Examining CARM's "Entropy Argument"

Of course, in attempting to argue that the universe has a cause beyond itself, as this argument seeks to do, one necessarily treats the universe as if it were an event, when in fact the universe is not an event. What, then, is the universe? Indeed, this is a question which Slick does not even address anywhere in his argument, yet his argument is supposed to draw a conclusion about the nature of the universe. What does Slick consider to be a proper definition of the concept 'universe'? Well, it must be a secret, for he never tells us - this term, which is key to any argument about the "origin" of the universe, is nowhere defined in Slick's paper.

In spite of this negligence, Slick is quick to open his paper with a definition of the second law of thermodynamics. Why is he so eager to present a definition of this law of physics, and yet neglects providing a definition for the most crucial term of his argument, namely the term 'universe'? Could it be that the arguments for the need of a cause of the universe actually depend on such negligence? I would have to surmise that this is the case, for a proper definition of the universe will immediately show why the idea of a cause "beyond" the universe is incoherent.

Furthermore, we also must take into account the overall aim of the "entropy argument," which wants to argue that some form of consciousness is responsible for the existence of the universe. The theist of course does not contest the need for a starting point, so long as it is conscious in nature - a cosmic will which can command the universe into existence just by wishing it so. Thus, the "entropy argument" is an attempt, whether theists are willing to recognize it or not, to validate the metaphysical primacy of consciousness, which is a false view of reality. This is the view which holds that existence finds its source in consciousness, or is in some way dependent upon a form of consciousness (such as a will or command) or conscious action (such as wishing). This view of reality contradicts the metaphysical primacy of existence, which is the recognition that existence exists independent of consciousness, that the task of consciousness is not to create its objects, but to identify them, that reality does not conform to consciousness, but that consciousness, to be rational, must conform to reality. According to the primacy of consciousness view, reality is plastic, fluid and pliant, amenable to the desires of the ruling consciousness (cf. "God's plan in human history" etc.). According to the primacy of existence, reality is absolute, unchanging, and not subject to the revision of someone's desires (i.e., wishing does not make it so).

Since the aim of the "entropy argument" is to derive a conclusion which is inconsistent with the metaphysical primacy, it cannot be a sound argument; i.e., it can only fail. To assert otherwise is to commit the fallacy of the stolen concept, which occurs when one asserts a concept while ignoring or denying its conceptual roots. Since consciousness is consciousness of existence, existence must exist in order for a consciousness to be conscious. Thus the primacy of consciousness view of reality, in asserting that consciousness precedes or somehow holds priority over existence, commits the fallacy of the stolen concept by asserting consciousness prior to its conceptual and metaphysical root, which is the fact of existence as such (since consciousness is consciousness of existence).

If the stolen concept committed by the primacy of consciousness metaphysics is accepted, then one commits himself, as a consequence, to the fallacy of pure self-reference. This is the fallacy which states that consciousness needs no objects. This is the acceptance of a contradiction, namely the notion of "consciousness conscious only of itself." This is a contradiction because, without an object beyond itself, the consciousness in question could never identify itself as conscious, for it is said to be 'conscious only of itself'. Conscious of what? Blank out. I.e., pure self-reference.

And this is precisely the predicament in which the "uncaused cause" would find itself if that "uncaused cause" were said to be conscious in nature (as Christians assume about their universe-creating deity). Of what would this deity be conscious prior to creating the universe? Well, if nothing else exists, then clearly it could be conscious of nothing. But if it is conceded that other things exist, then there goes the need for an "entropy argument" or any other cosmological apologetic to begin with, since it is conceded that things do not need a creator.

Thus, given these problems which suffocate the very aim and foundation of the "entropy argument," problems which theists themselves seem wholly unaware of, we can rest assured that it cannot fail to fail. I.e., it must fail.

But the problems for the "entropy argument" do not end there. Let's take a quick look at the "problem" which the "entropy argument" is supposed to resolve by its assertion of the existence of an invisible magic being which supposedly "wound up" the universe.

Slick immediately calls attention to the second law of thermodynamics, which "states that the amount of energy in a system that is available to do work is decreasing. Entropy increases as available energy decreases."

While it is clearly the case that Slick's argument depends on his understanding of the second law of thermodynamics, I asked myself as I examined his argument whether or not it takes into account the first law of thermodynamics. Religious apologists routinely demonstrate awareness of the fact that there exists a second law of thermodynamics, but it is not certain whether they are aware of - let alone understand - the first law of thermodynamics. This Law states that energy cannot be created or destroyed. Clearly then, the notion that the universe was "created" is in explicit violation of this Law. Yet theists seem either unconcerned by this, or completely unaware of it.

1. requires a cause beyond itself, or
2. that the cause of the universe (if established) is either

1. conscious in nature, or
2. ii) still exists.

To establish any of these points rationally, Slick would have to argue for them on the basis of a legitimate definition of 'universe', which he nowhere does in his argument.

But the use of the "entropy" problem in such arguments has further flaws. In his book Atheism: The Case Against God, author George H. Smith refutes the so-called "argument from entropy," which Slick has recast in his paper. In his refutation, Smith quotes a succinct statement of the argument by John W. Robbins, which states:

In response to this, Smith points out two fallacies right off the bat. In regard to the first, Smith states,

Indeed, Robbins attributes the qualities of "eternal, personal and transcendent" to this supposed "energy source" which he claims is responsible for the existence of the "physical universe," because he wants those attributes to apply. Clearly it is the apologist's desires which substitute for reasoned argument, for even in the case of Slick's argument, there is no case made for the supposed necessity that whatever caused the universe to come into existence has these qualities. In the case of Slick's argument, he wants to leap from the conclusion that there must be an "uncaused cause" of the universe, to the conclusion that this "uncaused cause" must be "supernatural," and states, "By supernatural I mean it is completely 'other' than the universe is not natural to it." Not only is this sentence awkward and incoherent, I do not see at all how it is supposed to follow from previously validated premises. While he does say at one point, that an "uncaused cause cannot be a natural part of the universe which is finite," he does not say why the "uncaused cause" must be "supernatural" as opposed to "subnatural" or "natural but not part of the universe." Thus we have a broad leap in reasoning which is nowhere warranted by the premises which Slick does provide. Indeed, Slick even admits that he argues more than reason will support when he confesses, "At this point I admit to making a leap of logic and assert that the supernatural, uncaused cause is the God of the Bible." Thus we have a series of non sequiturs asserted in the place of rational argument.

The second fallacy which Smith points out in Robbins' conception of the "entropy argument" is as follows:

Indeed, theists habitually special plead their case for the existence of an invisible magic being which they want to exist, but cannot seem to successfully prove exists. If the theist wants to argue that the Second Law of Thermodynamics applies only to that which is natural, and therefore that the "uncaused cause" which he concludes by prior specious reasoning is exempt from its applicability by virtue of the fact that it is "supernatural" (my, how convenient!), then we're again faced with Slick's non sequitur exposed above.

Smith resolves all these matters by pointing out the following:

In addition to this point of clarification, Smith also points out that, "More importantly, however, the Second Law only pertains to closed systems, which, according to many physicists, renders it inapplicable to the universe as a whole."

Thus an assumption about the scope of applicability of the Second Law of Thermodynamics is made in haste. Smith goes on to quote Dr. Adolf Grünbaum (Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, [New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963), p. 262], who writes,

Next Smith quotes E. A. Milne (Sir James Jeans: A Biography, [Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1952), p. 165], who states:

And lastly, Smith quotes Drs. L. D. Landau and E. M. Lifshitz (Statistical Physics, [London: Pergamon Press Ltd., 1958], p. 29), who state:

Smith concludes, then, that

Consequently, since time is a measure which necessarily assumes the relationship between one object and another, it is obviously incoherent to speak of time applying to the universe as a whole. Since the universe is the totality of all existence, we obviously cannot coherently assert a relationship between the universe and something existing beyond it, because the notion of something existing beyond the universe is itself incoherent. Consequently, since the concept 'time' cannot apply to the universe as a whole, it is incoherent to speak of how "old" the universe is. The universe simply exists because existence exists. Therefore, because of this faulty use of the concept 'time', premise 2 must either be significantly modified, or discarded.

Now let's examine the third premise in the "entropy argument" which Slick presents. This premise, in its entirety, is as follows:

This premise builds on the contents of the second premise, namely the notion that time can apply to the universe as a whole. Of course this assumption, far from being validated by the "entropy argument," has been shown to stem from a misunderstanding of the concept 'time'. Also, it must be emphasized that the universe is not an "event," but objects. On the contrary, events are composed of actions which take place within the universe, since actions are actions of objects which exist. Where do these objects exist? If they exist, they exist as a part of the universe, since 'universe' is the totality of that which exists.

The third premise also relies on the assumption, encountered in the first premise (reviewed above), that the Second Law of Thermodynamics and its principle of entropy applies to the universe as a whole. But of course this could only have a chance of being validated if one could show good reasons why we should consider the universe to be a closed system. Authorities in the science of physics have argued against this assumption, and Slick does not argue for its validity to boot.

If one were to attempt a proof of the non-eternality of the universe by arguing that an eternal universe necessitates "an infinite regress of events," one would have to establish what he means by 'event' and define an objective means of counting events. However, this task would be extremely problematic, and it is difficult to see how it would be immune from the application of arbitrary or subjective standards. Take for instance the rotation of the earth on its axis. When is "one event" accomplished, and what distinguishes this unit from other actions which might be considered also to provide a unit standard of 'event'? Is a full rotation of the earth on its axis "an event" while a quarter of that rotation is only a "sub-event"? If so, why? Why would a full rotation of the earth constitute a "full event," while only a portion of that rotation would have to constitute a "sub-event"?

Since the "entropy argument" wants to argue against the "infinite regress of events," such issues would have to be addressed and resolved to the satisfaction of objective standards, and to my knowledge this has never been done. And certainly Slick does not show awareness of this consideration in his formulation of the argument. Why, for instance, could one not say that the "history" of the universe consists of five primary events, and the finite number of individual actions can be considered to be "sub-events" bracketed within these five primary events? Questions such as these, although seemingly bizarre on the face of it, would of course have to be considered when one attempts to argue against the eternality of the universe by intimating that an eternal universe implies an "infinite regress of events."

Besides, even if one could show that the "infinite regress of events" problem were a legitimate problem, it is uncertain how this problem would be resolved by asserting a beginning of the universe and the existence of a creator which is said to be responsible for that beginning. Were there no events prior to this creative act? If this is argued, how would one know this, and how would one prove this to be the case? Again, we would here encounter the theist's faith interjected to resolve conceptual problems which, he thinks, afflicts the non-theistic conception of the universe. It is as if one could argue that the universe had a beginning and then start making up stories from there to exempt the theistic view from the very problems charged against the non-theistic view. This is not reason, but fantasy, and must be discarded by the rational individual.

From here, the fourth premise of the "entropy argument" wants to build on the conclusions supposedly sealed in the prior three premises. But since these prior premises are shown to have irresolvable problems of their own, and thus any further premise which attempts to build on them cannot be true. Consequently, the fourth premise, namely that "there must be a single uncaused cause of the universe," must be rejected.

The "entropy argument," therefore, because of its numerous problems and misapplication of concepts, cannot be accepted as evidence for the existence of anything, let alone a god, Christian or otherwise. While purporting itself to conclude that the universe must have had a beginning, it fails to consider any definition of 'universe', and thus does not even identify what it's talking about. Further, it is shown that on a proper definition of 'universe', the notion that it had a beginning is incoherent. Additional problems are shown to afflict the theist's use of the concept 'entropy' and the rash conclusions he wants to draw from it. And lastly, and most importantly, the argument as a whole fails to comply with the principle of objectivity as it clearly commits itself to the primacy of consciousness metaphysics. These are not problems from which the theist can recover his argument by simple adjustments. Instead, these problems to varying extents will be present in any attempt to utilize the "entropy argument" as a proof of god.

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