„Proofs for God“

In this chapter I will try to show You the difficulties when trying to combine rationality and belief. Many ( like for example atheists ) try to show that (traditional) belief is not supported by logic and that therefore it is wrong. Others try to show that in many ways using rationality to explain religion is wrong in the first place as religion and belief is by nature not subject to rational reasoning. As for me I only try to show the limits of reason and ratio and belief. We start here with the „proofs“ people made for the existence of God. It’s interesting that exactly those that always tell the atheists that there is no way to „disproove“ God now try to proove him. We will see that there is no proof for the existence of God, just as there is no proof against him. It is however important to understand that the mere attempt to proof God is senseless. Belief and faith require more then our reasoning can (for the moment) do.

Ontological Proof

The proof ( this one is from Anselm of Canterbury ) goes like this :
a) God is something, to wich nothing higher can be thought of.
b) Such a being is thinkable (is existent in thoughts)
c) Would it only be thinkable and not really exist then something higher would be thinkable; it would thereofore not be God
d) Ergo: It exists really

We will stick to the most common interpretation of this proof. According to it, a) is a definition of the term God. Nowadays one mostly formulates it as follows: „God is a perfect being“, so the word „higher“ is to be understood as „more perfect“. In b) „thinkable“ means something like „possible“, so one can understand it either in the way „It is possible that such a being exists“ or in the way „There is a possible object to which this term can be applied“. Anselm`s argument for c) is, that real existence is a mesure for perfection. According to this thesis a real existent thing is always more perfect that a non-real (imagined) thing.
Now we will examine the argumentation:
1) The definition in a) is highly questionable, since the term „A is more perfect than B“ is normally associated with a certain aspect (of value) F and normally means „A is concerning F more perfect than B“ ( for example : „A is more just than B“ ). So concerning some aspects A could be more perfect than B, but concerning others it could be vice versa. Therefore results the incomparability between A and B concerning the term „more perfect“. There could be many objects to which nothing higher exists simply because they are not comparable to other things. To make a) an adequate definition of the term God one must assume that all objects are comparable concerning the term „more perfect“, but this simply is not the case. Also for a „fleshless“ God many terms concerning perfection don’t make sense ( like beauty, strength, health etc.). It is however not clear which aspects of perfection should be used for God. It would be circular to ask maximal perfection in a) for all possible aspects of values which are appropriate for a God. One could only use those aspects which are adequate for a „fleshless“ being.
2) Let us now assume that a) would be correct and we even had cleared the problems about aspects of value for God. Even then this doesn’t conclude the existence of a possible object which fullfills a). This is the main problem of the proof. The term „squared circle“ is understandable, yet there is no object which fullfills this and the question if there is a perfect being or if not for all beings there is one more perfect thinkable is not trivial. The fact that a term is understandable ( making sense ) results only in the existence of the term, not in the existence of the object. At least it would be necessary to show that such a term would not be analyticaly empty. This could only be done with the sentence „It is possible that there is God.“ but not with „There is a possible object that really is a God.“ But the first sentence leads again to questionable assumptions.
3) As already said c) assumes that a real existent object is always more perfect than a non real (imagined) one. This is highly questionable however. Why would a real murderer be more perfect than a murderer in a book for example. A good example for the error in the argumentation is made by Gaunilo. He said: „There is a (in all aspects) perfect island thinkable, so it’s existent in mind. Would it not be existent in reality then it would not be perfect. Therefore it exists.

A modified version of the ontological proof can be found with Leibniz:
a) A God is a necessarily existing being
b) Therefore it is possible that such a being exists
c) Therefore a God exists
In this example c) really is the result of a) and b). The error lies in the fact that b) is not correctly reasoned. But even if b) (and the whole proof) would be correct there still would not be a clear result. There could be many necessarily existent objects but one would not call them all gods.

As conclusion we see that the ontological proof is not justifiable. The existence of Gods neither an analytic truth nor a logical tautology. We will therefore skip the tries to „save“ the argument, which only bring up new problems and errors.

Cosmological Proof

There is a hole family of cosmological proofs, mostly going back to Platon and Aristoteles. This proof is the one most commonly found among the „common folk“. Today’s discussions are normally about the following formulations. The important critics are from Kant and Hume. Most important is the proof of the existence of a first „mover“, a first „cause“ and the necessary being.
God as first „cause“
a) There are things, which’s existence are caused.
b) Cause for the existence of an object is always a different object (than the object that exists)
c) Each chain of causes for the existence of an object A1 (meaning all chains ....,A3,A2,A1 of objects, so that An is cause of existence for An-1 (n>1)) is finite ( has beginning and end ).
d) Ergo: there exists and object that causes the existence of other objects but was not itself caused and such an entity we call „God“.

According to the traditional view causes are always objects. Today we won’t say an object causes another object or causes it’s creation; we see causes and effect as „events“. Here we talk about the causes for the existence of an object. We can’t say the mere existence of an object causes the existence of another object ( for example: the mere existence of a glassmaker doesn’t cause the existence of glass, only his work causes this). So we must understand the sentence „A is cause for the existence of B“ like „There is an action (activity) or change of a which causes that B comes to be“. Therefore not God can be seen as primal cause, but his actions. So we have to change the proof.
a) There are events, that have a cause.
b) The cause is always different from the effect (result)
c) Each chain of causes for an event E1 (meaning all chains ....,E3,E2,E1, so that En is cause of En-1 (n>1)) is finite ( has beginning and end ).
d) Ergo: there exists a primary cause, meaning a cause which is not result /effect.

In a) there is no problem. This is a fact based on experience so that the cosmological proof speaks about the existence of God not as an analytical (in the case of the ontological proof) but as an empiric fact. Also b) is not problematic as it simply expresses the case-effect relationship and it’s irreversibility. Since cause preceeds effect ( at least it starts earlier ) no event can be cause of itself. The problem of this proof lies in c). The argument for c) is that if there is no first cause, there will be no second, ergo no third etc. ergo no cause at all which would contradict a). But obviously doesnt have to be so and therefore is incorrect. The easiest example are the natural numbers (-..., -2, -1, 0, 1, 2,....) where You won’t find any „first“, ergo second etc. but one can’t conclude that natural numbers are not existent because of this. This argument is therefore not valid. Also it doesn’t say that everything that happens has the same first cause. Therefore there could be many first causes, which nobody would all call „godly“.

God as “ens necessarium”

a) something exists
b) all that exists, exists either contingently or by necessaty
c) everything that exists contingently (was once created)
d) all that is created, is created by something which already exists
e) if all existed contingently, there would have been a time in which nothing had existed
f) because of d) this simply can’t be
g) therefore something must exists by necessaty and this we call „God“

The start a) is not problematic. At first site this is also so for b), because a fact is contingent exactly then, if it’s possible that it exists and that it doesn’t exists. If the fact is not contingent it means it’s impossible that he exists or it’s impossible that it does not exist (meaning it’s necessary that it exists). If it really exists, the first of both alternatives is not given. The point c) is reasoned as this: For all contingent facts there is a possibility that they don’t exists. Since the fact on the one hand exists and on the other hand there is a possibility that it doesn’t follows that it once (in the past) did not exist.
The last part of the sentence however can’t be deduced out of any definition of the term possibility; neither of the definition that possible means not analytically false nor of the definition that possible is what once was or will be (diodor). So we can’t define contingent existence as the „non - existence“ of an object because then the necessary existence of an object in b) would only mean that it has existed for all time till now. Since we can’t conclude that it will continue to exist, we hardly could characterise God by the necassity of his existence. The best way is to understand „existing by necassity“ as „forever existing“ and argue for c) and b) with the (problematic) assumption that all which doesn’t exist forever either never existed of or has a start and end of existence (exists only for a period of time).
Then d) states that everything existing has a cause for it’s being existent. The fatal error of the proof however lies in the fact that e) doesn’t follow out of d). From the term „for all existing objects there is a time at which they did not exist“ doesn’t follow „There is a time at which all created objects still din’t exist“. E) would be only valid if the number of objects created till now would be limited ( not infinite), but we have no argument for that. The point f) is just as reasonable as d): If there is a Time t at which there are no objects, so there are also no causes for objects after t; also after t there can’t be any objects. So with e) the proof shatters. The points a) to d) only state that for all time there were things existent but not that there exists something which has been in existence for all time.
There are some other versions of the cosmological proof but in the end all make the same mistake (which will be explained below). One question is why this proof is so popular ? That’s very easy to explain. The explanation of contingent facts by other contingent facts only leads to new questions of the new facts. This chain of questions will only end if You give reasons that are not contingent but necessary. This is a rather old ideal „explanation theory“ that can be found with Plato and Aristoteles, but there is no guaranty that it is realisable, especially that all facts can be explained by necessaty. As a matter of fact it is even highly implausible. Let us for a moment think contingent facts exist (which is used in all arguments and proofs). The problem is that what is caused by necessaty is itself necessary, so that contingent facts can’t be explained by necessary facts.

Teleological Proof

This argument is based on Sokrates. God is deduced out of the finality or „reasonability“ in nature. The proof goes like this:
a) In the world there is a final „behaviour“ that is neither by chance nor intelligent.
b) Everything that is not intelligent, behaves final only under the leadership / influence of an intelligent being
c) Therefore exists an intelligence, which orders all natural things for a final reason and this we call „God“

We say about a) that there are things in the world that always or mostly act in the same way and cause what is best without us being able to call them intelligent. Their behaviour is not by chance but rather by „natural“ laws (even if only statistically). The „goal“ or „end state“ (finis) is one –concidering certain aspects - optimal state. The main error lies in b) with the unclear definition of finis or „goal“. A goal is on the one hand something that is conciously aimed for. We speak here of the goal of actions. On the other hand a goal can be a state which will be at the end of a processes realisation. In physics there are not only causal rules where every process is dependend on the one before but also final rules that say that one process acts that one state will be reached and uphold. Now if You use the first definition of the term „goal“ You can’t postulate a) without assuming before that there really is an intelligence behind all. This is circular reasoning. And the second definition of the term „goal“ is also unusable. The existence of a final, ordered behaviour, even when seen in the context of reaching or upholding an end state doesn’t result in the presence of an intelligent being. Just look at a ray of light that goes through different media and takes the way which is fastest. There we also don’t assume an intelligence behind this behaviour. Also finality in the second meaning doesn’t exclude causal explanations of the behaviour.
The second error lies in the step from a) and b) to c). Even if we assume that all final behaviour and actions in nature which are not intelligent by themselves have an intelligent being as „controller or cause we can’t proove that all these things have only one „causing intelligent being“.

Conclusion

There are many other „proofs“ for Gods existence but those are the most relevant ones. Of course the others are also not „correct“. So as result of above discussion we should have seen that (at least at the moment) there is no correct, usable proof for Gods existence. Either the arguments are incorrect or they are so „wide“ that the term they refer to is not necessarily the being we understand as God. Kant once said about these empiric facts (proofs): „Would the highest being stand in the chain of these empiric conditions, it would be part of the chain, just like all „lower“ parts of it and would (as the „lower“ parts) require more research for the even „higher“ parts of the chain. (meaning God would not really be the superior being). However if we tried to separate God from this chain, to regard him as a being superior to our natural understanding, then how could reason build the bridge to him?“ So as conclusion we note that the key - ideas of theism about the existence of God and therefore theism at all can’t be rationally proven.