The quest for clarity and distinctness in our philosophical discourses started in the Renaissance Period with Descartes' radical challenge of traditional philosophy. Descartes attempted to put into doubt, as a starting point of critical analysis, anything and everything that we hold dearly. Separating myths from reality, obscurity of philosophical claims to the light of reason become the strong points of Cartesian obsession. However Descartes attempt to reconstruct philosophy with the hope of resuscitating reason fell short of methodological precision. From the practice of looking authority as the ultimate source of truth he sought dependence on a priority, solves the problem of rescuing philosophical ideas from the realm of obscurity to the light of reason . A priori ideas lack concreteness in our apprehension of reality.

Husserl, overwhelmed by mathematics like his predecessor, tried to put life once again on the quest for rigorous philosophy. Philosophical discourses must be established on solid grounds changing old styles of philosophizing capitalizing on metaphysical concepts but betray concrete reality. His famous battlecry was to 'go back to things themselves'. This idea captivates the interest of his time who suffered from a long drought of philosophical clarity. Phenomenology was used as a method to attain this purpose. But Husserl's sudden turn to transcendental phenomenology created discontent among his followers. The concept of transcendental ego, which he hopes to secure a clear and distinct idea, crumbles under persistent attack on the issue of inter-subjectivity. Since then and until the advent of logical atomism a new light gradually developed. Wittgenstein's philosophy of language aims to clarify philosophical propositions as our access to reality. He believes that problems in philosophy are nothing but grammatical in content. Ignorance of grammar makes our claims unclear. Hence, this paper examines Wittgenstein's (W in short) philosophy of language contained in his earlier work the Tractatus Logico Philosophicus (TLP) and to its unprecedented further development in Philosophical Investigations (PI).

I. Situating Wittgenstein

1. The influence of Logical Atomism.

   Logical analysis, first in its atomist and later in its positivist stance started to develop in England. With the publication of Russels' Our Knowledge of the External World [1914] and the Analysis of the Mind [1921] and of W. TLP in 1922, logical atomism developed swiftly as a realist triumph over idealism¹. Russels work serve as the catalyst that catapulted logical atomism to a new height. In fact, W. early philosophy shows reflections of Russel. Close examination of the TLP reveals the following assertions tackled earlier in Russel.²

   1. The first truism to which I draw your attention is that the world contains facts which are what they are whatever what we may choose to think about them.... Which they can be either true or false.
      This statement is similar to TLP 1.1, 4.25, 2.063
   2. Facts belong to the objective world. They are not created by our thoughts. There are negative as well as positive facts
      In TLP 2.12, 2.06
   3. A fact cannot be either true or false but only the proposition
      TLP 4.022
   4. If you want to make a complete accounting of the world you cannot do that by merely enumerating the particular things that are in it ... you must also mention the relations of these things and there properties
      In TLP 2.14, 2.15
   5. All traditional metaphysics is filled with mistakes due to bad grammar
      In TLP 4.003.

   Looking at these passages we see very close connections between Russel and W. in both his earlier and later works. For instance, the opening passages of TLP states: "The world is the totality of facts not of things" (1.1) which resonates in other passages of the TLP that is, 2.063 and 4.25 resembles that of the earlier Russelian tradition. Another very important similarity is found in TLP 2.06 and 2.12 when W. talks about the existence and non-existence of the state of affairs. He observes that reality contains facts that either exist or not. A fact that exist is affirmed by our true propositions. However the concept of the negative fact is misleading because there is no negative facts only a negated fact.

   Facts are neutral. Again Russel create deep inroads in W. view of the world when in TLP 2.14 and 2.15 he presents the picture whose elements are related to one another in a determinate way. Russel previously emphasizes this that things are by nature related with each other. And that how reality presents itself to our perception. The word determinate is reflective of logical analysis in Russel that the clarity of our ideas about the world depends heavily on the distinctness of our language. In fact W. picks this up to mean that philosophical problems are nothing else but pseudo-problems³. That analyzing the sense of these problems is like destroying a house of cards because there is nothing in it but the problems of grammar.⁴

2. Beyond Russel

   The publication of TLP was more important to Russel than to W. earning a Ph.D. Russel provided the preface of TLP in a candid affirmation of its profundity. He says:

   Mr. Wittgenstein's TLP whether or not it prove to give the ultimate truth on the matters with which it deals, certainly deserves by its breadth and scope, to be considered an important event in the philosophical world⁵

   Russels remarks rebounds to him because very glaring resemblances are found in his writings. TLP is in fact a measure on how deep has Russel influenced Wittgenstein. Assertions dominating most of the parts of the TLP overwhelm conspicuous footprints traceable to its mentor. However, W. gradually broke ties with Russel in PI, a product of long years of reflection on his earlier writings. PI is viewed as a continuation of his earlier positions, though differences are more than obvious to say that it is more of a repudiation.

   TLP contends that words signify objects and the sense of the object signified is the meaning of the word it bears. In 3.203 W. states that "a name means an object. The object is its meaning". The difficulty to keep this claim arises when the bearer of the object no longer exists. Does the meaning of the name signifying the bearer also ceased to be meaningful? PI argues that the name is still meaningful even if our signification does not make sense anymore. For instance, if red objects are all destroyed, does not mean that the idea red is destroyed together with the red objects. However, our signification of objects red does not make sense anymore.

   The difference is further exemplified in the concept of family resemblance. TLP insists that a clear and distinct idea is attained through defining its boundaries using definitions. Propositions present the logical scaffoldings of the world so that one can actually see from the proposition how phenomena stand logically (4.023). However, PI views this as a limited and inadequate description of world-proposition relation. These limitations are clearly seen in the analogy of the games that PI uses. Elements of games crisscrossed with each other like threads in a rope woven together. Some of these elements may be found in other games but establishing a common feature is impossible. A game is understood in playing the game. The rules are part of the game but knowing the rules does not assure us of knowing what the game is all about. Hence, Gadamer claims that every time I play the game it is always different. The to and fro motion carries the player and the spectator to an experience that transcends the boundaries of definitions. A game is like language. Some words are not understood by a simple definition especially in the field of ethics and aesthetics. The concept of good and beauty are subjective concepts. To define them is to assume a common experience, an attempt that contradicts the notion of a game.

   Lastly, both PI and TLP considers philosophy as a vehicle that brings us to clearness and distinctness in our assertions thereby clearing problematic philosophical discourses. Whereas TLP approaches the problem through atomic propositions using logical analysis, PI deals with the problem through the examination of our ordinary language. TLP's demand for a determinacy of sense (logical language) finds its limit when applied to ordinary language. Hence we can safely say that very important propositions are repudiated by PI and together with it Russel's influence on Wittgenstein.

II. Main Themes In early Wittgenstein

The development of W. philosophy can be divided into 2 general classifications: the Early and the Latter. The early Wittgenstein can be seen as a Wittgenstein of Logical Atomism under the influence of Russel, Frege, and Schopenhauer. The latter period is W. philosophical maturity. Here he gradually distanced himself from his mentors and started to develop his own philosophy. The Philosophical Investigations is this maturity. His constant conversations with his friends compelled him to reflect his previous assertions and tried to crystallize it, ensuring that the foundation of philosophical discourses is solid enough to claim clarity and distinctness.

1. Ontological Atomism.

   The first section of TLP presents W. conception of reality. He views the world as all that is the case. This world is the totality of facts knowable only through individual examination. These facts constitute the existence of the state of affairs composing the world. W. carefully distinguished things from facts. Things are the objects that we perceive like the cup on my table. A cup is composed of different facts like its size, color and shape. For instance when I say: 'The cup has a picture of bugs Bunny drawn on its sides' that statement is a fact about the cup among several other facts. Facts are not things although things are composed of facts. By facts W. mean that reality are interconnected with each other to form a unity. This unity is a built in mechanism so to say just like atoms that composed a whole from interrelated parts. Facts are neutral. However our reference to facts can either be true or false. The proposition that affirms a fact is true, and a proposition that denies the existence of a fact is false. This distinction is clarified in the later part of the paper.

   This interconnection is further explained by his concept of objects. The term object is used in many different ways through the entire Wittgenstinian literature. Sometimes W. uses object to refer to things, and at times to facts or even to the state of affairs. To complicate the matter, he also use the term to signify substances (TLP2.0272, and 2.021). This substance is similar to the Kantian noumena or what Locke used to call: 'I know not What'. These multiple usages are done without qualifications. Hence the reader is sometimes at a loss what W. mean by object say in a particular context.

   This substance composes the world. Here W. goes deeper in his atomism. Just like atomic particles that constitute the bodies in the world of physics so is substance constitute reality. This substance can never be composite; it is always simple (TLP 2.021). It is the essence of things and therefore transcends configurations of things like color, shape, sizes, etc...(TLP2.0232). Substance does not change, only their configurations(2.0271) which produce the state of affairs and this state of affairs constitute the world. In short, W. ontological atomism is founded on an immutable unchanging reality of substance. The change that we perceive in the external world is not substances but their configurations.

2. Picture Theory.⁶

   The picture theory is described in 2.63: 'We picture facts to ourselves ... a picture is a model of reality (2.12) a picture is a fact (2.141). The analogy of the picture is incisively developed in order to give us an idea that language, in the use of propositions, are pictures themselves . For instance, I can present my own picture of one beautiful afternoon.

   I sat on the staircase watching very intently the sun as it slowly descends , its radiance is gradually covered by mountain peaks , cold breeze blowing my hair very gently from distant shores as if a sigh whispering to me that light has gone and with darkness its time to take a rest.

   This picture displays unity in all of its various elements (2.151). The wind, the sun, the mountain... are woven together to create a perception of a unified whole in the midst of diverse images. W. calls this a pictorial form because it shows relations with other pictures. This pictorial form exposes a logical form , that is, the form of reality. So a picture with logical form is a logical picture. W. moves a little deeper by translating apprehension of physical reality into thought. A logical picture of facts is a thought (3). Here W. proves two things. First, that reality is concrete and tangible (3.1) excluding other realities like the spiritual, psychical or metaphysical. Discourse about them cannot be verified in reality. For instance when somebody says 'I have a toothache', I do not have other means to verify whether, this is true or false. I do not have an objective access to this information except the face value of the proposition. What guarantee do I have that this friend of mine is telling the truth?

   Spiritual realities are not included in W. conception of reality. They escape objective inquiry and facts presented by them cannot be verified. The truth value of such propositions does not make any sense. Plato describes the material world as a faint reflection of the world of eidos. This statement leads me nowhere. How can I be sure that Plato was not drunk when he said this? Anybody who wants to sound grand can safely find refuge in metaphysical arguments without fear of any objective verification. Hence 3.1 says that the world contains elements despite the facts that our thoughts are uncertain and indefinite. Further it suggests a commitment to determinacy of sense by limiting discourses to determinate entities.⁷

   Secondly, we can have access to reality through language. In TLP, language is presented as an amalgam of various kinds of propositions. Propositions on the other hand are composed of simple elements signifying a particular reality. Just as the state of affairs being represented by a picture whose individual parts form a unity so is language. The elements of proposition are internally related with each other so much so that the sense of each word are woven together to form meaning. A proposition in order to be a picture of reality must be true. A true proposition tells about a fact, while a false proposition denies a fact. W. calls this a negative fact. However, this conception of a negative fact draws the attention of critics charging him of using ambiguous terms. At the outset, W. describes facts as something independent from the truth value of propositions. Now he claims quite differently. He introduced that facts can actually be negative. And this assertion disagrees its neutrality. W. clarifies this saying that facts are negative when the fact does not exist. For instance, when I say 'I have a Martian friend' this statement is a negative fact and my proposition does not confirm the existence of a Martian much less being a friend of mine. Hence a negative fact is a fact that does not exist. This dilemma could have been avoided if W. calls negative fact as negated fact or the denial of the existence of a fact. To add, the proposition 'My cup has a picture of Bugs Bunny painted on its sides' is true when it agrees with the fact and false when it does not. However, the proposition is false when there is no picture of Bugs bunny on it. The fact remains neutral.

3. Propositions.

   W. says in 3.1 that 'In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses' and what constitutes a propositional sign is that in its elements (the words) are coordinated with one another in a determinate way (3.14). Section 3.2 further describes the proposition as a thought that can be expressed in such a way that its elements, the propositional sign, correspond to the object of thought. These passages communicate very important position that exposes a certain degree of influence on W. In his philosophy of logical atomism, Russel says, "The simplest sort of fact is the atomic fact. The proposition expressing them is atomic proposition. This kind of proposition cannot fail to signify reality. It was one of the important concerns of Russel to provide certain degree of distinctness in philosophical expressions. W. did not only follow Russel but conceptualized ways on how this grand dream come true. He started with the analysis of the propositional signs. 3.1 asserts my previous discussion. One of the criteria for the determinacy of sense is to talk about sensible objects because only sensible objects are verifiable. Secondly, the words that we use to signify these objects must follow a certain structure in which individual parts ascertain a definite sense of meaning. W. dream succeeded in 3.203: "A name means an object. The object is its meaning". Hence, if the object signified is sensible and the name we ascribe to it is its meaning then sense of what we say is indeed clear and distinct. In other, words if the object name ceased to exist, then the name that signifies it no longer makes sense. This argument is referred to in Russel as the Phaedo Phaedo theory. In "The author of Waverly exists" the analysis of this propositional function should be that,

   1. there must be at least one author
   2. there must be utmost one author
   3. and whoever he is he must exist

   But what if the author of Waverly is fictional? Russel says that the proposition does not make sense.

   W. adds that objects can only be names and that a name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition. It is a primitive sign. W. finds this very important in order to ascertain determinacy of sense. But ordinary language presents various signification. Let us say 'Pedro is gay'. Ten years ago Pedro would probably welcome this as a complement. But using the word today may render Pedro's identity questionable. W. proposes the use of a sign language that excludes them by not using as the same sign for different symbols that which is governed by logical grammar (3.325).

4. Elementary Propositions.

   W. says that propositions are composed of various elements (words or names) that signify an object. Some propositions are complex that means they contain more than one proposition. For instance, ';Leah is intelligent and beautiful' is composed of the propositions (he call primary) Leah is intelligent and Leah is beautiful. This complex proposition can either be true or false. It is true when it agrees with reality that Leah is indeed intelligent and false when proven otherwise. When W. talks of proposition as representing the existence and non-existence of the state of affairs (4.1) he is asserting two positions. First that propositions are composed of names and these names signify objects. And the sense of objects is its name. Secondly, that true elementary propositions cannot fail to correspond to reality. The result is a complete description of the world. In short, proposition cannot fail to show something. This idea of showing is based on the following supposition: First, that the underlying form of our language must match the underlying of the world. Second, the underlying form of language is made manifest through a combination of signs. Third, that the underlying form of language reveal the underlying form of the world. W. refers to in 6.124 that propositions describe the scaffoldings of the world or rather they represent it. In this case W. limits his understanding of reality within the boundaries of human perception explicitly excluding those transcendent realities for they evade verification.

   Summary

   To sum up TLP has the following assertions:

   1. The world is all that is perceptible, tangible and verifiable. We have access to reality based on our perception. Hence any meaningful discourse delimits itself from the psychical, extramental and the spiritual themes. They might be true based on individual perceptions but it can never be verified.
   2. The world consists of facts not of things to display interconnectedness in them and create a whole (a state of affairs). This whole is like a picture where each part forms its unity.
   3. We have access to this whole (the world) through language. Language is an amalgam of propositions, the basic of which is an elementary propositions consisting of simple signs (proper names) whose individual meaning depends on the existence of the objects they signify. They express cohesive relations between signs in a proposition and therefore in language. This also affirms cohesion of the different elements in the world. Hence if propositions are true, then they represents reality as it is. Thus propositions are pictures of reality. Propositions show the scaffoldings of the world.
   4. Language must take the forms of logic (deductive) because logic sharpens determinacy of sense. If language successfully lays the foundation of necessity and determinacy then problems in philosophy is avoided. In short these problems are grammatical in nature. To assert depth in philosophy means ignorance of grammar.
   5. TLP aims to clarify problems in philosophy.

III. The Philosophy of Language in Later Wittgenstein

1. The Transition

   M. Hintikka and Jaako Hintikka started the discussion on W's. transition with the question "How many W. were there?" The question of course presents surprise but understandable enough considering the unexpected turn of events. What has been considered as the Bible of logical analysts⁸ was subjected to critical examination by no less than W. himself. This sudden turn is known to have started during 1928 to 1929.⁹

   One of the important items that become the object of debate in the transition is the question whether the picture theory in TLP was replaced by the latter's concept of language games. This is observed as the eventual difference between TLP and PI. Some critics identified the TLP with the Augustinian Picture that W. categorically repudiated in PI.¹⁰ In fact the first 137 sections of the PI are devoted to expose untenable claims in the TLP, pointing very systematically why the change is a must.¹¹ Here two broad pictures of TLP are under attack. First, that words stands for things and sentences are combinations of such words. Second, the doctrine that that sense must be determinate.

   To clarify this issue, this section aims to present the differences and similarities between TLP and the PI. It is my thesis that the difference resides primarily in the replacement of the phenomenological language with that of everyday language in the PI. In the words of W. himself,

   I do not now have a phenomenological language or primary language as I used to call it, in mind, as my goal. I no longer hold it to be necessary¹²

   It has to be noted that the problems W. discussed in the PI are more or less the same problems that he discussed in the TLP. The difference however lies on methodology.

2. The Augustinian Picture

   The PI starts with a quotation from St. Augustine's Confessions. He presents the basic structure of language implied in the Augustinian Picture (AP). The AP has the following assertions. Words name objects and has meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object which the word stands. W. further discussed this point using an analogy,

   Let us say that language is meant to serve as a command between A the builder and B his assistant. A is building with building stones, blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. A shouts to B SLABS! B comes forward and bring the slabs to A and so on. This form of language has no syntax and grammar yet the message is clearly expressed and understood by B. However this language game is very limited W. objects. To prove his point, he used an analogy of a game. What is a game? Does it consist of dribbling the ball and shooting into the ring? But such definition is very limited and does not even describe most of the games that we are acquainted with. This kind of language is the kind taught to children during the early language formation where nouns are learnt first before its uses. Hence pointing to an object and call the object as cup, glass etc... does not tell us of their uses and our understanding of them is very limited. He calls this ostensive teaching.

   In sections 8-17, W. discusses the gradual expansion of language. In section 8, he elaborated the language between A and B but added a few words: 'D SLABS THERE!' This form already contains syntax, new vocabulary plus accompanying gestures. Understanding A (on the part of B) presupposes a lot of things. First, that B knows the slabs are classified according to sizes or perhaps to colors so that when A shouts D slabs he is referring to this particular kind of measurement. Secondly, it also presupposes previous knowledge of the variables D being part of the alphabet. The same case with teaching language to children. Alphabet and numbers are shown to them and the name to describe each is uttered. Later the objects are gradually brought up to the awareness of its uses. So words in sentences and sentences themselves have many uses. W. used the analogy of the tool box. Just as a tool has multiple function so is language.

   The AP resembles the structure of the language games in TLP. TLP claims that words in a proposition are names that signify objects. The meaning of the object is the name it bears. Names cannot fail to signify or the name does not mean anything. W. repudiated this earlier position in two ways: First, a word can be a proposition. Is the word SLAB a word or a proposition. It depends on How you use it. It is possible that the language game between A and B is well defined that every time A shouts SLABS! B has to report how many slabs are left. It can also mean a shortened form of a command BRING ME A SLAB!. In section 19, W clarifies his point saying: "How do I know that every time I hear A SLAB! he means bring me a slab? Second, meaning is understood not simply on the name it bears but on their use or application. He used the analogy of the game of chess. If I call this piece a king does this mean that I know it by its name. Knowing what a king is requires a knowledge on how it works in the game. The functions of the king describe the name but the name does not imply the use. That to say I know the function by the name it possesses does not make sense.

   Frege's analysis of assertion affirms the contention of AP. His analysis is guided by fundamental ideas. First, that a declarative sentence has its content, a thought which, is what it expresses. A thought is objective. It exists independently of being apprehended.¹³ Secondly, it is possible to express a thought without asserting it, and to entertain a thought without judging it to ;be true. Frege further contends that a declarative sentence used to make an assertion and a corresponding sentence question have a common content. W. is discontented with this explanation. He says that not at all times that an assertion always contains an assumption . For example the statement, 'Is it raining? Yes! Only becomes an assertion containing an assumption because of the affirmation (yes). But would this show that every statement should contain an assumption.?

   W. insists that ordinary language does not limit itself to declarative sentences. Sentences function in many ways, as commands, requests, threats, pleas invitations, etc... To limit one's self to one form makes communication ineffective (Section 23).

   W. concludes that knowing what each word of a sentence signify does not fix the use of the whole sentence. It demands how the word is used, the manner on how we use it in terms of the tone of voice or body language that accompanies with it, and the context where we use it.

3. Problems with Ostensive Definition

   Ostensive definition is different from ostensive teching. OT is a process of teaching a child a term by showing an object what it corresponds. Naming an object is knowing an object. Ostensive definition involves knowing a word by definition. W. finds this misleading. He asks: 'What is the meaning of the number 2? OD proceeds by showing to the child a pair of nuts. But does this kind of explanation clarify the matter? Or only confuses the child. It is possible that the child associates the number with the nuts that every time he hears 2 he always thinks of the nuts. Further, I can also teach the child the color blue by pointing to a blue t-shirt : 'This is Blue' Is it possible for the child to conceive the color without associating it with the shirt? Possible but there is still a chance of confusion. OD is inadequate to give us an idea about an object. Knowledge of an object requires knowledge of the context in which it is used.

4. Real Names

   According to AP, OD correlates names with objects, a name has meaning in virtue of standing for an object. Consequently, if a name lost its correlated object, then meaning is also lost. This idea generates pressure to restrict real names to expressions standing for what cannot fail to exist, that is, logically proper names.¹⁴

   The concept of real names has its background on Russel's logical atomism what is commonly known as the Phaedo-Phaedo theory discussed earlier. To sum the, the theory states that a name ceased to be meaningful one's the object it signified ceased to exist. The cup is meaningful when it refers to an existing object that we know as cup. But let us say , all cups are broken, the word ceases to make sense. W. repudiates this idea in section 39 using the word Excalibur. He argues that the name, which refers to a sharp bladed sword, still makes sense even if the sword is broken. The maiden name of a woman is lost once she gets married but does that mean that her meaning as a person is also lost?

5. Simples

   W. talks of simple signs in TLP 3.2. He states that in a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign corresponds the object of the thought. In 3.202, he calls simple signs as names.

   Simples are the objective correlates of logically proper names. In section 46, W. quotes Socrates that simples can only be named. Socrates defined simples as primary elements. TLP 202, calls this simples. Russel calls this individuals. The idea behind the notion of simples is W. obsession to apply the finishing touches of his dream for a determinacy of sense. He believes that simples cannot fail to signify objects and if propositions are composed of this simples then it signify facts. If language which is composed with clear and distinct propositions then the state of affairs is clearly understood eliminating nonsensical discourse in philosophy.

   However, TLP's idea that our access to the notion of simples is attained by comparing it to composites is untenable. In PI, W. insists that we use the word simples and composites in many different ways. Is a tree simple or composite? W. says that the answer to the question depends on what criterion you use. If the criterion limits to the physical constitution of the tree then the tree is indeed a composite because it is an amalgam of different parts. But if one's criterion is the atomic composition of the tree then the tree is simple. Hence, to say that simples constitute the composite, or the composite is constituted by simples, is unwarranted.

6. Determinacy of Sense

   Sections 1-64 present varieties of language games that insists on definitive analysis on the concept-word (that the word is the concept of an object). It further asserts that the essence of language must take the form of definitive analysis that establish sharp boundaries. All these arguments are repudiated in the PI. Hence W. is under pressure to fill up the vacuum. He devoted sections 65-142 to establish a new philosophy of language based on the analysis of the ordinary use of language. He started with the notion of family resemblance.

   1. Family Resemblance

      W. claims that language is similar to a game. Games, when compared with each other, display crisscrossing features. We see in them a complicated network of similarities in details or generalities.¹⁵ Having similar features with other games do not mean that all these games can be known by abstracting common features and use it to define these games.

      In section 68, W declares that a concept of games is without boundaries. Defining a game based on the rules they follow does not describe our understanding of a game. A game is always played very differently every time I play the game. The to and fro motion carries the players into an experience of awe and wonder that even time and space is transcended . Players and spectators are both mesmerized by this movement. One lost track of time. In Gadamer's words,

      Play is a phenomenon that can be known when actulalized in playing. One cannot feel the exertion , of repeating it, of moving to and fro. One is carried by this rhythm. A game lives only in being played. The to and fro motion is not from us but from the game... there is a tempo beyond my control¹⁶

      Language as games cannot be understood by sharpening its boundaries through the use of definitive analysis (like in TLP). This contention invites criticisms. If so then it is open to various interpretations and consequently we cannot know what do we mean by a game.

      In section 70 , W presents a question "Does the proposition the ground is covered with plants' useless unless we know what a plant means? This remarks resuscitated a common assertion of the TLP that in order for a proposition to describe state of affairs is for its simple signs to signify meaning. In short the quality of ordinary language is elusive of definitions but only through examples can we possibly understand what it means.

      Another objection is raised in 76. The absence of a definition will reduce our proposition to vagueness. Just like a picture, its clarity depends on well-defined lines and angles as well as the proper combinations of colors. This argues that knowledge of any form must be something definite and the use of definitions sharpens the boundary of the concept.

      W. admits that the nature of language indeed contains some elements of vagueness. But to say that definitions clarify this vagueness W. is very apprehensive. Take the case of ethics and aesthetics. In ethics, the concept of good is ambiguous. The concept has families of meaning. To insist on one definition transgresses cultural values that modify this concept. Aesthetics centers on the idea of beauty like in art. What is beauty in art? In his book the Relevance of the Beautiful, Gadamer talks about art as a play, a symbol and a festival.

      Art as symbol points away from itself. It is something which calls to itself, participates in what it means. In art there is unity between appearance and idea. Reality is represented by art and it is only when I tarry that reality is unfolded before me.¹⁷

      Hence, no definition fits our conception of moral goodness or sense of beauty . Games have rules but rules do not circumscribe the game. Language is the same with games. Defining a word is not understanding. Application of these words becomes the measure of our understanding of the word. Application of words is not bounded on rules.

   2. Nature of Philosophy

      One of the important goal of TLP is to attain clarity and distinctness in our use of language. W. claims that the sublime role of philosophy is to see to it that this goal is attained. He started by constructing language games that limit itself to the facts of the world. Thereby evading discourses that elude verification in reality. In simple terms, philosophy does not strive to look for answers but to clarify the questions we ask. He insists that there are no problems independent of language. Hence, the philosophy of TLP is logic used as a tool of inquiry into the essence of the world. It is the apriori structure of what is possible since the world is preserved to follow in this order. As such, logic is sublime because it becomes a method in unfolding the essence of things. As a consequence the structure it possess is very important in order that this noble goals do not fail.

      Russel and early W. agree in looking at language as having a formal unity. What Russel thought of atomic propositions finds very important elaboration in W. concept of simples in order to solidify his picture theory. It claims to have caught reality, that the fact is encapsulated in our thought. The later W. repudiated this idea in section 98,

      We are not striving after an ideal, as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense and a perfect language awaited construction by us... there must be perfect order even in the vaguest sentence

      He adds in 99 that a language that is vague does not make it less logical. He implies that relying on ordinary language may not possess determinacy of sense as in logical propositions which provide smooth and frictionless concepts. But W. insists that it is inadequate when faced with the actual language of our daily activities. Hence in 107, he says that we go back to that friction to the rough ground. At this juncture W. successfully highlights the inadequacy of logic. However, he is not implying that we have to get rid of it. Logic does not cease to be rigorous but shifting of methodology becomes W. last recourse in order to resolve the problems of philosophy.

      Sections110-115 dwell on the captivating illusions of philosophical depth¹⁸. To say that philosophy is deep is accepting our ignorance in grammar. What makes philosophy deep is a misrepresentation of our forms of language. Philosophical depth is a grammatical joke. What has been regarded as deep and profound is nothing else but house of cards. He says we are only clearing the ground of language on which it stands.

   3. Understanding

      Both TLP and PI remind us of the important role of philosophy in the knowledge of things. In TLP we see philosophy as a method to penetrate the essences of things through the use of different propositions that cannot fail to refer to phenomena as they are actually in the state of affairs. This approach employs the use of rules to ensure that understanding takes place. But the problem of this method starts when the rules that we use do not turn out as we assume . We are entangled with these rules. The same noble cause that PI wants to continue. Sections 89 to 137 talk about philosophy not as a vehicle that provide answers to questions but an analysis of the linguistic underpinnings of such a question. Hence, philosophy is not concerned with the answer but the sense of the question that we ask. W. is concerned with the analysis of language - that overarching concept that subtly commands and controls the flow of any discourse. Oftentimes, students in philosophy are naturally carried in by the pseudo-problems in philosophy. The problem and the method magnetized their attention, that in the midst of confusion and bewilderment, they exclaim of the depth and profundity of philosophy. Sobriety in the midst of ecstasy is the goal of philosophy. Philosophy is nothing but grammar.

      In 122, W says that the main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words. In 119, W. says that the results of philosophy are the uncovering of one or another piece of plain nonsense and of bumps that the understanding has got any running its head up against the limits of language.

      1. Understanding as a Mental State

         Understanding is a mental state that can be attained at a given time in our saying and hearing of words (138). Sometimes even in a flash, one very important shift in W. thought is that this understanding in a flash may not even be connected with the use of application. Earlier, one argument against OD is that we cannot know an object solely by its name but its use. A king of chess can be known not by its name but by its use in the game. W. does not want to repudiate this claim when he says that understanding may not even be connected with the use. What he wants is to show that understanding is not limited to its use. The context in which it is applied is very important for understanding. Change in context can yield new meaning.¹⁹ Hence, meaning cannot be identified with anything independent of the context of application.

         In 139 W. talks about the method of projection. Let us say I have a picture of a cube in my mind every time I hear the word cube. Does not this picture tell me also about the use of the cube? Knowledge of the cube as projected in the mind is possible. Every time the word is heard a picture is formed. But the problem here is "How do I know that the image I have in mind indeed corresponds to the word I hear? Can I say to somebody 'I have an idea of a cube in my mind' and generate an approval at once? Definitely not. He might doubt what I said. Verification of the content of my expression can only follow when the application of the image is the same application that my friend knows. Here W. is already preparing the ground for language. Hence verification happens when, through the use of the same language, our description of the cube agrees with each other. To sum up, understanding means applying it on the proper context.

      2. Knowing the Rule

         W. offers another possibility on how understanding could possibly occur. Let us say the teacher asks his students to write the numbers 0 - 9. Probably the teacher starts by explaining how the sequence of numbers follows. The students perfectly follow this sequence as they are taught. They now can write numbers 0 - 9. Is this understanding? W. insists that though training the students in counting/writing numbers, this mastery is not understanding but a prelude to it. Fogelin says that there is more to counting than doing something in conformity with a rule. Following a rule seems so mechanical to understanding.

      3. Reading and Understanding

         W. explains in 156 whether reading can be categorized as understanding. Let us say A reads a particular poem. With careful accentuation, A interprets the poem perfectly to the affirmation of his audience. Can we equate this with understanding? How do we know that he understands the poem. It is possible that he drank a shot of whiskey before he delivered the poem and that the influence of the liquor helps a lot. Or who knows that he was into drugs before the piece was delivered. Or say student B delivers the same piece. The audience remained unmoved; the interpretation was dull. Another student C delivered the piece without show of emotion. He was only reading it. What is our criteria of judgment to evaluate that between the three A got the right spirit of the piece? W. says there is only one person who can verify in this case and that is the person concerned (sec. 159). But this does not clarify the issue. If understanding is verifiable in language then we should be able to verify it somehow. W. says that when one is reading the words shape one's utterances (sec. 169) These words intimates the sound to me and form a unity. That is the unity that convinces the audience which one got the right interpretation. The audience of course is presumed to have some degree of acquaintance about the poem we are talking about.

         One very important idea that keeps on reverberating in TLP is the concept of contingency. In TLP W. limits propositions within the phenomenal - that which is contingent. This position is not abandoned in PI. His analysis of the language games fortified, very strongly, his defense on the concept. Understanding, in short, happens within the boundaries of what is contingent. To understand is linguistic. We use language to communicate understanding. Verification is very possible because of the nature of language which is common. Everybody knows what others are talking about. This is the reason why W. is reluctant to accept that understanding happens in a flash and such understanding is personal and cannot be communicated. Meaning can only be given in immediate experience. This contradicts his earlier position that meaning is given by the name of the object signified.

         Understanding takes place in A, B, and C when a general agreement among their audience occurs.

      4. Numbers and Machines

         W. makes an analogy of a machine in PI 193. Knowledge on how machine works provides an idea on what determinacy means. Just as machines are designed to follow a specific function so is determinacy in our ideas. Once all the parts are set, the machine is expected to do its function. But what if the machine does not function as expected? The operator then might wonder whether determinacy is always expected. This analogy is very crude. In reality machines are expected to do its function. The point of W. here is that following a rule, like a machine following internal rules, is not understanding. The rule is already programmed. It is imposed from the outside regardless of whether it has some relations to experience. He insists that understanding occurs in experience. If there is any rule then that rule is subjected to experience and not from something else. There is no pre-existing structure that can be the object of intuition.²⁰ The analogy of the machine, students knowing the sequence of numbers through training, or delivering a poem are like following a structure. Any form of following posits something external to experience. Rules are signposts that direct action (sec. 198) but if actions are limited to following a rule then they are not understanding. Understanding occurs only in experience.

         Following a rule implies two things. First, is that my action is governed by a rule. Secondly, it connotes a social element which explains causal relationship within the context of institutions, practices and customs²¹ In 199, W says that obeying a rule is a practice. And to think that one is obeying the rule is not really obeying a rule. He is not the one that judges that he obeys the rule. Because obeying a rule is not private. (sec.202). Thinking is different from obeying. Hence, obeying means conforming to the norms of society. Here W. becomes controversial. To follow the norm of society contradicts his previous idea of machines etc. that understanding should be anchored on experience. It remains his contention until this point. What he is saying in obedience of a rule is that if understanding takes place, there is only one way where we can verify such understanding and that is conformity to practice. If language is a means of communication, then there must be agreement not only in definitions but also in judgments.

7. On Private Language

   It is the thesis of this paper that the difference between TLP and PI is the unexpected shift from phenomenal to ordinary (physicalistic) language. W. has more than good reasons. The shift is needed in order to accommodate new experiences and concepts that can no longer be absorbed in the old position. Phenomenological language lucidly describes whatever is the case. However, language as it is used in ordinary conversations exposes the inadequacy of a logical form of language. This issue is clarified in W. concept of private language.

   202 states that obeying a rule is a practice. And to think that one is obeying a rule is not obeying a rule because it is not possible to obey the rule privately

   Inner Experiences and Language

   Can language be used to describe inner experiences like pain, pleasure, sorrow? etc... When I tell somebody my tooth aches is this not an example of a private language? W. answers the challenge by giving two analogies: First, if description of an inner experience means using a language known only to himself then there is a private language but is that possible? For example I invent a code signifying private sensations. I use 1 to refer to sadness, 2 to joy, 3 when I am surprised and so on. Hence when I get a grade of 4 in this course I will tell my wife excitedly "I am very 2. My Prof. gave a grade of 4"! My wife, very frustrated, would probably say "Is that what you get in philosophy?"

   Secondly, W. explains the problem of private language using the analogy of the beetle. For instance each one of us has a beetle in a box. In my case what I know is that beetle in my box. I do not even know whether other boxes have beetles on it. I do not know how their beetles look like if there are. The beetle in the box is the same as inner experiences. They do not have a place in the language games at all. Not even as something.²² In order to grasp the meaning of our propositions, we must see to it that our language is no different from others. Hence, private language cannot be possible. Private experiences are genuine. They are real. We have words to describe them but these words must conform to generally accepted usage. Language carries with the entire human tradition, world views, value systems, practices and norms, a philosophy of life. All facets of human life come into life through language. That is why language has to be taken in a particular context. If a lion is able to speak our language we cannot possibly understand him because he does not know the underlying concepts hiding every word that we utter.

   Critical Analysis and conclusion

   Reading the TLP is indeed an experience of awe and wonder because with it determinacy of sense is conveniently attained. The determinacy of sense, the main objective in both the TLP and the PI, has always been the preoccupation of many philosophers of so many philosophical movements. Many failed but others succeeded at least in their attempt to verify the content of our discourses. However, Wittgenstein is very different from all of them. In the first place, his attempt was not only a method, unlike Descartes, Hume and Kant. His is not just an epistemology but a philosophy of linguistic interpretation. A seminal idea that brought into life new thinkers that develop what he has started. The philosophies of Searle, Austin, Carnapp, Anscombe and the rest of the philosophers of language like Gadamer and Habermas always remember the name with so much adoration. Many instances has Wittgenstein been quoted in Gadamer's magnum opus, the Truth and Method, expressing his tremendous debt of gratitude. The optimist philosopher as he is always known, Gadamer did not really make an elaborate critique in the literal meaning of the word. But definitely his concept of language as tradition did imply very subtle but substantial modifications and improvements on Wittgenstein. Gadamer claims that understanding a language is possible because of tradition.

   Obviously we cannot understand a traditionary work if we thematize that language as such . But the other side of the question, which must not be ignored, is that it is impossible to understand what the work has to say if it does not speak into a familiar world that can find a point of contact with what the text says.²³

   Wittgenstein's concept of the impossibility of private language is resonated in this particular passage. Understanding is possible because of familiarity of the language used. Familiarity because language is always public. However, Gadamer says that understanding language is not simply knowledge of its use, or because the words are simply familiar to us. Language is only a medium of communication of one subjective world to another subjective world. Gadamer adds,

   The infinite perfectibility of the human experience of the world means that whatever language we use, we never succeed in saying anything but in a more extended aspect, a "view" of the world²⁴

   Gadamer does not intend to attack W. concept of understanding. What he is saying is that understanding is incomplete without taking into consideration the world of the other. Sometimes this world is not exposed through language. The inner of the person remains a mystery, what is known by language through conversation might not be the totality of the person. Hence to understand ordinary language means to take into consideration the world of the other. Gadamer adds,

   That language and world are related in a fundamental way does not mean, then that the world is the object of language²⁵

   Another point that Gadamer wants to contribute in this discussion includes projection in understanding.

   A person who tries to understand a text is always projecting. He project a meaning for the text as a whole as soon as some initial meaning emerges in the text... working out this fore-projection, which is constantly revised in terms of what emerges as he penetrates into the meaning, is understanding what is there²⁶

   This idea is actually borrowed from Heidegger in his book Being and Time. Here Heidegger states that part of the essence of being is understanding. Understanding is being in the world. Gadamer modified Heidegger in his concept of prejudice. Understanding is always prejudiced that means we cannot at times distance ourselves from it unless we are aware of its inner doings. Understanding in this context requires awareness of this prejudice.

   On the other hand, Wittgenstein catches the attention of Habermas too especially in the latter's concept of communicative action. Wittgenstein concept of ordinary language sowed seeds of challenge on the young Habermas that put his spirit restless, inspired but in many respects dissatisfied. This critique can be summed up in this phrase,

   Rejecting his earlier conception of language as a formal system of representation , the later Wittgenstein turns towards a detailed examination of the ways in which expressions are actually used in everyday language games. This is a change of emphasis with which Habermas is wholly sympathetic, but his reservation is that in Wittgenstein and his disciples, the logical analysis of the use of language always remained pluralistic, they have failed to develop it into a theory of language games²⁷

   Habermas , says that understanding language requires two things (not only the speech acts that was developed by Austin): first is the level of inter-subjectivity in which the speaker/ hearer communicates with one another and second, the level of object about which they come to an understanding.²⁸ It seems that what is implied in Wittgenstein's conception of language is level two when both agrees the object of language considering that language is basically public. But the first level somehow agrees with what Gadamer talks about that in language the entire lebenswelt (to use Dilthey's term) is also communicated through language. Both Gadamer and Habermas agree that language is an amalgamation of values inherited from a long history of that very distant past. For Gadamer understanding that past can be done because the interpreter is part of tradition. The temporal distance that separates the reader from the text is bridged by mutually belonging to this tradition. On the other hand, Habermas, says that this tradition creates a kind of rationality impinging on the person without him knowing it. This rationality, in forms of ideology for instance, create value systems, habit formation (as in fads), mind sets etc. of a people. This rationality then is working actively but behind the intricacies of language. So much so that understanding ordinary language requires understanding of this overarching rationality. In short, Wittgenstein's analysis of language games is inadequate considering the complexity of human language itself.

   BIBLIOGRAPHY

   Primary Sources

   Wittgenstein, Ludwig. The Blue and Brown Books. Ed. By Rush Rhees. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958.

   __________________. Notebooks. 1914-1916 ed. By G.H. Von Wright and G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1961

   __________________. Philosophical Investigations. trans. by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953.

   _________________ . Tractatus Logico Philosophicus. trans. by D. F. Pears and B. F. McGuinness with Intro. By Bertrans Russel. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961.

   _________________. Philosophical Remarks. Ed. By Rush Rhees and trans. by Raymond Hargreaves and Roger White. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975.

   Secondary Sources

   Baker, G. P. and PMS Hacker. Wittgenstein Philosophical Investigations: An Analytical Commentary vol. 1. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980

   Fogelin, Robert. Wittgenstein 2nd ed. London: Routledge, 1976

   Hintikkaa, Merrill and Jaakko Hintikkaa. Investigating Wittgenstein. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986

   Pitcher, George. Wittgenstein: The Philosophical Investigations. New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966.

   Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. 2nd rev. Ed. Trans. by Joel Weinshimer and Donald Marshall. New York: Continuum, 1996.

   Thompson, John. Studies in the Theory of Ideology. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984.

   ---

   ¹ Quinton, p.1
   ² Bertrand Russel, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism , ed. By David Pears (London: Fontana, 1972)
   ³ PI, section 111
   ⁴ Ibid, section 118
   ⁵ TLP, p. 9
   ⁶ perhaps the most dramatic link between Frege and and W. is the latter's picture theory of language.
   ⁷ Fogelin, p. 157.
   ⁸ George Pitcher, Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations: A Collection of Critical Essays (New York: Doubleday and Company Inc., 1966), p. 3
   ⁹ Hintikkaa, p. 137.
   ¹⁰ Fogelin, pp. 107-143
   ¹¹ Ibid, p. 107.
   ¹² Philosophical Remarks, 1st section p. 51 This quotation is originally taken from W. Notebooks p. 205.
   ¹³ Baker, pp. 52-53.
   ¹⁴ Baker, p. 93.
   ¹⁵ Ibid., pp. 131-132
   ¹⁶ The Relevance of the Beautiful, p. 34
   ¹⁷ Ibid., p. 35-36
   ¹⁸ Baker, p 191.
   ¹⁹ Fogelin p. 145 quoting W. PI section 130.
   ²⁰ Fogelin, p. 158
   ²¹ Ibid., p.161.
   ²² Hintikkaa, p. 246.
   ²³ Hans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method Second revised Ed., trans by Joel Weinshimer and Donald Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1996) p. 442.
   ²⁴ Ibid., p. 447
   ²⁵ Ibid., p. 50
   ²⁶ Ibid., p. 267
   ²⁷ John Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), p. 260.
   ²⁸ Ibid., p. 261