A Response to Shandon
Guthrie's Opening
Argument
By CJ Holmes
In his debate with
Daniel Adams on the existence of God, Christian apologist Shandon Guthrie opens his side of the debate by announcing the twin positions
which he aims to defend. They are:
(1) There is no good evidence to suggest that
God does not exist, and
(2)
There is good evidence to favor the view that God does exist.
Regarding (1), what could possibly constitute
evidence that something does not exist? Evidence presupposes existence,
and applies only to that which does exist, not to that which does not
exist. There is no onus of proving that the non-existent does not exist.
And simply asserting that X exists in no way entails an obligation on those who
do not accept it. Evidence is the wrong thing to ask for in the case of
atheism.
The
question which Guthrie and those like him should be asking is: Is god-belief
rationally tenable? If they think so, then they should be prepared to support
this position, if they can, since it is their claim that a god exists in the
first place. If they cannot support this position, then they should simply
admit it, and recognize that they only want something to exist, and not claim
to know that something exists. Acting as if a god exists, does not serve
as a proof that a god exists. Furthermore, it seems disingenuous to posit the
existence of something, and then to look for evidences (or construe
things to serve as evidence) to support this position unless there's good reason
to do so. This strikes me as a reversal and
immediately raises the suspicion that our leg is being pulled.
Regarding (2), we await Shandon's evidence with
eagerness.
Shandon writes: "Adams comes from the
atheist conviction and, as such, makes a claim to knowledge."
I also "come from the atheist
conviction" (since I am an atheist), and my primary claim to knowledge in
this regard is simply that I have no god-belief. I'm not certain what Shandon
would accept as evidence going toward a proof of my statement here, so I
suppose he will simply have to accept my word for it: I have no god-belief. So
those who claim to me that there is a god which exists somewhere, will have to
provide some kind of substantiation if they desire to prove it to me.
Otherwise, I will go with the default in my case, which is atheism. (Below I provide more some reasons why I do not accept the
religious view of the world.)
Shandon writes: "So he is simply mistaken
when he says, 'the burden of proof lies upon the positive claimant'. This is
disconfirmed by philosophers who understand basic epistemological principles
underlying the Burden of Proof."
Do not those who assert the positive bear the
onus of proof? If one tells me, a person who has no god-belief, that a god
exists, is he somehow relieved of providing a proof? Well, supposing he has no
intention of proving it to me, then I'd say that's certainly the case, and we
each go our merry way, he to his god-belief, and I to my life. But if he wants
to prove his assertion to me, he will have to own up to his burden of proof,
otherwise he forfeits any available rational means of persuading me to assent
to his position. So, bickering over who has the burden of proof really comes
down to who is trying to persuade whom of what positive claim. I am not trying
to persuade anyone of any positive claim; I am simply announcing as a gratuity
that I have no god-belief. Those who disapprove are invited to put their best
foot forward.
Shandon writes,
If Adams were correct in this claim then that would mean that
statements that are negative claims would never have the burden of producing
any evidence. Think about it. This would mean that claims like 'Death does not
exist' or 'The geocentric cosmology is not true' would automatically possess a
greater balance of truth value ex hypothesi.
This would not be the case in light of evidence
to the contrary, which can be supplied if one has evidence in favor of the
contrary. In the case of ‘Death does not exist’, all one would need to do to
show why this is wrong, is to point to an organism which has died. It is
unlikely that a reasonable person would dispute the testimony of his senses. In
the case of the claim that ‘The geocentric cosmology is not true,’ one can
point to the reasons why it is reasonable to hold this position. The answer to
both negations is to demonstrate the truth of their opposites, i.e., to
prove the corresponding positive, something which many theists seem to be reluctant to
do in the case of their god-belief. The real question at this point boils down to: Who is trying to persuade
whom? Since I am not trying to persuade any believer to abandon his
beliefs, I accept no obligation to argue on behalf of my position. If
requested, however, I will simply point to the reasons why I hold what views I
hold, and why I don’t hold those views which I do not hold, as I do below in the case of god-belief.
Shandon writes:
Instead, philosophers have suggested that
the notion of prior probability, or the notion that a claim has a degree of
initially accepted concepts, is the antecedent to the burden of proof. In other
words, the reason why a claim like 'Death does not exist' or 'The heliocentric
cosmology is not true' must be defended is because the claims themselves are
generally rejected by a general consensus.
Such negations are "generally rejected by a
general consensus" because evidence to the contrary has been provided and generally
accepted. In other words, the burden of proving the positive counterpart to
these claims has already been met. One merely needs to point to this in
order to refute their negation. If theists could meet their burden of proof, then
they would be able to point to it in the same fashion. However, since they cannot,
they bicker and agitate over who is the rightful bearer of the onus of proof,
in spite of the fact that it is they who assert the positive and it is they who
are out to persuade others to accept their beliefs. Clearly, the burden of
proof rests on their shoulders, and if they are unwilling to meet it, they have
no one to blame but themselves for failing to persuade others.
Now, Shandon and other apologists must think
about this very carefully if their ambition is to persuade others to
their view. As I have stated, I have no god-belief. Now, what evidence do they
have to the contrary? They may say, "We do not argue the contrary."
To which I say, "Then what's the fuss?" And they might respond,
"Well, the 'fuss' is that you reject God and we have evidence that God
exists." But I have not claimed that I reject anything. I have simply
acknowledged that I do not have a certain belief. So in terms of positive
claims and the burden of proof, it is unclear exactly what the theist wants, if
indeed he wants to put forward a persuasive proof concluding with the
establishment that his god exists. Until he does so, it is most likely that I
will still have no god-belief. And happy I shall remain.
Shandon writes, "In the context of God,
despite the overwhelming acceptance of theism as the better view, we can, for
the sake of an academic debate, posit that the consensus is inconclusive."
Well, we should hope so, if indeed we keep in
mind the context of those who are involved in the relevant correspondence
(especially when we keep in mind the inconvenient fact that virtually every
theist believes in his own god).
Shandon has a god-belief, and I have no god-belief. It really makes no
difference how many agree with either side. In matters of demographics, how
many affirm one form of mysticism over another as against those who affirm
neither, may be relevant from a statistical point of view. But in matters of
putting forth a persuasive proof, all that is really at issue are a) the position
of those who are intent on persuading others to their view, and b) the case they
put forward to this end. Since I do not have
a problem per se that Shandon holds to a form of god-belief, I see no reason
why I should attempt to persuade him to abandon it. If he is happy with this
belief and believes he can achieve personal integrity through such beliefs,
then so be it, let him try. However, I have no god-belief, and perhaps this causes him
resentment or aggravation, or uneasiness. Thus, he is free to assemble a proof
with the aim to persuade me if he so chooses. Otherwise, he forfeits his
attempt to prove his position to me, and we both go our merry ways. Either way
is fine with me.
Shandon boldly claims,
"THERE IS NO GOOD EVIDENCE TO FAVOR ATHEISM AS TRUE."
And here is his argument:
When we look at the statement made by Adams
about why atheism is true, he simply suggests that theism is not true and,
thus, compels us to believe that atheism is true on that basis. But Adams fails
to realize that arguments for God's existence may fail, but it does not follow
that other arguments or beliefs about God's existence are false. In the movie
Contact, the scientist (played by Jodi Foster) experiences an event unconfirmed
by the physical evidence. But she (along with the audience) really experienced
the event despite the physical evidence. Is she then committed to denying her
experience because the available evidence does not point in her favor? Of
course not. Therefore, Adams has to provide us with some reasons why he thinks
atheism is the better world view.
First of all, where does Shandon establish the
truth of his leading statement, namely, "THERE IS NO GOOD EVIDENCE TO
FAVOR ATHEISM AS TRUE"? Does the truth of this proposition conclusively
follow from anything that Shandon has written? If so, I don't see how. Thus,
given my failure to see both the direct inferential relevance of the body of this
section to the title which it bears and any logical consequence of the latter to
the former, I would have to suppose that it is
inadequately titled. I would expect, reading such a title of a section in an
opening statement of a formal debate, that it would at least be established by
the content of the section it heads. But I do not see this to be the case in
this section of Shandon's opening argument.
Let’s break
up Shandon’s above paragraph and examine what exactly he says so we can
determine if he really does prove the truth of the claim titling the post.
Shandon writes:
When we look at the statement made by Adams
about why atheism is true, he simply suggests that theism is not true and,
thus, compels us to believe that atheism is true on that basis. But Adams fails
to realize that arguments for God's existence may fail, but it does not follow
that other arguments or beliefs about God's existence are false.
Again, I do not see the relevance of what Adams
might or might not say on behalf of his atheism to Shandon's claim that
"THERE IS NO GOOD EVIDENCE TO FAVOR ATHEISM AS TRUE." Are we to expect
that the truth of Shandon's claim follows from the fact that Adams does not
provide the evidence he is seeking? Or, is Shandon's
point about Adams' statement supposed to serve as a premise in an argument
securing this position? If so, what is the total argument? Shandon gives us
little in this regard that can be readily detected from what he does give.
Shandon also writes,
In the movie Contact, the scientist (played
by Jodi Foster) experiences an event unconfirmed by the physical evidence. But
she (along with the audience) really experienced the event despite the physical
evidence. Is she then committed to denying her experience because the available
evidence does not point in her favor? Of course not.
I'm not certain how this point is relevant to what
Shandon wants to conclude in this section of his debate, or in his debate in
general. But even in the film in question (which I've seen numerous times
myself), there is evidence confirming that something happened in
Miss Airway’s little adventure (an 18-hour gap in recording tape), which is
inconsistent with the prevailing view that nothing extraordinary happened.
However, this evidence is suppressed. Shandon's citation of this point in the
development of his case does not take this into account. Is Miss Airway aware
of this suppressed evidence? No, not at all. Then again, it was not her whom
she was attempting to persuade. Rather, the hearing which she had to endure
pressured her to attempt to persuade those who did not experience firsthand
what she experienced firsthand. Thus, the fact that evidence was suppressed is
crucially important both to the drama of this portion of the film, and to the
context of the point which Shandon tries to make in his overall argument in
this section of his opening statement. Thus, it seems to me that a relevant
part of the context of the film he cites in support of his position has been
ignored in order to substantiate his position.
Ironically, this same
point could be used on the side of the atheist, since it is possible that there
is evidence which strongly or conclusively contradicts the claim that there is
a god, but which is suppressed or not seriously considered. Shandon has done
nothing to rule out such a possibility.
Consequently, I cannot
accept that Shandon has in any way established the claim “THERE IS NO GOOD EVIDENCE TO FAVOR ATHEISM AS TRUE."
Shandon also has a
second fundamental point in his opening debate. It reads as follows:
(2) ONE GOOD REASON TO SUGGEST THAT THEISM IS
TRUE
When we ask the questions, "Where did the
universe come from?" and "Why does the universe exist instead of just
nothing?", we are left with two possible options. (i) The universe is
infinite, or (ii) The universe began to exist. But when we consider that
infinity minus infinity results in self-contradictory answers, then we have no
reason to think that the infinite is anywhere in existence. This includes an
actual infinite in time as well as space. Therefore, it seems that (ii) is vindicated.
Indeed, modern cosmology has confirmed this in the accepted Big Bang model of
the universe. This means that the universe began from a singular point that
entailed both the origin of time as well as space. But since things just do not
pop into existence uncaused out of nothing, then there must have been a cause
for its existence. Given this discovery of the evidence, it seems clear that
theism is true.
So far, we have seen no good evidence to favor
atheism. But I have provided good evidence to suggest that theism is true. In
order for Adams to prevail in his upcoming critiques, he has to do more than
just attack my position. He must erect a positive case of his own more
convincing than theism. Unless he does this, then the evidence favors theism as
the best world view.
There are a number of issues which Shandon brings up here. Let's take these points in separate stages.
Shandon writes:
When we ask the questions, 'Where did the universe come from?' and
'Why does the universe exist instead of just nothing?', we are left with two
possible options. (i) The universe is infinite, or (ii) The universe began to
exist. But when we consider that infinity minus infinity results in
self-contradictory answers, then we have no reason to think that the infinite
is anywhere in existence.
Shandon states that there are only two options
in answer to the question "Where did the universe come from?" Those
answers, Shandon states, are:
i) The universe is infinite, or
(ii)
The universe began to exist.
However, it is unclear why these two answers are
the only answers available to rational consideration. Indeed, Shandon
nowhere demonstrates that the questions he asks are valid to begin with (since
there is a such thing as an invalid question). Instead, he simply takes it for
granted that these questions are valid. But there is good reason to see why this
is not the case.
In
addition to this, there are
other issues which need more critical attention from Shandon. For instance,
what does Shandon mean when he uses the term 'universe'? Well, Shandon does not
say. Thus, I must assume what I understand the term 'universe' to mean as I
assess his argument here. By 'universe', I mean the sum total of that which
exists. By this definition, I mean that anything and everything which
exists or is said to exist, must exist within or as part of the
universe. (I am taking this definition from the Objectivist literature (cf. The
Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism from A to Z, ed. H. Binswanger (1986), sv.
'universe'). Indeed, one online dictionary (Merriam-Webster)
seems to confirm my definition with its primary definition for this term:
"the whole body of things and phenomena observed or postulated." On
this definition, we should note that the notion that something exists outside
the universe is incoherent. Besides, the question “where did the universe come
from?” is essentially no different from asking “why does existence exist?”
which can only invite stolen
concepts. Thus, I would point out that this question is conceptually
invalid to begin with.
Additionally, assuming my definition ("the
sum total of that which exists"), I would infer that the universe must be
eternal (as opposed to being "infinite" or having a beginning at some
point in time). This constitutes a third position, a position that Shandon does
not list in what he believes are the only plausible answers to questions about
the general nature of the universe.
In regard
to what Shandon does provide, I cannot accept the idea that the universe is
"infinite" since I hold that the universe is the sum total of that
which exists (i.e., it includes everything that exists, and only that which
exists). The notion 'infinite' applies only to potentialities and not to
actualities. Shandon's own remarks seem to confirm that he also does not accept
the position that the universe is ‘infinite’ when he writes, "when we
consider that infinity minus infinity results in self-contradictory answers,
then we have no reason to think that the infinite is anywhere in
existence." Thus, I
think both Shandon and I are in agreement that the universe is not
"infinite" (though I cannot say we are in agreement as to why we both
reject this view, since his reasoning on this point is unclear to me).
But does this rule out the possibility that the
universe is eternal? I don't think it does. It certainly does not rule
out an eternal universe in the sense that I understand it. In order to qualify
my point, I will distinguish between what I mean by 'infinite' and what I mean
by 'eternal' since I do not hold that these terms are conceptually equivalent or
interchangeable. By 'infinite' I mean "greater than anything specific."
Mathematicians seem to assume this definition in one sense or another when they
use this term in relation to the number series, for "infinity" is
assumed to be greater than any specific number which they might indicate. The
essential of the notion 'infinity' seems to be the concept 'unlimited'. But a
number is by nature delimiting to itself (e.g., 5 is 5 and no more and no less,
assuming equal units). Thus, since to have identity means for something to be
itself and nothing more, then to exist is to be finite, i.e., limited
to itself, since to exist is to have identity. Consequently, I cannot accept
the notion of an actual infinite, and some philosophers (e.g., Harry Binswanger
for one) also argue quite plausibly that even the idea of a potential
infinite is not rational as well.
But this does not substitute for the concept
'eternal', which simply means that the concept 'time' does not apply. On this
matter, I agree with Dr. Leonard Peikoff when he writes,
Time is a measurement of motion; as such, it is
a type of relationship. Time applies only within the universe, when you define
a standard - such as the motion of the earth around the sun. If you take that
as a unit, you can say: ‘This person has a certain relationship to that motion;
he has existed for three revolutions; he is three years old.’ But when you get
to the universe as a whole, obviously, no standard is applicable. You cannot
get outside the universe. The universe is eternal in the literal sense:
non-temporal, out of time. (The Philosophy of Objectivism, lecture
series [1976].)
Thus, keeping these distinctions in mind, there
is no contradiction, conflict or incompatibility in holding that the universe
is both finite in terms of identity (since the sum total of existence
includes only that which does exist), and eternal with respect to the
concept of time (since the concept 'time' does not apply to the totality). If
one objects saying that the notion of an eternal universe is paramount to
saying that it exists in an infinite amount of time, he is ignoring the fact
that time is a form of measurement, and that as a form of measurement, it
requires a standard of measure, and since the universe includes everything
which exists, there is nothing which can serve as a standard when we get to the
universe as a whole. Thus, it ignores the fact that, in regard to the universe
as a whole, the concept 'time' simply does not apply.
Furthermore, it seems that Shandon's own
statement "when we consider that infinity minus infinity results in
self-contradictory answers, then we have no reason to think that the infinite
is anywhere in existence" would (along with the points I have made above
against the idea of actual infinites) rule out the supposition that the god
identified by the Westminster
Confession of Faith (WCF) exists, since this formal and elaborate statement
of faith affirms that "God… is infinite in being" (cf. Chap. II.I.(b)) and
assumes that
God is also actual. So apparently, both Shandon and I are in agreement that the
god indicated by the WCF does not exist, by Shandon's own reasoning and by the
reasoning I have provided.
Thus, when Shandon states, "This includes
an actual infinite in time as well as space," we can recognize that any
objection to the supposition that the universe is eternal is guilty of the
fallacy of context-dropping, since it fails to take into account the context of
the units subsumed in the reference of its premises, namely the concepts
'universe' and 'time' and the nature of their referents.
So, on this account, I would have to conclude
that Shandon's statement, "Therefore, it seems that (ii) [“The universe
began to exist”] is vindicated," is not true.
Shandon points out that "modern cosmology
has confirmed this in the accepted Big Bang model of the universe."
Indeed, many have argued for the plausibility of the Big Bang. But what does
the Big Bang theory say? Shandon clarifies this when he states, "This
means that the universe began from a singular point that entailed both the
origin of time as well as space."
Did this "singular point" exist?
Well, if it did exist, then this does not overturn the supposition that the
universe is eternal, since 'universe' means "the sum total of
existence." It does not matter whether the universe consists of 100
billion galaxies or 100 billion atoms or one atom. If all that exists equals
all that exists (i.e., if A is A), then the totality is implied whenever one
asserts the existence of any one thing, whether it is postulated that only one
thing or many things exist. Thus, even if one asserts the Big Bang (which I am
not affirming here), then the supposition that the universe is eternal is still
not compromised or contradicted. The Big Bang actually only pertains to the form
in which the universe existed at one time, or to the distribution of its parts.
It posits the beginning of what some scientists call the inflationary
distribution of the parts of the universe, not of the universe per se. If the
universe started as a “single point” then the Big Bang is not claiming that the
universe popped into existence from nothing.
Shandon writes, "But since things just do
not pop into existence uncaused out of nothing, then there must have been a
cause for its existence. Given this discovery of the evidence, it seems clear
that theism is true."
While I agree that "things do not pop into
existence uncaused out of nothing," I do not hold that "there must
have been a cause for [existence]" [1]. Indeed, existence exists; even
those who put forth the kinds of arguments which Shandon seems to be putting
forward must assume this. Why not simply start with the fact that existence exists,
and recognize that the universe is the sum total of that which exists, and go
from there? Where does the notion of a 'god' come in? Indeed, it nowhere
follows logically from anything which Shandon does provide. The notion ‘god’ in
Shandon’s hands is no better than a mere stopgap to occupy an artificial hole
in thinking, and has no more philosophical value than a throw-rug. He illicitly
concludes that there must be a beginning to the universe (which I have shown to
be incoherent), and since he himself holds that "things do not pop into
existence uncaused out of nothing," he still seems to think that there can
be a "god" which can pop things into existence out of nothing (e.g.,
'creation ex nihilo'). But simply by asserting the existence of one entity, no
matter what it is, he implies the existence of the totality by its necessary
membership in that totality, and thus nullifies any supposed need to explain
the fact of existence as such, which the notion 'god' is alleged to accomplish
(cf. “doctrine of creation”).
Therefore, I cannot
accept Shandon's preemptive conclusion that, "Given this discovery of the
evidence, it seems clear that theism is true." For one thing, this
conclusion does not follow, since even if one could establish that the universe
requires a source beyond itself, this alone would not be sufficient to
establish the truth of any form of theism, poly- or mono-, nor would it even
necessarily imply it. Indeed, if one accepts the premises which Shandon gives
here, then what holds him from dreaming up any one of a huge assortment of
supposedly plausible explanations for "the existence of existence"?
And, even if one could
establish that the universe is not eternal and that it requires a cause outside
itself (a notion which I hold to be conceptually incoherent and unsupportable,
for reasons given above), it would have to be shown that this cause was
conscious in nature for this to serve as evidence for the existence of a god
(since theism asserts a form of consciousness as the cause of the universe; cf.
“God created the universe by an act of will”), and Shandon nowhere
attempts this. Thus, if we accept the notion that the universe requires a
cause, there is no contradiction in assuming that the cause was not conscious
or possessed no consciousness at all. Indeed, whatever is supposed to have
caused the existence of the universe, might itself no longer exist. Nothing
Shandon says rules out considering this possibility if indeed we could accept
the notion that the universe requires a cause outside itself.
So, when Shandon writes, "So far, we have
seen no good evidence to favor atheism," we must ask, "what would
qualify as 'evidence to favor atheism'?” Indeed, I do not believe that Geusha,
the god of the Lahu tribesmen of Northern Thailand, exists. But what 'evidence'
can I put forward that Geusha does not exist? Indeed, I do not need to
prove that the non-existent does not exist. Furthermore, since atheism is the
absence of god-belief, and I am an atheist, then I am evidence in favor of
atheism. I exist, and I am an atheist, I therefore submit myself as evidence in
favor of atheism. If theists reject this, then I simply point to the fact that
existence exists, and to the fact that existence exists independent of
conscioussness, which theists themselves must assume.
Shandon writes, "But I have provided good
evidence to suggest that theism is true." But what evidence has Shandon
actually provided? Indeed, he has provided no evidence which endures criticism.
He has only engaged in a few conceptual ringlets, which I have shown to be
invalid. He has not put forward positive existential evidence; rather, he has
attempted to put forward a chain of inferences to conclude that the universe is
not eternal (even though he seems to confuse 'eternal' with 'infinite' – a
confusion which I have corrected), and from this assert that the universe
therefore requires a cause outside itself (which I have shown to be incoherent,
since in my view 'universe' includes everything which exists; if something
exists, it must exist as part of the universe), and thus conclude that
theism is therefore true (a non sequitur). So, Shandon needs to re-address what
he means here by "evidence" when he states, "I have provided
good evidence to suggest that theism is true." He does not point to any
physical or perceptually accessible evidence, thus he probably means conceptual
evidence, i.e., arguments, and these are shown to be fallacious and
insufficient.
When Shandon states, "In order for Adams to
prevail in his upcoming critiques, he has to do more than just attack my
position. He must erect a positive case of his own more convincing than theism.
Unless he does this, then the evidence favors theism as the best world
view," he only shows his own awareness of the feebleness of his own
argument. All that the non-believer needs to do is clarify whether or not his
intention is to persuade others to his view. If he does intend this, then he
must identify in positive terms what his view consists of, and provide
arguments to support that view. If he does not intend to persuade others to his
view, then all he needs to do is point out that he has no god-belief, and that
the arguments for the existence of a god which are proposed to him are invalid,
as I have done above. If either venture is successful (which should be
accomplished with a minimum of effort, as I have shown), then clearly atheism
is duly justified.
___________________________
[1] Shandon writes "there must have been a
cause for *its* existence". It is unclear what he considers to be the
antecedent for the pronomial adjective 'its' in the context in which he uses
it. It appears that the 'it' in "its" has the concept 'existence' as
its proper antecedent, thus rendering the following restatement of his
inference: "...there must have been a cause for [existence's]
existence." But if the supposed 'cause' is itself also supposed to exist,
then one is assuming what he sets out to explain, thus committing himself to a
stolen concept. I do not know if this is what Shandon intended to do.
I do not hold to the
religious view of the world because I do not accept any variation of the idea
that reality conforms to consciousness. Rather, I hold and operate consistently
on the premises a) that existence exists independent of consciousness, and b) that no
amount of wishing will change the facts of reality. Thus I don’t accept the
idea of miracles, creation ex nihilo, the notion of divine revelation or
morality based on commandments, for these are all expressions of the primacy of
consciousness view, which I reject as false. All these ideas are products of
imagination and a false understanding of the mind and its relationship to the
world. However, in the absence of a
rational view premised squarely on the primacy of existence principle, they are
often mistaken for truth. So, where the early church father Tertullian confessed that
he believes because it is absurd, I do not believe because I
think it is absurd. I generally do not accept ideas which I consider to be
absurd and claim them to be true. Simply, I do not believe the claim that a man
in 1st century Palestine rose from the dead for the same reason I do not believe
that cows jump over the moon: because neither claim can be rationally integrated
into a proper view of reality, which Objectivism supplies.
When one affirms his
position on the basis of faith, he concedes that reason is on the side of his
adversaries. A “relationship” with a god cannot be one founded on reason, which
is the faculty that identifies and integrates the data provided by the senses.
While Christians say that their faith has to do with a “relationship with
Christ,” I simply ask what role reason plays in this supposed relationship.
Indeed, how does one reason with someone who thinks he’s always right? And if
one thinks that someone else is always right, when would he attempt to reason
with him? Since the believer thinks that whatever God says is always right,
then reason really has no role in this supposed ‘relationship,’ even if the
believer protests otherwise. One does not persuade someone who is convinced
that he’s right to think otherwise. The actions of the believer speak much
louder than words on this account. Perhaps the believer chooses to have
relationships with beings with which he cannot reason. I do not. Perhaps that
is one of the essential distinctions between me and those who claim to be
Christians.