Attributes of God

The fact that there is no argument at the moment that proves God rationally and perhaps it is impossible to do so at all. We of course can’t conclude that God doesn’t exist. We will turn to some ideas that show this. They want to prove that the theistic definition or view of God is empty, because either some of his attributes can’t be fullfilled or because some contradict each other, or because the idea that God has certain attributes ( which are assigned to him according to theistic ideas ) simply contradict empiric facts. So there are some arguments for the „non - existence“ of God. These can be diverted into 2 types. The first ones try to proof that God doesn’t exist. The second one only try to prove that certain aspects of God can’t be. The proofs against Gods existence lack correctness however, so we will only turn to proves against certain aspects of God. Some theists see God as a person, a nonmaterial being, everlasting, good, moral perfect, allknowing, allmighty and as creator of the world. As there are various different theistic terms for God the chances to disprove God as a whole are nearly not existent.

Allmighty

In every religion You will find that God is allmighty. He can do all he wants, rules undisputedly above all nature and all laws. This human idea should be explained now with reasonable means, so we first need to see what allmightiness is.
As a first idea we will say :
a) A being x is allmighty exactly then, when x can do all x wants to do
This definition is commonly heard but it is rather week because it doesn’t make a statement about the limits of imagination or will of the being. Also there is an error in it as everybody would be allmighty if he restricted his wishes. So we will modify it a bit.

b) x is allmighty exactly then, when for all fact p is valid: x can cause that p is existent.
Such a definition can be found with Descartes. However even in old age people saw the difficulties with this definition. The first problem is if God could also create contradictious facts. With this ability to create for example that at the same time and place it rains and does not rain, or that 2x2=5 one can’t assign any reasonable sense. Therefore mostly allmightiness is defined like follows:

c) x is allmighty exactly then, when for all (analytically) contingent fact p is valid: x can cause so that p is existent.

But also for this definition there exist a number of problematic issues. I will only concentrate on those issues that really shatter c) or weaken it severly.

• For many contingent facts (like for example moral evil) we assume that they exist without God causing them although he could. Therefore the fact `p is and God does cause that `p is contingent. This is paradox however as God would have to cause and not cause it at the same time. If You follow this route You will see that if c) is valid for all contingent facts p is valid: if p exists then God caused p. This however is concerning things as moral evil for example not thinkable.

• Gods allmightyness can’t be fit with the idea of human freedom. If a person a ( at a specific time) does an act F or doesn’t, this F-Action or F-Notdoing is a free action of a, so the fact that a does an action F is contingent, but God can’t cause that a does F. If God would cause that, then a couldn’t act freely, since You can’t cause something another does freely. So if there is free will, then God can’t be allmighty in the sense of c).

If You keep all this in mind You will realise that we don’t have a good definition of allmightyness at the moment. The following paragraph will be a bit complicated.
Even the term „cause“ is fatal as a cause is always before the result, so one would not be able to cause things in the past. If You consider God an agent in this world You would limit his „power“ to all things which could be done at a specific time. This makes him a very powerful being, but still restricts him so we can’t speak of allmightiness. Also one could assume that God is not part of this world, so the term „cause“ is not ment in the „normal“ sense. By saying this You can say that God could create every possible world and therefore also every fact in one of these worlds. With this assumption however You only speak about allmightyness relative to this world, not however relative to the „world“ God himself lives in. Still one could use c) if we assume the idea of an „external God“. His „causing“ is no longer something in our (worldly) time, his power doesn’t change. God would be able to change things in the past (from our point of view), because with the causing of a world he can also cause everything that happens in it. This concept doesn’t even contradict human freedom, since if there is a world w with an agent x who can do F at Time t so it is in w valid that x can do F at t. This means that if x does F we will see this action as free even if God made the world in which x really does F. God can also create non - deterministic worlds and it’s in harmony that he causes the action F from x. This means that it’s harmonious to think that x does this action F from free will. I know last sentences are somewhat complicated :-) ) However this point of view is not really satisfying, since we still must take the word „cause“ in a temporal surrounding. Firstly if God realises a world he only can afterwards realise new ones. So therefore he would limit himself by his actions. There would be a sort of supernatural, quasi - temporal order. Secondly the harmony between „God causes that an inner - worldly agent x does F at a Time t“ and „The doing of F by x is a free act“ makes the „causing“ irrelevant.
Lets look at a simple example: chess: We assume all possible worlds would be all possible endings of a chess game. So we would say the real game (the real world) would be determined by the players, by their choices of moves in the situations they are in. We would not say that the real game would determine the moves of the players but only that it would imply them. The „causing“ of God is also a determination. The making of a non - deterministic world as the real one is no determination of all things therein. One could only say that God determined all those things that from the very beginning were necessary (like for example the natural laws). This power of God resembles more the deistic view of God. The ability to intervene in this world can only be assigned to God if we see him also as agent in this world, and with this perspective he (as we already saw) is not allmighty in a definable way.
So the conclusion is still the same: We don’t have any useful definition for allmightiness. And as long as we see God as supernatural being and inner - worldly agent at the same time this won’t change. Also the argument there would not be an allmighty God must therefore be used with a special meaning of allmightyness and can’t be generalised.

Moral Perfection and Freedom (to choose)

One of the central points in defining God in religions is the idea of mercy and or freedom of God. Freedom is also a requisite for allmightiness. We will leave behind the problems associated with allmightiness and just assume that God

• Has a certain amount of freedom of action, meaning that he has a certain amount of alternatives from which he can choose his actions

• Has a certain amount of freedom of will, so it can change it’s own preferences.

Without free will there is no real freedom as Your preferences govern Your actions. If we can‘t influence those then we are only able to do what we want; what we want is then ruled upon us, so our actions are not really under our control. Even we humans speak about ourselves as having those 2 type of freedom for us (of course in a little amount compared to God).

Even this minimalised assumption we made about God comes into conflict when we say that moral perfection is an essential property of God, because this says:
a) It is analytically nessecary that God will always choose the – or in case their are several equal: one – way of action which is morally best.

When making this statement You see that God has only freedom of action when there are 2 or more morally optimal alternatives. Even more problematic is that with a) You strip God of all freedom of will. It would not be a free beeing, but merely a morally perfect machine. When we now assume that God is not subdued to any external force and always will act rational according to his own preferences – irrational behaviour or actions in affect are nothing we can assume God has – then this means that he necessarily wants to do what he does, so that after a) he wants always the best and therefore has necessarily the perfect moral preferences. God then had no way to change his preferences and to command them. God can only be called „good“ however if he really does good, but doesn’t necessarily do or want it. Necessaty is not always considered by force, yet who necessarily does something is not free in his actions, so he is no moral agent. So we can only speak of God as a being that is not able to act in a bad way like we speak about a deeply to justice and goodness committed human being that he couldn’t lie: He can’t do it in the sense that it would collide with his principles to which by his own free will he subdued, but it doesn’t mean that he doesn’t have the ability to lie or would by nature always tell the truth. So to speak about Gods mercy obviously involves his freedom not to act good or to be able not to act good. If a human does good deeds then he doesn’t do it because of chance but because he has reasons to do so. Trusting God is therefore only justified if God is not naturally ordered to do good and serve justice.
Of course You could say now that a being which is not absolutly good would not be called God by us, since it would be worthy of high praise ( as the term God requires ).
For this we can only give the response that firstly a being can only be worth of praise if it does good by it‘s own free will. Secondly things that form the characteristic part of a being are no essential attributes. Since a being at least partly determines it‘s own character, the character can’t be essential (not changing or evolving ).
Also You can’t define good as all that God does since then all would be good that he wanted or did, meaning that the sentence „God is good“ would be uniformative. If kindness would also be a defined attribute of the word God these two definitions (good, kindness) would also be circular. On the other side the idea there could be an „order of values“ independent of God which he follows concerning his actions doesn’t fit into the traditional view of God as creator of all reality. When speaking of the „good“ we get two different interpretations. If we consider it „the ability to be good“, so goodness would not be an independent existence like the independent existence of God as a being. If we understand „good“ as things or actions which are good, so they would not exist independent from God who by definition is creator of all things. Also the sentence „God follows an order of values concerning his actions“ is somewhat unclear as one will presume that he does this from himself and not by following given criteria. So one can say: the sentence that one is ordered to do good or should do good implies that he doesn’t do it by his own, so for a perfectly good being there exist no moral demands or orders to which it had to subdue it’s will.
Although one cant define „Good is whatever God wants“, this doesn’t imply that „the Good“ would be ontologically independent from God or that for God there would not be any moral laws he had to submit to.

Impassiveness and Love

The idea of the impassiveness of God comes from greek mythology. For them God is a being with „blessedness“ meaning that God (impassiveness/blessedness means )is free from pain, suffering, envy or trouble. This idea however is also found in islam, christianity etc. On the other side islam teaches that God loves his creation ( especially the humans ). The problem is that everybody who loves is not blessed in itself as he also exposes himself to the suffering a lover has when for example the loved one turns away from the beloved. So whoever speaks about the impassivness of God must deny the center of religion or he would loose all claims of consistency. However impassivness is no central idea of the theistic definition of God.
Allknowing and human Freedom ( Predetermination (Qadar) vs. Free Will )
One of the most discussed problems is the idea of God knowing all while at the same time humans have free will.
The term allknowing can be explained like this :
a) A being x is allknowing exactly then, if for all fact p is valid: x knows that p
The problem about this definition becomes clear when we assume the word knowledge to be something that one can have only knowledge about a thing for which we can give reasons. These reasons of course mean that they must be known circumstances, but known circumstances are things that already happened. So at a time t one is only able to know that some Event E will happen in the future if he can conclude this by circumstances out of natural laws present at t. Therefore it’s not possible to know at t that E will occur if either E is a event by chance or by free will. Therefore God can’t know what free agents (persons) will do in the future and since allknowing implies knowledge of the future as a) says allknowing is only possible in a detministic world. So if man is free God cant be allknowing.
Against this argument You can of course say that we used an idea of the word knowledge that may be not usable for God. Most theologists think the knowledge of God not to be discursive but rather intuitive ( it‘s no knowledge based on reasons). Therefore we must use a more general definition for knowledge and we define allknowing as: x knows in t that p exactly then, if x in t is sure that p and p really is. Knowledge in this sense doesn’t imply that the world is determined. Therefore no contradiction of allknowing and freedom of man can be found – at least if You don’t assume that every conviction of God is not essential attributes of him. Because if they were then they were necessary and since after a) God can’t err all facts of which he is sure would have to be. God can be essentially allknowing which mean that for all facts it is necassary that he know about them but he can’t know all he knows by necassity. Otherwise he would have to know in all possible worlds the same which would be impossible since different worlds have different rules.

Allknowing, allmight, mercy and the evil in the world

The sophists have argumented :

• If God doesn’t know about the evil in the world he is not allknowing.

• If he knows about it but can’t do anything about it he is not allmighty.

• If he knows about it and could do something about it but doesn’t then he isn’t good.

This argument is even nowadays often used against the existence of an allknowing, allmighty and mercyful God or even against the existence of God himself (if You consider these attributes essential). It isn’t really conclusive though. One relevant critics against the argument is human freedom. Freedom is such a high value that the costs of moral evil (the bad things people do) is outweighted. With the creation of free humans God has in a way restricted himself to the extend that he can’t give them freedom and makes them not doing any bad things. Also this „contra-argument“ can be attacked. Since God knows all people in the world, why would he not generate only those that behave „freely“ in a good way? On the other hand again those that believe in God don’t see illnesses or other evils as really evil. For them God can even give sense to evil things and after all in the hereafter the evils that one lived through will be paid for with paradise.
However we can generalise the argumentation:
Is it possible that there is a goal, which is only reachable in this world and is so valuable that all evil in this world is outweighted? If there is such a goal then the idea of allmightyness, allknowing and Gods mercy are harmonious with the evil in the world. This problem is the so called „theodicee problem“. But we will not further speak about it as logically we can say one thing. Although the „meeting“ of evil and suffering is for many people the reason to disbelieve in God, we logically can’t prove that evil and the attributes ascribed to God contradict.

Conclusion

All above mentioned arguments are (if at all correct) no proof for the non - existence of God. If they are usable at all they only prove the contradictions or impossibilities of certain (by traditional theists) ascribed attributes of God. There is still enough room for modified ideas of God. The first conclusion we can draw is that it’s difficult to express the theistic idea of God into precise terms and therefore the difficulties of rational theology in general, which needs such a precise term. The second conclusion is that the existence of God is rationally not disprovable (or provable).