Some Comments About 'Faith', Part I

Subj: Some comments about 'faith'

Date: 6/24/02 9:47:41 PM Pacific Daylight Time

From: [email protected] (Carubemil Jex)

To: [email protected]

I’ve been giving this matter some more thought, and there are four main areas I want to enlarge on in this post for future reflection and discussion by the participants of this list.

1) Defining ‘faith’:

Since both Rob and Raza (and I would be willing to assume many other Christians) are in agreement with each other in that they do not accept Bev’s conception of faith as an act of will (i.e., to act *as if* something one does not believe is true) as an accurate portrayal of what faith really is in the biblical context, we still need to settle then what exactly faith *is* (since so far we only know what it is *not* according to attending believers). Many Christians whom I have met tend to treat faith as if it were a means of securing knowledge or knowing truth. Basically, faith is treated as a kind of epistemological faculty. Believers tell me that they "believe on faith." In Jaberz post 436, Raza went so far as to distinguish between three different kinds of faith:

I have not seen these partitions identified in the Bible, and I’m still wondering what exactly is the difference between "rational faith" as Raza conceives of it and reason as I understand it. So far, I do not think that Raza has stated what that difference is, even though he affirmed to Bev (again in post 436) that they are not one and the same.

So, under the heading of this first point, I want to draw attention to the fact that we still have no positive identification of what constitutes faith as such from a legitimately Christian standpoint. Repeating Hebrews 11:1, as I shall show below, does not go very far in addressing this question if believers hold to the position that faith has an epistemological function comparable to reason (as opposed to the act of will which Bev has suggested).

2) Hebrews 11:1a - "…the substance of things hoped for":

In Jaberz post 435, Raza stated that he has historically assumed that Hebrews 11:1 was disjunctive, in that it should read "faith is [11:1a] the substance of things hoped for, OR [11:1b] the evidence of things unseen," rather than "faith is [11:1a] the substance of things hoped for AND [11:1b] the evidence of things unseen." (Please note how I have divided the verse in question into two parts, 11:1a and 11:1b for the sake of shorthand, as I will be referring to the two constituent phrases in such manner in order to distinguish them.) In Jaberz post 509, Raza mentioned that he would consult his dad, who apparently has some knowledge of Greek (?), to determine whether this verse should be considered to be stating a disjunction rather than a conjunction. To date, I’m not certain what he has discovered (I think Raza has been too preoccupied with his school studies to participate in recent weeks).

Meanwhile, I have maintained that I have historically assumed this verse to be a conjunction of the two phrases 11:1a and 11:1b, at least in the sense that they are to be taken as jointly definitive of the idea in question, which is ‘faith’ (see my posts 444 and 466). My basic argument for the conjunctive nature of this verse (as opposed to the disjunctive nature which Raza prefers) is that there is no obvious indicator of disjunction, and that a comma commonly signifies conjunction of phrases and clauses in all the western languages which I have studied (and, mind you, I do have a university degree in a foreign language, though it is not in Greek). For instance, if one makes the statement "Gina was enthusiastic, ambitious, conscientious," I would take this statement to mean that all three qualifiers apply in conjunction to the individual named as the subject of the sentence, since the commas only serve to separate each from one another, not to indicate an "either-or" scenario.

But in spite of this, Raza still has maintained that it is reasonable to consider Hebrews 11:1a and 11:1b to be disjunctive. That’s fine. But while considering Heb. 11:1a and 11:1b to be disjunctive may relieve one from needing to cohere an instance of faith to both phrases of the verse, treating them as a disjunction necessitates a standard of reference by which one determines when an instance of faith is more in line with the notion of "the substance of things hoped for" (Heb. 11:1a) or with the notion of "the evidence of things unseen" (Heb. 11:1b), and so far as I know, the Bible nowhere indicates what this standard could possibly be (and I strongly suspect most believers, if not all, would also not know what this standard would be as well). Thus, considering Hebrews 11:1 to be disjunctive in nature may amount to the endorsement of the convenience of a "pick and choose" course of determination, a process which I think would be unprotected from personal biases, subjective preferences and arbitrary expedience.

Furthermore, if we should consult the Bible as to which arm of this disjunction, Heb. 11:1a or Heb. 11:1b, constitutes the proper definition of ‘faith’, I think the preponderance of the biblical ethos favors Heb. 11:1a, given Paul’s emphasis on the importance of hope (along with faith) in I Cor. 13. Additionally, while Ephesians 2:8 states that one is "saved through faith," Paul in Romans 8:24 states that one is "saved by hope," thus sealing the connection between faith and hope in a salvific context, which would of course imply a deep epistemological relationship between faith and hope. Obviously, there is an intimate connection between faith and hope according to New Testament writings. What exactly that connection is, is indicated most explicitly in Hebrews 11:1a, stating that "faith is the substance of things hoped for."

So the primary point here is two-fold: One, if one holds that Hebrews 11:1 entails a disjunction between "the substance of things hoped for" and "the evidence of things unseen" (a view which I do not hold), I submit that the former holds greater preponderance in the Bible (for reasons given above), and thus it is all the more important, Two, to explain the relationship between knowledge and hope (since faith is treated as if it were an epistemological faculty). To what exactly does the phrase "substance of things hoped for" refer? What exactly is the nature of this "substance"?

Moreover, if one holds that faith has something to do with the achievement and/or validation of knowledge or the securing of truth, then the relationship between one’s hopes and truth and/or knowledge must be explained. This is imperative if Christianity is to have any credibility as a legitimate philosophy. The Bible itself is quite secretive on these matters, and believers have historically been quite vague on these matters.

3) Hebrews 11:1b - "…the evidence of things unseen":

Hebrews 11:1b is also not without its share of problems. It states that faith is "the evidence of things unseen." This definition can be presented mathematically as an equation. Where F = ‘faith’, E = ‘evidence’ and TU = "things unseen," we have the following equation to represent Heb. 11:1b:

F = E + TU

I have tried to figure out what this could mean, and the best example I came up with is as follows:

I am sitting in my living room with all the curtains closed as I read a book. I hear a car going by on the street outside my house. I do not see this car (since the curtains are closed), but I do have evidence of the car’s existence, namely: the sound it makes as it whizzes along on the street past me. This mechanical sound which the car makes is the "evidence" of something which I do not see. I infer from this sound that its cause is a vehicle of some kind, as opposed to a group of kids playing basketball, a locomotive or an airplane or some other sound-making machine.

It is here where I think the definition provided in Heb. 11:1b proves to be both sloppy as well as confusing for believers. According to Hebrews 11:1b, this sound itself is faith, since it states that faith is "the evidence of things unseen." According to the mathematical shorthand for the definition of ‘faith’ which I gave above, where S = the sound which the car makes and C = the car which makes the sound but which I do not see running along the street, we would have the following equation:

F = E(S) + TU(C)

Thus, according to Heb. 11:1b, faith is equivalent to *a sound* in this case.

This is not how Christians usually think of their faith. Christians seem to think of Heb. 11:1b as stating that faith is "…the [awareness, perception or knowledge of] evidence of things unseen," not the evidence itself. (Some translations even have the word ‘conviction’ in place of ‘evidence’, and this would also prove to be problematic.) For the identification of something as evidence of something presupposes a means by which one has awareness, perception or knowledge of that evidence (as well as an epistemological means of connecting the two, namely a means of inference).

But this is not what Heb. 11:1b states – indeed it makes no indication of how one is to achieve awareness of the evidence in question or of how one is to connect the evidence in question with the "thing unseen" stipulated in the definition, and far be it from me to insert words into Scripture which do not appear there.

But even if the Bible were to explain the means by which one is to gain knowledge of this evidence and by which one is to connect this evidence with the object which it supposedly implicates (and indeed, in no way does it address these matters), this conception of ‘faith’ is still not out of the woods yet. Look how little information such ‘evidence’ can provide us. For instance, in the scenario which I give above about the car passing my living room with the curtains closed, I can say very little about the "thing unseen" which is producing the sound which serves as "evidence" for its existence. The ‘evidence’ only provides me with the most general knowledge, and then only by implication. While the sound I hear may be sufficient for me to determine that it was made by a car (as opposed to a rocket or a marching band), it tells me little else. It does not tell me the make of the car, who’s driving it, where it came from or where it’s going, how many passengers (if any) are in it, how old the car is, what color it is, where it was manufactured, how long the present owner has owned it, how many doors it has, etc. I may be able to infer from the sound it makes which direction the car is traveling in relative to my position due to the apparent change in pitch and directional perspective of the sound, but even this would probably need to be verified by additional evidence. I might be able to determine if the car is accelerating or decelerating depending on similar qualities of the evidence, but again, such an inference would be subject to further verification. If I’m really knowledgeable about cars (and I am not), I might even be able to make a good guess as to what kind of engine it has.

But these inferences are strictly related to and dependent on the modality of my perception, namely hearing, and it is clear that I could not make perceptual judgments about the vehicle in question which would require a different modality of perception (e.g., sight). So clearly, faith as construed by Heb. 11:1b to be "evidence of things unseen" is precious little to go on in determining the identity of the "thing unseen" in question.

Furthermore, with Heb. 11:1b in mind, what are we to make of the common exhortation that one should "have faith"? Frequently, believers tell me that I need to "have faith," and everything will automatically work out to the better, or so it seems from their comments. When believers tell me to "have faith," on this definition, it seems that they are telling me to "have evidence." But evidence is not something which one can will into existence. Perhaps they are expecting me to interpret certain facts in such a way that they can be construed to serve as evidence which favors the conclusions which they prefer. But again, this would be disingenuous, for an honest examination of evidence is one which seeks to discover what that evidence points to. It is not one which seeks to gerrymander facts into evidences supporting conclusions which one has already accepted apart from evidence.

So if this is what the exhortation "have faith" should mean, then one ought to reject it, since it is in conflict with an honest, rational view of knowledge.

Thus I submit that, according to this definition with the added allowance for a means by which the ‘evidence’ it points to can be known, faith is quite unreliable. And even with that allowance, it is hopelessly problematic, I dare say completely unworkable.

4) Notes from Robinson’s "Religion and Reason":

I think some of the comments which Richard Robinson makes about Christian faith in his essay "Religion and Reason" from his book An Atheist’s Values (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1964), pp. 113-123, are worth considering. For instance, most Christians tend to think of faith as a virtue. But as Robinson points out, the definition of ‘faith’ provided in Hebrews 11:1 "does not make faith a virtue, since neither a substance nor an evidence can be a virtue." Robinson states that the definition of ‘virtue’ which he has in mind is "a praiseworthy habit of choice, and neither a substance nor an evidence can be a habit of choice." It’s hard to see how anyone could disagree with Robinson’s point here.

Contrary to Raza’s definition of ‘rational faith’ and his claim that this model of faith best fits what the New Testament is saying faith is, Robinson points out that "Christian faith is not merely believing that there is a god. It is believing that there is a god no matter what the evidence on the question may be... Its essence is the determination to believe that there is a god no matter what the evidence may be." And in my experience, this is of course very true, and I think this points the notion of faith in the direction of what Bev has mentioned, that faith is an act of will.

As an example, I consider how often I have encountered believers who approach me with arguments, and when I’ve shown those arguments to be insufficient to achieve what they are intended to achieve, believers typically continue to press the matter, either by modifying the argument in order to overcome the deficiencies which I’ve pointed out, or by grabbing and making use of some additional argument in order to secure their case? Very often indeed! ("Weebles wobble, but they don’t fall down…") Typically believers do not respond to criticisms by saying, "Gee, you know, that’s a good point. Maybe I’ve been wrong about this matter, I’ll have to give that some more thought," as one would do in an honest and rational inquiry into some matter. Instead, they continually seek to pry open an imaginary back door, so as to slip into the realm of rational credibility as if unnoticed.

On this point, Robinson points out that, "In religion it is particularly easy for intellectual dishonesty to escape notice, because of the common assumption that all honesty flows from religion and religion is necessarily honest whatever it does." And this again is certainly true in many cases. Many if not most believers tend to treat their religious belief as if it were not only infallible and sourced in omniscience, but also wholly good and righteous, and that affirming its "truths" is also wholly good and righteous, even if the believer has never really examined what he is saying is true or can show that what he is saying is true is actually true.

Because of these facts, Robinson concludes that "Christian faith is essentially a case of irrational belief and trust and decision, because it consists in deciding to believe and trust the proposition that there is a god no matter what the evidence may be," and this is due to the fact that "faith is reckless of evidence and probability." Here Robinson’s insights on this matter reflect my experience with believers very accurately. It is because these findings seem to represent the case in my encounters with believers that I have concluded that believers claim that god exists because they want god to exist, not because they have rationally secured the knowledge that such a being exists. Over time, believers invest themselves, their hopes and the very basis of their self-value in this belief, both emotionally and cognitively, to the point that, to admit that it is all a sham after all would be paramount to taking a wrecking ball to one’s psyche. So the pressure is always on to prop up the façade of belief continually, no matter what the expense. Naturally, believers will likely deny this, but this is what experience proves time and time again.

I would conclude from these points that faith and reason are not only incompatible with one another (for indeed, if one has reason, he has no need to claim faith), they are entirely antagonistic to one another. I am willing to examine arguments to the contrary conclusion, but I would expect that those arguments address the issues which I have pointed to above in order for those arguments at least to be relevant to the issue at hand. Otherwise, I have to agree with Rand when she stated that "to rest one's case on faith means to concede that reason is on the side of one's enemies - that one has no rational arguments to offer" (Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal, p. 197).

CJ