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On
Alleged Flaws of Pancritical
Rationalism
by
Dmitry Sepety
Criticisms of Antoni Diller's criticisms of pancritical
rationalism
in the article “On critical and
pancritical rationalism”,
forthcoming in the journal Philosophy of the Social Sciences.
In the article “On critical and
pancritical rationalism”, Antoni Diller criticizes Bartley’s ‘pancritical rationalism’ to show that
critical rationalism is superior to it. In this polemical piece I argue that
most of these criticisms, as epitomized by Diller on his internet-site (http://www.cantab.net/users/antoni.diller/rationalism/pancritical.html),
are mistaken,
mostly due to misinterpretation of Bartley’s statements. As important issues of this
polemics, I highlight Bartley’s contribution to the development of
non-justificationist conception of rationality and discuss an important
question of how Popper’s and Bartley’s non-justificationism is (and is not) to
be understood.
1. Principal Contentions of “Pancritical Rationalism”
My own view is that the question of
inferiority/superiority between critical and pancritical rationalism is
unfruitful. I think that what Bartley calls ‘pancritical rationalism’ or
‘comprehensively critical rationalism’ is an important contribution to
development of critical rationalism. But, it is to be admitted that it was
Bartley himself who has provoked the discussion in terms of
inferiority/superiority, by his sharp criticism of ‘critical rationalism’ and
opposing ‘pancritical rationalism’ to it.
What Bartley’s contribution consists in? It is solution of “the problem of limits of
rationality”. As Bartley describes it:
“I was confronting the contention … that there is an
essential logical limitation to rationality: the rational defence and
examination of ideas must, for logical reasons, be terminated by an
arbitrary and irrational appeal to what can be called dogmas or absolute presuppositions.” (Bartley
1984, 221)
Bartley’s solution, which he calls “pancritical rationalism” or “comprehensively
critical rationalism” may be summarized
in three principal contentions:
(1) Non-justificationism:
The contention about necessity of dogmas or absolute presuppositions stems from
the demand that all our beliefs were justified rationally; this demand entails
infinite regress of justifications; it seems that this regress must be broken
on some unjustified positions accepted as dogmas. Pancritical rationalism,
instead, breaks with the demand of justification and identifies rationality
with criticism: “nothing of any
interest can be justified in the way required …; criticism is nonetheless
possible provided one unfuses
justification and criticism” (Bartley 1984, 221);
(2) The solution
of the problem of limits of rationality: “there are no limits to
rationality in the sense that one must
postulate dogmas or presuppositions that must be held exempt from review” (Bartley
1984, 221)
“What I did … was to show that no authorities or justifiers in this sense were needed in criticism.
… criticism can be carried out successfully and satisfactorily without … any
resort to dogmas or authorities. That is, when I declare that all statements
are criticizable, I mean that it is not necessary, in criticism, … to declare a
dogma that cannot be criticized…; I mean that it is not necessary to mark off a
special class of statements, the justifiers, which do the justifying and criticizing but are not open to criticism…”
(Bartley 1984, 223)
In other words,
(2.1) Rationality
understood as critical attitude, openness to criticism may be comprehensive: we may hold all positions (including the critical
attitude itself) open to critical discussion.
On my view, these principal contentions of pancritical
rationalism are right. And I consider their explicit statement and defence as
Bartley’s important contribution to the development of critical rationalism. Bartley
may well be mistaken on some other, minor points, but this does not afflict the
principal contentions of pancritical
rationalism, as described above.
And first that is to be noted about Diller’s criticisms of pancritical rationalism is
that they do not affect principal contentions of pancritical rationalism at all.
In the following text I confront each principal Diller’s criticism of Bartley, as epitomized on his internet-site, with my
rejoinder.
2. (Mis)interpreting Critical Rationalism
Diller:
“Bartley misinterprets critical rationalism.
For him, it is summed up
by the principle that any assumption, except this one, which cannot be
supported either by argument or experience is to be discarded.”
Rejoinder: Probably, Bartley did partially misinterpret critical
rationalism. But Bartley did not describe (in Retreat to Commitment) it in the way Diller attributes to him.
Besides, his (mis)interpretation indicates important drawbacks in Popper’s
description of critical rationalism in chapter 24 of Open Society and Its Enemies.
Bartley
did describe critical rationalism as position whose adherents share three
distinctive points (which distinguish critical rationalism from uncritical):
"(1) They concede that rationality is limited in the sense that some
matters, such as the principles and standards of rationality, cannot be justified…
(2) They claim that this concession is unimportant, or at least not important
enough to give any consolation to irrationalism. (3) If challenged, they tend
to ground or justify rationalist position in personal or social commitment to
standards which are beyond challenge." (Bartley 1984, 97)
Bartley’s
own position, pancritical rationalism, share with critical rationalism points
(1) and (2); and it strenthens (1) with emphasizing that “nothing of any
interest can be justified in the way required”. So, the purported difference is
about (3). But it is far from obvious that critical rationalism, in Popper’s
description, is really guilty of (3). In Open
Society and Its Enemies I find
nothing to support unequivocally the charge of (3). So, probably Bartley misinterprets
Popper on this point.
Bartley
did support his charge by quotation of a fragment from Open
Society and Its Enemies where
Popper did describe critical rationalism as “minimum concession to
irrationalism” (Popper 1957, 232) which admits that the rationalist attitude
“is based upon an irrational decision”, “an irrational faith in reason”, −
“a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its limitations, and
its basis in an irrational decision (and so far, a certain priority of
irrationalism).” (Popper 1957, 231)
Bartley
have qualified these statements as “obviously fideistic”. Popper did deny this.
In 1992, in Kyoto, he did explain that he did mean by “faith” not Faith of
fideism, but faith-belief, − “my belief that it is a good attitude to try
out, or perhaps to adopt”; so “fideism doesn’t come in”. (Artigas 1999, 30-31)
So
far, it seems that Bartley’s criticism of critical rationalism is based on
misinterpretation. But there are further complications.
In
the same speech in Kyoto Popper has made a statement:
“Critical discussion means discussing not attitude or
such things, but problems, and solutions of these problems, therefore theories,
propositions, positions and so on.” (Artigas 1999, 31)
This
statement seems to say unequivocally that (moral) attitudes are not proper
objects of critical discussion (which is the same as to say that they are
exempt from criticism). If Popper did really mean it (we are to take into
account that the speech was impromptu), this strongly supports Bartley’s charge
("If challenged, they tend to ground or justify rationalist position in
personal or social commitment to standards which are beyond challenge").
For me, it is incomprehensible how Popper could mean it, − for in Open Society and Its Enemies he did
discuss moral attitudes (such as holism, individualism, rationalism,
irrationalism) critically. On the other hand, I can not imagine, what else
Popper could mean by that statement.
Important
points of Bartley’s criticisms were that critical rationalism, as described in chapter
24 of Open Society and Its Enemies, 1)
with respect to the problem of limits of rationality “Popper’s own explicit
first attempt to solve the problem is inadequate” and 2) it “seems to operate
within a justificationist context foreign to the dominant themes of his own
thought” (Bartley 1984, 104). I think there is much to support these criticisms.
Name
“critical rationalism” was introduced by Popper in section 2 of chapter 24 of Open Society and Its Enemies, as an
alternative to “uncritical (comprehensive) rationalism”. The last is described
as the attitude of accepting “the principle that any assumption which cannot be
supported either by argument or by experience is to be discarded”. (Popper 1957,
230).
Popper
agrees with irrationalists that “this principle of uncritical rationalism is
inconsistent; for since it cannot, in its turn, be supported by argument or by
experience, it implies that it should itself be discarded” (Popper 1957, 230).
Let us call this problem the specific
problem of uncritical rationalism.
Popper
also remarks: “This criticism may be generalized. Since all argument must
proceed from assumptions, it is plainly impossible to demand that all
assumptions should be based on argument” (Popper 1957, 230). Let us call this
problem the general problem of uncritical
rationalism.
After
this Popper dwells more on the specific
problem of uncritical rationalism and proposes, as its solution:
“our choice is open. We are free to choose some form
of irrationalism, even some radical or comprehensive form. But we are also free
to choose a critical form of rationalism, one which frankly admits its
limitations, and its basis in an irrational decision…” (Popper 1957, 231)
Now,
how about the general problem of
uncritical rationalism? What is critical rationalism’s solution to this problem?
In Open Society Popper had given no
explicit answer. But, the solution of the specific problem of uncritical
rationalism is of little (if any) profit, if there is no solution to the
general problem of uncritical rationalism.
On the other hand, if there was the solution to the general problem of
uncritical rationalism, it would contain the solution to the specific problem.
It
may be said that the solution of the
general problem of uncritical rationalism is there implicitly − in
Popper’s acknowleging the problem as pernicious for uncritical rationalism and
in his earlier description of rationalism (rational attitude) as “an attitude
of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience… an
attitude of admitting that ‘I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an
effort, we may get nearer to the truth’.” (Popper 1957, 225) Yes, but this
implicitly present solution was lacking explicit statement. This explicit statement
was given by Bartley and accepted by Popper.
It
is appropriate to remark that Popper, in Realism
and Aims of Science did acknowledge the importance of Bartley’s
contribution. Two fragments are especially pertinent to our discussion:
“It was only recently that I began to suspect … that my own approach to
the theory of knowledge was more revolutionary… This suspicion arose from a new
way of viewing my own approach, and its relation to the problem situation in
philosophy; a way that was suggested to me by my friend W.W.Bartley, III.”
(Popper 1983, 18)
“It seems to me that Bartley’s simple formulation – that justification
can be replaced by non-justificational criticism – and his emphasis on the change of focus involved in the
transition from the various justificationist philosophies to a critical
philosophy which does not aim at justification is most illuminating… Bartley’s
formulation also helps to explain why I can agree with so much that has been
said by various irrationalists against rationalism and rationalist attempts to
justify our beliefs, though I make no
concession to irrationalism, but insist, on the contrary, that any theory
or belief may, and should, be made subject to severe and searching rational criticism…” (Popper 1983, 27)
Bold
style mine. “I make no concession to irrationalism” can hardly be interpreted
otherwise than renouncement of the description of critical rationalism as
“minimum concession to irrationalism”. In this prospect, suggested by Bartley,
the proper answer to irrationalism is not the “minimum concession” of admitting
that rationalist attitude “is based upon an irrational decision”, “an
irrational faith in reason”. The proper answer is renouncing the
justificationist principle “that any assumption which cannot be supported
either by argument or by experience is to be discarded” – replacing it with the
principle of openness to criticism. And the difference between critical and
uncritical (justificationist) rationalism consists not in “minimum concession
to irrationalism”, but in adhering to completely different principles of
rationality. Making this clear is principal Bartley’s contribution to critical
rationalism.
3. Convergence
Diller: “Key
elements of pancritical rationalism are already present in critical rationalism.”
Rejoinder: Yes. But this is hardly proper criticism of
pancritical rationalism because,
on the
one side, Bartley did admit that pancritical rationalism is dealing with the
problem of limits of rationality “within
the general framework of his {Popper’s} own approach” (Bartley
1984, 105);
and Bartley did acknowledge that ‘pancritical rationalism’ was suggested to him
by Popper’s lecture “On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance” and by
Popper’s falsificationism;
on
the other side, Popper, under influence of Bartley, has “incorporated” (in
Addendum to fourth edition of The Open Society and Its Enemies) “the
principle that everything is open to criticism (from which this
principle itself is not exempt)” (Popper 1971, 408-409) – the précis of
pancritical rationalism, and (in Realism
and the Aim of Science) have adopted “a new way of viewing my own approach, and its relation to the problem
situation in philosophy; a way that was suggested to me by my friend
W.W.Bartley, III.” (Popper 1983, 18)
4.
“Tossing Yarrow Stalks” and “Irrational Decision”
Next Diller’s criticism of Bartley concerns with
Popper’s description of critical rationalism as “form of rationalism … which frankly admits … its
basis in an irrational decision” (Popper 1957, 231).
Diller:
“Bartley sees the need to make
such an irrational decision as being a serious liability of critical
rationalism. No moral decision is needed to accept pancritical rationalism; Bartley
sees nothing wrong in someone deciding to accept pancritical rationalism as a
result of some arbitrary method such as "tossing yarrow stalks" (Retreat,
second edition, p. 94, fn. 34).”
Rejoinder: Let us begin with "tossing yarrow stalks" and look at the fragment in which the
phrase occurs. The whole point of this fragment is that what matters for rationality is
not the source of our beliefs (or moral attitudes),
what makes us to believe (or accept) them initially,
but our attitude of holding them open to criticism. I
think it is right, and is the same thing that Popper says in the lecture “On
the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance”.
In particular, the
sentence in which “yarrow stalks” occurs is:
“…when one is concerned with the question of whether a decision is
criticisable, it hardly matters whether that decision was originally
made as a result of argument, … or whether he or she decided by tossing yarrow
stalks or by
some other arbitrary method” (Bartley 1984, 94).
As far as I see it, this statement means only that the question of “the
sources” of “decision” is quite irrelevant to the question of whether a “decision”
is criticisable. Bartley does not
say – and, I think, does not mean – that in
all other respects there is nothing wrong in making important “decisions”,
such as accepting critical or pancritical rationalism, by "tossing yarrow
stalks or some other arbitrary method". There is no reason to consider
Bartley as a proponent of a crazy epistemology-and-morality in which we accept
positions by tossing yarrow stalks and then criticize them with arguments using
as premises other positions accepted by the method of tossing yarrow stalks.
So, I think that Diller misinterprets Bartley when he attributes to him the
view that there is “nothing wrong in someone deciding to accept pancritical
rationalism as a result of some arbitrary method such as "tossing yarrow stalks"”.
Now about “irrational decision”-“moral decision”. Bartley
did not write that “no moral decision is needed to
accept pancritical rationalism”;
neither did he write that “the need to make such an irrational decision” is “a
serious liability of critical rationalism”. Bartley makes just a minor
criticism-correction (in a footnote on p.106) to Popper’s statement that “a
rationalist attitude must be first adopted if any argument or experience is to
be effective, and it cannot therefore be based upon argument or experience” (Popper 1957, 230). Bartley’s
objection is that for a particular
argument to be effective, it is not necessary that a person has already
accepted a rationalist attitude; much less is nesessary: that this person was open to this particular argument at this
particular moment.
This objection, made by Bartley but casually, can be strengthened.
It may be argued, that acceptance of rational attitude need not be “irrational
decision” – it is really neither irrational,
nor decision.
1) It is not
irrational. Popper’s admission of necessity of “irrational decision” is based
upon argument: "neither logical argument
nor experience can establish the rationalist attitude; for only those who are
ready to consider argument or experience, and who have therefore adopted this attitude already, will be
impressed by them" (Popper 1957, 230). Italicizing mine, − and the
phrase italicized is mistaken; it is non
sequitur. To see this, we need to clarify the meaning of the vague phrase
“to adopt the attitude”. As far as I see it, there are two alternatives.
First, stronger meaning: “to adopt the rationalist attitude” means conscious
self-identification with this attitude. If so, then adopting rationalist
attitude is not necessary for a
person to be impressed by argument or experience. It is not the case that a
person must first make conscious self-identification with rationalist attitude,
and this enables him/her to be influenced by argument or experience. It is the
case that a person is influenced by argument and experience before he/she makes
conscious self-identification with rationalist attitude.
Second, weaker meaning: “to adopt the rationalist
attitude” means to have a mental disposition of being “ready to consider
argument and experience”. But such a mental disposition is not a simple matter
of absent/present; it is a matter of degrees. There is no point (moment) of
adoption rationalist attitude, in this sense.
All people have it, to some degree. In this sense, all people are
rationalists, to some degree (though in some cases this degree may happen to be
negligibly small). Starting with some inborn disposition, we develop (or
degrade) it throughout our life under influence of experience and arguments,
i.e. rationally, in Popper's meaning of "rationality".
2) It is not decision. As far as our beliefs and
moral attitudes are concerned, we do not
decide – we do make judgments (and, surely, we do not make them by
"tossing yarrow stalks"). We decide on our actions – what to do in a
particular situation – but not on what to believe or value. We may be persuaded
by arguments into believing X or (re)valuing Y, but do not decide that from now
or some other moment on we will believe X or value Y.[1]
5. How non-justificationism is not to be understood
Diller: “Bartley thinks that a person
should abandon a position if the argument which supports that position is shown
to be invalid (Retreat, second edition, p. 71). However, only a
justificationist should do that…”
Rejoinder:
Let
us look at what Bartley really writes on the page 71. Despite Diller’s
(mis)description, Bartley writes nothing about whether a person should or
should not abandon a position if the argument which supports
that position is shown to be invalid.
Bartley writes quite a different thing: that if a person does not abandon
a position if the argument which supports that position is shown to be
invalid, this means that the position
“far from depending on argument, was held independently of it” (Bartley 1984,
71).
Diller: “An anti-justificationist
should only abandon a truth-apt position if falsehoods can be derived from it.
… Bartley subscribes to the justificationist fallacy I call the strategy of
attacking foundations which usually has four stages:
However,
just because a theory follows from false premises does not mean that it itself
is false.”
Rejoinder: The first objection against this charge is that
it is based on misinterpretation of Bartley’s statements on p. 71 of The Retreat to Commitment, as explained
above. The interesting thing about this objection is that by making it I risk
to be charged with committing the same “justificationist
fallacy” − “the strategy of attacking foundations”. Really,
on Diller’s description, it is good and well to charge anyone with anything on
whatever ficticious grounds, and if someone shows that there are no real
grounds for this charge, he is committing “justificationist fallacy” − “the strategy of attacking
foundations”.
So, my
second objection is that what Diller calls “the strategy of attacking foundations” is
not justificationist fallacy, except if it is believed to be the only way to criticize a theory, or
if it is believed to be able to prove
falsity of the theory criticized.
If “the strategy of attacking foundations” was
“the justificationist fallacy”,
then Popper would be guilty of it at least as well as Bartley. For Popper often
did criticize different theories by “attacking foundations” – for example, in The Open Society and Its Enemies. For
example, the great deal of Popper’s criticism of Marxism is not derivation of
falsehoods from it, but criticism of arguments of Marx and his followers.
But
this is not Popper’s (or Bartley’s) fault – for “the strategy of attacking foundations” is
usually good and reasonable (though not universally applicable) strategy.
Suppose
a person P believes that a theory T is true because of arguments A, B, C. Now,
if you succeed to make such a criticism of A, B, C that P admits that they are
unsound, then P has no reason to believe T and will, probably, renounce it. In
any case, he would be dishonest to continue to invoke A, B, C as reasons to
believe that P is true; he must either find other arguments or admit that he
believes T for no reasons at all. Usually, such acknowledgment is pernicious
for T (despite the fact that it is not
proven that T is false).
Is it
“justificationism”? If it is, then both Popper and Bartley were
justificationists. But, it is not “justificationism” in
the sense in which Popper and Bartley did use the word.
Popper’s
and Bartley’s “anti-justificationism” is not denial that our theories usually need
to be supported by some arguments. It is just explanation that such a support
does not “justify” anything in the sense of proving it true or highly probable
(in the sense of probability calculus). For all supporting arguments use some
premises which can not be “justified”, so the whole chain remains “unjustified”.
But this does not mean that we need not arguments to support our theories.
We
usually do need some arguments to support our theories. It is clear why. It is
not the case that we accept theories on whim, for no reasons at all. We usually
accept them for some reasons. At least, the reason for accepting a theory is
that it seems to us to be a good solution to some explanatory problems. Now, if
it is demonstrated that theory does not really solve the problem it was
intended to solve, or that there are better solutions, this may be good enough
reason to renounce it. And we may have some other arguments which support our
acceptance of a theory. If it is demonstrated convincingly (for us) that all
arguments which did make us to believe that T is true are mistaken, we will
hardly continue to believe that T is true. It will hardly be reasonable to continue to
believe it.
(This
does not contradict with acknowledging that it is inevitable to hold some positions without having any
arguments to support them, because they just
seem true to us. This acknowledgement, together with anti-dogmatic reservation
that such unsupported positions may be mistaken and may be criticized and
revised, is the core of non-justificationism.)
So, “the strategy of attacking foundations” is usually
useful and reasonable strategy. Though it can not prove that a theory under
discussion is false, it can provide us with good reasons to disqualify this
theory as “radically flawed or
intellectually bankrupt”.
To explain it a bit differently, I will refer to Popper’s formulation, in
the book In Search of a Better World, of “The principles that form the basis of every rational
discussion, that is, of every discussion undertaken in the search for truth…” These principles are: “1. The
principle of fallibility… 2. The
principle of rational discussion: we want to try, as impersonally as possible,
to weigh up our reasons for and against a theory… 3. The principle of
approximation to the truth…” (Popper 1992, 199)
Now,
if in rational discussion we are “to
weigh up our reasons for and against a theory”,
then our criticism of a theory may be either providing new arguments (reasons) against the theory, or demolishing some
earlier provided arguments (reasons) for
the theory. Both “strategies” are equally legitimate and equally apt to influence
results of “weighing up”.
Literature
Antoni
Diller's website. On critical and
pancritical rationalism. http://www.cantab.net/users/antoni.diller/rationalism/pancritical.html
Artigas, M.
1999. The Ethical Nature of Karl Popper’s
Theory of Knowledge.
Bartley,
W.W. 1984. The Retreat to Commitment.
2-nd ed. La Salle, Illinois: Open
Court.
Musgrave, A. 2009. "Can I Decide What to Believe?", in
A.Musgrave, Secular Sermons.
Percival, R. S. 2012. The Myth of Closed Mind.
Popper, K. 1957. The
Open Society and Its Enemies. 3-th
ed. London: Routledge, vol.2.
Popper, K. 1963. “On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance”, in K.Popper, Conjectures and Refutations. London and
New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
Popper, K. 1971. The
Open Society and Its Enemies. 5-th
ed. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
vol.2.
Popper, K. 1974.
Intellectual Autobiography. In P.A.Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Karl Popper. La Salle, Illinois: Open Court.
Popper, K.
Popper, K. 1983. Realism and the Aim of Science. London and New York: Routledge.
[1] I
ought an acknowledgement to A.Musgrave and R.S.Percival for earlier explicit
statement of this view, with respect to beliefs. Percival also defends the
thesis that all people are rational, which I use with a proviso (which seems to
me important) “to some degree”.