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During the negotiations, the Netherlands had insisted on retaining
sovereignty over West New Guinea, a position condemned by Indonesia
as the continuance of Dutch colonialism and a "troublemaking
anachronism."1 The Hague argued the West Papuans had little or
no connection with the Asians of Indonesia. They also claimed that
they had only administered West New Guinea from Java because they
did not consider it practical to appoint a separate governor and
administration for a territory with only a small Dutch presence.
Nonetheless, Jakarta claimed that West New Guinea was an integral
part of the Dutch East Indies and should therefore be part of
Indonesia. Further talks were held on the issue in December 1950,
but no agreement was reached. By 1957, Indonesia had unsuccessfully submitted four resolutions on their
claim to the UN General Assembly. They now turned to what John
Reinhardt describes as the third and final phase of the West Irian
dispute, a skillful mixture of diplomacy and threats of military
force.2 In 1961 this campaign had become a matter of some concern to the newly
elected President J. F. Kennedy. Although hostile to Sukarno, he was
more prepared than his predecessor to seek a resolution to the
dispute. Policy makers in Washington were concerned about Jakarta's
massive Soviet-backed increase in military expenditure. Howard
Jones, US Ambassador to Jakarta, later wrote: Sukarno understood the tactics of realpolitik. He was a master of
painting himself into a comer and waiting for someone to rescue him.
In this situation, with the help of the Russians, he created a real
threat of war. It was not a bluff.3 Eventually Washington decided that the only way to avoid a Dutch /
Indonesian war on a seemingly irrelevant issue was to persuade the
Dutch to accept a compromise involving a transfer of sovereignty to
Indonesia, linked to some form of self-determination. As one US
official wrote in February 1962:
I can't blame Dutch for doubting that Indos have any intention of
allowing genuine plebiscite five years or so from now. But the
important thing is that some such Indo promise is the essential
face-saving device Dutch have been seeking. We must get them to take
it as best they can expect.4 Eventually, The Hague was persuaded to accept such a solution and on
August 15, 1962, they signed the New York Agreement with Jakarta.5
In what was in effect a face saving measure for the Dutch, the
territory was not directly transferred to Indonesia. Instead, under
the Agreement, a temporary UN administration (UNTEA, United Nations
Temporary Executive Authority) was established to run the territory
for a minimum of seven months. There was no maximum limit set, but
in fact the UN withdrew on May 1, 1963 as soon as the minimum period
had been completed. At no point in the negotiations or the
decision-making process were any West Papuans involved.6 Under the terms of the 1962 New York Agreement, this temporary UN
administration was only the first part of a process that would
ultimately lead to the Papuan people of West New Guinea exercising
their right to self-determination. Situation
in 1968 In August 1968, a UN team returned to the territory, now renamed West Irian Led by the Bolivian diplomat Fernando Ortiz Sanz, its responsibility under the Agreement was to "assist, advise and participate" in the act of self-determination planned for the following year. By the time Ortiz Sanz's UN team arrived, the territory had already
experienced years of Indonesian rule and was facing serious economic
and political problems. Peter Hastings, one of only two Australian
journalists to be allowed to visit since 1963, gave a damning
assessment, despite his support for continued Indonesia control: The simple fact is that, since the Dutch departure, the Indonesian
Government has done little or nothing until this year to develop the
country or to give the Papuans any substantial economic development
projects or any real degree of political participation. Papuan
feeling is running high.7
British Embassy communications from Jakarta reported that they were
briefed by a US Consular official, Reynders, who also visited the
territory in early 1968. Following his return to Jakarta at the end
of March, Reynders reported that Indonesia simply did not have the
economic resources necessary for the proper development of West
Irian. Commenting on the enormity of the problem he wrote, "The
sort of sum required for a proper -development of the country is,
and will remain, completely beyond Indonesia’s means."8 He
also believed that Indonesia did not have the economic or military
resources necessary to deal with the security threat posed by
"Free Papua" rebels of the OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka,
Free Papua Movement): The Indonesians have tried everything from bombing them with B-26s, to
shelling and mortaring them, but a continuous state of
semi-rebellion persists. Brutalities are undoubtedly perpetrated
from time to time in a fruitless attempt at repression.9 Even the Indonesians admitted privately that the situation in West Irian
was grave. In May 1968, an Indonesian Ministerial delegation led by
the Sultan of Yogyakarta made a visit to assess the situation. On
their return to Jakarta, the delegation briefed the press on their
success in dealing with the various problems that they had
identified in the territory. In reality, they were shocked at what
they had seen. A British Embassy cablegram in July informed London
that: ... the visit was chiefly significant in providing members of the Cabinet
with a first-hand account of the immensity of the economic problems
and a demonstration of the unpopularity of the military and civil
authorities which rule the territory.10 The New York Agreement referred to an opportunity to "exercise freedom of choice," and of consultations with "representative councils" on procedures and methods to be adopted for "ascertaining the freely expressed will of the population." At no point were the critical words "referendum" or "plebiscite" mentioned.11 Nonetheless, Article XVII of the Agreement states that all adults from the territory were eligible to participate in the act of self-determination, "to be carried out in accordance with international practice." Although no definition of what this meant was given, the phrase is of central importance when considering whether or not the terms of the agreement were ever legitimately fulfilled. Suharto was prepared to take full advantage of the deliberately vague
terminology in the Agreement. He was also aware that, with the
possible exception of China,12 no major power had any interest in
opposing their position on West Irian. Since the signing of the
Agreement in 1962, Washington had shown little interest in the issue
and apparently rebuffed suggestions by both the Dutch and the
Australians that they should "concern themselves rather more
closely" in issues having to do with the Act.13- Further
evidence of this US position was given by Edward D. Masters, at the
US State Department. In a conversation with a British diplomat in
June 1969, he commented that Washington saw little merit in getting
involved in the "niceties of ascertainment," which might
lose them good will in Jakarta to no advantage. He then added
"the State Department were themselves faced by some criticism
from the Senate but it was unlikely to amount to very much."14
Despite Suharto's violent suppression of the Indonesian Communists,
the Soviets were mainly uninterested in criticizing Jakarta for its
dealings with the territory, particularly as they had been
Indonesia's key ally in its campaign for West Irian. There was some
condemnation in Soviet publications of Suharto "cheating the
Papuans who long for genuine independence",15 but as one
British official, David F. B. Le Breton, remarked:
... there are signs that the Communist [states] would like to mend their
fences with [Jakarta] and for that reason they may prefer not to do
anything which would worsen their relations with Indonesia at the
present time.16 Another British official, I. J. M. Sutherland, commented in April 1968: The strength of the Indonesian position lies in the fact that ... they
must know that, even if there are protests about the way they go
through the motions of consultation, no other power is likely to
conceive it as being in their interests to intervene. . . . I understand that the exiles may find support in the Australian press.
But I cannot imagine the US, Japanese, Dutch, or Australian
Governments putting at risk their economic and political relations
with Indonesia on a matter of principle involving a relatively small
number of very primitive peoples.17
The plain fact is that there is no other solution than for Indonesia to
keep West Irian; no one is thinking in different terms; and no
Government is likely to complain so long as the decencies are
carried out.18 Significantly, this attitude was shared by the Australian Government, the
only Western power with any remaining direct interest in the issue
(Australian New Guinea shared a border with West Irian). In late May
1968, a British diplomat, Donald Murray, reported that from
Australia's point of view, the more quietly the act of self
determination passes off next year the better."19
Ortiz
Sanz's Arrival On August 23, Ortiz Sanz arrived in West Irian and embarked upon a ten-day, three thousand mile tour of the territory by air. Accompanying him throughout was a team of eight Indonesian officials led by Sudjarwo Tjondronegoro, Jakarta's representative for West Irian affairs. On his return, Ortiz Sanz wrote a report for Secretary-General U Thant in which he praised the work of his Indonesian hosts: the Government, must be given credit for progress in elementary
education, the process of assimilation through use of a common
language [Indonesian], school integration and apparent efforts at
fraternisation.22 He also added: We know in advance that the principle of "one man one vote"
cannot be applied in all areas of the territory, both on account of
the terrain and the lack of sophistication of vast segments of the
population.... We also know that the Indonesian Government, which
seems not to be very sure about the results of the consultation,
will try, by all means at its disposal, to reduce the number of
individuals, representatives, and institutions to be consulted.23 To counter this predictable move by Indonesia, Ortiz Sanz promised that
he would endeavor to enlarge the number of Papuans engaged in
deciding the issue so that, in his words, the UN could prove that
they did indeed try "to provide as democratic a basis as was
possible to ascertain the real will of the population."24 Although Ortiz Sanz spent very little time in the territory during 1968,
the Indonesians were still uncomfortable about his presence. In
December, they complained to his superiors in New York that he had
become a focus of attention to the Papuans and was causing a
"certain excitement" which was obstructing the
"smooth running" of the territory. It is true that,
despite being constantly accompanied by Indonesian officials, Ortiz
Sanz was approached by at least twenty-six Papuans who managed to
pass him petitions and letters, most of which condemned Indonesia
and called for a genuine referendum in the territory. Importantly, Jakarta also objected to the UN's intention to send up to
fifty staff to West Irian. This number was later reduced to
twenty-five, but in the end only sixteen UN staff members were
employed, and these included administrative personnel. Looking back,
it seems incredible that the UN agreed to limit the number of its
officials to such a small, token figure. By way of comparison, the
UN mission to organize and monitor the August 1999 referendum in
East Timor totaled upwards of one thousand individuals, including
several hundred police and hundreds of electoral officials. While
Ortiz Sanz's team had the more limited responsibility of
"advising, assisting and participating" in the Act of
Self-Determination, it operated in a territory many times the size
of East Timor. Both territories were engaged in an act of
self-determination, but the comparison demonstrates the immense
difference between a genuine attempt to monitor a democratic
referendum and one that was not genuine. It is not surprising that Indonesia ignored his suggestion, since there
is evidence senior Dutch and UN officials had already agreed with
Jakarta as early as 1963 to a method for self-determination which,
did not involve any direct voting by the population. In May 1963,
Australia's Washington Embassy forwarded information to Canberra
which it had received from the Americans: The Dutch and Indonesians have apparently been sounding each other out on
the question of the form of the self-determination exercise. The
Dutch apparently are prepared to agree to the exercise taking some
form other than a plebiscite.... Narasimhan's [U Thant's Indian chef
de cabinet] view is that the Act might take the form of consultation
with local councils and village representatives.26 A year later, Jose Rolz-Bennett, the Guatemalan Under Secretary-General
for Special Political Affairs, made a similar suggestion to the
Indonesians during a visit to West Irian and Indonesia.27 On the issue of political freedoms, Indonesia was specifically obligated
under Article XX of the Agreement to "guarantee fully the
rights, including the rights of free speech, freedom of movement and
of assembly, of the inhabitants of the area." Commenting upon
this, Ortiz Sanz warned Jakarta that without these rights and
freedoms, the international community would not be satisfied that a
"fair and truly democratic judgment had been made by the
Papuans."28 At the same time however, he assured Sudjarwo that
Indonesia "has the absolute right to take all the measures it
deems necessary to maintain internal order."29 In fact, under the Agreement Indonesia did not have the absolute right to
do as it chose, if, by its actions, it undermined the rights and
freedoms of the Papuans. In reply, Sudjarwo thanked Ortiz Sanz for
not questioning Indonesia's security measures, adding that economic
difficulties encouraged agitation and "Many simple-minded
people get easily affected by this kind of cheap propaganda and
incitement. "30 Whether or not nationalism is an incorrect term to apply to the political
aspirations of a predominantly traditional tribal society like West
Irian, reports by various foreign visitors are consistent in their
conclusions that the overwhelming majority of Papuans did not want
to be ruled by Jakarta. In one example, a British journalist, Garth
Alexander, visited the territory in early 1968 and briefed British
officials on his return: Probably the most striking feature of Alexander's report was the further
confirmation of what we have been told before that the majority of
the West Irianese ... are very far from wishing to become integrated
with the Republic of Indonesia. Of all the people he spoke to, and
he met between three hundred and four hundred, none was in favour of
such a solution. The impression he has is that the Papuans loathe
the Indonesians, perhaps in the same degree and as a direct
consequence of the way in which the Indonesians have despised and
belittled the Papuans.31 A second example is contained in a July 1969 report by Jack W. Lydman of
the US Embassy, who cited members of Ortiz Sanz's UN team who had
privately conceded that 95 percent of the Papuans supported the
independence movement.32 Of course, when the moment arrives, it would be very difficult, indeed,
to assess the real importance of such anti-Indonesian sentiment
since, as you are very well aware, only a very insignificant
percentage of the population is capable of or has interest in
engaging in any political actions or even thoughts.33 Concluding his report, he added: The tour has confirmed my initial impressions ... that the implementation
of the provisions of the New York Agreement relating to
self-determination "in accordance with international
practice" is, indeed, impossible.34 In reply, Under Secretary-General Rolz-Bennett agreed and wrote that
"the lack of development of the population, stood out all too
clearly."35 This willingness by the UN Secretariat to abandon the minimum safeguards
contained in the Agreement was characteristic of its attitude
towards the issue throughout its involvement with West Irian. In
effect Washington had given the UN the awkward task of providing a
veneer of respectability for what was simply the transfer of control
of West Irian from one foreign power to another. As Terrence Markin
comments: The Americans, who had repeatedly assured the Netherlands [before the
settlement] . . . that they would "stand accountable to our
principles" by insisting on a self-determination process that
was "a reality and not a mockery," began shortly after the
signing [of the New York Agreement] to argue that the responsibility
for ensuring a fair exercise really lay with the UN and the
Netherlands. Around the same time the Dutch were losing much of
their will to press this issue.... And with neither the US nor the
Netherlands pressing the issue, the UN had little incentive to do
much.36 1969.
Indonesia Rejects the "Mixed Method" The beginning of 1969 was marked by the surrender of the Mandatjan brothers, rebel leaders from the far west of the country who had been fighting the Indonesians for the past two years. By mid-January, however, rebellion in the area erupted again as around two thousand Arfak tribesmen rose up under the new leadership of Frits Awom. In response, Jakarta was forced to transfer two additional infantry battalions to the region from South Sulawesi.37 Meanwhile, at a meeting in New York in late January, Sudjarwo informed
the Secretary-General that Jakarta had rejected Ortiz Sanz's plan to
adopt a "mixed system" for the Act.38 However, the UN
Secretariat's apparent prior agreement with Jakarta in 1963 to
dispense with any direct voting suggests the plan might simply have
been a public gesture to demonstrate UN efforts to ensure some
democratic involvement in the Act. An alternative possibility is, that Ortiz Sanz was not fully briefed by
the Secretariat and was not aware of its previous discussions with
Jakarta. In this case his effort to introduce genuine Papuan
participation might have been undertaken without proper consultation
with U Thant. Evidence of this comes from an Indonesian newspaper in
July 1969 which claimed that Sudjarwo had been angered to discover
that the "mixed method" was Ortiz Sanz's idea and had not
originated in New York.39 This scenario would support the position
of those who argue that Ortiz Sanz was more a victim of maneuverings
in New York and Jakarta, rather than a cynical participant. As Sir
Patrick Shaw, the Australian Ambassador to the UN, commented in
April 1968 after meeting him, "Ortiz Sanz is a man of goodwill
and integrity but I am not sure that he has much conception of the
sort of environment in which he will find himself working in West
Irian."40 In meetings held between Ortiz Sanz and the Indonesians during February,
Sudjarwo outlined the method which the authorities had decided to
adopt. Their chosen option was to enlarge the eight regional
councils, already existing in the territory, and create special
Assemblies which would then each reach a collective decision on
whether or not to remain with Indonesia.41 These existing regional
councils had been set up by Jakarta when it took over in 1963, and
their members were appointed by the authorities. Ortiz Sanz could do
little but request that he be given information about all existing
councilors to help him determine to what extent they truly
represented the population. Sudjarwo agreed, but nothing was ever
handed over.42 Soon afterwards, Sudjarwo gave Ortiz Sanz further information on the
selection process to be used to appoint additional members for the
planned assemblies. One group would be chosen by existing approved
political, social, and cultural organizations. A second group would
consist of "traditional" tribal chiefs selected by the
existing council members, and a third group was to be elected by the
people themselves.43 As a result of this, the only potential opportunity for genuine popular
participation lay in the election of the third group. In practice
however, this method of choosing additional members meant that the
Indonesian authorities and the existing Indonesian appointed
councils had tight control of the whole selection process for the
final "consultative assemblies." As Ortiz Sanz wrote in
his final report, Sudjarwo had informed him, "Those few
people--possibly existing---not in favour of retaining ties with the
Republic of Indonesia, are ... not organised in legally existing
political groups or parties in West Irian".44
To justify this proposed method for determining the Papuan's response to Indonesian rule, Jakarta consistently claimed that the vast majority of the Papuan population were in favor of staying with Indonesia and did not want the Act to take place. In their General Assembly report they wrote that this view was based upon hundreds of supporting statements which they had received from Papuans.45 In private however, Sudjarwo was unhappy about the number of
anti-Indonesian petitions which were being sent to Ortiz Sanz and
then forwarded on to him. At one point he even complained to the
Secretary-General that these petitions were beginning to upset the
Indonesian army.46 In his final report to the General Assembly, Ortiz Sanz wrote that he had
received a total of 179 petitions during his time in the territory,
both for and against Indonesia. With regard to the first
group--petitions favoring Indonesian sovereignty over West Irian--he
said that these came from the regional councils and various
officially recognized organizations. They were, he said, written by
politically minded and better educated people. At no point in the
report did he question whether these were genuine views or simply
the result of Indonesian pressure.47 In contrast, he was dismissive
of the anti-Indonesian petitions, describing them as being often
barely intelligible and usually anonymous. More importantly, he asserted in his official report to the General
Assembly that over half the petitions he received were
pro-Indonesian.48 One has to question why he wrote this because it
was simply incorrect. In the UN archives in New York, details of 156
of the 179 petitions survive, recording all those received up until
April 30, 1969. Of these, ninety-five are anti-Indonesian,
fifty-nine are pro, and two are neutral.49 Therefore, even if all the missing twenty-three petitions were
pro-Indonesian, this would mean that over half would still be
"anti-." In fact, Ortiz Sanz privately admitted that many
of the petitions he received in the final weeks were against
Indonesia, so it is reasonable to conclude that in total, at least
60 percent of the petitions delivered to the UN were against
Indonesia and in favor of a referendum. It is not realistic to suggest that Ortiz Sanz simply made a mistake,
since the descriptions of each petition are clearly typed and the
list is easy to add up. Consequently, either Ortiz Sanz himself
chose to mislead the UNGA deliberately, or he was told to do so by U
Thant. Whoever was responsible, it is a clear illustration of the UN
leadership's collaboration with Indonesia to legitimize the
Indonesian takeover of West Irian, at the expense of the Papuans,
who thereby lost political rights guaranteed in the Agreement. Political
Prisoners and Political Rights Further evidence of this collaboration comes from correspondence between Ortiz Sanz and Sudjarwo on the issue of political prisoners. While Ortiz Sanz acknowledged that the New York Agreement required the release of any political prisoners, he let Jakarta know that he accepted their right to deal differently with those he described as "anti-state." He even went so far as to suggest that it would be better to move such troublesome people out of the territory before the Act was put into effect.50 In March 1969, the Dutch privately urged U Thant to consider sending in a
UN expeditionary force to ensure that the vote could take place
without intimidation from the Indonesian military.51 The
Secretary-General, however, contested The Hague's assertion that
such a deployment was permitted by the Agreement and rejected the
suggestion. Ortiz Sanz commented, probably correctly, that it was
just a Dutch tactic to enable them to claim that they had at least
attempted to protect the Papuans.52 Besides, Jakarta would have
certainly refused to allow such a deployment. Nonetheless, Ortiz Sanz did continue to apply what little pressure he
could on Indonesia to include some democratic content in the Act. On
March 18, he issued a press release in which he declared that
Indonesia's chosen method would only be acceptable if it fulfilled
three prerequisites: 1. The final consultative assemblies had to have a sufficiently large
membership. 2. The assemblies should represent all sectors of the population. 3. The new members of the assemblies should be clearly elected by the
people. He ended by stating that Jakarta had given him official assurances that
these prerequisites would be complied with.53 Whether this
declaration was made widely available to the Papuans is unknown, but
if the authorities did not actively cooperate in disseminating the
press release, then it is unlikely many Papuans were informed of
these prerequisites.
On April 11, the last of the regional councils met to accept officially
Jakarta's chosen method for the Act, although they loyally
reasserted that the whole exercise was an unnecessary distraction
and that West Irian would always be Indonesian. The outcome of this incident has shown for the first time in West Irian
the possibility of peaceful democratic demonstrations by the
population and evident good-will on the part of high ranking
Indonesian military commanders. Everything
is now quiet.54 Two months later, however, he was forced to revise this positive report and to inform the Secretary-General that at least forty-three people had been arrested and detained without his knowledge, following the demonstration.55 Meanwhile, it appeared that the UN's efforts to influence Indonesia were
continuing to fail. In mid-April, Ortiz Sanz told Rolz-Bennett that
Jakarta had decided that new members of the regional Assemblies
would simply be suggested by officially appointed ad hoc committees,
rather than elected by the people. as previously promised. This was
a clear snub to Ortiz Sanz, so soon after his public statement on
the importance of elections for the assemblies. In reply, a rather
exasperated Rolz-Bennett wrote: Our initial reaction is that Indonesia may be going too far particularly
by its decision to have the additional representatives
suggested-which means in fact appointed-by an ad hoc committee. Our
Indonesian friends should realise, as you have told them so many
times, that the method for the act of free choice should not depart,
so radically from generally accepted norms of political
representation. It is surely not beyond human ingenuity to devise a
method whereby the additional representatives would be elected or
selected by their respective communities, thus giving an opportunity
to the general population to be involved in the act of free
choice.56 Rebellion Ortiz Sanz’s initial reaction to the rebellions was to try and ignore
them, and he instructed his staff to refrain from any involvement in
the issue. He also informed the press that internal security was a
matter for Jakarta and not his business.59 This response was not
well received by his superiors, and Rolz-Bennett immediately
instructed him to obtain full information on the disturbances from
Indonesia.60 Under pressure from New York, Ortiz Sanz also made a
brief visit to the area. On his return to Jakarta he issued a
statement to the press claiming that all was now quiet.61 In fact,
he saw little during his inspection tour and sometimes never even
went beyond the airstrip. Furthermore, he had actually written his
press statement before his trip commenced.62 In private, however, he was sufficiently concerned about the general
situation so that in mid-May, he requested that U Thant ask to delay
the Act by three to four months in order "to provide us with a
last opportunity for improving the democratic conditions."63
But the Secretariat had no enthusiasm for this idea, and
Rolz-Bennett replied by asking "whether it would in fact be
possible to change significantly the conditions in the territory
during the period of a suggested postponement."64 UN
Pressure on Indonesia While General Sarwo Edhie suppressed the rebellions, the UN continued to urge Jakarta to moderate its stance on the Act. A UN report in May of a meeting between U Thant and the Indonesian Ambassador states: .... the Secretary-General emphasised the importance of electing the
additional councilors in a way that would ensure that the new
councilors would truly represent the people of their constituencies.
This would be the touchstone in the judgment about the fairness and
validity of the whole exercise which would be made by member States
of the United Nations.65 But by the time U Thant made this plea, Indonesia had already begun
appointing the new councilors without informing Ortiz Sanz and his
team, who were supposed to be monitoring the whole exercise. It was
a further embarrassment to the UN's representative, especially as
the situation was being reported by some of the foreign press. Ortiz
Sanz again appealed to Sudjarwo saying: I stress, the importance of a properly implemented Act of Free Choice
because I believe Indonesia wishes a final, and not a temporary,
solution to the problem of West Irian. The Indonesian Government
should take a calculated risk and allow the opposition the
opportunity to express its views. This is the moment for the
Indonesian authorities to adopt courageous and generous measures.66 Eventually, under pressure from Rolz-Bennett, Ortiz Sanz reluctantly
wrote to Sudjarwo urging him to re-stage some of the elections, so
that the UN could be there to monitor the process. To his surprise,
Sudjarwo agreed,67 and between June 26 and, July 5, a selection of
fresh elections took place in the presence of UN officials and,
occasionally, the foreign press. Despite this, by the end, UN
officials only actually managed to witness the election of 195 out
of the 1,022 Assembly Representatives who eventually took part in
the Act. Nonetheless, it was to be the only occasion in which UN pressure on
Indonesia had any effect during the entire period, and Ortiz Sanz
made much of it in his final General Assembly report. Absent from
this report, however, is any description at all of the election
meetings themselves, and the reason for this omission becomes clear
from reading the accounts given afterwards by the few members of the
foreign press present, and by the locals themselves. A typical
example was described by the Australian journalist Hugh Lunn, who
witnessed one election in Biak which was also attended Ortiz Sanz
himself. The election, he said, consisted of a group of Indonesians walking into a
silent crowd of Papuans and choosing six men that they themselves
had selected.- Hugh Lunn then described how Indonesian soldiers
arrested three Papuans who displayed placards demanding a
plebiscite. One journalist appealed to Ortiz Sanz to intervene, but
he simply said that he was there just to observe.68 When one considers the importance attached by the UN to these elections,
which were represented as the "touchstone" on which the
democratic credentials of the whole Act would be judged, it is hard
not to conclude that their efforts were completely unsuccessful.
Even in those few elections witnessed by UN observers, it was
obvious that genuine democracy had no perceivable part to play in
the exercise. With the failure of his final attempt to create an
appearance of democracy, Ortiz Sanz was to spend the remainder of
his time in the territory collaborating with U Thant and Jakarta in
their efforts to conclude the Act with as little controversy as the
situation permitted. UN
and Indonesian Collaboration The importance attached to this task, and the extent to which it became Ortiz Sanz's only concern, is well illustrated in a letter which he wrote to Rolz-Bennett on June 14. In this letter, Ortiz Sanz revealed that Sudjarwo was "not only concerned, but worried" about two particular points. The first was the attitude of the Netherlands Government towards Indonesia's chosen method for the Act. The second was the contents of the final report which Ortiz Sanz would submit to the UNGA. With regard to the former, Ortiz Sanz declared: I advised him privately though emphatically that his Government should
try to obtain assurances that the Netherlands' Government would not
cast any doubt on, or challenge, the Act of Free Choice. This would
prevent a heated debate in the General Assembly. On the subject of his final report, Ortiz Sanz wrote: ... as an expression of my continued co-operation, I offered to show
Sudjarwo, on a personal basis, those parts of the report that might
be controversial or create discrepancies with the [Indonesian]
report.69 This is a significant letter for two reasons. First of all, it reveals
that Indonesia was genuinely concerned at possible international
criticism of their intention to deny the Papuans any genuine
self-determination. More importantly, however, this letter provides
unambiguous evidence of Ortiz Sanz's direct involvement with Jakarta
in measures aimed at, minimizing the impact of any international
protest at these fundamental breaches of the Agreement. While this
level of duplicity and cynicism might be expected from, a State in
pursuit of its perceived "national interest," it is a
completely indefensible mode of action for a representative of the
Secretary-General of the United Nations. However, the Secretary-General himself seems to have made similar
suggestions to the Indonesians. At a private meeting held in New
York on June 20, U Thant informed Sudjarwo that: The Indonesian Government would have to consult very diligently with the
Members of the General Assembly for the purpose of preventing the
submission of a draft resolution touching on the substance of the
West Irian matter.70 In the last weeks before the Act began, Ortiz Sanz told Rolz-Bennett that
the human rights situation was actually getting worse, despite his
constant appeals to Jakarta to show restraint. He even twice asked
the Indonesians to arrange for him to meet with President Suharto so
that he could express his concerns. But, as he had to concede in his
final report, Suharto was too busy to see him.71 The
Act of Free Choice On July 14, the Act finally began with a meeting of the 175 "consultative assembly" members for Merauke. In addition to Ortiz Sanz and his team, a large group of senior Indonesian politicians and soldiers were present. Also there were the Ambassadors of Australia, the Netherlands, and Thailand, accompanied by Indonesian journalists, officials, politicians, and a small number of foreign reporters.72 As was the case with all the other meetings, the assembly members had
spent several weeks before the day under guard by the authorities
and isolated from the rest of the community. Some assembly members
claim that they were threatened and bribed by Brigadier-General Ali
Murtopo, Commander of the Army's OPSUS (Special Operations Section),
during those weeks when they were under guard. Murtopo had been
selected by President Suharto to go to West Irian with a team of
military students, and teachers in order to mount a "hearts and
minds" campaign and "make a success" of the Act.
According to the Reverend Hokujoku who was a member for Jayapura,
Murtopo warned them that Indonesia was a great military and would
not tolerate dissent. If they wanted their own country, he mockingly
suggested that they could ask the Americans for a piece of the moon.
Hokujoku also described how those Papuans chosen to speak at the
meeting were given exact instructions about what to say and were
forced by the Indonesians to rehearse their speeches.73 In Merauke and elsewhere, the task of the Assembly members, as decreed by
Jakarta, was to come to some form of collective decision using a
vaguely defined Indonesian method for reaching consensus, known as
musjawarah (consultation / deliberation). What this meant in
practice was that a number of senior Indonesian officials addressed
the Merauke members telling them that they should, for a variety of
reasons, remain with Indonesia. Then, Ortiz Sanz made a brief
statement about the importance of their task and reminded them that
they were speaking not only for themselves but for all Papuans.
"Do not hesitate to speak the truth and be loyal to the wishes
of your own people." Following these speeches, twenty of the Assembly members stood up one
after the other and made a series of almost identical statements.
They proclaimed that they had considered themselves as part of
Indonesia since 1945, they recognized only one country, one
constitution, one flag, and one Government, that of Indonesia. After
these statements the Chairman, a Government official, told the other
155 assembly members to stand up if they agreed with their
colleagues position. All then stood up. The Indonesia Minister of Home Affairs then concluded the proceedings by
thanking the members for their decision and pledging that Indonesia
would fulfill its responsibility to develop the territory
economically and in every other respect. West Irian, he promised,
would be given autonomy in organizing, coordinating and carrying out
this task.74 The following day, Ortiz Sanz gave a press conference in which he
defended the Indonesian musjawarah system as "practical."
He later argued that the option of national independence for West
Irian would not be feasible.75 The Sydney Morning Herald published
an editorial on July 14 which was fiercely critical of the whole
exercise and the behavior of its own Government in Canberra: The last stage in the betrayal of the people of West New Guinea is
scheduled to begin today.... No amount of word twisting can change
the ugly fact that an unsophisticated island people is being quite
deliberately and openly cheated of its right, guaranteed by an
international agreement reached under the aegis of the United
Nations, to decide its own political future.... Where else in
today's world would the dictum be accepted that a people was too
primitive ever to be free?76 Despite such criticism, the next assembly went ahead as planned in Wamena
on July 16 with identical results.77 The third assembly meeting took place on July 19 in Nabire in the Western
Central Highlands region. According to the journalist Brian May, a
recent rebellion had emptied the area of local people to such an
extent that the Indonesians had to ship in Papuans from other
regions to play the part of Assembly members.78 Even so, another
journalist Hugh Lunn, reported that one assembly member managed to
contact him to ask whether he could guarantee that there would be no
reprisals if one hundred members spoke out against Indonesia at the
meeting. Lunn replied that he could not give such a pledge. Another
member then slipped him a note to say that the assembly had all been
bribed. At the same time, a third member attempted to pass a note to
the UN team, but according to Lunn, they refused to accept it.79
Despite all this, Ortiz Sanz's official report made no mention of
the rebellion or allegations of bribery.80 The same day, Jakarta
declared that the results so far meant that West Irian had already
chosen to stay with Indonesia. The remaining meetings would
therefore be nothing more than a confirmation of this result.81 The
next two meetings in Fak Fak and Sorong also followed the same
format as the others, with the same speeches and the same pledges
love and loyalty to Jakarta delivered by the handful of Papuans
selected to speak. In Manokwari, while the assembly voted, Papuan youths outside the meeting
room chanted " alone, alone." In response, armed
Indonesians threw them into the backs of lorries and drove them
away. At one point, Hugh Lunn the only foreign journalist present,
was threatened with a gun by an Indonesian while he took photos of
the demonstration. He then ran inside to inform Ortiz Sanz, but
Ortiz Sanz refused to intervene.82 On July 31, the Biak meeting followed the same pattern. Meanwhile scores
of Papuans on the island were in detention, having been arrested
shortly before as a precaution by the authorities in case they
disrupted the event.83 On August 2, with food, drink and singing laid on, the final Assembly
meeting took place in Jayapura.84 To celebrate, various Indonesian
military officers and officials were then paraded shoulder high by
groups of Papuans, in what could be described as a rather tasteless
theatrical display of pre-rehearsed jubilation.85 With the final part of the Act's implementation complete, Jakarta
solemnly announced that the legal and final result, in accordance
with the New York Agreement, was that all the Papuans had elected to
remain with Indonesia. Aftermath Our strong impression is that the great majority of UN members want to
see this question cleared out of the way with the minimum of fuss as
soon as possible ... The Arabs and the other Moslem states would
certainly support Indonesia strongly. There is, moreover, general
recognition, even, according to the Dutch, on the part of the
moralistic Scandinavians, that there is no alternative to Indonesian
rule. Finally the Secretariat, whose influence could be important,
appear only too anxious to get shot of the problem as quickly and
smoothly as possible.86 Three months later, in November 1969, Ortiz Sanz's final report was
presented to the UNGA. In his conclusions, he expressed concern that
the political freedoms guaranteed by the Act had not been fulfilled.
He also conceded that "certain elements" of the population
favored independence. Nonetheless he declared that, "with the
Guam limitations; imposed by the geographical characteristics of the
territory and the general situation in the area, an act of free
choice has taken place in West Irian in accordance with Indonesian
practice, in which the representatives of the population have
expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia."87 Technically this was an accurate statement, if by "Indonesian
practice" he meant an exercise totally devoid of any genuine
democratic content. But the New York Agreement Specified that Papuan
self-determination had to be carried out in accordance with
"international practice." Ghana, and several other African countries at the November meeting,
condemned the exercise for being undemocratic. They also called for
a proper act of self-determination to be held in the territory in
1975, on the grounds that the Agreement had not been properly
fulfilled. However this amendment to the main resolution on Irian
was defeated by sixty votes to fifteen, with thirty-nine
abstentions. In the end, the General Assembly voted by eighty-four votes to none, with
thirty abstentions, to simply "take note" of the
Secretary-General's report, and the reports of and Ortiz Sanz.88 Conclusion ... set in train the dissolution of innumerable ethnically complex states
whose main claim to unity derives from the colonial mandate. The
consequences of this for the stability of the international system
could be incalculable.89 when minorities are discriminated against or their identity is threatened
by majority policy ... the minority is not participating together
with the rest of the population in the ever-continuing and ongoing
process of self-determination.... This means that the minority can
realize its right to self-determination not in the society as a
whole, together with the rest of the population, but only
separately.90 Finally in response to an inquiry by U Thant on the legal aspects of the
Papuans' right to self-determination, the UN's legal adviser replied
in June 1962: ... since President Wilson enunciated the principle of self-determination
in 1918, there appears to emerge a strong presumption in favour of
self-determination in situations such as that of Western New Guinea
on the basis of the wishes of the peoples of the territory
concerned, irrespective of the legal stands or interests of other
parties to the question. While other factors may also be taken into
account, there seems to be a growing practice of recognising that
the wishes of the local population should be paramount.91 The purpose of this paper, though, was not to discuss the legitimacy of
Papuan self-determination because this right had already been
explicitly acknowledged by the Netherlands and Indonesia when they
signed the 1962 Agreement. Furthermore, by agreeing to participate
in the implementation of this Agreement, the UN Secretariat
undertook a responsibility to ensure that it was properly fulfilled.
Instead, my intention has been to determine first of all whether the
Agreement was properly implemented and second to assess the UN's
role in its implementation. I would contend that the first part of this does not require an in-depth
study of the subject to arrive at an accurate conclusion. A brief
examination of the official November 1969 report is all that is
needed to conclude that the Agreement was not fulfilled. Under its
terms, the Netherlands Indonesia and the UN had an obligation to
protect the political rights and freedoms of the Papuans, and to
ensure that an act of self-determination took place, in accordance
with international practice. On both these points, the three parties
failed, and they did so deliberately since genuine Papuan
self-determination was never seen as an option by any of them once
the Agreement was signed. On the UN's part in the Agreement's implementation, it is clear that the
Secretariat's priority throughout was to ensure that West New Guinea
became a recognized part of Indonesia with the minimum of
controversy and disruption. This was the role assigned to the
organization by the Americans in 1962, and U Thant saw no reason not
to comply. It was Cold War politics, and the rights of the Papuans
counted for nothing. Indeed it would have been extraordinary if
things had turned out otherwise. To fulfill its task, the UN Secretariat tolerated Indonesian interference
and intimidation of the population during the temporary UN
administration of the territory. Shortly afterwards, it collaborated
with the Dutch and Indonesians in agreeing privately to abandon the
use of any direct voting system for Papuan self-determination. In
the year leading up to the Act, the Secretariat's objective was to
minimize the potential for international criticism by ensuring the
appearance of a sufficient level of genuine Papuan participation,
while obtaining the desired result. To achieve this they made a number of suggestions to Jakarta. Ortiz
Sanz's "mixed method" was one example (as previously
mentioned, there is some uncertainty as to The plan's origin; it may
or may not have been originally devised by Ortiz Sanz). Another was
their attempt to make sure that some Papuans participated in the
process of selecting additional representatives for the final
assemblies. Both U Thant and Ortiz Sanz emphasized privately and
publicly their concern that there be some democratic dimension to
these selections. In the Secretary-General's final report, much was
made of Jakarta's agreement to hold fresh elections in a few of the
many areas where no UN officials had been present. In reality,
though, this was nothing more than token gesture, and one can
conclude that there was no genuine participation by the people in
these selection processes. In the end, the unanimous decision by
1,022 to remain with Indonesia made a mockery of the UN's endeavors,
despite an apparent final effort by Rolz-Bennett who, according to
Markin, had confidentially urged Jakarta to record some negative
votes, "to give the outcome the appearance of
legitimacy."92 One can argue however that the lack of
international interest in the Act made their failure largely
irrelevant at the time. With the realization that Indonesia was going to ignore their
recommendations on this issue, the UN chose to cooperate with
Jakarta in its efforts to stifle any international criticism of the
way the referendum in West Irian had been handled. In this effort
they were assisted by other states including the Netherlands,
Australia, the UK. These countries all privately lobbied other
countries, particularly in which seemed most likely to condemn the
result. Furthermore, Ortiz Sanz stated in his report to the UNGA
that the majority of petitions he received from Papuans were
pro-Indonesian; he made this assertion despite the fact that he must
have known it to be false. In the end, one can say that Ortiz Sanz's task was a thankless one, since
he was condemned by the Indonesian press as a Papuan sympathizer,
and criticized by a number of Western diplomats for his timidity in
defending the Papuans. To this day however, he maintains that the
method adopted was the most democratic possible under the
circumstances and that the final result was "wise and
sensible."93 To conclude, the UN was an active participant in the systematic
undermining of the New York Agreement, but its actions were
initiated and supported by Washington, Jakarta, and the Hague. In
acting as they did, U Thant and the UN Secretariat allowed the UN to
involve itself in a dishonest process which deliberately denied the
Papuans political and human rights. On December 10, 1999, Dutch Foreign Minister Van Aartson announced that
he would initiate a historical re-examination of the circumstances
surrounding the Act. Van Middelkoop, the MP who was behind the
proposal replied "….finally we can look the Papuans straight
in the eyes."94 It remains to be seen whether the UN will agree
to join the Dutch in returning again to this particular episode from
its past. Endnotes
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Copyright © 2002 Elsham News Service. All rights reserved.
