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Sharia'a and Its Application


 


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Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz

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Salman Bin Abdul Aziz

Ahmad Bin Abdul Aziz

SHARIA'A AND ITS APPLICATION, CACSA Member, October 4, 1997

PART ONE: SHARI'A

From 1980-85 I lived and worked as a teacher in Taif, the summer capital of Saudi Arabia. With a perfect mountain climate, friendly people and convenient proximity to city-life amenities in Jeddah and remote campsites along the Red Sea, Taif was an nice place to call home.

Early one weekend morning just as I was wading out to a reef north of Jeddah, an urgent radio call reached camp with a message that there was an emergency in Taif that required my immediate return.

Upon arrival at my residence in the Northrop cantonment two hours later, I found Northrop management and Taif police detectives present in force. My house had been burglarized. In the front yard Sri Lankan and Filipino men who had access to the house were being questioned by the police.

Inside it was evident that virtually everything of value except kitchenware and furniture was gone. A bedroom window in the rear of the structure was broken. Various items were strewn wildly across the back yard and over the wall that separated the cantonment from a neighborhood soccer field.

Upon further inspection it was noticed that the perpetrators, apparently in no particular hurry, had even stopped to refresh themselves with a snack from the kitchen. Soft drink cans, wrapping and food were scattered about. In minutes the entire kitchen and much of the rest of the house would be covered with fingerprint dust.

Without saying so at the time, Taif's finest were also tracking a trail of debris that extended from beyond the soccer field, across a four-lane highway and up a steep, hillside path leading into a densely-packed community of small mud brick houses - Saudi houses.

A boy who had been involved in previous criminal activity was confronted by the police detectives that afternoon. I was later told that it took about half-a-second for the suspect to identify the actual culprits.

By that evening three Saudi teenagers were being held at police headquarters in downtown Taif. Inside the non-descript station the boys were placed in separate cells - isolated from each other, their distraught families and their peaceful community.

I was called to the station. There the chief-of-police introduced himself and then led me into a room with several large boxes on the floor. He asked if all of the items that had been stolen were present. A few things were missing.

Next, I met with the parents of the teen-aged burglars. Never before or since have I seen family members so deeply hurt by the misdeeds of their children. These were economically poor people. Simple people. Honest people.

In one blur-of-a-day a crime had been committed, the police department had done its job, and the case was well on its way to a just conclusion. Notably, nobody, but nobody, had attempted to cover for the boys or to in any way lessen their responsibility for their actions. In fact, what followed was quite to the contrary.

First, the boys' families apologized to me in words and gestures offered with as much sincerity and grace as can be imagined. They asked the value of the items damaged or missing and promised compensation (a pledge they honored a few days later).

Second, one evening shortly thereafter, the police brought the boys back to my house where they were photographed reenacting their looting spree. The process was forthright, even friendly, and, whether by design or not, served the purpose of reconciling the relationship between culprits and victim.

As it turned out, the leader in crime was a third-time offender in his late teens. While sitting on the cantonment wall between soccer games he and his younger, record-free accomplices had seen me pack my car and leave for the weekend. The combination of opportunity and curiosity had led directly to the plunder that took place.

Third, a few weeks later I was called to attend an administrative hearing related to the affair. With the confessions on record, it was time for sentencing. The judges asked if I had further claims against the boys or their families. I did not. I was then invited to comment regarding the sentencing, which I did.

It was my belief that spending the summer in jail would be an appropriate punishment for the first-time offenders. In the case of the third-time thief, who was eligible to lose a hand due to his repeated crimes, I asked that he serve an extended sentence, but that his hand not be severed. The court agreed.

My last connection with the matter began near midnight on the Fourth of July. It was a typically dead quiet night on the cantonment. I was asleep. Suddenly, I was startled awake by rapid, loud banging on my doors and windows and non-stop ringing of the doorbell.

Peeking out around a curtain, I saw
Mutawa (religious policemen) and many armed men in uniform in the front yard. A SWAT-style vehicle was parked in the driveway. The whole setting struck me as too bright.

Reluctantly, I opened the door. A
Mutawa immediately led me towards the street. He spoke no English; I only some fundamental Arabic. The best I could understand was that he wanted me to look at something.

There must have been twenty men shifting about on all sides, but the ruckus of a few moments earlier had been replaced with absolute quiet.

Out from the back of the truck the three young men who had broken into the house that spring stepped single file onto the street. They seemed different. One looked up, pointed my direction and spoke to the people around him. For an instant I wondered if I was being accused of something.

The Mutawa and I continued our attempts at a discussion. I wished I knew
more Arabic. Finally, I got the message.

That year our Fourth of July fell during the Islamic holy month of Ramadan (the month of fasting). The
Mutawa and other police were present as part of a roving, city-wide demonstration against vice in the community. They had come to me as a gesture of good faith - to show me that justice was being served.

On command the boys leaned forward. Then, in turn, each was "whipped" with a long, thin, flexible rod. The blows were popped quickly against the loose-fitting thobes the boys were wearing. If anyone was hurt at all it didn't show. But then, I don't think physical pain was the intended consequence.

What I had just observed, and had come to appreciate ever since the burglary was discovered, was a community (families, police, religious leaders) with a strong, certain set of values and a sense of duty towards all, including the occasional criminal . . . and an outsider like me.

The young men who had violated my home had already spent weeks in jail. They had gone to their final exams at school in chains. And they had been made public examples of during the most joyous period of the year, Ramadan.

Nevertheless, their punishments had not been acts of vengeance, but a reminder to them and to society that it is the responsibility of the community to support the general welfare. The criminal actions of these three boys had been a disgrace to every person of good faith in Taif. It was the responsibility of the community not only to reject their misdeeds, but to pave the way for their re-acceptance into society.

Of all my many experiences in Saudi Arabia none left so profound an impression as this introduction to Shari'a (Islamic Law). As I saw it, the young men who committed the crime were genuinely better off for the way their infractions were handled, so were the people of Taif, and so was I.

It is a lesson I will always appreciate.

PART TWO: . . . NOT SHARI'A

By late August - early September 1993 I was in the process of reestablishing residency in Saudi Arabia. Except for an extended stay during the conflict with Iraq and an occasional business trip, I had been away from the kingdom for eight years. Working in Dallah Tower by day and scouting for permanent housing during non-business hours, this was a time of professional and personal transition that had long been anticipated.

I had served for the previous two years in the United States as vice -president of Middle East Industrial Development Company (MEIDCO), a Liechtenstein-registered, Jeddah-based investment and consulting operation led by Munir Al-Moarawi, a Syrian national, whom I had met in 1991.

Over time, Dallah Telecom, a recent subsidiary of Dallah Al-Baraka Group, Saudi Arabia's second largest company, had become the principal client of the projects which I spearheaded for MEIDCO. Munir Al-Moarawi had literally moved into the Dallah Telecom facility and had full run of the place. [ Dallah Telecom was managed by Abdul Fattah Nazer, a brother-in-law of Saleh Abdullah Kamel, president of Dallah Al-Baraka.].

I had not entered into this aggregate blindly or without some hesitation. It is common knowledge that corruption is the life's blood of the Saudi Arabian elite. In fact, the Saudi kleptogarchy is widely recognized as being among the most successful, least encumbered criminal enterprises in history.

Still, under the right circumstances, Saudi Arabia could be a great place to live and work. For this I was mostly content in my role of identifying and developing business opportunities for MEIDCO and its clients - while remaining personally apart from the web of intrigue. Bypassing the obstacles created by corruption was left to Munir Al-Moarawi.

Was I naive in believing that I could go about my work without being affected by the graft that controlled the Saudi economy? You bet I was. And it didn't take long to find out just how wrongheaded I had been or just how much Saudi Arabia had changed in only a few short years.

It is not that the Saudi elite were honest stewards of the economy before the Gulf War, but in its aftermath I found myself almost nostalgic for the shady, yet unsophisticated corruption of the early 80's. Though still played out daily in the newspapers and on TV, the illusion of the Al-Saud as benevolent caretakers of state and religion was effectively dead. In its place: a thoroughly-mercenary, blatantly-arrogant cynicism that was spreading from the top.

The game was over. The pretense was gone. The feeding frenzy was on.

Every day at work became an education for me in the ways of the new Saudi Arabia. However, with so much at stake, personally and professionally, I was determined to endure. Silly me.

The first project which MEIDCO had brought to Dr. Abdul Fattah Nazer and Dallah Group in 1991 was an opportunity to team with GTE Government Systems Overseas Corporation in an effort to sell GTE's Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE) and related support to the Signal Corps of the Royal Saudi Army and to the Saudi Arabian National Guard. The potential cost of the project over a period of several years was as much as US$1,000,000,000. My role was that of liaison between GTE, MEIDCO and Dallah.

IMSE was easily the right product for the needs of the Saudi ground forces. It was clearly the best proven (Gulf War), best priced, best financed system available. Furthermore, IMSE was easy to use, and the only product which was interoperable with US equipment (no small benefit in itself considering the fact that Al-Saud rule owed its continuing existence to the backing of the US military).

The principal competition for IMSE came from Thomson, the French communications giant. Its product, RITA, was no longer in production. However, because of peculiar ties between the French and certain Saudi military officials, including HRH Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, the Minister of Defense and Aviation, and General Marzouki of the Signal Corps, GTE had been prohibited even from making a technical presentation of its product to the Saudis.

MEIDCO introduced GTE to Dallah because, absent a strong, well-connected Saudi partner, GTE was never going to be allowed to compete for the contract. Dallah/MEIDCO then solicited the behind-the-scenes "services" of HRH Prince Fahd bin Sultan.

After stringing GTE along for more than two unproductive years, Dallah (Nazer) and MEIDCO (Al-Moarawi) essentially abandoned GTE to fend for itself. But the GTE project, such as it was, had served another purpose. It had created the illusion that Nazer and Al-Moarawi were veritable "players."

To get a moribund Dallah Telecom going, Saleh Kamel, on the advise of Nazer, approved a far-reaching compact giving Al-Moarawi/MEIDCO the unrestricted use of Dallah Telecom resources to develop investment opportunities on Dallah's behalf. By March 1993 Al-Moarawi had essentially taken over the daily operations of building Dallah Telecom.

By mid-August the Al-Moarawi-Nazer duo had successfully defrauded Dallah Al-Baraka and its investors of US$4,500,000. And they were primed for more.

The project upon which the first fraud was based involved Dallah Telecom-MEIDCO setting up a Jeddah-based, Cayman Islands-registered company (GDC) to become the regional coordinator for long-distance callback services offered by Telegroup, Inc. of Fairfield, Iowa. While legitimate on its face, the Telegroup opportunity was nevertheless quite risky, as was readily conceded by Telegroup.

First, the Federal Communications Commission in the United States was soon to release a decision related to complaints by major long-distance carriers involving the use of unanswered dial tones without charge by resellers like Telegroup. An unfavorable ruling would have been a serious competitive blow to Telegroup and its independent contractors like GDC (now New Services Trading Company).

Second, according to the Ministry of Communications in Saudi Arabia, and as was later widely reported in the Saudi press, international callback services were patently illegal in the kingdom.

Despite these profound uncertainties, Mahmoud Youssef, economic advisor to Saleh Kamel, set the value of the start-up company at US$10,000,000.

Saleh Kamel approved this generous valuation and also gave a green light for US$2,500,000 in Dallah investor funds to be given to Al-Moarawi (and Nazer) in order to reimburse a "bribe" that Al-Moarawi and Nazer claimed had been paid to Mr. Cliff Rees, the Telegroup president for rights to the project. (I know of no evidence that Mr. Rees was offered or received such funds, and believe the opposite to be true.)

Contrary to Dallah policy, Kamel also approved $1,000,000 in undocumented expenses to Al-Moarawi (and Nazer) even though Dallah office space, Dallah staff, Dallah travel allowances, Dallah phone and fax, etc. (all paid for by Dallah investors) were used to start the business.

Still yet another US$1,000,000 was given to Al-Moarawi (and Nazer) for setting up the deal. (Nazer, of course, received his regular Dallah salary and bonuses as well.)

On top of the above, Al-Moarawi/MEIDCO (and Nazer) was given 50% of the shares in the business (minus a cut from each side to HRH Prince Faisal bin Fahd to ensure protection from the Ministry of Communications).

In total, US$4,500,000 of Dallah investor funds (plus GDC stock) had vanished into thin air - and the company had yet to set up operations. For this purpose Kamel and Youssef came up with another US$1,000,000.

A few days later in a meeting to determine the operating budget for GDC, Mahmoud Youssef let slip to me that funds other than those officially set aside for operations (the US$1,000,000) had changed hands between Dallah and MEIDCO in setting up GDC. As a GDC director (along with Nazer, Al-Moarawi and Youssef) I was entitled to any information about the finances of the company, but Youssef refused to explain the transaction(s) to which he had referred.

That night, Al-Moarawi reluctantly admitted that additional payments had been made by Dallah to MEIDCO. However, he would not reveal the purpose or the amount. His stated opinion was that the financial relationship between Dallah and MEIDCO was none of my business. He further advised that Nazer was part of the arrangement and that previously undisclosed MEIDCO partners (princes) were "people who could kill people and get away with it."

I returned to the United States.

After weeks of getting nowhere in my attempts to resolve the situation, I resigned from MEIDCO and sent the irregular information in my possession to Saleh Kamel. Mahmoud Youssef, who works in Kamel's office, redirected the materiel to Abdul Fattah Nazer (Al-Moarawi's purported accomplice).

By phone Nazer expressed his concern and offered himself to mediate the problems. He promised that we would meet in London. Nazer also instructed me that Saleh Kamel would not take an active role in resolving the matter. I was told to provide information only to Nazer or Youssef.

As one might surmise, the only concern that Nazer subsequently evidenced was for protecting himself (and Al-Moarawi). The meeting in London never happened.

Instead, what transpired were surreptitious efforts by Nazer, Al-Moarawi and Youssef to discredit me and to ensure that the fraud (or the fact that I knew of the irregularities) was concealed from Saleh Kamel.

Not long thereafter, Kamel agreed, at the urging of Nazer, to pay Al-Moarawi (and Nazer) an additional US$1,500,000 in bogus fees related to another project I had set up. The cause for the payment this time was that Al-Moarawi had somehow gotten hold of and copied Youssef's (Kamel's) internal office files detailing an underhanded attempt by Dallah (Youssef and Kamel) to cut Al-Moarawi/MEIDCO out of a consulting commission.

Finally, eight months after first trying to report my concerns, I reached Saleh Kamel via a private fax line. He responded with a request for documentation. I sent what I had.

Approximately six weeks later Nazer was dead. Al-Moarawi was (according to Youssef) being protected from litigation by a son of King Fahd, either Faisal or Sultan. Kamel fell stone quiet on the subject.

In fact Saleh Kamel unexplainably was silent on several fronts as relate to his fiduciary duties to Dallah investors. He did not press criminal charges against Al-Moarawi. He did not make a claim against the estate of Abdul Fattah Nazer. He did not make a claim against Al-Moarawi's Saudi sponsor, HH Prince Salman Suderi. He did not make a civil or criminal claim against Middle East Industrial Development Company in Liechtenstein. And he continued to operate a business (GDC) he knew to be illegal in Saudi Arabia.

[The Al-Saud-controlled government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia claims SHARI'A (Islamic Law) as its constitution and the source of legitimacy for its rule. In theory, all persons in the kingdom are obliged to conduct themselves in accordance with basic standards set forth in Islamic Law and are guaranteed the protection and support of SHARI'A.]

As an alleged victim and a person with alleged knowledge of criminal acts, it has been both my right and my responsibility under Islamic Law to press criminal charges in the matter. Nevertheless, my petitions have been completely ignored by King Fahd, Prince Bandar (ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States), the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs and the Saudi Grievances Court - all of which are REQUIRED BY SHARI'A to respond to and act upon such allegations.

[The United States Department of State is now considering my claims of Due Process Denial (avoidance in this case) as relates to my right to assert criminal charges in Saudi Arabia.]

At issue is simply the Al-Saud's government's legal and moral responsibility to adhere to its SHARI'A constitution.

Unequal justice, the sanctuary of the Saudi elite, is surely not SHARI'A justice. It is not the prerogative of the Al-Saud family to decide (based on the rank of the accused) whether allegations of criminal activity should be investigated and ruled upon; it is their explicit duty under Islamic Law to ensure due process.

Furthermore, the alleged role of certain members of the Al-Saud family in the crimes (and cover-up) makes necessary under Shari'a the appointment of an independent international tribunal (Muslim) to oversee the neutrality of the judicial process. Said independent tribunal should have at its disposal all the powers of investigation that exist under Islamic Law. And it should be have the right to present its findings, whatever they may be, in a public forum.

To be sure this is just one little case. Many have been wronged worse than I have been.

Nevertheless, it is my intention that the Al-Saud government, or its successor, will live up to its responsibilities in this case as established by Shari'a. I seek nothing more. I expect nothing less.

My ultimate hope is to rediscover the Islamic integrity that I witnessed years ago in Taif.

From a fatwa (issued by Imam Mohammed Hanooti, 8 December 1996):

I. A constitution based on Shari'a, as in Saudi Arabia, requires the administration of equal justice for all. Equality is fundamental to Islamic Justice and all should expect to live in peace, security and justice.

II. Criminal allegations are a serious concern. Whatever merits allegations of criminal activity may or may not have should be determined through a proper investigation followed by appropriate judicial ruling.

III. Under Islamic Law no person in authority may in any way hinder the pursuit of justice. As regards allegations of criminal activity, a person of responsibility should do everything in his power to guarantee a fair and complete investigation.

IV. According to Shari'a no title, or person with title, can give a person an exception or privilege under law. For a person in authority to limit or prevent investigation, trial or justice would be improper.

V. Islamic justice is based on neutral judgment. An Islamic judicial system should provide a neutral channel for justice [when a monarch or his family or their associates faces allegations of misconduct].

 


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