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Three Popper’s Theories to Be
Distinguished
and Two Misinterpretations to Be
Avoided
by Dmitry
Sepety
Hypothetico-deductivism
is the view which can be described in three major theses:
1) Deductivism:
The only kind of valid inferences is deductive inferences; there are no other
kinds of valid inferences or logics. In particular, there is no inductive
logics and inductive inferences. Neither are they needed.
2) Hypothetism:
All our theories, beliefs etc. are (by their origin) conjectures, hypotheses,
and they may be mistaken.
3) Hyphenation:
The way to rationally deal with such hypotheses is to derive (deductively)
their various consequences and try to estimate whether they are true. If we
estimate some of consequences as false, then some of hypotheses from which
these false consequences are derived must be false; so, we are to try to find
out (conjecturally and with help of further check of consequences) which one,
and then to abandon this (conjecturally) false hypothesis or to replace it with
a better one.
Falsificationaism
is an application of hypothetico-deductivism to empirical sciences, as the solution
to the problem of induction. It is the theory which can be described in two
major theses:
1) Logically,
as a matter of logical validity, scientific
theories (universal statements of empirical sciences, such as laws of nature) can’t
be verified by results of experiments and observations (singular
empirical statements), neither as a matter of truth-demonstration nor
as a matter of high-probability demonstration (in the sense of probability
calculus), but can be falsified by results of experiments and observations
(singular empirical statements).
2) The
development of empirical science (the way to improve our empirical theories) proceeds
by conjecturing hypotheses aimed to solve some explanatory problems and exposing
them to severe critical examinations and attempts of empirical falsifications;
those hypotheses which fail to withstand such examinations are declined as
falsified, while those which withstand them are tentatively accepted as true
(which acceptance, being tentative, may be revised whenever new arguments and
results of observations make it needed).
Non-justificationism (critical rationalism) is Popper’s-Bartley’s
solution to the problem of infinite justificatory regress or the problem of
limits of rationality. The problem arises from the understanding of rationality
as the demand to accept those and only those theories which are justified by
arguments. It is easy to see that this demand can never be satisfied, in
principle. For any argument needs premises which, according to the demand, need
themselves be justified; so we get involved into infinite justificatory regress
or vicious circularity. Hence, all our views are irrational and can’t be
otherwise, for logically inescapable reasons. Critical rationalist solution to
this problem is renouncing of the understanding of rationality as the demand
for justification, in the sense described above. Instead, critical rationalism
identifies rationality with openness to critical discussion – impersonal
discussion in the search for truth.
One
widespread mistake about non-justificationism is the view
that it is sort of direct extension-generalization of falsificationism. This
mistake was made even by Bartley[1]. In
fact, these two theories answer very different problems and have entirely
different logical structures. To see this clearly, consider these
contrapositions:
(1) If
described in terms of ‘justification’, falsificationism is concerned with a specific kind of relative justification – inductive
justification-verification – justification of universal statements (such as
laws of nature) relative to singular statements (results of experiments and
observations). Non-justificationism is concerned with absolute justification
(not with justification of some statements relative to some other statements).
(2) Falsificationism
is concerned with inferences in one direction – ‘inductive direction’ – from
singular to universal statements. Non-justificationism is concerned with
inferences in any direction.
(3) Inductive
justification-verification is impossible not because premises of inductive
arguments are not justified, but because there are no logically valid truth-transmitting
inferences in inductive direction[2].
Absolute justification is impossible not because of invalidity of inferences, but
because premises are not (can not be) justified in the way demanded.
(4) Falsificationism
is based on the logical asymmetry in inductive direction: there is no truth-retransmission
(hence, verification is impossible, as a matter of logical validity), but there
is falsity-retransmission (hence, falsification is possible, as a matter of
logical validity). This asymmetry has nothing to do with non-justificationism,
since non-justificationism is concerned with arguments in any (whether
inductive or deductive) direction.
(5) As
a matter of logical validity, verification (whether conclusive or
probabilistic) is impossible, while falsification is possible. As a matter of
justification, conclusive or probabilistic refutation is just as impossible as
conclusive or probabilistic ‘positive’ justification.
(6) Falsificationism
is dependent on hypothetico-deductivism, on the non-existence of inductive
logics with inductively valid inferences. Non-justificationism doesn’t depend
on hypothetico-deductivism; its arguments would be as good as they are even if
there existed inductive logics with inductively valid inferences.
The mistake
about the relationship of non-justificationism to falsificationism seems to be
the major source of another, more
detrimental mistake – the understanding of non-justificationism as
‘negative’ theory of rationality where ‘negativity’ means that we never have
and needn’t arguments in favour of our theories, statements etc.; all we need
are arguments against. This is a grave misunderstanding which have nothing to
do with logics of Popper’s and Bartley’s arguments, except in specific case of empirical falsification.
Really, if there is nothing wrong in using non-justified premises in arguments
against, there is just as well nothing wrong in using non-justified premises in
arguments in favour. Hence, non-justificationism, if properly understood, doesn’t
make arguments in favour in any way deficient as compared with arguments
against. In fact, this quite agrees with what Popper and Bartley really wrote;
but this is sorrowfully misinterpreted by many Popper’s followers (see, for
example, my criticisms of David Miller’s and Anthoni Diller’s interpretations
of critical rationalism).
Let
us take, for example, Popper’s statement from the book In Search of a Better World Popper’s formulates
statement:
“The
principles that form the basis of every rational discussion, that is, of every
discussion undertaken in the search for truth… 1. The principle of fallibility…
2. The principle of rational discussion:
we want to try, as impersonally as possible, to weigh up our reasons for and
against a theory… 3. The principle of approximation to the truth…”[3]
Really,
Popper did deny the existence of ‘positive reasons’ while affirming the existence
of ‘critical reasons’, and sometimes used ‘negative’ as synonymous to
‘critical’. But this Popper’s opposition of ‘positive’/‘critical’ has nothing
to do with the opposition ‘for’/‘against’ (‘favourable’/‘disfavourable’). With
Popper, ‘positive’ means ‘providing certainty or high probability’; while
‘critical’ (and, sometimes, ‘negative’) means ‘tentative, in the light of
current state of critical discussion’.
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[1] To quote: “in 1960, I proposed to contrast
justificationist and nonjustificationist theories of criticism as a
generalisation of his {Popper’s} own distinction between verification and
falsification” (Bartley, W.W., III. 1990. Unfathomed
Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth. La
Salle, Illinois: Open Court. – p.237)
[2]
But there are logically valid falsity-transmitting inferences in
inductive direction (and that is why empirical falsification is possible, as a
matter of logical validity
[3] Popper,
K.
(Bold style mine)