University of Venda Discourses on Difference and Oppression

1. BACKGROUND

The outbreak of the Second World War resulted in the abundant availability of cheap black (unskilled) labour. This in turn influenced unfair wage determinations for black workers and the working conditions that affected their social life as poverty abated. Related to this were the hard economic conditions during the war. This sowed seeds of grievances and, subsequently, protest. The grievances and protest stimulated the re-emergence of an independent black trade union movement that also experienced growth (Yudelman 1975: 294). This must be understood against the background that at the beginning of the war, black trade unions were not recognised and, therefore, virtually insignificant (Callinicos 1993: 32).

Regardless of this, labour protest spread to include the mining sector and municipal workers- as will be seen later- thereby indicating the broadening scope of industrial action. Therefore, the war contributed to the germination of, as well as the growth of, a black worker union movement. Callinicos (1993: 77) has argued that the Second World War led to rapid growth in the black working class and unions because social grievances that accompanied that process, affected many. Because Blacks constituted the majority of the working population, the disparities that they were subjected to stirred a louder voice of protest. These circumstances helped the trade union muscle of black workers to develop much more effectively during the war period because of their (Blacks) increased numbers. This being the case, the preceding statements bring to mind the need to discuss the reasons behind the flexing of the black trade union muscle.

Because black workers were in the majority their contribution to the war effort was essential and vital even though the interests of the industrialists always enjoyed priority. But one can argue that a healthy atmosphere in relation to production and profit would have resulted from better conditions of labour and better reciprocation towards the efforts of the workers. Unfortunately, employers only considered productive efficiency when dealing with their employees (Yudelman 1975: 85).

Thus, one detects the myopic attitude that was overriding the situation of labour conditions of Blacks: emphasis on war production and profit at the expense of the contributors to production. Yudelman (1975: 85) has argued that if work conditions were bad, workers had the rights to look for better ones, by moving from job to job and/or frequently moving from one residential location to another. That was one way of responding to poor working conditions and wages.

It would be wise to bear in mind that, wartime shortages and declining profits not only affected black workers in relation to wages but also led to labour reduction. As such, moving from one job to another was not always an answer to their labour problems because it usually resulted in losing the existing job opportunity instead of acquiring another. These were some of the experiences that created class-consciousness amongst the disadvantaged black workers in the sense that they felt exploited regardless of their contribution to the war effort. The government, employers and supervisors rode on the back of the black worker with a common cause of ensuring production for the war. They were also convinced that by tolerating black trade unions (during the war) they had found the ideal basis for industrial peace (Simons and Simons 1983: 516). Industrial peace was all the more important for the war economy that was closely tied to the status quo. The opposite would have frustrated war economy and production.

Although contribution to the war effort was essential, the position occupied by the worker also caused this "all important" labour force to be looked down upon. The black factory worker was usually a packer, cleaner or general labourer, who although excluded from any industrial council could be jailed if he went on strike (Simons and Simons 1983: 510). This was regardless of the hard social and working conditions that could force the disgruntled worker into striking. Black workers were not expected to show their general dissatisfaction regarding the status quo by means of strikes because it was illegal.

Business interests did not take into consideration black political rights except during the early years of the war when there was a degree of tolerance. Thus, one may talk of a situation of recognising the necessity for increased black labour versus the obstructionist legislation related to, specifically, the black worker. Therefore, trade unionism flourished under conditions of increased employment and inflation during the war (Simons and Simons 1983: 544) because with increased employment of Blacks, grievances also multiplied. This means that the number of workers carrying the burden of wartime inflation increased, making the cry for better social conditions and wages louder.

However, other factors also contributed to the situation and determined the trend of black labour relations during the war. State policy towards black workers was also shifting at the time. The attitude was that it was necessary to ensure that the "war effort" would not be disrupted by industrial strike action (Mabin 1989: 128). Every mechanism had to be employed to ensure that the aims and objectives of the South African government to help the Allied Forces win the war were realized. This also explains why the government, because the economy was in steady progress, tolerated black unions (Callinicos 1993: 88)- even though they did not actually recognise them. This ensured that war production continued unhindered. It is against the background of this short discussion that a look at the factors that contributed to levelling the playing field for black trade unionism is necessary. These factors revolved around grievances.

The grievances were not only born out of war conditions but were also closely related to the social issues. These were poverty- which was closely associated to low wages, inflation and shortage of commodities- exclusion of black workers from the cost of living allowance, and restriction against trade union organization. These grievances were readily exploited by the Communist Party of South Africa CPSA) and helped sow seeds of discontent and militancy.

2. GRIEVANCES

From the above it becomes evident that the black worker, though vital to the economy during the Second World War, was only tolerated rather than valued. Wages and conditions of work emerge as the most distractive features of industrial progress during the war. Magubane (1990: 535) has argued, however, that black exploitation did not only concern white versus black, but the operation of the capital system and its related laws. This economic system and its specific laws created disparities among black and white workers which, at the end, led to conflict. Therefore, stratified issues governed the social situation of the black worker and emanated from the very place where he or she had hoped to experience improvement of social conditions: the workplace.

According to the then labour legislation, like the Colour Bar and Job Reservation Acts, Blacks were regarded as inferior. They were subjected to segregation by law, and isolated from the mainstream of the labour movement (Simons and Simons 1983: 535). It is against this background that the issue of grievances will be discussed.

Poverty among the black urban community of the Witwatersrand was evident but overlooked by the state and employers alike. Compounded by the situation of the war, black unskilled workers were, clearly, rarely earning enough to cover the costs of essentials. The position of the black working class within the political economy was no better (Bonner 1981: 243). As a result, grievances were approached through confrontation and struggle. Problems over food shortages, high rents, pass raids, etc., followed the same modus operandi of confrontation and struggle: by so doing forming the black working class (Hirson 1989: 243). These were the issues that unfolded among black workers, especially in the manufacturing industries. These workers were closer to the heartbeat of the poverty-stricken black urban population of the townships. These people, alone or with their families, resided in miserable slums, which were areas of bitter struggles against pass laws, shortage of dwellings and frustrating township life (Hirson 1989: x)- which was synonymous with poverty. To all these conditions Blacks reacted. The most famous reaction to the shortage of dwelling during this period was when blacks through the leadership of James Mpanza invaded a piece of land where they erected hessian shanties. This further indicated how far the culture of protest had broadened during the war. The invasion showed that grievances over housing had assumed the nature of mass protest.

The grievances over shortage of commodities during the war, pitted against the significant contribution of black labour to the war effort created a situation of struggle. Black workers in the manufacturing industries rapidly developed this attitude of grievances. They experienced difficult conditions in many ways. They lived within them in the townships and talked about them at the work place. Almost every aspect of their lives was more than ever before affected by them. Shortages of materials during the war had hampered the building of houses and wartime inflation magnified the poverty in which they lived.

The experiences of workers in the manufacturing and mining sectors were rather different in some instances. There were also differences from within one category of work to another, either in mining or manufacturing. Mining had underground workers and mine clerks/"boss boys" while in manufacturing there were packers, cleaners, supervisors, etc. Nevertheless, although the mine clerks were not subject to the same restrictions and hardships as surface and underground workers, they were also excluded from the cost of living allowance (Lodge 1983: 19). They, therefore, shared some of the experiences of the underground workers. Thus, while they enjoyed better work conditions than underground workers, like being able to visit locations during weekends, their deprivation equally prompted them to affiliate to the African Mineworker’s Union [AMWU] (Lodge 1983: 19), which will be discussed later.

Affiliation to the AMWU did not necessarily mean that union activity was permitted. Trade union activity for black workers was prohibited (Mabin 1989: 103) in both sectors under discussion. However, during the war, business interests just tolerated black trade union membership. State policies and employers were still hostile to the collective organization of black workers, as it was regarded as a threat to the viability of the labour-repressive framework (James 1992: 86). Therefore, because they were isolated from the mainstream of the labour movement, they just watched as the situation deteriorated. Much as they yearned for a legal industrial mouthpiece, legislation [1] dashed the likelihood thereof.

Aggravating the conditions was the fact that black unions could only be recognized in principle. This did not entail registration. Registration, it was feared, would give the black unions a legal platform from which to launch protest and this was not acceptable to the government and the employers. As such, black trade unions were not allowed direct representation to the Department of Labour (DOL), but to the Native Affairs Department (NAD). While the DOL treated Blacks with "comparative fairness", the NAD tended not to compromise (Webster 1994: 243). The non-conciliatory and oppressive attitude of the NAD was regarded as suitable for the war period as it would serve as a repellent or deterrent to protest or any efforts at negotiations for the better. This actually shows the extent to which the aspirations of black workers were being trampled on. In contrast to the strength of the white trade unions, black workers were virtually powerless (Wilson 1972: 77).

The grievances that were brewing due to the deteriorating conditions born out of the war, were like a latent volcano, which was about to erupt. The only handicap was the non-existence of effective black worker organization. Freund (1985: 10) [2] has proclaimed that any man did not deserve his name if he would accept the position and remuneration that have always been meant for black workers. This might have been very strongly put, but it indicates the potential of the grievances that appeared to be irrepressible. Stadler (1987: 52) shared Freund’ s sentiment when he said:

It was because of these grievances that black workers were calling for a gradual transformation of the wage structure. Added to that was the call for the right to engage in collective bargaining, where they also insisted that the interest of the workers and employers were not basically antagonistic (James 1992: 89). Black workers felt that they deserved to enjoy some rights and opportunities, just like their white counterparts. Their interests were not necessarily different, rather occupations in the work place in some instances were. Whites were generally skilled and occupied positions that were supervisory. The common thread was that they both were contributing to the war economy. These circumstances made the grievances of black workers real. They believed that they had transcending grievances and that they deserved to be accorded similar mechanisms to those of their white counterparts to transfer them. That is why they were instigating for the reorganization of black trade unions, especially during the hard times of the Second World War.

3. REVITALIZATION OF BLACK TRADE UNIONISM

Using the background information of the preceding subsections it may be easier to understand the situation of black workers before the revival of black trade unions. It may also be easier to understand why and how, against the odds, black trade unions experienced a great revival, followed by increasing worker militancy. The main obstacles were funds - because of the inability to raise money from subscriptions- restrictive laws, working in a divided society and continual police surveillance (James 1992: 89). Against these odds the efforts of the socialists and trade unionists bore fruit. They succeeded in organizing trade unions and pressed wage claims without any consideration of the so-called industrial peace: the black working class demanded conditions and won concessions during the early war years (James 1992: 76-77) [3].

From the above, it becomes clear what kind of wartime conditions were associated with black trade union revitalization. Mention of the fact that they went ahead, regardless of difficulties, entails a need for reasons and/or factors that contributed thereto. War grievances may only be regarded as a catalyst for black trade unionists to have persevered against all odds.

In contrast to the lack of political interest among black workers almost a decade before the war, the 1940s were a period of activity. According to Lodge (1983: 11), political movements adjusted to the new pressures and opportunities created by the popular upheavals that came with the massive wartime expansion of the black working class. The influence of the war is spelt out explicitly in relation to the revival of black trade unionism. Black politics was experiencing a state of "limbo" for a decade preceding 1940. As such, that the general atmosphere created by the war rescued black politics from a state of limbo cannot be underestimated. In a way the war ushered in a period of "ferment."

The struggles of black industrial workers not only set an example which the migrant mineworkers were to follow later, they also created a generation of union organisers and political activists who came to play a crucial role in the formation of the AMWU (James 1992: 85)- see 3.3. This statement serves to open up on the actual relationship between mining and manufacturing workers. It also exposes the fact that because both were experiencing wartime hardships, they were drawn together as black workers to fight for their rights. Economic factors of the war also encouraged the black middle class to adopt a more politically militant outlook (Lodge 1983:24). In this regard the Communist Party of South Africa (CPSA) played an important role, but also capitalized on the frustration of black workers. The party concentrated on wartime grievances in its approach to trade union revitalization and instilling militancy among black workers.

3.1. The CPSA, other organizations and the revival movement

During the early 1940s the black trade union movement was apparently not yet ready to lead community struggles. But as the war progressed, the CPSA drew closer to the mood of black workers in manufacturing by holding regular meetings in various locations and townships throughout the Rand (Callinicos 1993: 71). The party had a better chance of unionizing because its membership was predominantly white. With white workers having bargaining rights as stipulated by the Industrial Conciliation Act, it was fairly easy for the CPSA to infiltrate white workers but still organize among black workers.

Initially the CPSA had paid little attention to local township politics, let alone try to win black workers’ confidence as their representatives. Besides, ordinary Blacks equally did not really understand the dynamics of the CPSA or just did not care. In the 1940s the majority of black workers was illiterate and did not have easy or sustained access to ideological opportunities (Fortesque 1991: 484). However, against a backdrop of deteriorating social conditions, the war offered a better chance for the CPSA’s trade union work which by then had scarcely begun. However, it was through Moses Kotane (the party’s general-secretary) that in 1940 party members paid much closer attention to local township politics (Fortesque 1991: 484).

The conditions of black workers and their next of kin during the war played right into the hands of the CPSA. Poverty was endemic and was accompanied by overcrowding (Worden 1994: 62). Black proletarians in the urban areas had to contend with high costs of housing, transport and food. As much as industrial expansion unleashed by the war socially affected the black worker, it also greatly increased communist activity, enthusiasm and membership after June 1941- when the wrath of social conditions was being felt- and transformed the influence of the CPSA among the black working class (Fortesque 1991: 486).

The ability of the CPSA to infiltrate the black worker constituency must also be associated with the wartime conditions and grievances. The CPSA was able to read and capitalize on the mood of frustration of black workers, thereby becoming active during the war. In 1940 it was isolated and ineffectual. But as the war progressed it established a very strong presence in the black trade union movement. It resultantly became very influential in South Africa’s urban locations by 1945 (Duncan 1990: 481). The ability of the CPSA can be measured against the background that it was able to identify two most important "seedbeds": the poor urban black population in general and the frustrated black worker in particular. The two were wallowing in social hardship and misery and the CPSA succeeded in benefiting from this.

Frustrated by low wages, working conditions and dire poverty, discriminatory labour laws made it more difficult for black workers to organise effectively and fight for their social rights. However, the CPSA, whose ultimate goal was to spread its ideologies amongst black workers, used this opportunity to organise and revive the black trade union movement. The war conditions could not have created a better opportunity for the party.

The party used every means possible to push its efforts. It organized meetings, distributed pamphlets and used "Inkululeko", its official mouthpiece that appeared during the Second World War (Rosseau 1979: 111). Throughout the war years, "Inkululeko" was able to spread its party’s ideology, but most importantly, touched at the very heart of the matter, stressing the poor conditions of black workers. It used that opportunity to "personify" itself as redeemer of the suffering black worker. The paper at one stage criticized the government for trying to clamp down on war crime by increasing the police force. It argued that the causes of crime were illiteracy, poverty and unemployment that were rife amongst urban Blacks. Interestingly, it even claimed that the CPSA had made it its priority to help Blacks achieve better living conditions (Rosseau 1979: 113).

Lacking mechanisms with which to fight for better conditions, the workers were, therefore, susceptible to the message of the CPSA. Wartime conditions of black workers were exploited by the CPSA to gain their confidence and give rise to trade unionism. Most black workers shared stories of work and life experiences (Fortesque 1991: 487) that were also exploited by the party. These drew the CPSA closer to the discriminated black workers and gave it an opportunity to expand. In the process, of course, was the dual purpose of unionizing the oppressed black workers, and increasing Party membership. This was also an indication of the party’s success, especially in trade union organization.

The CPSA gained a degree of popularity and influence during the early War years (Christian Mission International of South Africa 1985: 191) and recruited a number of workers for the trade union (Fortesque 1991: 491). This was possible mainly because black workers were basically concerned about their own conditions and not about the success of the CPSA as a party. Fortesque (Fortesque 1991: 491) has even described CPSA membership of the factory groups as having been generally unstable. Thus, the party’s success depended on tangible results as related to workers’ grievances and expectations rather than mere ideology. This may mean that as long as black workers could identify positive results the party would remain attractive to them as a political home.

In the first years of the war, therefore, most of the established unions grew rapidly, accompanied by the formation of new ones by the organisers from the CPSA, the Joint Committee of African Trade Unions (JCATU) and the African National Congress [ANC] (Callinicos 1987: 165). Adding muscle to the whole process was the Congress Youth League, which was formed in 1943 under the leadership of Anton Lembede. It stressed the importance of black leadership and self-determination, the need to be people oriented and the importance of militant action such as boycotts, strikes and trade union mobilization (Worden 1994: 86). The involvement of black political movements obviously gave the CPSA further impetus to go ahead with the revival process.

Although what formed the bottom line of its aims was party-membership drive, the CPSA’s contribution to black trade unionism cannot be dismissed. The exploitation of the situation at the Rand during the Second World War and the mechanisms used, coupled with the support for black workers from the ANC and its Youth wing, was obviously what the CPSA needed. Given the advantageous position in which it was legally and socio-politically, it was able to transform itself into a voice of the disadvantaged black workers.

Capitalizing on its status, the CPSA called for the immediate repeal of the War Measures, the recognition of black unions and the extension of collective bargaining (Simons and Simons 1983: 557). These might have sounded like a threat to the government and employers. But the CPSA used the fertile situation of wartime grievances to reorganize black trade unionism and instil worker militancy. Against this background, through the CPSA union growth was closely related to, and depended on, the social conditions of black workers during the Second World War, which was also closely associated with black proletarianization and urbanization (Webster 1985: 60).

3.2. Council of Non-European Trade Unions (CNETU)

On the eve of the Second World War, the only recognized non-governmental labour organization representing registered unions was the South African Trades and Labour Council (TLC). It mainly related to white trade unionism because black trade unions could neither be legally recognized nor registered. Somewhere down the line, the TLC adopted an explicitly non-racial stance by accepting affiliation from black trade unions and called for full legal rights for black trade unionists (Lewis 1984: 1). However, regardless of its non-racial composition, it might have found its interests for black and white trade unionization being at the crossroads.

Therefore, the relationship between the TLC and black unions became a cause for concern (Lewis 1984: 1). Subsequently, both the parliamentary Labour Party and the TLC opposed the extension of bargaining rights to Blacks (Kirkaldy 1992: 16) [4]. This means that the TLC, therefore, later presented itself as unfaithful to its non-racial stance. This also shows that the relationship between the TLC and black trade unions was just window-dressing.

Having implanted high hopes among the black working class, one would have expected Blacks to feel betrayed or left in the lurch by the TLC when this happened.
It was this involvement in black trade unionism by a white trade union federation that had come to nothing that disgusted black workers and black trade unionists, especially. By the late 1930s black workers had formed their own African Federation of Trade Unions (Kirkaldy 1992: 16). After the outbreak of the Second World War the JCATU was formed under the auspices of Max Gordon. It consisted of seven unions with a claimed membership of 16 000-20 000 (Webster 1994: 143) [Max Gordon was a white man with Trotskyist inclinations]. This must have created problems if one were to refer to previous experiences with the TLC. However, of utmost importance was that an organizational foundation and structures for black trade unionism had been built. That was the trump card.

Pitted against Max Gordon was Gana Makabeni, a black unionist who first revitalized the Clothing Workers Union and was later joined by the other black unions which had broken away from Max Gordon’s JCATU to form the Committee for Non-European Trade Unions [CNETU] (James 1992: 87). The formation of this umbrella body must have watered down the notion that Blacks and black workers in particular had "organizational shortcomings." One would, as such, expect it to draw the majority of black industrial workers- because unionization was prohibited on mining ground- for its membership.

Against the odds the CNETU became a dominant black union federation during this period and helped cultivate black worker militancy (James 1992: 87). Pampallis (1991: 164) has mentioned that the most important black trade unions were affiliated to the CNETU. Black workers needed the TLC previously because they did not have their own trade unions. But it had not done enough to promote the organization of black workers. The CNETU, on the other hand, by virtue of having a black man as a leader, must have appealed to black workers. He obviously was perceived as sharing the same experiences as other workers who were equally discriminated against, especially at their places of work. As a result, black labour was in a stronger bargaining position during the war than it had been before or was to be in the immediate future (Lodge 1983: 18).

By 1945 the CNETU was able to claim 119 affiliated unions with a membership of 158,000, 60% of who were in the Transvaal (Pampallis 1991: 164). At last, black workers had a bigger and stronger trade union movement, although it still lacked recognition. Its presence obviously made a difference. Pampallis (1991: 164) has also contended that the CNETU was meant to bring about greater unity among black trade unions. Unfortunately, problems within the union itself frustrated efforts at greater unity. Nevertheless, the quest for unity must have been of great significance to black trade unionism during the Second World War.

The fact that the CNETU was aiming at representing the aspirations of the overall black working class must have, also, served as a factor that attracted black workers to the CNETU. It depicted itself as a front that wanted to confront their wartime conditions. It wanted to form a united front to confront not only wage determinations but union rights as well. This second wave of trade unionism (after the Industrial and Commercial Workers’ Union- ICU) quickly achieved a large membership during the Second World War (Callinicos 1993: 87). This was encouraged by an increased number of Blacks who were in employment. The government was also anxious to maintain good relations with black workers for the sake of war production. That is why it showed a degree of tolerance to black trade unionism. The situation encouraged the increase in the number of black workers, thereby strengthening the hand to fight for industrial rights.

Hirson (1989: 25) has pointed to a situation of tolerance by the government, hence the success at unionization, although by the end of 1943 it became harder for the working class to win any concessions. This was because the government later deserted its tolerance stance. That the black trade union movement had been revitalized, was growing rapidly, and in the process rearing its militant head was significant. According to Witz (Mabin 1989: 123), by 1945 at least 40% of black industrial workers belonged to unions that were affiliated to the umbrella body established in 1941 from a variety of black trade unions- the CNETU.

From the above, it becomes evident that a generally inclusive trade union movement was revitalised among the black industrial workers. Although they might not have understood the dynamics of trade unionism, of essence is that black workers had been drawn together by the conditions of the war. These conditions had united them for a common cause: to fight for better wages and working conditions.

Bozzoli (1987: 420) has shown that organizations were formed for municipal, railway, cement, building, dairy, iron and steel, laundry, meat and matchmakers. Thus, the CNETU comprised of a diversity of workers linked to different work situations and earning wages that contrasted drastically. The common ground was that the social conditions and wages were a cause for concern. According to Bozzoli (1987: 404) the popularity of the trade union movement was strengthened by challenging minimum wage determinations of the wartime government. The growth of the CNETU in popularity was, therefore, aided by its objective to represent a broad spectrum of the working community. Its focus on Wage determinations that affected a diversity of workers helped it flex its trade union muscle.

3.3. The Influence of Trade Unionism on Mineworkers

It is apparent that black trade unions realized that it was possible to bargain for black workers in the manufacturing industry as well, and not only for white workers (James 1992: 84). One other thing that encouraged the whole scenario was that the government wanted to maintain industrial peace to ensure war production. That is why there was tolerance of black trade unions in exchange for the support of the war effort (Grundlingh 1989: 72). This trend breathed life into black trade union revitalization. The promises not only helped the CPSA and other organizations consolidate their individual structures but also served as a trump card for revitalization of the trade union movement.

A reflection on the actual focus of this essay will again remind us that the issue at stake here was the social conditions of black workers in the mines and manufacturing industries on the Witwatersrand during the Second World War. After discussing revitalization of black trade unionism in the manufacturing industry, one is bound to realize that the process would not have been complete without extending towards mine workers. Manufacturing workers and mineworkers shared a lot of wartime disadvantages and disparities. It was realized that, as they were also contributing to the war effort, the inclusion of the mineworkers would be of utmost importance to strengthen the black trade union front.

The unionists and the CPSA realized that the organization of black miners would provide an even greater stimulus to wartime industrial action (Hirson 1989: 169). On 22 June 1941 the CPSA openly spoke in favour of a miners union, citing the demand for high wages to increase purchasing power (Hirson 1989: 190) as the most important issue the union would fight for. However, the disadvantages of such a move were actually being prioritized. The organisers were fully aware of the handicaps entailed in organizing on mine grounds and, of course, in the compounds. According to the NAD and the Chamber of Mines black unions were essential for the sake of industrial peace and social order, but not on the mines (Webster 1994: 174).

Black trade unions were, therefore, promised recognition by the government, in order to buy time, whereas the actual objective was to ensure war production. Furthermore, mines did not operate along the lines that the manufacturing industry operated because trade union activity was prohibited on mine grounds. Maybe that was why the Chamber of Mines was even able to override the decision of the government or government-appointed commission, regarding mineworkers’ affairs.

Despite non-recognition of trade unions for black workers, especially on mine grounds, the organisers found a way of involving the mineworkers in trade union organization. That was when the position of the mine clerks and other supervisory strata- also referred to as boss-boys- became useful. James (1992: 91) explained their importance to the whole scenario thus:

During this period, the mine clerk and supervisory strata did not only affiliate to the AMWU, but also helped transfer the teachings of unionists to others in mine employment. The conditions of the war and the influence of wartime on trade union activity enabled the black mineworkers on the Rand to come to realize their organizational ability (Magubane 1990: 83) when they contributed to black trade unionism. The fact that black workers were being "manipulated" by the CPSA and other black unionists was actually not in vain. They became very effective during the war in helping organize and conscientize other mineworkers in trade unionism. The very cruel and unacceptable, but tolerated, compound system also became strategically useful during the war.

The employers wanted to use compounds to make it difficult to mobilize and conscientize the workers and enhance solidarity for strong and effective trade unions. Nevertheless, with the Second World War, the mobilization process was made possible with the growth of the AMWU between 1942 and 1946 (Ncube 1985: 19). Although they were denied freedom of movement, the presence of the AMWU made dissemination easier because the mineworkers spent most of their time in the compounds doing virtually nothing. Union organizers used chains and ropes to throw leaflets into mine compounds while women vendors wrapped food in political pamphlets before handing them over to workers (James 1992: 102). The fact that the mine clerks and workers of the supervisory division were also aware of the efforts at unionization contributed greatly to the process. If they had they been negative or unaware of the situation and what it entailed, they might have aborted the efforts of the unionists.

From the above it becomes evident that the marriage of convenience between the CPSA, the ANC and black trade unionists that developed during the war ignited or rekindled the fire of black trade unionism. The growth of the CNETU in leaps and bounds owing to the affiliation by most black trade unions [the AMWU included] during the war, particularly in 1942 (Ncube 1985: 61), cannot be overlooked. Equally, the joint efforts of the three organizations, although for different objectives, cannot be under-estimated. Capitalizing on wartime conditions, the CPSA, CNETU and the ANC, initially organizing mainly among manufacturing workers, were also able to spread their influence towards the mineworkers.

When black trade unionists, took their industrial ideology to the mineworkers, they introduced a process which challenged a capitalist class which relied on racial domination for their existence as a class (James 1992: 88). For the first time, black mineworkers were also made to realize that they could also voice their grievances. This did not mean that obstacles that prevented them from organizing had been removed. However, despite harassment of its officials and the fact that gatherings were prohibited on mine grounds, the AMWU steadily grew in influence, and by 1944 had a claimed membership of 25 000 (Roos and Clynick 1995: 15)[5]. In the process, the migrant mineworkers were transformed from an instrument of co-operation into an instrument of rebellion (James 1992: 94).

As such, during the war, through the CNETU, the black labour movement was in a very strong position to challenge either the government or employers for statutory recognition (Ncube 1985: 62). The war period was a good time to fight for recognition. But as the war progressed, especially when it appeared that the Allied Forces would win the war, the government slowly but surely adopted a very hardened attitude towards black trade unions. This further frustrated efforts at gaining recognition.

4. FROM REVITALIZATION TO STRIKE ACTION

It cannot be disputed that trade union organization is just one way to identify with and preach about worker grievances. However, efforts at union organization are usually followed by more than lip service. Worker militancy usually follows and becomes the most effective way of showing the authorities that complainants in the work area really want to see their demands met. For that reason, recognition of black trade unions encouraged protest activities throughout the War period, which climaxed in the Mineworker’s Strike of 1946 (Ilife 1987: 140).

It is of utmost importance to understand the events surrounding the situation of, and the objectives of, the strike action of the war period. During the war, strikes became a viable strategy to fight for material benefits for the ordinary workers, especially as they related to wage increases (James 1992: 88). Workers’ demands were understandably wide-ranging, but generally pivoted around the issue of wages.

Because grievances in relation to inflation were pronounced early in the war, strike action started as early as 1941. Social conditions of the war had already started to have an impact on black workers. These workers’ strikes were usually of a sporadic nature. Some of the issues that formed the list of demands were working conditions, overtime pay, reinstatement of victimized workers and the recognition of trade unions. Perhaps most striking is the fact that demands also included an end to the migrant labour system, especially towards the end of the war (Hindson 1983: 57). This also meant that black workers felt that the migrant labour system was detrimental to their family ties because they were forced to exist as bachelors (in compounds) though they were married. The demand was most striking because this system had been synonymous with mine labour for quite a long time and had never been challenged. The influence of the war, therefore, cannot be underestimated because the migrant labour system had been there long before, but it was then, during the war, that the workers were militating against it.

Black trade union organization, however, experienced inherent problems that became prominent throughout the war period. Men who neither had political experience nor organizational skills led the black trade union movement. Most were, however, being politically ambitious and they sometimes had no close connection with the constituencies in the industries concerned (Taylor 1962: 108). Those politicians were trying to exploit wartime frustrations of the workers to inflate their parties’ membership.

To further compound the situation, the promise of union recognition in exchange of support for the war effort was not fulfilled (Lewis 1984: 126). On the one hand, the wartime situation of the black workers was being used by trade union leaders and political leaders to achieve their own ends. On the other, the workers were actually also being manipulated by their "custodians", the government and employers alike. The problem of "black racism" also sowed division within the black trade unions, resulting in the lack of a united front (Webster 1985: 151). Therefore although sharing a common bone of contention, ideological differences and ambitions retarded the progress towards an effective and concrete black trade union movement or action.

Regardless of the shortcomings, the war period was characterized by social disparities to which black workers unavoidably responded by strike action. Signs of a resurgent militancy appeared and were pronounced in ways such as the Alexandra bus boycotts and a great campaign against pass laws in 1944 (Simons and Simons 1983: 151). Workers used various forms of protest to portray their grievances: from work stoppages to demonstrations, from marches to bus boycotts. Dissatisfaction was growing, strikes erupted and continued throughout the war, involving both urban workers on the Rand and migrants living in hostels and compounds (Callinicos 1993: 88). The bottom line is that the determination of the protesters could not have been better punctuated. In August 1943, for example, thousands walked eighteen miles a day, between Alexandra and Johannesburg, rather than pay an increased bus fare from 4d to 5d)- to and from work- (Simons and Simons 1983: 88). A numerical difference of one penny might appear insignificant, but given the wartime low wages one can readily understand the concern and opposition to increases by the impoverished black worker, who was actually living below the breadline.

A reference to Alexandra residents is an attempt to allude to a diversity of workers who had fallen victim of the wartime conditions. It is an attempt to show that Alexandra, as a township, had as its residents, workers who were related to different situations and experiences, but shared a common denominator: frustrating socio-economic conditions that were a result of war economy. For example, workers who were affected were attached to sweet-makers, the railways, dairies, saw milling, the Johannesburg municipality, meat wholesalers, flour mills and the mining industry- involving migrants living in compounds- (Lodge 1983: 18). Therefore, the effect of wartime economy had touched most of the black worker community on the Witwatersrand.

Many wartime strikes resulted in the redress of grievances; especially where it could be shown that employers had been paying low wages (Kirkaldy 1992: 15). In other words, in these instances the employers conceded that the wages had been low. Obviously, however, the redresses might not have been satisfactory but just compensatory, hence the culture of protest that characterized the war period.

Another characteristic of these wartime strikes was that they sometimes broke out spontaneously (Roux 1948: 338-9). Without effective organization objectives are, usually, not realized and this may be followed by more strike action. Clearly indicated here is that wartime social conditions of black workers had become a focal point of their grievances to the point where it did not necessarily depend on organization.

Of further significance is the presence of militancy among black workers, very early during the formation of the CNETU. Roos and Clynick (1995: 17) have further punctuated this by saying that black workers were more resilient during the war, which was a sign of determination and testimony, perhaps, to the importance of the vast numbers to the industry or the strength of the CNETU in the mid 1940s. Therefore, the workers’ strikes, largely disorganized early in the war, became significant with every strike action during the war, and in the process strengthened the CNETU. This was obviously negating the employers’ perspective about the mineworkers’ union organization and strike action that was labelled as premature. On that note Simons and Simons (1983: 122) have said that:

Significantly, wartime conditions and worker determination inculcated the attitude of militancy that set precedence for protest, whether organized or not. The measures that the government introduced could not diminish the spirit that had taken root among black workers. Throughout 1941-1942, the number of black workers involved in strike action gathered pace: for example, some 5 000 in 35 strikes in 1941 and 12 800 in 58 strikes in 1942, and included disputes in which employers conceded to demands and strikes were averted by the DOL (Hirson 1989: 86).

These numbers, indicate the spirit of black worker determination of the war period to protest against social injustice. They also show that the workers were prepared to go the extra mile during the period of the war to alter wartime conditions for the better. However, in the event of workers ignoring the government wartime legislation, one would readily expect it to react even more harshly and the workers to retaliate similarly.

Black workers and the unions, obviously, had to deal with a "Mammoth task" in supporting industrial action because it could easily result in loss of much needed job opportunities. Black workers began to make demands in a situation of high unemployment of wartime economy. Moodie (1988: 22) has claimed that they derived their strength from worker militancy rather than co-operation with the state. He attempted to show that unions used the wartime situation to usher in a new era of industrial action. Black workers and their union movement were apparently standing at the threshold of a massive permanent labour movement which did not rely on co-operation with the state, regardless of the negative attitude of the state.

The state resultantly hardened its attitude for the latter part of the period of the war and only just co-operated but did not promote the aspirations of the workers. It is, therefore, not surprising that around late 1946 or early 1947 the state’s tolerant attitude towards black workers, the product of wartime requirements, began to change (Roos and Clynick 1995: 17). This prepared ground for the Miners’ Strike of 1946, which towered above all strike actions during the war. Note that these were the mineworkers who were earlier labelled politically premature for strike action by the Gold Producers’ Committee. Indisputably it was the most significant strike action of that period. The strike was motivated by worker grievances over wages and work conditions. It did not necessarily depend on union mobilization because most mineworkers were illiterate, and did not really understand the dynamics of trade unionism.

Fortesque (1991: 508) has concurred that the most impressive example of work-place mobilization during the 1940s, the Miners’ Strike of 1946, occurred not mainly because of the activities of the AMWU or the CPSA, but that mobilization depended on room networks and ethnic groups. Maybe reference to the role of the mine clerks and the black mine supervisors explains this much better. Their involvement obviously made a difference. Their efforts were also successful because black worker grievances had actually embedded themselves among them. These conditions made it possible for the formation of the AMWU with the grievances making the time more ripe than ever. The miners were intellectually ready-made and had only lacked a formal industrial platform like the AMWU. The AMWU, therefore, became highly involved in the 1946 strike when over 70,000 black workers engaged in industrial action based on work place demands and wage increases (Simons and Simons 1983: 574). The reasons for the strike, however, transcended the work place barrier because the grievances of the workers also impacted on their family lives.

This was also taking place largely because of the fact that black miners had not shared in wartime prosperity: they were frequently charged for violation of the Riotous Assembly Act or War Measure 145. (Crush and Yudelman 1991: 12). However, the grievances, demands, as well as the spirit of militancy, overshadowed this wartime legislation. These grievances had already taken root among the mineworkers although shackles made it highly impossible for them to cry out loud. The war conditions availed the AMWU of an opportunity to organize thousands of mine employees and, by the beginning of 1946, they had gained support in a number of mines around the Witwatersrand (Roux 1948: 344). This obviously entailed a lot of hard work from union organizers. Restrictions placed on trade union organization on mine grounds must also be borne in mind. Coupled with these was, of course, the educational deprivation of the mineworkers.

The complaints from black miners and their impatience made the government and the Chamber of Mines more stubborn to worker demands (Callinicos 1993: 88). Black miners on the other hand had no alternative but to regard this kind of response as a sign of arrogance and a reluctance to accede to their demands. This attitude was obviously born out of the idea that doing so would set a precedence that would be difficult to eradicate. However, the governments’ and employers’ action and determination to secure industrial stability for the sake of war production did not faze the spirit of the AMWU and of black workers in particular. The AMWU had earlier in August 1944 called a conference, attended by 700 delegates and 1300 members, followed by secret meetings at night under mine dumps, thereby preparing ground for 1946 (Simons and Simons 1983: 572).

The strike shook the government from slumber and forced it into action (Simons and Simons 1983: 559). Government joined hands with mine owners to ensure mine production and profitability and the continuation of the migrant labour system, thereby helping to destroy the AMWU. It also reprimanded employers of urban workers in manufacturing for wanting to negotiate with black unions (Webster 1994: 177). Ironically, the state itself had tolerated black workers under war conditions of necessity for war production. Emphasis on war production had, therefore, evaporated with the end of the war and the victory of the Allied Powers. This again exposes the fact that black workers were tolerated for the sake of the war. As the war had ended the relationship of convenience had also been terminated.

From the preceding discussion one gets acquainted with the influence of the war on black worker industrialization and unionization, more especially the black mineworker, who was statutorily deprived from participating in industrial action. The fact that the unionization process of the war period took place on mine grounds amidst war legislation cannot be ignored. The momentum thereof can be measured by the resultant 1946 strike. The rebellions of black workers during the war and after may be interpreted as a response of a working class that was fighting for its rights and recognition (Belcher 1979: 679). Having contributed so much to the war effort, the workers had hoped to be treated better rather than to be exploited. James (1987: 18) has argued that many of the strikers and the AMWU regarded their action as a moral victory even though they did not achieve their demands. The workers might not have succeeded in putting enough effort into realizing the most sought after aspirations. I, however, believe that black workers actually succeeded in proving that they had become a force to be reckoned with, especially when pushed to the limit by the government and employers during the war.

The only disheartening thing is that, amid the increasingly harsh post war economic environment, union members lost interest in the trade unions because they failed to meet their material interests (Fortesque 1991: 510). This indication of disillusionment may be understood against the background of the failures experienced during strike action. Furthermore, the state and employers alike adopted harsher attitudes towards industrial militancy. As such, unions once again found themselves in a weak bargaining position (Webster 1994: 177). They had lost members and post war conditions were very different to wartime conciliatory tones.

Even if it may be said after all the arguments that black trade unionism did not go the extra mile in consolidating itself during the war, of significance is that it managed to make a mark in the history of industrialization vis-a-vis black worker unionization. In the same vein, one must not lose sight of the fact that the developments were mainly possible due to conditions that sprang up from war conditions.
 
 

 1. Legislation in question were the Industrial Conciliation Act (ICA) and War Measures 145 and 1425, which controlled black labour and prohibited trade union activity on mine grounds respectively.

 2. “The Social Character of Secondary Industry in South Africa, 1915-1945, with special reference to the Witwatersrand”, is a paper delivered at the African Studies Institute Conference, University of Witwatersrand, 22 April 1985.

3.  The success related to the winning of concessions during the early war years may be associated with the fact that it was apparently so because the government and/or employers basically wanted industrial peace for the period of the war. This would obviously ensure war economy and industrial expansion, hence the achievement of the underlying goal: helping the Allied Forces win the war.

4.  “The Radicalization of Black Politics and the Government’s Race Policy in the Years Surrounding the Second World War”, was prepared for a lecture and as handout for the 1992 “History 300” class by Mr. Alan Kirkaldy at the University of Venda.

5.  “Servicemen, Social Justice and the Honour Code: The Springbok Legion 1941-1947”, was prepared for the South African Historical Society Conference held at Rhodes University on 5 July 1995 by N. Roos and T. Clynick.