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Fahd bin Abdul Aziz
Sultan Bin Abdul Aziz
Naef Bin Abdul Aziz
Salman Bin Abdul Aziz
Ahmad Bin Abdul Aziz
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CHAPTER 14
-
- Twin microphones concealed in Bob Mazur's briefcase picked up
the sound of his zipper. He was in the restroom on the fifteenth floor
of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International offices in Miami. He
had run into Aftab Hussain there before they were to meet with two
senior bank officials. Hussain had taken the opportunity to prep Mazur
for the upcoming meeting.
-
- "They'll ask you who is your bankers," explained
Hussain. "They'll begin the questioning." "Have you had
an opportunity to tell them why it needs some very careful
handling?" asked Mazur. "Yes, I have told them,"
replied Hussain. "You also mention it. Tell them it should be
very carefully handled and it should be exclusively handled by Mr.
Hussain."
-
- It was 10:37 on the morning of January 11, 1988, when they
left the restroom and walked into an L-shaped conference room at BCCI.
Hussain said he had various presents for his new customer. He
presented Mazur with a large desk calendar and a small pocket
calendar, both emblazoned with the BCCI logo. As they settled onto two
comfortable couches in a corner, Mazur placed his briefcase on the
glass-topped coffee table. Suddenly there was a burst of laughter as
the door to the conference room opened and two men walked in.
-
- "Mr. Bilgrami," Hussain said, introducing Mazur to
the first man in the door, a handsome Pakistani who spoke excellent
English and had gone to college in California. Now in his
mid-thirties, he was the bank's top producer in LACRO, bringing in
deposits all across South America. It was Bilgrami who had engineered
the acquisition of the Banco Mercantil in Colombia.
-
- To Mazur's trained eye, Akbar Bilgrami was polished and
smooth, a banker who was clearly several notches above Aftab Hussain.
- "And that's Mr. Awan," said Bugrami, gesturing to
the trim, well-tailored man who had followed him through the door.
Awan was more restrained than the outgoing Bilgrami and the overeager
Hussain. As the meeting progressed, Mazur began to think of him as the
central figure in this part of the C-Chase drama.
-
- The dance began. Mazur described himself as a financial
counselor who was affiliated with a New York securities firm.
Previously, he had done business with Florida National Bank in St.
Petersburg and Cr6dit Suisse. But he said he was very satisfied with
the service he was getting from Hussain in Panama.
-
- A few minutes into the meeting, a secretary stuck her head in
the door and said, "Mr. Mora is here for Bob." "Oh
no," stammered Mazur, for once surprised.
-
- He had planned to meet Gonzalo Mora, Jr., later. He had told
Mora that he had a meeting first with his bankers at BCCI, but Mazur
had never imagined that his sleaziest client would track him down at
this sensitive business meeting. Mora and the bankers represented two
opposite ends of the investigation, two poles that Mazur only wanted
joined through drug cash. Perhaps Mora had his own motives. Perhaps he
wanted to check up on Mazur, make sure he really did have connections
with these BCCI bankers.
-
- It was Awan who urbanely eased Mazur out of this awkward
situation. "Why don't you invite him in here?" he said.
"And we'll come back. Okay?"
- As they left the conference room, the Pakistani bankers
brushed past Mora and another man with Mora without speaking. Scarcely
looking around, Mora demanded the checks, which Mazur fished out of
his briefcase. With the second man translating, Mora proceeded to give
the horrified Mazur instructions for the next cash pickup in New York
and mentioned that he would soon be meeting with one of Roberto
Alcaino's associates.
-
- For well over a year, Mazur had arranged his life in
leakproof compartments; keeping the phases of the undercover operation
separate was the most secure way to avoid unwanted revelations. The
investigation depended on it. So might Mazur's life. Yet here was Mora
stumbling into a critical session, a session on which the most
important phase of C-Chase depended. Mazur did little to disguise his
impatience as he tried to hustle the two intruders out the door. As
Mora and his associate were leaving, the associate observed to Mora:
"Mob gente"-mean man.
-
- When the bankers returned, Mazur had regained his composure.
He apologized for the interruption and said he would insulate them
from his clients in the future.
-
- "In other words, we'll be dealing directly with
you?" asked Awan. "I'm much more comfortable with
that."
-
- "There might be exceptions," explained Mazur. He
might want some of his established clients, educated men, to meet the
bankers. "But in ninety percent or better of the instances, I
think it would be safer for everyone if I just dealt with the
client."
-
- "Fair enough," said Awan.
-
- In a sense, the interruption had broken the ice. Formalities
could be dispensed with. The four men, particularly Awan and Mazur,
talked and laughed like old friends as they went through the business
of learning about each other.
-
- Mazur explained that he had dealt with some of his clients
for a long time, gradually educating them in more sophisticated ways
of dealing with their money. The next lesson, he said, was shifting
some of their funds to Luxembourg or Switzerland. He was leaning
toward Geneva and Zurich, where he understood that BCCI had an
affiliate. Some of his clients also might be interested in purchasing
property that could be held as collateral for loans from the bank. He
said he thought he would be investing $5 million a month through BCCI.
-
- "I'm sure things will develop to the point where we'll
all feel very, very comfortable," said Mazur. "I feel
extremely comfortable with Hussain and, ah, and you gentlemen as well.
The key to my dealings here is a necessity for the confidentiality and
I feel very comfortable with that. My clients are not exactly the
greatest fans of the tax system here."
-
- Awan laughed and said, "We can't really blame them for
that, can we?"
-
- Both Awan and Bugrami said they understood the need for
confidentiality. And certainly BCCI had the global reach that Mazur
required. Awan explained that the bank operated in seventy-two
countries, with particularly strong operations in Latin and South
America. Awan spent a long time describing the global reach of BCCI
and its backing from wealthy Arab families. He explained how he had
been recruited to the bank by its founder in 1978, the same time as
Bilgrami. Together, they had arranged the acquisition of a bank in
Spain for BCCI and later had worked together in Colombia before both
were posted to Miami.
-
- After a time, Bugrami excused himself and then Awan left for
another meeting. As he moved toward the door, Awan asked if Mazur came
through Miami often.
-
- "I have a fiancee who lives in Key Biscayne," he
said, referring to the wealthy island-enclave in the bay linked to
Miami by a short causeway.
- Richard Nixon lived there when he was president, but his
oceanfront house had since been sold to a pilot for the Medellin
cartel, who had expanded it dramatically.
-
- "Quite frequently," said Awan.
-
- "Quite frequently," echoed Mazur.
-
- Another agent might have been bolder, but Bob Mazur had
learned patience, learned to go with the flow in these sensitive
meetings. Awan and Bilgrami were a couple of sophisticated characters.
Mazur had seen no reason to mention the source of his investment
funds, and they had not asked. The discussion had been harmless, a
get-acquainted session. The only reference to any criminality, Mazur's
mention of his clients' dislike of the tax system, had been passed off
as a joke. Aftab Hussain had been more direct because he was less
experienced.
-
- After Awan and Bugrami left, Mazur and Hussain spoke in a
more direct fashion about various investments. Mazur wanted to know
about sending large amounts of cash to the bank in Panama via courier.
Since Operation Pisces, however, banking authorities in Panama had
taken a dim view of large cash deposits at the country's banks.
Hussain explained that regulations were strict, but he offered an
alternative. Mazur could bring cash, $4 million if he wanted, in
twenties, fifties, and hundreds. It would be placed in a safe deposit
box at the bank. "A big box." And it could be fed gradually
into the money flow, over several days. The young banker wanted to
cover all the angles.
-
- At the end of January, Hussain's efforts to cultivate Mazur
had earned him a certificate from BCCI honoring him as "performer
of the month," although to his sorrow there was no raise.
However, for Mazur, Hussain was already a secondary blip on the
screen. The agent's radar had zeroed in on Awan. There would be plenty
of time to make sure that Amjad Awan knew the origins of the money he
was handling. In terms of importance, Awan added up to more, far more,
than Hussain-or even Gonzalo Mora, Jr.
-
- The reference to a fiancee in Key Biscayne was more than idle
chatter. The Customs Service had decided to invent a girlfriend for
Mazur. It wasn't that he was lonely. It was a safety precaution.
-
- The Colombians had seen a number of undercover operations
launched at them, and as the undercover tactics became more
sophisticated, so did efforts to detect them. As part of their
defenses, the Colombians often used two straightforward tests. The
strangers would be offered drugs and women. Suspicions would focus
immediately on those who refused either one.
-
- Drugs had proved to be the easier test to pass. Undercover
agents typically responded that they did not use drugs out of personal
choice. They did not object to those who did; it was good business.
But using them yourself, that was bad business. Mazur had made a point
from the start with the Moras that he did not use drugs.
-
- The logic was harder to apply to women. In the early days, a
typical undercover operation involved a meeting or two, an hour or
two. Undercover cases were becoming more prolonged and intimate in the
eighties. Agents spent days and even weeks with their targets, wooing
them with lavish spending and high living. Sexual encounters, either
by chance or for pay, were inevitable. Refusing to participate could
raise all sorts of alarms.
-
- Mazur himself had learned the dangers in 1982 when he was
investigating the money-laundering and marijuana-smuggling operations
of Charles Broun and Bruce Perlowin. On one of his trips to Las Vegas
to change small bills into large ones, there had been a knock on his
hotel room door in the middle of the night. Looking through the
peephole, he saw an attractive young woman. His new associates, he
concluded, were either being sociable or setting him up to see how he
responded to the sexual enticement. Mazur's solution was simple. He
went back to bed, pretending not to hear the knock. The next time
Mazur went to Las Vegas, he took along a female agent.
-
- Early in the C-Chase investigation, Gonzalo Mora, Jr., had
suggested to Mazur and Emir Abreu that all three of them hire some
hookers for a night. The two undercover agents had bowed out
gracefully, but now Mazur determined that he needed some protection.
-
- The solution was Kathy Ertz, a tall Customs agent in her
middle thirties. Ertz was a fraud investigator in the Miami office and
happened to be available when C-Chase needed a volunteer. Using the
name Kathleen Erickson, she would be introduced to the targets as
Mazur's girlfriend. Along with providing an out if Mora or someone
else showed up with a pair of hookers on his arms, Ertz offered
strategic values, too. With two pairs of eyes and ears, the agents
could watch each other's backs. Too, a woman could develop leads and
confidences through avenues not open to a man. Before C-Chase was
over, Kathy Ertz would play a critical role in calming the suspicions
of a powerful and dangerous Colombian.
-
- Mazur's role as Robert Musella, financial consultant and
money launderer, was a total immersion in the character. He had
created a separate life for himself, shuttling between Tampa, Miami,
his phony office in New Port Richey, and a dozen other cities. In a
life where every fact is partly an illusion and the illusion continues
for months and months, the risks are personal as well as professional.
-
- Occasionally Mazur strayed from the path, returning to his
old life. There were regular meetings with other Customs agents to
discuss strategy and other matters, runs along the shore with Paul
O'Brien, the veteran supervisor in the enforcement division and the
man on whom Mazur depended most. Once every couple of weeks, he would
take the ultimate chance and meet his wife somewhere or even spend a
night at his home with her. But each time he stepped out of character,
Bob Mazur increased the deadly risk that someone would make the
connection between his two lives. The consequences could be fatal.
-
- Pulling top BCCI officials into the operation would require
big bucks. That meant that Mazur had to persuade Gonzalo Mora, Jr., to
abandon the original laundering scheme in favor of the loan-back
arrangement.
-
- Although Mora was quite satisfied with the check-cashing
arrangement, he listened as Mazur explained the risks. The biggest
problem was that they lost control once the checks were moved into the
black market by the money brokers with whom Mora dealt. The checks
could wind up being renegotiated back in the United States, Mazur
said, which could create suspicions among any U.S. authorities who
might examine Mazur's financial affairs.
-
- A foolproof alternative had been provided by BCCI, said
Mazur. He then explained the loan-back arrangement to Mora in some
detail. This way, he said, Mora could pay the drug suppliers directly
with checks drawn on the Panama accounts because the money there was
already clean.
-
- Mora accepted the new scheme, even agreeing to split the one
and a half percent fee that BCCI was charging. Since he had hooked up
with Mazur, Mora's business had expanded so sharply and profitably
that he was willing to follow almost any advice from his American
partner.
-
- In fact, on the day in January when Mazur described the
arrangement to him, Mora had some news of his own. Don Chepe was so
pleased with the way things were working that he wanted to add some
other cities to their money-laundering route. While Don Chepe's
identity remained secret, Mora said that the new business had been
sent their way by one of the big man's associates, Javier Ospina.
-
- A Colombian with an unpleasant tendency to drink too much,
Ospina was one of a handful of men who helped organize the collection
of money from the cartel's drug distributors in the United States.
Once they had collected a sufficient amount, they turned it over to
Mora and the Mazur ring for laundering.
- Mora was anxious for Mazur to meet Ospina, for the Colombian
held the key to even more business. He told the American that he was
trying to arrange a get-together in a few weeks, but Ospina was
reluctant to come to the United States. It might have to be somewhere
else.
-
- With Mora's okay and the expectation of collecting more drug
money, Mazur was free to move ahead at the bank. He wanted to test the
extent of corruption within this globe-girdling institution.
-
- On January 25, 1988, Mazur returned to the BCCI offices in
Miami and met with Awan and Bilgrami. He gave them documents
permitting him to transact business in the name of a new shell
corporation, Lamont Maxwell. He had purchased the corporation from the
same Panama lawyer who set up IDC International.
-
- Forms were executed to open accounts for Lamont Maxwell at
BCCI in Panama and the Banque de Commerce et de Placements, the bank
affiliate in Switzerland known as BCP. Mazur told the bankers that he
had had two transfers for the Swiss account, one for $1.2 million and
one for $476,000. The money would be held in ninety-day certificates
of deposit and counterbalancing loan proceeds would be deposited in
the IDC account in Panama.
- While waiting in Awan's office that day, Mazur learned
something new about BCCI. At the time, it did not seem to be of major
significance. Later, however, this knowledge and Awan's eventual
elaborations on it would emerge as the most explosive information
uncovered during Operation C-Chase.
-
- The first piece of this puzzle, however, was transmitted
innocuously enough. Awan telephoned the First American Bank affiliate
in New York to arrange the transfer of the funds to Switzerland. As he
waited for someone to answer at First American, he explained to Mazur:
"First American is a bank which is unofficially owned by us. Uh,
we don't disclose this fact. It's sort of bought by people who are
shareholders in our bank. And we haven't-"
-
- At that point, the telephone was answered in New York and the
subject of First American was dropped. But Mazur had picked up the
reference on the tape recorder concealed in his ever-present
briefcase, and it was a matter that would come up again. Over the
telephone, Awan issued the instructions for the transfer in Urdu to
the person on the other end. He ended the conversation with the
traditional Muslim phrase-"llah Akbar."
-
- Awan mentioned something else to Mazur that meant nothing to
C-Chase, then or later, but it turned out to be intensely interesting
to another group of investigators. Awan had returned just the day
before from a flying trip to Peru and Panama. He brought back with him
Akbar Mehdi Bilgrami, the manager of the Panama branch. A. M. Bilgrami,
an older man who had worked at the Bank of America before joining BCCI,
was not to be confused with Akbar A. Bugrami, Awan's young sidekick,
and Awan brought them together in the room so Mazur could see the
difference. (Awan chuckled to Mazur about an example of young Akbar's
chutzpah: he had once circulated a memo to all the BCCI branches
declaring that he was to be called "Akbar A." and the other
Bilgrami was to be known as "A. M.") They were all gathered
in Miami, Awan told Mazur, for a high-level meeting that afternoon.
Mazur never asked what it was about, but years later a commission of
Peruvian senators wondered at the coincidence. They were tracking the
Peruvian central bank reserves that former President Alan Garcia had
deposited with BCCI in Panama. A. M. Bilgrami was the account officer.
In early 1988, the money moved to Europe and was dispersed through a
network of friendly banks. Was Awan's trip part of this money trail?
Had he fit Mazur into a busy day devoted to a far more important
client? Garcia's Peruvian enemies wanted to know, but the C-Chase team
never realized there was a question.
-
- Foremost in Mazur's mind that day was making clear to Awan
the source of the money moving through the bank, a critical element in
any eventual prosecution for money laundering. Late in the meeting,
when they were alone, Mazur decided the atmosphere was right to sound
out the banker. He opened by explaining how important it was to him
that the funds from the loan arrangements be available quickly and
that the transactions appear to be routine loans guaranteed by
property.
-
- "We'll never discuss this again," Mazur said,
lowering his voice, "but the people with whom I'm dealing are the
most powerful and the largest drug dealers in Colombia. And I don't
care to overstate my abilities. I don't care to create any unnecessary
concern. We deal on tremendous faith and trust because we've known
each other for many, many years. And being able to rely on those two
issues of the appearance of the funds coming from the property loans
and, secondly, the turnaround time is all that I ask."
-
- "I want to be very clear and possibly blunt with
you," said Awan.
-
- "Huh," grunted Mazur.
-
- "I'm not concerned. .. it's not my business about who
your customers are," Awan continued.
-
- "Right."
-
- "Or whatever. I deal with you. As long as we have a
relationship and we have a straightforward, clear relationship, the
funds are strictly legit and clear and everything."
-
- "Right," said Mazur.
-
- "I'm not concerned further than that because, you know,
I'm not really responsible for the morals of your customers. I deal
with you. As long as you and I have a clear, straightforward,
legitimate business, we will provide you all the security, all sorts
of security and anonymity. Further than that, I don't want to
know."
-
- With this pledge of straightforward dealings, the men agreed
to seal their new understanding with dinner that night at an Italian
restaurant in the trendy Coconut Grove section of Miami.
-
- Bob Mazur had gotten what he wanted, recorded conversations
with Aftab Hussain and Amj ad Awan that prosecutors could use to
indict and convict the two bankers of money laundering. They were
crucial in establishing the new path for Operation C-Chase. However,
world events were about to intervene and send the investigation
spinning in a new direction.
-
- Amjad Awan was becoming Americanized. On January 31, 1988, he
held a party at his house to watch the National Football League's
Super Bowl on television. Of the guests, only Akbar Ah Bilgrami was
rooting for the Denver Broncos. As a former Washington resident, Awan
was a fervent Redskins fan, so he won some money from Bugrami when the
Redskins beat the Broncos with a stunning second-half comeback.
-
- "This morning he says it was a lousy game. Really
bad," Awan said to Bob Mazur the next day as he joked about
Bilgrami's reaction.
-
- The two men were meeting on February 1 at the BCCI offices to
clear up a minor problem with the power of attorney Mazur had provided
for Lamont Maxwell, his latest shell corporation. Not long into the
meeting they were interrupted when Awan took a telephone call.
-
- "Hello. Hello. Yes. Friday's okay?" Awan asked the
person on the other end of the line. "Yeah, I know. Well, what is
it? What'd he say? No, that's not the point. The point is that under
the circumstances, and I told him this last Friday, that it will be
best if we have the least possible contact because who knows who is
listening on the telephone."
-
- After another minute or two in which Awan discussed plans for
a trip somewhere later in the week, he hung up and, turning to Mazur,
said, "My friend is in deep trouble these days."
-
- "Who is that?" asked Mazur.
-
- "General Noriega," Awan replied with a laugh.
-
- "Oh, yes," said Mazur. "I think I'll hold off
on my trip there. I'm rather concerned about it."
-
- "No," Awan assured him, "things will work out.
You know, it's rather like the Kurt Waldheim situation. They'll indict
him. They won't let him come to this country."
-
- "Uh-huh," said Mazur with a nod.
-
- "And that sort of thing, he's going to harden his stand
against the U.S. because he isn't getting out. The only way he'll get
out is by the bullet."
- Stories in newspapers and on network television newscasts in
the last two days indicated that the U.S. Department of Justice was on
the verge of indicting General Manuel Noriega on drug charges. The
Reagan administration's disaffection with its one-time ally in Panama
had deepened to animosity in recent months. Many would trace the slide
to Seymour Hersh's article nearly two years earlier in The New York
Times. But many events no longer allowed the administration to promote
the fiction that Noriega was a hero of the drug war as he had been
portrayed in Operation Pisces.
- There was the matter of the ouster of the elected civilian
president of Panama, Nicholas Barletta, in early 1986, although for a
time some in Washington were willing to let it go because Noriega had
stolen the election on Barletta's behalf in the first place. A more
serious crisis erupted in June of 1987 when a former military
commander in Panama, Colonel Roberto Diaz, openly accused Noriega of
complicity in the brutal 1985 torture-murder of Hugo Spadafora, a
leftist who had made too many accusations that Noriega was involved in
drug running. The charges by Diaz were not new, but they had incited
public protests that were suppressed only with force. To Noriega and
Awan, the anticipated drug indictment was just another round in the
struggle to do business.
-
- Noriega, aware through his lawyers in Miami of his likely
indictment, had been in touch several times with Amjad Awan. Now, he
wanted BCCI to assist him in transferring his fortune out of Panama
and into secret accounts before the U.S. government tried to freeze
the funds.
-
- The atmosphere was tense when Mazur returned to BCCI the
following day. Awan apparently had spoken with Noriega on the
telephone the night before. He and Bilgrami were worried about what
was going to happen to banking in Panama when the inevitable occurred
and the general was indicted. Both had seen the crackdown in the wake
of Operation Pisces. This could be worse. Noriega's corruption had
protected his favorites, but who knew what would happen if he were
charged? Now was the time for damage control. Bilgrami and Awan wanted
to isolate themselves from Panama.
-
- Bilgrami advised Mazur to limit his conversations with
Hussain and anyone else in the BCCI office in Panama to matters
concerning his Panama accounts only. His dealings with the bank
elsewhere in the world should be kept secret.
-
- "The reason we have is that the least people who know
about the contact with the bank... because we don't want anyone, you
know, in Panama, if there's an investigation, you know, the situation
in Panama is not legal," said Bilgrami. "If any of our
officers there is subpoenaed to come in there and give evidence about
any account, this is a situation we are trying to avoid over
here."
-
- Awan did not want Mazur to be too alarmed. "This is just
a precaution," he said.
-
- And Bilgrami said that contact with Hussain was okay because
he was "very much part of the team."
-
- One day earlier, on February 1, 1988, two teams of federal
prosecutors from Miami and Tampa had gone to the main headquarters of
the Justice Department in Washington. They secured final approval for
simultaneous indictments of Manuel Antonio Noriega on drug and
conspiracy charges.
- The explosive indictments were announced on February 4 at a
joint press conference held in Miami by Leon Keliner, the U.S.
attorney in Miami, and Robert Merkle, the U.S. attorney in Tampa.
There were headlines around the world. In Panama, Noriega thumbed his
nose at the charges, accusing the United States of trying to
intimidate Latin leaders who dared to criticize the Americans.
-
- Charged along with Noriega were leaders of the Medellin
cartel and other assorted drug traffickers. One of the defendants was
Roberto Steiner, the man who had bought Richard Nixon's house on Key
Biscayne. Many of those indicted with Noriega were unfamiliar to the
public, just more Latin-sounding names in another drug enterprise.
-
- But some of them rang bells with Amjad Awan. Among them were
Noriega's longtime associate Enrique Pretelt and another former BCCI
customer, pilot Ricardo Bilonick. And newspaper stories said that the
Tampa charges against Noriega and Pretelt were based on the testimony
of Steven Kalish, the marijuana smuggler who had been referred to BCCI
in Panama by Noriega's late friend Cesar Rodriguez.
-
- At this point, the agents in Operation C-Chase were unaware
of the extent to which Awan and BCCI had served as bankers to Noriega.
Awan's mention of Noriega following the phone call on February 1 had
piqued the interest of the agents, to be sure, but they had nothing
else to go on.
- Although C-Chase and one of the Noriega investigations were
run out of Tampa, the details of both were kept secret. Only those
with a need to know were aware of either investigation. In fact, the
most extensive security surrounded C-Chase because a leak would have
endangered Mazur and Abreu.
-
- "It was an undercover operation dealing with a lot of
Colombians," said one federal law enforcement official involved
in the case. "That meant there was always a possibility of
somebody disappearing forever if word leaked. People in the office
knew some sort of money-laundering investigation was under way, but
nobody knew the specifics of it. It was kept that way
intentionally."
-
- But one man knew the details of both investigations. And what
he knew made him believe fervently that it was vital to penetrate the
Bank of Credit and Commerce as deeply and successfully as possible.
-
- Mark Jackowski was regarded as one of hardest-working, most
tenacious federal prosecutors in Tampa. When U.S. Attorney Bob Merkle,
whose own personality had earned him the nickname "Mad Dog Merkle,"
had a tough case or a big case, he assigned it to Jackowski. And in
Florida in the 1980s, that meant drug cases.
-
- At the start of C-Chase, Jackowski had paid little attention.
He was devoting far more time to Noriega and a half dozen upcoming
drug trials, including one of a doper named Leigh Ritch, who had been
Steven Kalish's partner.
-
- There was little expectation among prosecutors that Noriega
would be brought to trial in the United States, at least not any time
soon, so Jackowski was able to devote more time to plotting strategy
in C-Chase. His deeper involvement could not have come at a better
time.
-
- The biggest worry for the Customs agents at the time was a
bungle by their own colleagues. By then, Customs agents in Los
Angeles, Chicago, New York, Detroit, Philadelphia, and Houston had
helped with the cash pickups and other aspects of C-Chase. In
addition, agents from the DEA had been used from time to time to
assist in keeping pickup sites and other aspects of the undercover
work under surveillance.
-
- There were factions within Customs and DEA that regarded
money-laundering cases as nickel-and-dime stuff. Unless there were
drugs on the table, it was a pissant case. The extended family of
C-Chase was not a happy one.
-
- As Mazur and Abreu escalated the size of the cash pickups,
federal agents across the country were getting glimpses of bigger and
bigger players in the drug world. In particular, the appearance of
Roberto Alcaino in Los Angeles marked the first time that a major
launderer and drug trafficker had been lured to the surface. Customs
agents in Los Angeles were anxious to nail Alcaino, and their fervor
created tension with the C-Chase agents. Drugs and money are almost
always kept separate at the stage in trafficking where Mazur and his
team were operating. Money from street sales or bulk sales was
collected at a central spot, away from the drugs, to minimize risks
from the cops. Then the money was delivered to Mazur's pickup teams.
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- However, agents in Los Angeles and the other cities were
tracking the C-Chase money launderers back to the drug distribution
networks that employed them. Sometimes they ran across drugs in the
process. The result was an understandable but highly dangerous urge-at
least to Mazur and Abreu-to seize the drugs, particularly since DEA
policy said that undercover operations are not supposed to allow large
quantities of drugs to hit the streets. And sometimes drugs and money
did get mixed up in the same deal.
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- In one instance, in late January 1988, a tractor-trailer
truck had been spotted near one of Abreu's cash pickups. DEA agents in
Detroit had had the truck under surveillance on its trip north from
Texas and believed that it contained a huge load of cocaine. They
desperately wanted to stop the truck, arrest the occupants, and seize
the dope. The risk was that Don Chepe and his associates would connect
the bust with the money laundering, thus exposing Operation C-Chase.
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- This was a problem inherent to long-term undercover
operations. Events occur through the life of the investigation that
have the potential to destroy the undercover operation. At the same
time, dedicated agents in the war on drugs cannot be expected to
ignore multi-ton shipments of cocaine. Yet when a load of cocaine is
seized and people are arrested, it touches off legal proceedings and
publicity that have the potential to reveal details of the underlying
investigation.
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- Sometimes, subterfuge can be used. When Customs agents were
using wiretaps to monitor the operations of a Colombian
money-laundering ring in Los Angeles in 1988, they picked up word that
a 1,000-pound load of cocaine would be leaving Los Angeles for the
Midwest. They alerted authorities along the route and the truck
carrying the cocaine was stopped supposedly for a routine traffic
violation near St. Louis, Missouri. But more often, there is neither
time nor ability to put so much distance between the undercover agents
and the arrests.
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- Had C-Chase been under the control of the FBI or DEA, the
tensions might not have run so high. Those two agencies are run along
military lines, with the special agents in charge of the field offices
under the direct control of officials in Washington. In Customs, there
is no central authority for enforcement efforts, or in any event, it
is traditionally a weaker one. These weaknesses were eventually
identified in a report issued in 1991 by a blue-ribbon task force that
criticized the service for mismanagement and cronyism. Among the
systemic problems listed in the analysis were inadequate training for
supervisors and agents alike, inattention to allegations of corruption
and mismanagement, and the lack of central control.
- Indeed, regional Customs commissioners have far more power
and independence than their FBI or DEA counterparts. The result is a
bunch of fiefdoms that one federal prosecutor compared to feudal
England. This creates problems on many levels for people trying to run
a national or international investigation that requires close
communication and cooperation between regions.
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- Mark Jackowski learned about this threat to the longevity of
Operation C-Chase in the week after the Noriega indictments. He sat
down with Laura Sherman and Steve Cook, who had been sharing the
supervisory duties as case agents, and was briefed on the status of
the investigation and the competing interests.
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- It was clear immediately to Jackowski that the investigation
had to be kept alive. He wanted to see how many people at BCCI were
ready, willing, and able to help launder drug money. So he decided to
bring together as many of the agents and prosecutors as possible in
Tampa to clear the air. He wanted to make sure the authorities in the
other cities realized what was at stake. He wanted to make sure they
knew who was in control of this investigation. And he wanted to slam
home the point by doing it on his turf.
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- There was little trouble persuading the agents and
prosecutors to come to Florida in February, at least not the ones from
the Northeast and Midwest. In the second week of the month, about
fifty or sixty federal law enforcement officers gathered for a series
of meetings at the Sheraton Hotel in nearby Clearwater. Jackowski had
purposely selected a location away from the federal building in Tampa
to maintain security.
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- To say that the parochialism evaporated in the Florida sun
would be nice, but it did not happen that way. In his discussions with
the other prosecutors, Jackowski tried to make his case for protecting
the underlymg investigation. In talks with their counterparts, Sherman
and Cook stressed the need to safeguard their undercover operatives.
Their warnings were particularly strong when directed at their
colleagues from Los Angeles. Customs in Tampa felt that the LA agents
had been sloppy in some of their surveillance and made some busts that
jeopardized C-Chase. The LA agents were equally forceful in defending
their right to operate as they saw fit.
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- When it became clear that there was strong reluctance to lay
off the drug seizures, talk turned to methods that could be used to
minimize the impact on the undercover sting. The agents and
prosecutors discussed using highway stops and other means of making
the arrests seem to be cold hits. They also discussed ways to add new
layers of information to the C-Chase intelligence, so that it could be
protected from discovery by defense lawyers.
- The results were disappointing to the Tampa crew. One of them
summed it up this way: "There was no acquiescence that Tampa
would run things. The agreement was that they would try to work with
us as best they could."
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- To some of the Tampa agents, C-Chase's days appeared to be
numbered. It was only a matter of time before someone grabbed a load
of drugs and Colombians and brought down the undercover operation,
too. They expected the end to be written by the cowboys from Los
Angeles. Until then, the pace of C-Chase would accelerate.
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