Eclipse of reason: The media in the Muslim world.
By Abdelwahab El-Affendi
Copyright (C) 1993 by Journal of International Affairs
Following the March 1993 killing of 10 suspected Islamic
militants and the wounding of 21 others by government security forces in
Upper Egypt, a British correspondent in Cairo scoured the English-language
Egyptian Gazette to see how these events were covered by Egypt's official
media. The Gazette's lead story the following day, however, was about the
flaring of violence and clashes between protesters and security forces in
the Israeli-controlled West Bank. The second story was about the shelling
of Sarajevo by Serbs, while the third was about clashes between Islamic
militants and security forces in Algeria. The previous day's bloodshed in
Upper Egypt was buried in a three-paragraph story on page two. On that
same day, the government-controlled television news also ignored the
arrest by the security forces of 118 so-called Islamic extremists.[3]
This kind of government news management is not exclusive to
Egypt. In fact, compared to many other Arab and Muslim countries, the
Egyptian press is rather free and vocal -- if lacking in credibility. The
Egyptian opposition papers likely printed some exaggerated account of
officially ignored government operations against the militants, leaving
the reader to guess at the truth, somewhere in between the two accounts.
In countries like Saudi Arabia, however, the media are far
more tightly controlled; for example, the Saudi public was not
officially' informed about the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait until three days
after the fact. This led Saudis to turn en masse to foreign radio
stations; radios sold out quickly in the days following the invasion.[4]
Still, Riyadh's manipulation of news and information is little different
from the information control practiced by other authoritarian governments
for decades. This media control, however, is not confined within Saudi borders.
For example in July 1987, the Saudi police broke up an Iranian
demonstration during the pilgrimage in Mecca, causing over 400 deaths.
According to the Saudis, the Iranians had instigated the violence
and the Saudi police had only responded. Not surprisingly, the
Iranians claimed that the demonstration was entirely peaceful, and that
the behavior of the Saudi security forces was completely
unwarranted. Neither side, however, was willing to mention the other's
viewpoint, although some elements of the Iranian version could be gleaned
from the vitriolic Saudi account.
More significantly, media outlets from Jakarta to Casablanca, while
carrying the Saudi story, made no mention of the Iranian version.
Had it not been for a few Western magazines and newspapers, Teheran' s
side of the incident would have been essentially non-existent.[5] This is
evidence that the Muslim world is witnessing what some Arab and Saudi journalists
are beginning to call the "Saudi Age:"[6] Over the last
two decades, Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Gulf countries have
gained consol of the most influential publications in the Arab world and
expanded their influence to Europe. Even the Western press has noted the
distorting effects of Riyadh's growing power over media outlets in the
Middle East, particularly the print media and satellite television.[7]
Moreover, the Saudis are not alone. They and their regional rivals
--Iran, Iraq, Libya, Egypt, and Syria -- have been struggling for an
absolute monopoly over publications and television and radio stations
targeting Middle East audiences.
Fearing the use of independent media by political opponents or dissident
groups, the governments of these countries have sought to suppress any
criticism of their policies or leaderships, as well as to avoid damaging
revelations about personal or political scandals. After excluding hostile
material from newspapers, magazines and the airwaves, some have then used
the media as a vehicle for their propaganda.[8] The Gulf states, led by Saudi
Arabia, want to buy peace to enjoy their riches unmolested; all have
sought to suppress any ideas that might emerge to challenge their
government's monopoly on power. In the process, they have managed to force
independent voices from the Muslim world using market manipulation,
bribery and sheer intimidation.
The result is a blanket dark age extending from Indonesia to the Atlantic
with long shadows falling over London, Paris, New York and other centers
of Muslim exile. Debate is stifled, publishing stymied and free thinking
all but eliminated in the Muslim world. This situation is, sadly, not new,
as demonstrated by a French observer's 1907 account of the press in
Ottoman Constantinople:
For thirty years, the press [have] ceased to exist in Turkey.
There are indeed newspapers, many of them even, but the scissors of the
censorship cut them in so emasculating a manner that they no longer have
any potency. If I dared, I would call them . . . eunuchs. Far be it from
me to mock at an infirmity which they are the first to deplore. . . . They
are to be pitied. I can understand that they prefer this diminished life
to total death --I would do the same -- with the patience the more
resigned in that their virility will sprout again of its own accord the
day their persecutor disappears.[9]
These lines could be written today to describe the state of the media in
the majority of Muslim countries. What makes the present situation more
hopeless, however, is that Gulf oil money has so easily co-opted Muslim
intellectuals at home and abroad; their "eunich-like condition"
is beginning to be seen as natural and permanent. The Saudis do not
need to coerce the journalists who flock to work for their papers and
television stations in London -- the high salaries offered by these
organizations are far more effective. As a result, there is no clamor for
freedom by those who would benefit from its expansion.
Dissent, therefore, comes only from those denied petro-dollar largesse,
and can be easily dismissed as sour grapes; when bondage is embraced with
contented resignation, liberation is unlikely. Nonetheless, a volcanic
explosion from below is in the making that could topple the edifice of
monied power and coercion. The media stranglehold by a conglomerate of
authoritarian regimes is not stifling protest, as the latter had hoped.
Instead, it is channelling protest to new and dangerous avenues. The
explosive acts of violent protest echoing in many Muslim capitals are
caused and intensified by the lack of free debate which could have helped
address the problems besieging Muslim communities.
Media manipulation is having opposite effects in other ways as well. The
Muslim masses have learned to decode skeptically messages from their
discredited media organs.[10] As a result, the messages of the co-opted
media are either not heard or are read quite differently than intended. A
counterculture, mainly based on rumor, has developed which represents
"unofficial news channels," frequently contradicting the content
of the official media. As far back as 1984, an American professor in Saudi
Arabia wrote that one was "likely to feel he lives amid a vast
rumor, whose centre is nowhere and whose circumference is
everywhere."[11]
While the conclusions reached in this article may relate mainly to the
Arab Middle East and Iran, media control there has historical, theoretical
and ethical implications for the entire Muslim world. As this article will
show, it constitutes a malaise that is most acutely manifested in the Arab
heartlands of Islam, but which has gripped the whole Umma (the World
Muslim Community) in its tentacles. The impact of this phenomenon
reverberates all over the land of Islam, reflecting another aspect of the
Umma's abiding unity.[12]
THE MODERN MEDIA IN THE MUSLIM WORLD
The contemporary crisis of the media in the Muslim world is closely linked
to its introduction as part of the nineteenth-century western political
and economic penetration of the Ottoman Empire. in 1799, Napoleon
Bonaparte introduced the first periodical publications to the Muslim world
during his occupation of Egypt.[13] The novel institution soon caught on,
and in 1828, Egypt's ruler, Muhammad All, established al-Waqai' al-Misriyya
(Egyptian Events) as the first journal in the Muslim world.[14] This was
soon imitated by the Ottoman Sultans and many other publications appeared,
some sponsored by reformist governments, others depending on private
initiative. Because most of these papers were socially progressive and
secularly oriented, frequently run by Syrian and Lebanese Christians and
sometimes associated with Muslim reformism,[15] they were sometimes
accused by traditional Muslims of being part of a sinister plot to
destabilize the Muslim world and infect it with the germs of Western
corruption.[16]
At a more sophisticated level, some contemporary Muslim thinkers have
questioned the very compatibility of modern media with Islamic ethics.
Professor S. Abdullah Schleifer, the leading proponent of this skeptical
view, has argued that the introduction of the modern media should be seen
as an intrinsic departure from traditional Muslim notions of morality. For
Schleifer:
[the] dawn of mass communication . . . is the late fifteenth-sixteenth
century overthrow of the pulpit by the printing press and the overthrow of
the priest by the printer-businessman as the arbiter of what is relevant
information and what values inform that information.[17]
The invention of printing, Schleifer argues, removed control over the
reproduction of literature from religiously trained scribes and monks and
gave it to business-oriented printers. This combination of what Schleifer
calls "hard technology" and profit-oriented publishing has meant
that such mass communication is essentially desacrilising, "since the
sacred is by definition personal and qualitative."[18]
In Schleifer's view, the secular media's self-image as advocates of the
public's right-to-know contradicts Muslim ethics. The characteristics of
the Western media -- aggressive violation of individual privacy, the
relentless exposure of the failings and mistakes of public figures and the
emphasis on criticizing social life -- represent gross violations of the
divine injunctions against spying, backbiting and emphasizing the negative
traits of fellow-believers.[19] By this definition, the censorship of
information by state authorities or other subversion of the public's
right-to-know is not a problem; rather, the problem is the media's
arrogant belief that such a right exists in the first place:
. . . Many of the acceptable modes and techniques of modem journalism
must be particularly repugnant to an Islamic perspective. Spying and
seeking to confirm suspicions (e.g. most investigative reporting) are
forbidden by Quran and hadith [the reported sayings of the prophet] as are
slander and backbiting, which means spreading stories, even though true,
which injure the feeling and honor of a Muslim. Slander is not simply a
legal error or an occupational hazard; it is a great sin. In numerous
hadiths the Muslims are forbidden to publicize their own and others'
faults; on the contrary, the Muslim is urged to cover up or hide
faults.[20]
For Schleifer, "Islamic journalism" can at best be a necessary
evil, demanded by the need to present an alternative to the onslaught of
the modern "international secular culture based on mass
communication, " which threatens to overwhelm the Muslim world.
Schleifer's position is deeply rooted in what he terms the
neo-traditionalist perspective, an attitude dominant among European and
Western Muslims since Muhammad Asad.[21] By
"neo-traditionalist," Schleifer refers to a special emphasis on
preserving the Muslim community's non-western heritage and a rather
romantic attachment to pre-modern forms of Muslim life; its advocates are
appalled by the way traditional Muslim institutions have been weakened by
the forces of westernization and modernization.
This romanticized view of the Muslim past is, however, historically
flawed. While the modern media has somewhat replaced the pulpit as a focal
point for social communication in the Muslim world, this obscures the fact
that the mosque was never its exclusive locus. While the mosque was a
central gathering place for learning and education, news distribution,
cultural activities and even government, there were alternative centers
such as the marketplace, the street and the ruler' s court. The mosque
often maintained hegemony over those alternative centers, but the
practices of poetry recitation and music broke free because of its
hostility toward them.[22]
Poetic production provides an interesting historical model for
understanding the modern Muslim media. Poetry and oratory were the primary
vehicles of mass communication in pre-Islamic, primarily oral, Arab
culture. The poets and gifted orators were the "journalists" of
the time, possessing those indispensable skills that needed to be wooed,
bought or intimidated by the seekers of power. Most rulers were aware of
the power exerted by poets, and they were very generous to the more
prominent among them. Poets repaid this generosity by singing the praise
of their benefactors. The few who expressed defiance usually suffered.
Orators were less fortunate and did not fare as well as poets, but they
too were either wooed or coerced. As poetry broke free from the strict
confines of Islamic ethics and became a profession geared toward earning
money through hagiography or pure entertainment, it became a decisive
element in shaping communication within traditional Muslim society.
Poetic production also exhibited some features common to the modern mass
media: maximizing audience impact with aesthetic and artistic excellence;
exploiting erotic themes; and appealing to tribal and other prejudices.
Classical Arabic poetry was more akin to advertising than a newspaper
editorial: it was mostly paid for by a ruler or a prince; it extolled the
client's virtues and criticized his opponents with little concern for
objectivity or veracity; and it exploited artistic skills to sell the
product to the wider audience, for whom it had to be attractive and
enjoyable if it was to have an impact. [23]
Along with poetry, books were another important medium for the
dissemination of ideas. Their content was mainly religious, although later
literature, poetry, philosophy and the sciences became popular subjects.
Nonetheless, the role of books was limited because of widespread
illiteracy and the absence of printing presses for mass reproduction.[24]
Clearly it is inaccurate to claim that the modern mass media have
displaced the mosque and the pulpit; there were many forms of social
communication in traditional Muslim society, not all of which were
religiously based, or even sanctioned. Poetry and music were part of
lifestyles not even considered Islamic, and frequently represented values
diametrically opposed to those of Islam. Wine drinking and illicit sex,
for example, were frequent themes in classical poetry. [25]
Schleifer's analysis of Islamic values is equally flawed, privileging the
status quo in an effort to resist change. His emphasis on the values of
privacy comes at the expense of the Islamic value of upholding justice and
speaking out against corruption.[26] The privacy argument cannot be used
to protect the criminal and the corrupt, and I would argue that the
principal problem of the Muslim community has been that too many crimes
have been left unchallenged, not that too many defects have been
unnecessarily publicized.
The romantic ideal of a past in which Muslim communities were supposedly
autonomous, and members could gather together in the mosque to resolve all
problems, is neither accurate nor practical. There can be no alternative
to developing effective channels of communication to strengthen Muslim
society; such a pan-Islamic communication system is a precondition for the
affirmation of the unity of the Umma. While such channels were once
constituted by international cosmopolitan networks of 'ulema (religious
scholars), by turuq (sufi brotherhoods) and by the Madhahib (major schools
of legal thought), these mechanisms are inadequate for the challenges
faced by the contemporary Muslim world.[27] Further, since many of the
issues facing Muslims concern the Umma as a whole, a pan-Islamic
communication system is needed so that these questions can be resolved via
ijma' (consensus), resulting from an Umma-wide dialogue, which presupposes
an atmosphere of free debate without coercion or the manipulation of
information.[28] The very existence of the Umma as a durable united
community thus depends on open channels of communication.
BEYOND IMPERIALISM
The perception that media in the Muslim world have not lived up to
expectations is fairly common, but is usually blamed on so-called media
imperialism. The culprit is seen as Western, particularly American,
hegemony in the field of international communications. The issue was the
subject of intensive debates in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly within
the U.N. Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) where fierce
campaigning on behalf of the New World Information and Communication Order
(NWICO) was ultimately futile.
The central complaint put forward by the proponents of NWICO was that the
West, by virtue of its domination of world media resources, had tended to
impose its cultural norms, political perceptions and economic interests on
the rest of the world. This phenomenon reflects the unfair advantage that
major industrial, -- especially Western -- powers enjoy in the field,
controlling as they do most of the major output of television, cinema,
radio, press and news organizations.
Third World spokesmen in this debate pointed out the need for a more
balanced flow of news, "news values that are more sensitive to Third
World countries' needs and plight in economic development, political
stability and cultural integrity . . . a sharing of communication
resources; development of training opportunities for Third World
journalists, " in addition to the encouragement of South-South
communication.[29] The main concern of Third World spokesmen appeared to
be for political stability and cultural self defense.
Many in the Third World were not satisfied by mere negative demands for
fairness in the media, but sought to take practical steps to redress the
balance. Some national news agencies, such as the former Yugoslavia' s
Tanjung, Iran's IRNA and China's Xinhua, have played a pioneering role in
giving an international voice to Third World causes and concerns. Further
attempts were made to pool resources among Third World countries, leading
to the Inter-Press Service, the Non-Aligned Nations News Pool, the
Pan-African News Agency and the International Islamic News Agency (IINA).
Publications such as South, Inquiry and Arabia --all of which emerged in
London in the 1980s -- represented further attempts to offer an
alternative voice to Western media institutions: All either collapsed or
lapsed into ineffective twilight, leaving the West's dominance in the
field unchallenged.[30]
THE MUSLIM RESPONSE
Among the Muslim attempts to create their own media voice, the most
ambitious was a monthly magazine, Arabia, The Islamic World Review. [31]
Arabia and its parent company, The Islamic Press Agency (IPA), were a
deliberate attempt to counter perceived Western hegemony and bias in the
international media. The IPA differed from the IINA -- the latter launched
in the 1970s by the Organization of the Islamic Conference --in that it
was owned by entrepreneurs with an Islamic vision based on dialogue with
the West. Both attempts to make an impact in the international media
community ended in failure. The IPA closed in 1987, because of managerial
and financial difficulties; its publications and ventures -- which
included advertising and audio companies -- failed to be profitable, and
the resulting disagreements among the agency's directors led to its
breakup. The IINA continues, but is hobbled by the need to appease 45
member-governments.
The creation of Arabia was followed by two publications of similar
orientation: South, supported by the now discredited Bank of Credit and
Commerce International (BCCI), and Inquiry, a pro-Iranian radical
publication. The first attempted to support a broad Third World
perspective, while the latter followed a radical Islamic line. Both folded
by the end of the 1980s.
The failure of these two projects further suggests that the earlier demise
of the IPA and Arabia was not accidental, but rather the result of a
structural condition affecting all media ventures with audiences in the
Muslim world.[32] Although all of these efforts collapsed because of low
distribution, negligible advertising revenue and weak markets, there was
also a broader political reason for their economic failure. Publishing in
the West meant high publishing costs for these ventures, while their
markets lay mainly in the Muslim world, which has limited purchasing
power.[33] While some have claimed that the IPA was located in London to
facilitate dialogue with the West, the real reason was that no Muslim
capital would accept an independent and free news organization. The
economic failure is thus a symptom of a deeper malaise affecting the Umma.
While other publications like Asharq al-Awsat and al-Hayat -- based in
London and sold primarily in the Arab world -- continue to flourish, their
success comes at a price. First, they have accepted full control by the Saudi
royal family. While Asharq al-Awsat was a Saudi venture from
the beginning, al-Hayat flirted briefly with independence during its first
year, before first accepting part-ownership from a prominent member of the
Saudi royal family and -- soon after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait
in 1990 -- full ownership by the Saudis.[34] These publications
find such support necessary for some of the same economic and political
reasons that doomed Arabia. As Western publications sold in poor Arab and
Muslim countries, they cannot hope to break even from sales alone: Besides
sometimes receiving subsidies from the Saudis and other Gulf
governments, they need access to Gulf markets -- which these governments
control -- to attract multinational advertisers; in addition, Gulf readers
have the purchasing power to buy such expensive publications. Saudi and
other Gulf rulers have sought to exploit this advantage, demanding loyalty
from publishers seeking to reach their markets or begging for their
subsidy.
More recently, the Saudi authorities' decision to allow advertising
on Riyadh's local, and satellite- and land-based television stations aimed
at the Gulf from London and Egypt, made it even more difficult for
publications to get sufficient advertising revenue. This shift has made
direct subsidies even more important.[35] The oil-rich Gulf countries,
being the only patrons willing to offer such subsidies, are now
increasingly insisting on full editorial control.
Thus Saudi Arabia -- as well as Iraq and Libya -- have bought or
corrupted major Arabic-language publications and media outlets in Europe.
The few remaining independent broadcasters and publishers are facing ruin
or are reduced to begging for support. For example, Radio Spectrum' s
Arabic service, which broadcasts for two hours daily out of London,
encountered financial difficulties soon after being established. This
coincided with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, giving the station the
opportunity to benefit by backing Kuwait. At the end of the Gulf War,
however, funding apparently stopped, and the station was bought by a
pro-Iraq financier. In 1992, the financier's license was withdrawn, and
Radio Spectrum's new owners have been writing to Arab embassies in London
begging for financial backing. The likely outcome of this process is
obvious. A similar radio station in Paris is owned by the Lebanese prime
minister Rafiq al-Hariri, who has been closely associated with the Saudi
King Fahd.
Thus the lack of a suitable base for pan-Islamic or pan-Arab media
organizations anywhere in the Muslim world has created a vicious circle of
high-cost, low-revenue prospects for any media organization seeking to
benefit from the relative freedom available in the West. This situation
has strengthened the stranglehold of petro-dollars on such expatriate
media ventures.
CONTROLLING THE MEDIA
The Muslim world has suffered with the rest of the Third World from the
lack of strong and independent media organizations at home. The
preponderance of authoritarian regimes and the lack of any meaningful or
durable democratic systems during the crucial post-colonial period has
worsened the situation. In particular, the Muslim world has yet to come to
terms with its Islamic heritage; the definition of the modern Umma; and
how to achieve freedom, stability and prosperity without a loss of
fundamental values. The leaders of Muslim countries have been unable to
resolve the contradiction between the popular commitment to the Umma's
Islamic heritage and the elite perception of how a modern Muslim society
should function. Instead, these leaders have consistently opted to stifle
free debate on vital issues; they have sought to ignore the contradiction
in hope that it would eventually disappear.
Their intellectual failure to achieve a synthesis between Islamic
tradition and Western-defined modernity, in a way that appealed to the
masses, was thus coupled with an intellectual and moral crime. Those who
failed to think wanted to ban others from doing so. Anti- intellectuals,
mediocre military officers and second-rate politicians -- from Turkey's
founder Kemal Ataturk onwards -- set limits to the debate dictated by
their own mediocrity.[37] This has perpetuated and worsened the original
contradiction, seemingly eliminating any chance of resolving it by
democratic means.
The section of ARTICLE 19'S 1991 World Report dealing with the Arab
heartlands and Iran makes depressing reading, alleging massive
restrictions on freedom of expression, tight governmental control of the
media, harassment of journalists and stifling of free debate in the
region. [38] Most repressive are Iraq, Syria and Saudi Arabia; not
even the slightest anti-government sentiment is allowed, and dissent is
punished severely. Such conditions have sometimes persisted for decades,
to the extent that their citizens have almost forgotten the meaning of
free speech.
Elsewhere in the Middle East, ARTICLE 19 reported signs of improvement,
most importantly in Algeria, Jordan and Egypt. The precarious
liberalization in Algeria, however, was completely reversed after the coup
of January 1992. In both Jordan and Egypt as well, severe laws were passed
during 1992, further eroding the previous -- albeit limited --press
freedoms. Even before these reversals, the process of regional
liberalization was far from complete. The report indicates that in Morocco
and Tunisia, draconian measures continued to restrict press freedom. More
significantly, the press that flourishes in these countries mainly backs
the government. Independent newspapers are either banned, harassed out of
existence or otherwise find it difficult to survive.
The situation is only slightly better in non-Arab areas of the Muslim
world. In Turkey, criticism of Ataturk, as well as the basis of the
secular political and social system he imposed, is prohibited. A Turkish
journalist who fled to Britain to avoid prosecution and a possible
five-year sentence, reported that authorities sought to try him for
writing a humorous column asking readers to cheer up and dissipate the
gloom surrounding their country.[39] The journalist was charged with
denigrating Ataturk, because the column was published on the day of the
official commemoration of his death. In Indonesia, all political and
social organizations -- including the media -- must profess adherence to
the official state ideology, the Pancasila, or face being banned.
Criticism of the regime is prohibited, as are foreign publications that
have revealed corruption involving the president' s family. In Iran,
numerous dissident publications have been closed down or continue to be
harassed. In Malaysia, one of the most democratic Muslim countries, the
ruling party and its associates own all major non-government publications.
THE SEARCH FOR FREEDOM
Since the nineteenth century, Muslim dissidents have sought to escape
their rulers' constraints, either in Europe or in other more liberal
Muslim countries.[40] Ironically, at the beginning of the twentieth
century, British-controlled Egypt emerged as a base for publications
seeking a freer atmosphere. After 1952 and the coup that led to the Nasser
government, Beirut gradually replaced Cairo as the main center for the
Arab press and the free exchange of views, although Egypt continued to be
both a major market and source of financing.[41] Not only was there
freedom of the press in Beirut, but it was also economical to publish
newspapers, magazines and books for the whole Arab world, Given the low
production costs, the purchasing power in most Arab countries could
sustain many such publications.
After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, however, Beirut also began to decline as
a press center. The war was followed by an economic slump that hit the
relatively prosperous Lebanese publishing industry, significantly
diminishing Beirut's importance as the common ground where rival Arab
regimes fought their media battles. Beirut's decline was accelerated by
the oil boom resulting from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting
Countries price hikes that followed the 1973 Arab-Israeli War. While the
rising wealth of the oil-rich Gulf Arab states did finance new print media
empires in Beirut, alternative centers emerged -- particularly in Kuwait
-- which drew journalists away from Beirut and Cairo to the Gulf states
and later to Gulf-financed publishing ventures in Europe.[42] The Gulf
states, however, were ill-suited to become new centers for the Arab press
because of their governments' heavy censorship policies, although the
relatively liberal atmosphere in Kuwait did offer some opportunities for
journalists and Qatar pioneered some successful cultural and religious
publications.
While publications remaining in Beirut had also become dependent on Gulf
finance, the 1975 Lebanese Civil War -- and the resulting disintegration
of state and society -- led to the eclipse of the Beirut publishing
community. The war, which began in April 1975, pitted the Lebanese
government against Lebanese Muslims and the Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO), and quickly led to the partitioning of Beirut along
Muslim and Christian lines. Factional militia began targeting journalists
and publications that they believed to be unsympathetic to their cause,
forcing many out of the country. The result was a migration of Lebanese
publications and journalists to Europe and the Gulf states. Syrian
intervention in 1976 widened the scope of the conflict and caused more
journalists to flee.
The exodus from Beirut, first thought to be only temporary, led to
profound changes in the structure of the Arab press. While in theory
Europe offered more resources and a better working environment, in
practice the costs of European publishing were so high that the expatriate
Arab press could not survive without access to Gulf markets and subsidies.
[43] The result of migration to the Gulf and Europe was to stunt the
development of Arab journalism and to contribute significantly to the
cultural and intellectual stagnation that now engulfs the Arab world.
Expatriate journalists developed a taste for expensive lifestyles, which
made them even more dependent on oil money and decreased their incentives
to write and report critically. The reluctance of expatriate publications
to risk market access by offending Arab and Gulf regimes tended to become
a cover for defeatism and corruption.
Even before their exodus to Europe, the Beirut newspapers were not immune
to influences and inducements from Arab regimes. But production costs in
Beirut were so low, and the diversity of publications so great, that these
influences had comparatively little impact. Conscientious and dissenting
journalists had ample opportunities to change jobs if they felt that their
employers had been co-opted; they could even start their own papers. While
outspoken journalists sometimes risked assassination, there were so many
publications that the press could not be easily coerced or corrupted. In
Europe, however, radical and conservative Arab publications were forced by
the economics of expatriate publishing into a strange consensus in their
coverage of the Gulf monarchies -- coverage that was consistently
favorable. The lively diversity of the Beirut press was thus lost.
THE IMPACT OF OIL MONEY
Karl Marx would certainly have claimed that the control of the Arab press
by Gulf oil money vindicates his theory of the economic determination of
ideas and political culture. In most Arab capitals, a journalist risks
losing his job if he criticizes the Gulf monarchies, and some publications
have been closed down.[44] Any editor who offends the Saudis not
only faces the threat of losing lucrative Gulf sales, but could also draw
the attention of his own country's security apparatus; Riyadh is not above
using its foreign aid as a lever to pressure recipients to curb their
domestic media.
A good example of such tactics is the ongoing battle for control of the
pro-PLO, London-based daily al-Quds al-Arabi, a relatively independent
newspaper that tilted toward Iraq during the Gulf war. Riyadh reportedly
made normalization of relations with the PLO conditional on the paper' s
refraining from criticizing the Saudi government.[45] As a result,
its editor was briefly dismissed last year, although he was later
reinstated. After Saudi Arabia announced the release of some PLO
funds it had blocked during the Gulf crisis, articles critical of Riyadh
ceased to appear in the paper. Nonetheless, the Saudis are said to
be pushing for more control over the paper and are seeking the permanent
removal of its editor.
During the summer of 1990, just before the Iraqi invasion, Kuwait deported
30 mostly leftist Palestinian journalists, including Mahmud al-Rimawi,
Tawfiq Abu Bakr and Ahmad Matar. Informed sources said the removal of
these journalists was linked to Saudi pressures. Moreover, the Gulf
states are said to maintain a so-called black list of Arab journalists who
criticize their monarchies. Last year, the disclosure that many Egyptian
journalists were on this list led to a fierce row in the Egyptian press,
which debated the issue for weeks.[46]
Another tactic of Middle East governments is to conclude agreements with
one another limiting criticism in their respective media. In December
1984, Ahmad Mahmud, editor of the Saudi daily al-Madina, was given
one hour to clear his desk and leave because he had printed a Reuters
report alleging the death of Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad. In March
1992, the editor of the Saudi daily Arab News, Khalid al- Maina,
was summarily dismissed, reportedly for offending Cairo by reprinting an
interview with the militant Egyptian Muslim leader Sheikh Omar 'Abdal-Rahman
that had originally appeared in a U.S. newspaper. Also in 1992, a pact of
media detente being negotiated between the Sudanese and Saudi governments
fell through when Khartoum insisted that the Saudi publications in
London should also be included. The Saudi zeal in adhering to such
agreements indicates their sensitivity to criticism. Several times in the
1980s, Saudi censors banned issues of Arabia that criticized
friendly governments in Kuwait and Morocco, even though neither government
banned the magazine at home!
Saudi Arabia has sought to suppress media criticism, to a lesser
extent, in most Muslim countries outside the Middle East. The 1980 case of
the controversial television film "Death of a Princess" was an
indication of Riyadh's willingness to extend the reach of its oil money to
Europe and the West. The film, allegedly based on a true story of a Saudi
princess and her commoner husband executed in the summer of 1977, was
made by a British producer, for the independent television company ATV in
partnership with the American PBS network and other companies from
Holland, Australia and New Zealand.[47] Its showing in Britain in April
1980 was accompanied by a frenzied Saudi counterattack, as Riyadh
openly threatened London with serious damage to its economic interests;
the incident may ultimately have cost the United Kingdom about $500
million in lost exports.[48] This prospect led the British foreign
secretary, then Lord Carrington, to express his government' s
"regret" at the showing of the film -- a move that occasioned
severe criticism from the opposition and the press. British businessmen
with Saudi connections also wrote letters to newspapers protesting
the film.[49] The filmmaker later disclosed that -- at the time -- he had
been offered substantial financial inducements to limit the distribution
of the film, but said he had declined them.[50] With similar public
attacks on the Netherlands, in which the film was later shown, and Saudi
economic retaliation against all of the countries concerned, it is no
surprise that few films which might so upset Riyadh have since been made.
An extreme case of the malaise and cynicism of the corrupted Muslim press
is the flourishing of the "blackmail rag." These newspapers,
usually employing minimal staff and using low-cost publishing techniques,
reproduced the infancy of European journalism and have enraged critics
like Schleifer. Irregularly published, these papers are used to blackmail
the Gulf and other Arab governments. Those leaders who pay receive
favorable publicity and their misdeeds are not reported; those who do not
have many of their secrets and scandals exposed.[51] A curious episode in
late 1992 illustrates the phenomenon: The entire editorial staff of the
London-based magazine Sourakia, which had alternated between praising and
denigrating the Saudi royal family in an incomprehensible pattern,
resigned and established a weekly publication called al-Maskhara,
allegedly published in the Bahamas. At first, this publication -- which
was distributed free of charge in London and carried no advertising --
concentrated its venom exclusively on the former editor of Sourakia and
one of his associates, who had formerly been linked to the Saudi royal
family. Later, al-Maskhara extended its criticism to the governments of
Yemen, the Sudan, Jordan, Iraq, PLO chief Yasser Arafat and an assorted
number of journalists and writers --all known to be hostile to the Gulf
monarchies. Mysteriously, al-Maskhara ceased publication in early 1993,
amid reports that all its editorial staff had returned to the original
magazine.
Insiders have offered the following explanation for these curious events:
The unfortunate editor and his associate made one too many extortionate
demands of their Saudi patrons who -- tired of having to pay
unreasonable sums and buoyed by their victory in the Gulf War --decided to
take revenge with their own paper, using the same writers employed by
their former clients. Then the Saudis apparently decided to obtain
more value for their money by using al-Maskhara to denigrate their
political opponents as well. The whole exercise was no doubt meant to send
a strong message to would-be extortionists. The dispute was evidently
settled amicably, however, and the era of the blackmail rag is not over.
Even allegedby respectable expatriate pan-Arab publications -- such as the
once fiercely independent aI-Hawadess weekly magazine, now owned by a
Lebanese publisher with Saudi connections -- operate on similar
principles, with the market determining their editorial positions and
reporting bias.[52] Market determination means that most publications now
avoid criticizing Arab governments in general, unless paid heavily by
rival regimes to do so. Sometimes only weak and marginal governments are
targeted, just to relieve boredom. Most papers are very careful when it
comes to criticizing the governments in Syria, Libya, Iraq or the PLO all
of which -- while offering cash to supporters -- have few qualms about
assassinating their critics. For example, in 1979, Salim al-Lauzi, then
the editor and publisher of al-Hawadess, was assassinated in Beirut;
suspicions centered on the Syrian intelligence services.[53] In 1987, Naji
al-Ali, a leading Palestinian cartoonist working for the London edition of
the Kuwaiti daily aI-Qabas was killed in London; the PLO was
suspected.[54] In 1982, the Paris offices of the pro-Iraqi al-Watan
al'Arabi were bombed, killing one passerby and injuring 60 others.[55]
Iraq had many enemies then, and the attack could either have been carried
out by Syria or Iran.
There remain some scattered centers of open debate in various parts of the
Muslim world outside of the Middle East: Malaysia, India, Pakistan and
Nigeria have sporadically flirted with press freedoms. But none of these
countries has produced an intellectual movement that offered sustained
guidance to the Umma. To be sure, during the Indian Khilafat movement and
later through Pakistani intellectuals such as Iqbal and Maududi, Muslim
communities in the Indian subcontinent appeared to offer broad
intellectual leadership.[56] Yet South Asian Muslims gradually became more
parochial in their preoccupations and abandoned all pretense of thinking
on behalf of the world Muslim community. Once again, Gulf and local oil
money played a role. Many Pakistani intellectuals migrated to the Gulf
countries or became associated with Gulf governments, sacrificing their
integrity in the process. Local corruption associated with oil money in
Nigeria, and to some extent in Malaysia, has had similar effects.
FREEDOM AND COERCION IN ISLAMIC HISTORY
Opposition to the free exchange of views has been a historical problem in
the Muslim world, and can be traced back to the Caliph al-Mamun and the
Mu'tazila intellectuals of ninth century Baghdad.[57] Al-Mamun (A.D.
813-833/A.H. 198-218), son of Haroun al-Rashid of Arabian Nights fame,
ruled during the cultural, economic and political apogee of Islamic
civilization. He was a leading intellectual, encouraging the systematic
translation of Greek philosophical and scientific works, and showing
particular favor to the Mu'tazila.
A1-Mamun, sided with the Mu'tazila when they argued that the Quran was
created by God and that the alternative of an eternal Quran would
contradict the uniqueness and unity of God, who alone existed from
eternity. This position was rejected by the more traditional religious
scholars and the Muslim masses who followed them. In what became known as
the "Mihna (ordeal) of the Quran's Creation," al-Mamun sought to
impose this view and persecute dissenters. Although the Mu'tazila attempt
to impose their doctrine within the caliphate failed, the Muslim community
passed through several dark decades during which majority opinion was
suppressed and genuine debate forbidden. Most importantly, the imposition
of religious doctrine contradicts Islam, which rejected the earlier custom
-- typical of ancient societies- in which rulers dictated the religious
beliefs of their subjects. The Quran is very critical of such impositions,
emphasizing that matters of belief are to be strictly determined by
personal choice. Coercion in matters of belief is not only forbidden, but
imposed beliefs are considered invalid, as they do not reflect an
individual' s moral choice.[58]
One reading of the Mihna, suggested by Richard Bulliet, sees al-Mamun as
attempting to reformulate caliphal legitimacy through the creation of a
centralized religious authority. "Had the Mihna succeeded, the
caliphate would have been well on its way of becoming a papacy or
patriarchate."[59] While al-Mamun's attempt to impose the Mu'tazila
position would have resulted in the establishment of an authority
monopolizing the interpretation of religious doctrine, it is unlikely,
however, that al-Mamun was consciously trying to reformulate caliphal
legitimacy in such terms. Rather than seeking to consolidate his authority
and government, al-Mamun likely took his caliphal legitimacy for granted,
and believed that it gave him license to impose his intellectual authority
on the community. Indeed, al-Mamun squandered considerable political
capital on this abortive project.
The Mihna was different from other conflicts in Islamic history in that
the Mu'tazila and al-Mamun perceived themselves as an enlightened elite
who did not need to persuade the masses and could impose their correct
beliefs. Intoxicated by their imperfect attempts to integrate the Hellenic
and Islamic tractions, the Mu'tazila derived a sense of superiority from
its privileged access to this new knowledge, which they believed was too
esoteric to be shared with the masses. The Mu' tazila demanded that the
masses accept their views and support them. Against them stood the
traditional religious scholars who believed in the authenticity of their
religious heritage and took pride in it. Moreover, these scholars
expressed their ideas in a language understandable to the masses, and
embodied the values of self-sacrifice and integrity that appealed to a
mass following. By contrast, al-Mamun and the Mu' tazila sought to impose
their beliefs without persuasion and force of argument.
The Muslim masses rejected the Mu'tazila; subsequent religious movements
that did not respect and hold a dialogue with tradition were also
eclipsed. Still, the elitist impulse remained. During the nineteenth
century, as the Ottoman rulers sought to modernize their empire in
response to European penetration, a new elite emerged in the Muslim world
by virtue of modern learning and a monopoly on contacts with the West.
Again they ignored Muslim society, refusing to initiate a dialogue over
the ongoing process of social change and modernization. As a consequence,
their policies failed to meet the Western challenge and ultimately caused
the Umma to succumb to European colonialism. [60]
In the post-colonial Muslim World, secular nationalist elites attempted
again to control debate and stifle dissenting voices during the process of
state-building. Ironically, these new elites sought to replicate al-Mamun's
failed attempt to centralize religious authority even when they claimed to
advocate secularism. Ataturk in Turkey, Nasser and Mubarak in Egypt, Ben
All in Tunisia and Suharto in Indonesia started their campaigns for
secularism by taking control of mosques and institutions of religious
learning. Like al-Mamun, they faced a rebellion from those who demanded
that religious practice and interpretation be independent from state
authority.
THE ECLIPSE OF REASON
The late 1970s and 1980s thus witnessed the stifling of free debate
throughout the Arab world, with the silence extending to Muslim expatriate
communities in Europe and elsewhere. While authoritarian Arab governments
sought to maintain media monopolies at home and co-opt the expatriate
press as part of a cynical attempt to retain power --regardless of cost --
the great success of their efforts was made possible by the complicity of
Muslim and Arab intellectuals who either collaborated with them or merely
failed to protest. A whole generation of intellectuals abdicated their
moral responsibility and chose silence or hypocrisy. But they have done so
with an uneasy conscience. Today, the Lebanese, Palestinian, Egyptian and
other Arab journalists in the offices of the Saudi-owned publishing
houses in London- as well as their Saudi managers and editors --
diverge radically in their convictions from the official line they are
obliged to follow. Earlier this year, when the Egyptian authorities passed
laws restricting the freedom of trade union organizations -- including the
journalists' union -- most prominent journalists working in the official
press refused to write in support of the new laws.[61] The situation was
similar to that in Eastern Europe before 1989; the dramatic divergence
between true and professed beliefs threatens a huge and uncontrollable
explosion.
The betrayal of the Muslim community by its intellectuals has not been
merely a result of money and fear. The 1980s were also the days of the
Islamic revival and the collapse of the socialist and nationalist visions
of the early post-colonial era. But the secular intellectuals rejected the
tide of the Islamic revival that threatened to overcome them, and they
sought to survive by joining forces with corrupt dictators and the
oil-rich Gulf states. They convinced themselves that they were not
deceiving themselves for money, but rather in the service of a good
cause.[62] This is Mu'tazila disease: Intellectuals, unable to make their
case to the Muslim community, again have sought victory by allying
themselves with corrupt despots and waging war against free thought in the
name of reason. The end result is that both freedom and reason have been
lost. The secular intellectuals' admission of defeat and their inability
to gain the support of the masses has led them not to come to terms with
this defeat, but to steal victory by collaborating with despotic
governments.
The limited pluralism now permitted in some Middle East countries
continues to be fundamentally compromised; still, only publications
controlled by government-approved parties or other political groups are
permitted, and a nonpartisan press is prohibited. For example in Egypt,
although the government has a monopoly on radio and television, a
nongovernmental press is now officially permitted and free of overt
censorship. As Robert Springborg notes, however, the government of
Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak has quietly sought to destablilize
opposition party-linked publications by denying them access to officially
generated news, harassing them and seeking to induce them to "go to
excess, to report rumors as fact, to disguise advertisements as news
stories, and to use intemperate language."[63] In Springborg's view,
the Egyptian government has sought to cause the opposition press to
discredit themselves as an unreliable source of information and thus boost
the credibility of the government media.
This absence of a nonpartisan voice is precisely the dilemma facing the
Arab and Muslim press as a whole. Even before the limited liberalizations,
there has never been a shortage of partisan press. Competing Arab regimes
have supported all kinds of publications, with the result that few points
of view have been without representation somewhere in the Arab world or
Europe. Still, all these manifestations of press freedom have been
infected by hypocrisy. Publications of the Iraq- supported Libyan
opposition have blasted Qadhafi but praised Saddam Hussein, The Iraqi
opposition in Syria have attacked the Iraqi Ba' ath party but lauded its
twin in Damascus. The Sudanese opposition press in Cairo has condemned
repression in Khartoum but described Saudi Arabia and Egypt as
model governments.
Still missing is an independent press that surveys these disputes from the
outside. It is difficult to find publications that give equal coverage to
differing points of view and competing arguments, and try to act as
impartial analysts. This situation was amply reflected in the coverage of
the Gulf crisis. While there were outspoken publications espousing the
Kuwaiti, Iraqi or Saudi points of view, each gave its favorite half
of the truth, with the result that the Arab public had to resort to
foreign media outlets such as the BBC World Service, Radio Monte Carlo or
CNN to get something resembling the full picture. Although such venerable
Western media outlets such as the BBC and the New York Times obviously
have their biases, these pale in comparison to the blatant propaganda
characteristic of the Arab media.
Far from offering security to authoritarian Middle East governments,
information monopolies and the muzzling and discrediting of the
independent press may be threatening the very existence of their
societies. For example, the violence seen in Algeria and Egypt in recent
months is linked to the breakdown of social communications, with the
collapse of traditional institutions and the lack of a credible mass
communications media to replace them. The brutal repression and
suppression of dialogue has led to the emergence of small and very
localized groups, such as Jihad and al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya, setting
themselves apart from the rest of society and often expressing themselves
violently.[64] The violent left-wing groups in Turkey, secularist trader
ground guerrillas in Iran and the recurrent uprisings in the Aceh region
in Indonesia are also symptoms of the same malaise.
Often states seem to try to bury their heads in the sand when faced with
the dissent. The Tunisian and Egyptian governments, faced with the growing
popularity of the Islamic opposition, sought to suppress free debate in
society about its significance. Last year, the Egyptian regime responded
to the rising tide of the violent opposition by passing draconian laws
further restricting press freedoms. The suppression of free mass
communication not only contributes to the fragmentation of society, but
compounds the problem by blocking the primary channels of social
communication thus blinding publics and governments to important political
and social trends, such as the ongoing Islamic revival. There was much
surprise among Middle East analysts when Algeria, long regarded as one of
the most secularized Muslim countries, voted overwhelmingly for the Front
Islamique de Salut (Islamic Salvation Front) in December 1991.[65] The
main reason for this surprise was the fact that the strictly controlled
state media had hidden the importance of popular Islam in Algerian
society.
The Saudi government was as surprised as anybody else when militant
opponents critical of the monarchy took over the Holy Mosque in Mecca in
1979 and called for the overthrow of the House of Saud. They were
similarly shocked in April 1991 when over 500 prominent intellectuals and
religious figures submitted a memorandum to King Fahd calling for a
radical overhaul of the political system and a more accountable and
democratic government.[66] This act of unprecedented defiance was
unanticipated mainly because all previous debate within Saudi society
was necessarily conducted underground. The Saudi government,
however, responded by further restricting the freedom of debate. The text
of the memorandum was never discussed in the local press, further eroding
public confidence in the official media -already discredited by its
handling of the Gulf war -- and leading Saudi citizens to seek
information via the now ubiquitous cassette tapes, as well as foreign
television and radio stations.[67]
CONCLUSION
Schleifer's thought-provoking critique of the media raises important and
fundamental questions about how an ideal Islamic society should regard the
role of the mass media. Whether the Western-defined modem mass media and
its accompanying values are appropriate for Muslim societies is an
important issue that the Umma must eventually address. The main problem
facing Muslims today, however, is not that the media are corrupting them.
Rather, they have corrupted the media, or their leaders have done so and
blinded the reason of the community. One can thus sum up the problem of
the modern Muslim world in the absence of free debate, a failure made more
poignant and glaring by the inability of the Muslim world to develop a
mass media capable of articulating the truth about itself and the world.
To avert the catastrophic disintegration of Muslim society, the
credibility of its leadership must be restored. The easiest way to do this
is to restore the health and freedom of the media. There is no alternative
to the institution in all Muslim countries of a pluralistic system, giving
full freedom of association and organization. A multiplicity of
organizations supporting the protection of human rights and the freedom of
the press must be allowed to form and work unhindered. The cornerstone of
such systems must be the freedom of the press. Not only must independent
media organizations be permitted, but they should be encouraged by
unconditional government financial support, preferably dispensed through
impartial institutions in accordance with agreed criteria and safeguards.
The small ruling elites who fear the consequences of democracy for their
lifestyles and freedoms should hasten to conclude a deal with the rising
forces in society that would guarantee them a minimum of rights and
freedoms before it is too late. Societies could thus be reconstructed
around the formal guarantee of basic civil and political rights for all
groups, and an undertaking of the democratization process.
The beginnings of such developments may already be evident in a number of
Muslim countries, such as the Arab countries of Yemen and Jordan, and
Malaysia. Malaysia, a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country with a slim
Muslim majority has overcome most of the impediments to democratization in
its history and boasts a rapidly industrializing economy. While some have
argued -- not without justification -- that Malaysia's democracy is not
perfect, it outshines any other Muslim country and most Third World
nations, allowing relatively free elections and reasonable press freedoms,
and with exemplary policies of religious tolerance. Malaysia also has
thriving political movements; its Islamic party has attained power in at
least one state, and has been legal since independence.
The ethical imperative for the Muslims at this juncture is to exploit mass
media potential to the fullest in order to launch a multiplicity of
long-overdue debates over how the Umma should chart its future course. Our
problems and moral failings are not from unnecessarily publicizing our
shortcomings, but of remaining silent in the face of horrendous crimes
being committed daily against the very existence of the Umma. The role of
a community that was designated as a "witness unto mankind" is
being subverted not only by its failure to give humanity moral leadership,
but by its shameful acquiescence to moral decadence and corruption.[68]
Our moral shortcomings are crying out of their own accord, without the
need for any mass media outlets to spell them out. We need an unfettered
and inquisitive media, not to condemn what has already been condemned, but
to seek the way out of the abyss and shed light on the road along the
way.[69]