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Classified
U.S. Documents Reveal
Papua
A Victim of Cold War Subterfuge
By
Edmund McWilliams
[a
retired senior Foreign Service Officer who served as Political
Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta in the late 90's]
Background
Classified
U.S. Government documents recently obtained through the Freedom of
Information Act reveal U.S. complicity in a subterfuge whereby the
United Nations General Assembly gave its formal approval to a
manifestly undemocratic plebiscite which denied the people of the
Indonesian Province of Papua their right of self-determination.
That exercise, known as the "Act of Free Choice," was
promised in an agreement brokered by the U.S.. and signed at the
United Nations in 1962 between the outgoing Colonial power, the
Dutch, and the Indonesian Government which claimed the territory.
George
Washington University's "National Security Archives's"
Brad Simpson compiled the declassified documents collected in
research entitled "Funding Repression: The Indonesian -
East Timor Project." The compilation of declassified U.S.
Government messages and memoranda documents U.S. Government actions
and policies regarding Indonesia's annexation of the territory of
West Papua in 1969. The documents reveal a little known,
disturbing example of Cold War realpolitik in which a patently
undemocratic process enabled the Government of Indonesian dictator
Soeharto to assume control of a vast territory populated by a people
racially, religiously and culturally distinct from the great
majority of the Indonesian population.
Incorporation
of the largely Christian/animist, Melanesian Papuans into largely
Islamic, Malayu Indonesia has had
tragic
consequences. Well-respected human rights monitors including
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the State Department's
own annual human rights report for years have chronicled unrelenting
human rights abuse meted out by the Indonesian military to West
Papua's civilian population. These sources and other reporting
including UN development assessments also make clear that despite
the enormous wealth that has flowed to Jakarta's coffers from West
Papua great natural resources, basic health, education and other
services remain unavailable to many Papuans after 40 years of
Jakarta misrule.
A
prominent Papuan human rights activist, John Rumbiak, contends that
"the Indonesian government's policies and
practices
with respect to Papua specifically, the government's transmigration
program, neo-colonial economic exploitation, and militarism have had
a devastating impact on the health and welfare of its citizens and
on the territory's unique and important environment.." A Yale
research project investigating international genocide, in a report
released this Spring, concluded that "throughout the past forty
years, the Indonesian government has shown a callous disregard -
and, at times, an intentional and specific malevolence - for the
basic human rights and human dignity of the people of West
Papua." The Yale project researchers conclude that
the Indonesian government's actions - perpetrated in large part by
the Indonesian armed forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or TNI) -
against the Papuan people "constituted crimes against humanity
and could rise to the level of genocide."
The
declassified messages and briefing papers compiled by the National
Security Archives project document U.S.
(and
U.N..) awareness that the Papuans act of self-determination, the
"Act of Free Choice" which the Indonesian Government was
required to conduct under a 1962 bilateral agreement with the
Government of the Netherlands, was deliberately and fatally flawed
in conception and implementation. The U.S., which had brokered
negotiations between the departing Dutch colonial power and the
Government of President Soekarno, bore a special responsibility to
ensure the fairness of the process through which the Papuan people
were to determine their future. The documents reveal that the
U.S. manifestly failed in this responsibility.
Negotiations
for the 1962 "New York Agreement" were organized and
mediated by the senior U.S. diplomat Ellsworth Bunker who worked to
defuse a festering confrontation between the Dutch and the
Government of President Soekarno. Soekarno, father of the
current Indonesian President, was determined to unite all of the
Dutch colonial holdings in the region under the Indonesian flag and
sent troops to West Papua in an attempt to secure it.
Ironically, those troops were led by then Colonel Soeharto, the
brutal dictator who would subsequently force Soekarno from power in
1966. In 1962, the Kennedy Administration, anxious to avoid an
anti-colonialist war and concerned that the unpredictable
nationalist Indonesian leader might turn to Moscow or Beijing for
help, employed Bunker to press the Dutch to forego plans to accord
the Papuans independence and instead make a deal with the
Indonesians. The resulting 1962 "New York Agreement"
placed the Papuans under what amounted to an Indonesian trusteeship
for seven years, with the promise of an "act of free
choice" at the end of that interregnum... The U.N.,
according to the agreement, was to provide an interim minimum seven
month administrative presence allowing the Dutch a diplomatic
departure and, crucially, was also to provide oversight
("assistance and participation") to ensure the act of free
choice was free and fair. Papuans were afforded no role in the
1962 negotiations.
The
succeeding seven years of rule from Jakarta were a disaster for the
Papuans. Under the guise of rooting out ineffectual, small
scale resistance mounted by poorly armed Papuans resisting brutal
Indonesian rule, the Indonesian military mounted successive
campaigns which exacted an enormous toll on the defenseless civilian
population. The Indonesians broadly failed to provide critical
health services, education or economic development to the Papuans
who had languished under Dutch colonial rule. The Indonesian
government launched exploitation of the vast natural riches in West
Papua well before the "Act of Free Choice" with benefits
accruing to the Indonesians
and
foreign firms, notably the U.S.-based Freeport McMoran which in 1967
began excavation of what is today the world's largest copper and
gold mine.
What
the Documents Reveal
U.S.
Government documents reveal clear U.S. understanding that as a
consequence of Jakarta's misrule most Papuans, given a free
and fair choice, would opt for independence. A May 1967 U.S.
Embassy report noted that the Papuans "resent (the) arrogance
of Indonesian military and blame Indonesian officials for drastic
shortages of goods and poor living standards now prevailing."
A separate Embassy report explained that the Indonesian Government's
presence in West Papua "is expressed primarily in the form of
the Army." An October 1967 Embassy airgram cited a Papuan
holding a senior position in the Indonesian Foreign ministry as
stating "99 percent of the Papuan population favors
independence from Indonesia." A July 1969
"confidential" airgram from the Embassy reported that
"grievances and anti-GOI sentiment are quite real, however, and
there is little question that a great majority of the non-Stone Age
Irianese favor a termination of Indonesian rule." The
message continued: "Opposition to the GOI stems from
economic deprivation over the years, military repression and
capriciousness and mal-administration." The report
concluded that "probably a decided majority of the Irianese
people, and possibly 85 to 90 percent, are in sympathy with the Free
Papua cause or at least intensely dislikes Indonesians."
The message identified among the Indonesian rulers "a tendency
to degrade the Irianese for their darker skin" and noted that
Indonesian soldiers "commonly expropriate agricultural
commodities." The report also cites a more specific crime
noting multiple reports from missionaries that upon taking control
of West Papua from the UN in 1963, Indonesian military personnel
emptied warehouses of goods belonging to local merchants and
transported the merchandise and food by Indonesian Air Force planes
out of the area. The report notes that within two months,
there was an acute shortage of food and consumer goods. Reporting
from the Embassy to Washington is also replete with accounts of
human rights abuse by the Indonesian authorities including holding
and mistreatment of political prisoners, looting conducted against
the Papuan civil population, and general brutality.
At
the same time, the Embassy also was aware of the Indonesian
Government's determination to retain control of West Papua
("West Irian"). A February 1968 Embassy airgram
cited "most observers" as concluding that while there was
broad Papuan support for independence, "Indonesia will not
permit a plebiscite which would reach such an outcome."
While the U.S. Embassy met regularly with Papuans and reported their
grievances in classified channels to Washington, senior U.S.
officials made clear to the Papuans that they "should look to
Holland in the first instance for insuring the fair implementation
of the New York Agreement" arguing that while the U.S. brokered
the agreement, it was not a signatory to it. At the same time,
Embassy
reporting also noted Indonesian efforts to prevent Papuans from
contacting and seeking redress from the few U.N. officials in the
area.
The
visit of an Embassy official to Papua in early 1968 provided the
U.S. with early warning that the Indonesians were planning to
subvert the "Act of Free Choice," the plebiscite that was
to have been a genuine act of self-determination as envisaged in the
U.S.-brokered 1962 New York agreement. An extensive report on
the visit cited a U.N. official as describing the
"probable" Indonesian plans as entailing the following:
"the Government will divide West Irian into a number of areas
and select a slate of three to five persons from each area; a
minority of each area's groups may be chosen on the basis of local
preference, but the majority will be Indonesian or Indonesian
controlled; the groups thus constituted will convene as a whole and
endorse union with Indonesia." That description largely
anticipated the subterfuge Jakarta was to conduct some 18 months
later. Underscoring the necessity of resorting to such fraud,
the same report notes "all but one Westerner contacted were
persistent in the belief that Indonesia could not win an open
election." The Embassy reporting officer concluded that
"violence is inevitable."
The
documents make clear that while the U.S. Government, through its
Embassy in Jakarta, was fully aware of the Indonesian intent to
subvert the plebiscite, Washington was not disposed to do anything
to protect the democratic integrity of the process. A June 1969
Embassy "confidential" telegram to the State Department
stated: "Considering all aspects of (the) situation,
mission wholeheartedly endorses Department position and guidance ...
USG has nothing to gain by interfering in (an) already complex
problem and thereby disrupting present fruitful relations with GOI
(Government of Indonesia)." The Embassy message to the
Department continues, "we should, however, continue in low key
to bring to GOI attention need for credibility in Act of Free Choice
for Irianese sake and to keep relations with Government of Australia
and Government of Netherlands on (an) even keel." A
"secret" State Department telegram to the U.S. delegation
at the United Nations also in June 1969 underscored this U.S.
position. It instructed the U.S. UN team as follows: "As
you are aware, discussion (of) this subject with U Thant (UN
Secretary General) is for a number of reasons a very delicate
matter. We do not wish to undercut our noninvolved stance and
appear to be interfering in what is essentially a matter between SYG
(Secretary General U Thant) and GOI. We wish especially to
avoid leaving (the) impression that USG (is) pressing the SYG toward
firmer position with GOI on carrying out 'letter and spirit' of the
1962 agreement."
The
importance of maintaining a discreet public distance from the rigged
plebiscite was underscored in a "secret" memo signed by
Henry Kissinger, then serving as Director of the National Security
Council, and addressed to President Nixon. The July 18, 1969
document is a briefing paper preparing President Nixon for his
upcoming visit to Jakarta. Kissinger's briefing paper,
under the heading of "Points to Avoid," cautions Nixon:
"the West Irian "act of free choice" will be underway
during your visit. It consists of a series of consultations
rather than a direct election, which would be almost meaningless
among the stone age cultures of New Guinea." Kissinger's
memo continues: "there is a UN observer on the scene, and
we assume that U Thant will go along with the Indonesian form of the
act of free choice. There is, however, a small but active West
Papuan
independence movement, and a variety of groups in Australia and the
Netherlands which take exception to
the
Indonesian techniques of self-determination. Because the U.S.
played a mediating role in resolving the Indonesian/Dutch
controversy over the future of West Irian, there may be a tendency
to associate you with the form in which the act of free choice is
being conducted. We should avoid any U.S. identification with
this act."
In
"talking points" prepared for Nixon's meeting with
Soeharto, the Kissinger memo advises Nixon that "we believe
West Irian will definitely decide to stay with Indonesia."
Kissinger advises Nixon not to raise the issue but adds that if the
Indonesians were to raise it, Nixon should say that "we
understand the problems they face in West Irian but do
not
believe it is in our interest or that of Indonesia for us to become
directly involved." The U.S. willingness to givetacit
support to the subterfuge in West Papua, which was underway during
the visit, is explained in part by the Kissinger memo's description
of the Soeharto regime, whose army, by that time, had succeeded in
killing hundreds of thousands, possibly half a million political
enemies. Kissinger's memo said of Soeharto's rule:
"The government is under the control of a moderate military
man, Suharto, who although indecisive by outside standards is
committed to progress and reform. He has achieved impressive
results in his own way in cleaning up the mess left by
Sukarno."
As
planning for the a mid-1969 "Act of Free Choice" unfolded,
the Embassy reported without comment information provide by the
Indonesian Government that it had succeeded in limiting the role of
the Secretary General's personal representative, Bolivian Ambassador
Fernando Ortiz-Sans, who, according to the New York Agreement, was
to assist in administering the plebiscite. The Embassy
reported that the Indonesians in New York had managed to delay the
arrival of the UN official (Bolivian Ambassador Ortiz Sans), reduce
his staff from 11 to five (his staff eventually grew to 16) and
ensure that he would be based in Jakarta and not in West Irian.
A May 1969 airgram from the Embassy noted the diminished role of
Ortiz-Sans as the plebiscite approached: "the active role he
envisaged for (his) mission in influencing the GOI has been blunted
in recent months and his grand plans have been circumscribed and his
activities limited strictly to observer/advisory function."
The
Embassy also regularly reported progress of GOI plans to preclude
any democratic result in the plebiscite. An August 1968
telegram from the Ambassador described the Indonesian Government as
"working to carry out (the) 1962 agreement in (a) manner which
is meaningful but which at the same time will ensure continued
Indonesian control of West Irian." A June 1969 Embassy airgram
reported without comment death threats from the Indonesian military
issued to any Papuan who did not vote for integration in the
"Act of Free Choice."
The
"Act of Free Choice" transpired during the summer of 1969
and followed Jakarta's plan closely. The Indonesians selected
a total of 1026 Papuans who were assembled at various locations and
given the option to vote for or against Papua's incorporation into
Indonesia. (Eventually only 1,022 participated.) The process,
as described in notes from the period compiled by a western
journalist in Papua and by an Indonesian "observer"
sponsored by Jakarta, was transparently fraudulent.
"Delegates" were encouraged to drink excessively by their
Jakarta military hosts. Those who indicated any resistance to
a pro-Jakarta vote were bluntly threatened. In the end, the
vote was unanimous for annexation.
U.S.
behind-the-scenes support for Jakarta's fraudulent "Act of Free
Choice" was most important at the United Nations where the
General Assembly, in the Fall of 1969, was called to accept the
exercise. An August 1969 memo
from
the State Department's Director for Indonesia, Paul Gardner, to
Assistant Secretary Green in advance of a meeting between Ambassador
Green and the Indonesian U.N. Ambassador reconfirmed the USG
strategy of offering quiet diplomatic support to the Indonesians.
The memo alerted Green that "the Ambassador might ask for our
support in preparing smooth U.N. handling of the act." It
advised: "You might point out that lobbying for certain
procedures could focus undue attention on the agenda item,
stimulating other nations to take part. If asked by other
delegations
for our views, however, the U.S. delegation would note that lengthy
debate could serve no useful purpose." In fact, U.S.
support for the Indonesians at the U.N. General Assembly ultimately
proved to be substantial. A November 17, 1969 "memorandum
of conversation" reported on a discussion between Secretary of
State Rogers and Indonesian Foreign Minister Malik and their staffs.
The memo notes that in response to a request from Malik that the
U.S. "do what it could to convince the African nations of the
need for judicious handling of the "Act of Free Choice
matter," Secretary Rogers responded that the U.S.
"had already been in touch with the delegations mentioned by
Foreign Minister Malik as well as with others." Rogers
added: "In our general discussions on this matter we have
taken the position that the 1962 Agreement has been satisfactorily
executed." The Secretary then offered to contact one key
African Ambassador personally.
The
importance of the U.S. role in the ultimate UN failure to disapprove
the fraudulent "act of free choice" is made clear in a
December 1969 message from the Indonesian mission to the UN to the
U.S. mission. The message, signed by
the
Indonesian Mission Chief, states: "On behalf of the
Indonesian delegation, permanent mission and staff, let me express
to you our appreciation for your valuable support regarding West
Irian, which has helped make possible the successful completion of
the long struggle of the Indonesian people for complete freedom,
national unity and territorial integrity."
Postscript:
In what must appear as deja vu for Papuans, the U.S. and the
international community appear again to
be
conspiring with the Government of Indonesia to subvert the civil and
political rights of the Papuans. After having pressed Papuans
to accept Jakarta's offers of "special autonomy" rather
than pursue independence, the U.S. and manyin the international
community have reacted in silence as Jakarta has reneged on its own
special autonomy offer and instead, has sought to divide the
Province into three parts. At the same time, among those
concerned about justice for the Papuans, there is a growing campaign
to persuade the United Nations to review its acceptance of the
fraudulent 1969 "Act of Free Choice."
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