope that is seen is not hope" - Romans 8:24. Have you seen that God does not lie?

I had written:

"If 'faith' has anything to do with ascertaining knowledge (and this needs to be clarified by those who advocate faith), then these questions must be addressed. Otherwise, there is no reason why one should not consider faith in distinction to reason (the latter being composed of principles outlining its basic processes), and reject faith as nothing more than a form of whim-worship."

RAZA responded:

"…and certain of that which he doesn't see, that is, he doesn't see today what will happen tomorrow)."

I then wrote:

"By what means does he acquire this certainty?"

RAZA now writes:

"BINGO! Now you're asking the right question. the *fact* is the bible doesn't say what means - therefore *biblical* faith is *not* incompatible with reason (for it could be a reasonable means!)"

But nowhere do you establish this, RAZA. You say it over and over, but nowhere do you make this case. At the beginning of your post, you say that faith is "a state of mind." Here I ask "By what means…" and it seems you want to answer this question with 'faith'. You miss entirely what I was saying here (you snipped me mid-sentence). A "state of mind" is not a process. Rather, it sounds more like a hypnotic episode. That is surely not how reason works.

If the Bible does not identify the means by which this certainty can be acquired, as you yourself affirm here, then the Bible fails to address a fundamental branch of philosophy known as epistemology. I know many theologians and apologists who would not accept this. But it seems clear that this apparent silence here which RAZA affirms has expedient ramifications for his case: since it is not specified, he can insert what he likes there to make the whole faith program seem more plausible. But then again, he overlooks the examples of faith in action given in the gospel stories (e.g., men walking on water). Being certain of something and walking on water are two different things, to say the least!

I wrote:

"If you say 'by faith', then you are answering with the point which needs to be explained in the first place. What is his evidence that whatever he thinks will happen tomorrow is what will happen? How did he acquire this evidence? What is the connection between the evidence (if there is any) and what he projects into the future? If you say 'faith', then again you are answering with the point which needs to be explained."

RAZA responded:

"All of these depends on the *type* of faith the person has (ie. rational, irrational or arational)."

And these distinctions of course are your invention, as you have already admitted (see post 593).

RAZA wrote:

"Faith *is* being sure of what we hope for and certain of what we do not see.

":. Faith is a certain mental state."

Yes, that's what you state at the beginning of your post. Thus, faith, in your view, is not a process (like reason). Thus it cannot be the *means* by which you arrive at certainty; in your view, it is the certainty itself.

RAZA had written:

"So seeing that they are the same essentially in meaning, then this means that we can use either as a definition of faith, that is, it is a disjunctive sentence."

I responded:

"I understand. Even if you call it a disjunction, both can apply in a given instance. That is what I mean by conjunction here. The NIV version which you quoted above explicitly affirms this."

RAZA now writes:

"Both can apply because I see them as essentially both being the same in meaning."

But they aren't the same in meaning, no matter which translation you look at. "Being certain of things hoped for" is not the same as "being sure of things unseen"; just as "substance of things hoped for" is not the same as "evidence of things unseen." There are definite differences between Heb. 11:1a and Heb. 11:1b.

RAZA wrote:

"Well I don't recall having read your previous arg anywhere before, but I still think there is good ground for my 'disjunctive' interpretation, given my knowledge of how the Hebrews write."

I responded:

"Perhaps I'm not too clear then by what you mean by disjunctive here."

RAZA now writes:

"No you are, I preffer disjuntive because that way people don't get hung up on satisfying *two* conditions (because I see the two as one)."

But the two are not really the same. Besides, neither horn of Heb. 11:1 seems to address the kind of faith which is modeled in the gospel examples of faith in action (e.g., men walking on water). How does Heb. 11:1 apply to these examples? The NIV version of Heb. 11:1 is all about "being certain" and "sure"; but being either certain or sure of something will not enable one to walk on water. No matter how certain someone may have conned himself into believing that he can walk on water, when he steps onto that water, he will of course not be able to walk on it. So, again, Heb. 11:1 strikes me as desperately inadequate to define the faith modeled in the gospels.

RAZA had written:

"One might add verses like Matthew 12:21 '...In Him [Jesus] the Gentiles will hope'. (cf Romans 15:12)"

I responded:

"Yes, there are many instances confirming that there is supposed to be a connection between faith and hope, but exactly what that connection is, remains unclear. Saying that 'faith is the substance of things hoped for' creates more questions than it could ever hope to answer by itself. Revising it to read 'faith is being sure of what one hopes for' makes little progress. I can hope that tomorrow the Dow Jones will skyrocket another 324 points like it did on Friday, and I can be sure that this is what I hope will happen. But for all I *know*, the markets could collapse again on Monday. Thus, if 'faith is being sure of what one hopes for', what good is it?"

RAZA now writes:

"If you don't know for sure then you don't have faith in it 'skyrocketing tomorrow'."

Okay.

RAZA writes:

"Normally you have faith in those you trust, so if you were sure because of 'inside information' that was leaked to you, then it would be a *rational faith* (even if it turned out to be false)."

Back up a moment to the first part of your statement here. You say "Normally you have faith in those you trust." But I am not certain what those whom I trust will do. I might think there are good reasons why I should expect someone I know well to do something, but I do not know these things for certain. So, while I have trust in someone, we cannot call it an instance of faith, for faith is a form of certainty, and there are too many unknown factors most of the time to achieve certainty of another's actions and character.

Furthermore, many believers have told me, an atheist, that I am acting on faith whenever I do something such as fly in an airline. But on the NIV's version of Heb. 11:1, this cannot be the case. For I do not have certainty that the airline will make it to its planned destination (one of the reasons why I don't like to fly). So clearly, believers are equivocating the notion of faith in order to pin it on me, a non-believer, in such circumstances.

RAZA had written:

"Substance is possible not the best word to be used. Assurance or being sure of. The 'substance' is our assuadness if you like."

I responded:

"What I like does not matter here. What matters is what is meant by the term in question as it is used.

RAZA now writes:

"Yes. (this post has been long in coming because of this bit here - I've been checking out the different ways in which the words in question are used in the bible). The word 'hupostasis' is used 5 times in the greek, this is the word that is 'being sure' in Hebrews 11:1.

"'Now faith is being sure (hupostasis) of what we hope for and certain (elegchos) of what we do not see' Hebrews 11:1 [NIV () added by me]"

Okay, that's making some headway. Do you know whether or not the words "hupostasis" and "elegchos" are nouns, or adjectives?

RAZA writes:

"It seems to me that this word has a variety of meanings, a least that's the way it seems from the verses that it is found in."

Strong's Exhaustive Concordance defines 'hupostasis' (entry #5287) as "essence," "assurance," "confidence," "confident," "person," "substance." Given these diverse meanings, I would think that context is a major factor in determining which meaning is implied wherever it's used. Note that both nouns ("essence," "assurance," "confidence," "person," and "substance") as well as one adjective ("confident") are given. (That's how I'm reading Strong's). Most are nouns.

RAZA wrote:

"the other word 'elegchos' (certain), is *only* used in this verse in the bible, however the word 'elegcho' from which it is derived is used 16 times in the greek. It seems to consistently used to mean convict/reprove."

Right. Strong's confirms this. Strong's gives the following terms for 'elegchos': "proof," "conviction," "evidence," "reproof." Neither of these is the same as certainty, and neither are adjectives, but all are nouns.

RAZA wrote:

"The amplified bible states the verse like this -

"'Now faith is the assurance (the confirmation, the title deed) of the things [we] hope for, being the proof of things [we] do not see and the conviction of their reality [faith perceiving as real fact what is not revealed to the senses]'. Hebrews 11:1 (Amplified Bible)"

I think even this is problematic, particularly if we take a look at the qualifiers in brackets. Are those taken from the Amplified Version, RAZA? The bracketed text at the end of the definition introduces the term "perceiving" and suggests a mode of perception which does not incorporate the senses. While this is the way many believers seem to treat faith in their claim to have knowledge of godly things ("I know this by faith…"), I think the more one examines the claim to a mode of perception which does not incorporate the senses, the more we'll find that this mode can only be described by believers in terms of what it is not, as opposed to what it is or is supposed to be. Negations are not a positive way to identify something. And what I'm seeking is a positive identification of the matter in question, which is the nature of faith.

It seems that, given my paltry knowledge of Greek (I haven't written in Greek since high school, when I had a penpal in Cyprus), the best rendering of Heb. 11:1 would be something like the following:

Notice though that confidence is not the same thing as certainty. While there are degrees of confidence (e.g., "I'm more confident that I'll be able to pay all my bills than Ted seems to be"), one is either certain or not certain of something. Sometimes you'll hear someone say "I'm fairly certain that…," but is this person certain or not?

Furthermore, while I can have "confidence of things hoped for," that in no way means that what I'm hoping for is true. I can be sure *that* I am hoping for something, but that is not how I take Heb. 11:1 to mean. And even if that were what Heb. 11:1 intends to say, it would in no wise imply the certainty of what I'm hoping for coming true. On the other hand, I could be confident in my hope that I will get a pay raise next year, for instance, but my confidence of this thing hoped for in no way guarantees that this will be the case. So, again, we come back around to the $64 question: what do hopes have to do with truth? Such questions must be addressed if one wants to say that faith is compatible with reason in some way.

Moreover, what are we to make of the notion of "proof of things unseen"? What is "proof of things unseen"? What is the form of such a proof? Certainly the author of Hebrews did not have formal syllogism in mind here, did he? I somehow doubt that. The authors of the Bible seem quite vacuous when it comes to formal operations in logic. So, I would think that the author of this definition has in mind something of which he is aware, but of which he is not aware by means of sight. That leaves four other modes of sensation open to consideration, as well as some make-believe form of "perception" (such as "just knowing" as many believers have claimed to me).

This is quite dubious, and certainly not compatible with reason (since reason neither excludes the evidence of the senses, nor arbitrarily discounts evidences because it is perceived by one mode of perception as opposed to another, nor is reason open to arbitrary claims of knowing which have no basis in reality).

I wrote:

"The translators of the KJV saw fit to use the term 'substance', but I think this term is problematically volatile. If 'assurance' or 'assuredness' are better translations, there are still many questions which need to be addressed if 'faith' is to have any rational plausibility at all, particularly because of the reference to hopes. Hopes are not a means of acquiring assurance of anything. Saying 'I hope X' in no way confirms that X is true, that belief in X is rational, or that X has any basis in reality whatsoever. Hoping is not a means of validation. This is the problem which Christians must address if they want to say that their faith is rational in some way. It's clear that there is no rationality here."

RAZA responded:

"The passage doesn't say hope is the means of aquiring assurance, rather that faith is when one is assured of said hope."

Okay, fair enough. But I think this is just as problematic, as I pointed out above. Being assured of one's hopes has no bearing on what may actually be the case. Being certain of what one hopes for may be based on error. And, again, how does this apply to the gospel's many examples of faith which portray it to be some kind of faculty which endows believers with the ability to perform magic feats? Given (a) the connection of hope to faith as we find in passages like Heb. 11:1 and (b) the examples of faith in action as portrayed in the gospels, it seems that faith is a means of making something to be the case simply by believing it to be the case. In other words, wishful thinking taken as both a means of knowledge and a means of causality. Such means are flagrantly incompatible with reason.

I wrote:

"Reason will not show that a man in 1st century Palestine was resurrected from the dead. This is what faith is needed for, since reason will not do the job (reason does not validate the arbitrary)."

RAZA wrote:

"Reason will not show anythign *by itself*."

I'm not sure what you mean by this. Are you saying that reason is not sufficient on its own to make inferences and prove conclusions? If that is what you're saying here, kindly supply your understanding of what reason is, in your view. Otherwise, please clarify this statement, and while you're at it, kindly supply your understanding of what reason is.

Perhaps you mean that reason *coupled with supernatural biases* will somehow "show" that a man in 1st century Palestine was resurrected from the dead?

RAZA stated:

"…but it is not enough to make the 'leap' that there is a car there,"

I wrote:

"It is not a 'leap' to infer that the sound heard has a cause. It is not a 'leap' to infer that the sound of a car means that a car produced that sound."

RAZA wrote:

"Hence it is a *rational faith*."

So before, faith was needed in order to "make a leap" to infer the cause of the evidence perceived, and now that I have corrected that there is no "leap" involved in an inferential process, that's because it is "rational faith"? Where do the hopes come in to play here? See, the meaning of the term 'faith' is constantly being equivocated in order to make it seem compatible with reason. There is no consistency here. Inferring that the sound of the car going by was made by a car is not a process which is supported on hopes; hopes have nothing to do with it (I could have hoped it was the ice cream truck). This kind of shape-shifting can only confound attempts to reach reasonable conclusions.

RAZA had written:

"So fact that there is evidence for a car (ie. the sound) would mean that this person's faith that there was a car would be a *rational* faith."

I responded:

"Again, not according to Heb. 11:1b. It's easy to show that reason is the means by which one can infer from the sound of the car (the evidence in this example) to the car itself (the cause of the sound)."

RAZA now writes:

"Yes, hence why it is rational."

The inferential process is rational, since it adheres to reality and the nature of the mind. But the inferential process is not a matter of faith, thus your term "rational faith" does not apply here. Again, as I stated above, the inference that the sound heard had a cause is not a matter of faith, since it has nothing to do with hopes. When I hear the sound of a car going by, I don't "hope" that the sound was made by a car. Again, you're trying to wiggle faith into an area where reason is sufficient by itself.

RAZA wrote:

"However *if* one is certain of this 'hope' then it is also faith, and that's the point - faith and reason are *not* incompatible."

It's not a matter of hope, RAZA! That's the point. If it's not a matter of hope or "confidence of one's hopes," then it is not a matter of faith. Period.

I wrote:

"This has nothing to do with faith. It has everything to do with reason. Also, according to Heb. 11:1b, faith is not belief, but evidence. Evidence and belief are two separate things."

RAZA wrote:

"Conviction."

But not a matter of hoping. So, faith does not apply on the Heb. 11:1 definition. Besides, since the examples of faith in action portrayed in the gospels make faith out to be more than a simple matter of confidence, conviction or surety, but rather a means of influencing nature (men walking on water) and revising reality (healing blindness, moving mountains, shriveling fig trees, casting out demons, turning water into wine, etc), then certainly, logical inference is NOT a matter of faith by any means.

Logic and reason are not means of turning wishes into reality.

RAZA had written:

"So faith is *coupled* with the physical evidence, it is the 'certainty' of that which physically or logically is not of necessity certain."

I responded:

"Huh?? This makes little sense to me. Can you clarify in order to pry open what you mean here? Please keep Heb. 11:1b in mind if/when you do."

RAZA now writes:

"ok, the car is not seen, but there is evidence for it (the sound)."

Right.

RAZA wrote:

"If a person is then certain of this conviction of the unseen, then they have a faith based belief in that car."

I don't think so.

RAZA wrote:

"It is not of logical necessity that there is a car there, so it could be wrong, hence why it is of faith."

It is of logical necessity that the sound heard was caused by something. Vibrations in the air (i.e., sound) do not occur without cause. So, I don't see how your rendering of faith applies.

RAZA wrote:

"However there is evidence that there is a car there, the sound, hence it is reasonable to hold this belief. Hence it is a rational faith."

I see how it is reasonable (since it is a matter of logical inference based on perception), but I don't know what you think the faith part does. I think this distinction that you're introducing (certainty of something that is not necessarily certain) is in no way implied in the Heb. 11:1 definition of faith; rather, it seems to be another of your inventions. You make faith sound like a booster chair for reason. I hold that reason needs no booster chairs (just as reality needs no gods).

I had written:

"For instance, in the scenario which I give above about the car passing my living room with the curtains closed, I can say very little about the 'thing unseen' which is producing the sound which serves as 'evidence' for its existence. The ‘evidence’ only provides me with the most general knowledge, and then only by implication. While the sound I hear may be sufficient for me to determine that it was made by a car (as opposed to a rocket or a marching band), it tells me little else. It does not tell me the make of the car, who’s driving it, where it came from or where it’s going, how many passengers (if any) are in it, how old the car is, what color it is, where it was manufactured, how long the present owner has owned it, how many doors it has, etc. I may be able to infer from the sound it makes which direction the car is traveling in relative to my position due to the apparent change in pitch and directional perspective of the sound, but even this would probably need to be verified by additional evidence. I might be able to determine if the car is accelerating or decelerating depending on similar qualities of the evidence, but again, such an inference would be subject to further verification. If I’m really knowledgeable about cars (and I am not), I might even be able to make a good guess as to what kind of engine it has.

"But these inferences are strictly related to and dependent on the modality of my perception, namely hearing, and it is clear that I could not make perceptual judgments about the vehicle in question which would require a different modality of perception (e.g., sight). So clearly, faith as construed by Heb. 11:1b to be 'evidence of things unseen' is precious little to go on in determining the identity of the 'thing unseen' in question."

RAZA responded:

"A better analogy might be if you're in a snowstorm and someone yells out to you telling you to stop because you're about to fall off a cliff..."

I then asked:

"Why exactly is this a better analogy? You do not say."

RAZA now responds:

"Because it's in a person and one can ask the person questions."

That would not make it a better analogy of the "evidence of things unseen" phrase. Rather, it would be an instance where one might be able to confirm or disconfirm inferences made from the "evidence of things unseen" on the basis of testimony, but this would introduce new factors which are not suggested in Heb. 11:1b. My analogy focuses on the very issue without contaminating it with irrelevant matters. By introducing new factors, it becomes more likely that we'll lose sight of the meaning intended by the Heb. 11:1b phrase in the attempt to understand what it's saying.

I wrote:

"Indeed, I can see similar deficiencies here. While I might be able to hear the person yelling, I might not be able to make out what he is saying, and even if I could, I still might not be able to tell who is yelling, what the person is wearing, where that person was born, etc. The "evidence" in question (the yelling voice) tells me very little beyond itself. You don't seem prepared to deal with the issues here."

RAZA responded:

"Yes, but you can ask them what they are wearing etc, hence why I say you Normally place your faith in those whom you trust - I trust God."

Understood, but the KJV version of Heb. 11:1b (which is what my analogy was attempting to isolate) in no way suggests that this is what faith is about. Again, there is no mention of trusting testimony implied in Heb. 11:1b. It states that "faith is… the evidence of things unseen." The sound of an automobile is evidence of a car passing outside one's visual field; while one might not see the car, one can hear its engine and thus be aware of evidence of the "thing unseen," which one can infer to be a car. So, on this translation, faith in this instance is literally the sound of the passing car, not awareness of the sound of the passing car. That's quite interesting, don't you think?

It's clear that the counter-analogy which you propose is intended to introduce an element foreign to Heb. 11:1b with the express purpose of bringing the issue closer to your god-belief. Below, you had mentioned something about people not being "neutral" in "what they see in facts." I think your counter-analogy may very well be an expression of your own biases here. It's best to try to keep those biases in check when they are not directly relevant to the matter under question. And since Heb. 11:1b mentions nothing about "trust" (in persons or anything else) or the pertinence of personal testimony, these matters are clearly irrelevant to what Heb. 11:1b is saying, as I have shown.

I had written:

"Furthermore, with Heb. 11:1b in mind, what are we to make of the common exhortation that one should 'have faith' (cf. Mk 11:22)? Frequently, believers tell me that I need to 'have faith', and everything will automatically work out to the better, or so it seems from their comments. When believers tell me to 'have faith', on this definition, it seems that they are telling me to 'have evidence'. But evidence is not something which one can will into existence. Perhaps they are expecting me to interpret certain facts in such a way that they can be construed to serve as evidence which favors the conclusions which they prefer. But again, this would be disingenuous, for an honest examination of evidence is one which seeks to discover what that evidence points to. It is not one which seeks to gerrymander facts into evidences supporting conclusions which one has already accepted apart from evidence. So if this is what the exhortation 'have faith' should mean, then one ought to reject it, since it is in conflict with an honest, rational view of knowledge."

RAZA asked:

"oh I hope you're not suggesting that 'facts' speak for themselves?

I then asked:

"What do you mean by this?"

RAZA replied:

"Francis Bacon held the view that science is objective and the scientists are just collect the data and then they will objectivly fit the data to get the whole story (this is simplified version of his view, obviously).

"Anyways, since then people have reaslised that all people hold presuppositions, presuppositions determine how a person views the data. If a scientist is cellecting data to answer the question 'what causes cancer', the scientist must *first* determine what is relivant data, they don't just get every single bit of data whether it is relivant of not. But who deceides if it is relivant or not? well, the scientist does, here the subjective factor comes in. the facts do not 'interpret themselves' they need some to interpret them. This is why philosophers of science discuss, the notion of 'underdetermination'. The facts underdetermine a theory because there can be more than one theory that fits the facts."

This is just another reason why I think people should learn Objectivism. It would greatly help them overcome their confusions in this regard. We can discuss presuppositions in a future thread. However, for now, I think we still need to reach some consensus on what faith means as it is used in the New Testament.

RAZA had asked:

"Or that there is a 'neutral' interpretation of any fact?"

I asked:

"Can you elaborate on what you mean here?"

RAZA responded:

"People are not neutral, they have all sorts of presuppositions, what a person's presuppositions are will determine 'what they see' in the facts."

So, what you're saying is that all individuals have base-level biases, is that right? Do you think that one can examine and correct these biases? What exactly are your biases?

RAZA wrote:

"Faith is not necessarily an alternative to reason, it can be cooperative with it."

This suggests that reason somehow "needs help" or may not be sufficient. Is that what you mean to say here? If so, what is your view of reason, and in what kind of instances would it need help? I suspect that one only needs faith when he wants to claim something that reason will not support. That is definitely what I see in the case of Christianity.

I asked:

"1. Is faith a method, or a product of a method?"

RAZA responded:

"Faith is a mental state"

Okay.

I asked:

"2. If faith is a method, what is the purpose of its task, and how dos it accomplish that purpose?"

RAZA asked:

"What do you mean by 'method'?"

I mean, roughly, a set of principles which together provide a systematic means of achieving some end. For example, reason is a process or method (I use the two terms interchangeably) by which new knowledge is validated by cohering it to previously validated knowledge. If faith is "a mental state" then obviously faith is not a method in this sense (since "a mental state" is not a set of principles which together provide a systematic means of achieving some end).

I asked:

3. If faith is a product (e.g., assurance, certainty, etc.), then by what means is it achieved?

RAZA answered:

"It is a gift"

So, this "mental state" is a gift?

I asked:

"4. Is faith a means of validating knowledge claims? Yes or no."

RAZA responded:

"What do you mean by validating? If you mean is faith a means of showing some knowledge claim is valid, then the answer is no."

That's essentially what I was asking. Thanks for this answer. This tells me, on your view, one cannot say he knows something to be true "by faith," since in your view faith is not a means of validating ideational content.

I asked:

"5. Can faith lead one to conflicting conclusions?"

RAZA responded:

"yes, depending on the type of faith (obvioulsy 'rational faith' cannot)."

But above you confirmed that faith is not "a means of showing some knowledge claim as valid," but here your answer suggests that you think it is a means of validation since you are confirming that faith can lead one to conclusions. This is what a method or process does; this is not what a state of mind does.

I asked:

"6. What precisely is the relationship between faith and hope?"

RAZA answered:

"faith is the certainity of hope"

But what certainty do hopes provide?

I asked:

"7. If faith is a means of validating knowledge claims, or enabling believers to have knowledge which reason could not give them, what is the role which hope plays?"

RAZA answered:

"The emphasis of hope is that hope is 'unseen'."

Are you here again confirming that faith is a means of validating knowledge? In response to my question No. 4, you said it is not. Your response to my question No. 5, however, strongly suggests that you think it is. And here, you seem to go along with the first part of the question, which is hypothetical in nature ("If faith is a means of validating knowledge claims…"). So, which is it?

I asked:

"8. Do you think having faith is a virtue? Why or why not?"

RAZA answered:

"Can't say I've thought of it as a virtue? I see it as a necessity because we are fallible, finite creatures."

What would an "infinite being" be, RAZA? In my view, that is a contradiction in terms.

I asked:

"9. If faith is evidence (in keeping with Heb. 11:1b), by what means does one gain awareness of this evidence?"

RAZA responded:

"faith is the conviction..."

Then the KJV is wrong when it says that "faith is… the evidence of things unseen"?

I asked:

"11. Is there a rational, independent means of testing the supposed truths one accepts on faith?"

RAZA responded:

"This is trying to suppose that faith is not necessarily rational."

And so far I know of no reasons why I should assume otherwise. Simply saying that faith is rational is not sufficient to show that faith actually can be rational. The definition in Heb. 11:1 is problematic, especially if one interprets it as suggesting that certainty is somehow dependent upon hopes, and the examples of faith in action in the New Testament's stories make faith out to be a kind of magic power. Both of these positions are not rationally tenable.

CJ