This scenario is the one that prevails in many educational institutions where philosophy and the social sciences happened to be placed together in a single department. One may leave them alone for say twenty years or fifty years and when one returns he/she will find them in their previous non-interactive mode of juxtaposition. The second scenario, which may be called antagonistic juxtaposition in the sphere of theory, is characterized by a polemic relationship between philosophy and the social sciences. In this scenario the order of the day is for philosophy to critique the social sciences, and vice versa.

Though the author has witnessed hostilities between the two departments in some local educational institutions, a real scenario of sustained and institutionalized antagonistic juxtaposition in the sphere of theory remains for him a hypothetical scenario. Theoretically speaking, this dialectical relationship can be very fruitful and can strengthen both the theory and praxis aspects of both departments. However, there are at least two reasons to believe that such a scenario would only amount to a momentary arrangement. Firstly, following the thoughts of the German hermeneutic philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer, two systems that are sincerely engaged in a sustained and institutionalized dialectical critique would end up not with a never-ending antagonism but to a Horizontverschmelzung (fusion of horizons), an arrangement not dissimilar to the third scenario that will be elaborated in a little while. Secondly, if a Horizontverschmelzung will not be achieved at all, and since a never-ending dialectical critique is a logical impossibility, the second scenario may just slide down and settle into the non-interactive mode of juxtaposition of the first scenario. The third scenario, which may be called functional merger both in the spheres of theory and praxis is characterized by the heightened interaction between philosophy and the social sciences, and the free interchange of theories, interpretive frames and research methodologies.

This trend of conjoining philosophy and social sciences was inaugurated by the Institut fur Sozialforschung, otherwise known as the Frankfurt School, when its founding theorists blended the Marxist inspired philosophical reflection with the emerging methodologies of the social sciences. The first scenario might be very stable, but it is not promising, and the second scenario though promising is not stable. Thus, among the three configurations, this third one has the advantage of being the most promising as well as the most stable.

To be more specific, this paper which is intended to document the author's personal efforts in making sense out of the problematic arrangement of blending philosophy and the social sciences, traces the narrative of his complacent belief on the first scenario, his discovery of the problems that such a belief engendered, and his final adherence on the third scenario.

B. A Gloss on the Disciplinary Boundary: The First Scenario

In 1996, the author wrote a book entitled Philosophy of Man. In its introductory chapter, he already tried to grapple with the problem on the disciplinary boundary between philosophy and the social sciences. Here, the German term Geisteswissenschaften -(Geist meaning 'spirit', and wissenschaften meaning 'sciences'), which literally means 'sciences of the spirit', or more liberally 'human sciences'-is used to refer to the social sciences. The term Geisteswissenschaften emerged when the German hermeneutic philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey made a contra-distinction between the human sciences and Naturwissenschaften (Natur meaning 'nature', and wissenschaften meaning 'sciences'), or the natural sciences. The author's 1996 work states: "There is a general type of science that is similar to philosophy of man in the sense that it also has man both as its inquiring subject and the inquired object. This general type of science is what the Germans would call the Geisteswissenschaften, or the human sciences which include among others psychology, sociology, anthropology, political science and history" (Demeterio 1996, p.6). To be more precise, this point can be amplified using the three-world theory of the British philosopher Karl Raimund Popper. Popper speculated that man simultaneously exists in three distinct worlds: namely, 1) the physical world of nature, 2) the internal world of ideas, thoughts, and emotions, and 3) the social world of inter-subjectivity. Whereas the physical world of nature is the object of inquiry of the natural sciences, both philosophy and the social sciences focus not only on the human person, but on his internal world of ideas, thoughts, and emotions, as well has his social world of inter-subjectivity. Consequently, the problem was rhetorically raised: "since philosophy of man and the Geisteswissenschaften have the same object, would this mean that they are just one and same thing?" (Demeterio, 1996, p. 6). Using the input-process-output conceptual frame, the similarities and differences between the two systems of knowledge were further highlighted. "The basic structures of any systems of knowledge can be conceptualized as composites of three things: a) first, the object studied, b) second, the procedure, or the approach, in studying the object, c) and third, the output, or the knowledge produced" (Demeterio, 1996, p.6). The social sciences, as already mentioned, have the human person, his internal world, and his social world as their object of inquiry. "Their procedure rests primarily on observation-experimentation, quantification of data, analysis and the subsequent conclusion. The output is predominantly descriptive it tells us what the human being is and how he normally behaves" (Demeterio, 1996, p. 6). On the other hand, philosophy takes the same human person, his internal world, and his social world as its object of inquiry. Yet, philosophy's procedure differs from that of the social sciences, for its approach consists of "the examination, analysis and classification of ideas, the method of deductive reasoning, the reductio ad absurdum, reflection and insight" (Demeterio, 1996, p. 7). Furthermore, philosophy's output also differs from that of the social sciences, in the sense that the knowledge that it produces is predominantly interpretive, qualitative and prescriptive. Graphically, we may represent the comparison and contrast of these two systems of knowledge with the following chart.

Whereas philosophy and the social sciences are similar in one fundamental aspect, that is in their having one and the same object of inquiry, they are different in their two other fundamental aspects, that is in matters of procedure and output. Thus, "these two differences are the factors that in the end made philosophy of man distinct from the Geisteswissenschaften" (Demeterio, 1996, p. 7). A further examination of the comparative chart above would reveal the absence of any interaction between the two systems of knowledge, both in the area of the method of inquiry, as well as in the area of output. That makes the resulting schema an instance of the non-interactive juxtaposition of the first scenario.

C. The Problems with the First Scenario

Aside from its actually intended task of introducing both philosophy of man and the social sciences to students, the author's 1996 work has accomplished one important thing: it highlighted the fact that both philosophy and the social sciences share the same object of inquiry which is the human person, his internal world, and his social world.

As the author ventured further into his graduate studies, teaching and research in both philosophy and the social sciences, he gradually realized how simplistic and immature his 1996 distinction is, and how problematic it grows. The first blow to this distinction happened when the author researched further into the thoughts of Wilhelm Dilthey, the philosopher who made the Geisteswissenschaften/Naturwissenschaften contradistinction, for an essay in Romantic hermeneutics. It was disclosed that as early as Dilthey, there was already an idea that Geisteswissenschaften thrive on interpretation. The American anthropologist Clifford Geertz, is just one of the most articulate contemporary advocates of this view. In his work Thick Descriptions, Geertz states: "Believing with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning." Thus, the distinction which was hinged on the difference between description and interpretation has been blasted, because apparently both philosophy and the social sciences produce knowledge which are both interpretive. The second blow to the 1996 distinction happened when the author researched further into qualitative methodologies in order to build an arsenal of data gathering tools for his research students, where he discovered that there is a powerfully emerging trend of doing social sciences the qualitative way. Thus, the distinction which is hinged on the difference between quantitative and qualitative has been blasted, because both philosophy and the social sciences can be qualitative in nature. The third and final blow to the distinction happened when the author took some specialized courses in social theory at the University of the Philippines at Diliman, where graduate students were required to read more and more writings of personalities whom the author knew beforehand as philosophers, like Karl Marx in socio-economics and sociology, Sigmund Freud in psychology and cultural studies, Emile Durkheim in sociology and anthropology, Max Weber in sociology of religion, Levi-Strauss in anthropology, Jurgen Habermas in social theory and ideological criticism, Michel Foucault in historiography, and many others. These encounters with philosophers in the various fields of the social sciences made him hypothesize that though philosophy and the social sciences are distinct in the lower levels of praxis-that is, in introductory studies, teaching, and research-they tend to converge as both systems of knowledge ascend into the abstruse sphere of theorizing. Graphically, this convergence can be represented by the following chart.

Though these discoveries mangled the author's 1996 comparative chart, it led him into another important finding in addition to his prior highlighting of the fact that both philosophy and the social sciences share the same object of inquiry: namely, that both philosophy and the social sciences tend to converge in the level of theorizing. These findings propelled him to speculate further into the relationship between these same systems of knowledge.

D. A Closer Look on the Disciplinary Boundary: Towards the Third Scenario

When the author started to write his dissertation, which as dictated by the very nature of his Ph.D. program, had to be interdisciplinary, he was obliged to give a rational justification of his rather liberal deployment of interpretive frames and methods culled from philosophy, literary criticism and the social sciences. This time, he decided to tackle same problem on the disciplinary boundary between philosophy and the social sciences using a historiographic method proposed by the French historian of ideas and philosopher Michel Foucault, known as genealogy. Genealogy is powerful tool in critiquing the powerful impact of the present state of affairs on the human mind. The present state of affairs can very easily deceive the mind to think that such a state of affairs is the only true, the only natural and the only valid status, as well as fool the mind that such a state of affairs lie outside the range of rational critique and analysis. "Through genealogy, the present state of affairs' claim to truth, validity and naturalness can be revealed as false (or at least as a truth among many other truths), as invalid and artifactual. This achieves its goals by historical re-investigation commencing with the present and going backward in time until some difference is located, then moving forward again to see the transformation while at the same time preserving the observed discontinuities as well as continuities, thereby establishing the past's negativity in relation to the present and vice versa" (Demeterio, 1997, p. 35).

The present state of affairs tend to suggest that the disciplinary boundary between philosophy and the social sciences is an old and massive stone-wall which is true, natural, valid, and therefore immune to any rational critique. That makes this disciplinary boundary a very interesting specimen to be subjected to the genealogical gaze. In the first chapter of the author's dissertation, he graphically presented the genealogy of the different systems of knowledge of the western world.

A mere look at the chart above would immediately reveal the series of exclusions and delineations that eventually produced not only philosophy and the social sciences, but the natural sciences, theology and literature as well. This all started as a single and unified body of knowledge. But as early as the Greek antiquity-when the philosopher Plato (428-348 BC) launched his attack against the poets, branding them as messengers of knowledge who never understood what their message was all about-the single and unified body of knowledge split into literature and philosophy. Sometime in the middle ages, philosophy further split into philosophy and theology, when Albert of Cologne stipulated a stricter methodology for philosophy that excludes recourse to divine revelation. Sometime during the renaissance, philosophy further split into philosophy and the natural sciences, when shortly before, during and after the scientific revolution, the 'scientists' called for a rigorous adherence to their newly formulated positivist and quantitative methodologies. Finally, during the modern times, philosophy split into philosophy and the social sciences, when the positivist philosopher Auguste Comte's defined the social sciences as a separate discipline devoted to the study of society, veering away from philosophy and leaning towards the robustly growing natural sciences. That act earned Comte the honor of being remembered as the founder of sociology. The series of exclusions and delineations that gave birth to the above-mentioned disciplines were uneven. The first two ruptures happened because of philosophy's efforts in self-definition. They were philosophy's movements away from the unphilosophical. The third rupture, however, happened because of the natural sciences' efforts in self-definition by moving away from the philosophical. Similarly, the fourth rupture happened because of the social sciences efforts in self-definition by moving away from the philosophical and towards the ideals of the natural sciences.

There is a very enlightening essay by Dalia Judovitz, entitled Philosophy and Poetry: The Difference Between Them in Plato and Descartes, that explains in more detail the first rupture of knowledge. Judovitz genealogically explained that the seemingly unbridgeable chasm between philosophy and literature was merely occasioned by a discursive technique of exclusion accompanying Plato's effort to attain a self-definition for philosophy. "The effort to distinguish philosophical knowledge from all other ways of knowing -- poetry, painting, and music -- becomes the first systematic effort to define philosophy in an absolute sense; as the 'mark of differences" (to use Plato's term) from all other domains" (Judovitz, p. 27). In the process of philosophy's search for identity, literature as exemplified in poetry became its ontological other, which necessitates the latter to be portrayed in an exaggerated negative light. This discursive procedure is known as symbolic inversion. Orvar Lofgren, a Swedish cultural anthropologist, wrote about an instance of this inversion that happened between Victorian bourgeoisie and the menial laborers such as the chimney sweeps, who were described by the bourgeoisie as dirty and uncouth. Lofgren says: "stereotypes can be viewed as an example of symbolic inversion, in which the bourgeoisie defined itself indirectly through a description of its opposite, its social other. In this light, stereotypes like these tell us more about the self image of the bourgeoisie than about the realities of the working class culture" (Lofgren, p. 38). Similarly, Plato's branding of literature as something inferior does not tell us anything about literature. Rather, it tells us about what Plato thought philosophy should be. Thus, the rupture between philosophy and literature was just an outcome of the discursive process of self-definition that necessitates a discursive process of exclusion. Following the same line of thinking, the split between philosophy and the social sciences can be thought of as something machinated by the similar processes of self-definition and exclusion. But this time it was the social sciences calling the shots and philosophy assuming the unsavory role of the ontological other. Comte was a positivist through and through and his efforts to pursue the ideals of the natural science could not but result into efforts of distantiation from the metaphysical pondering of philosophy. Thus, rupture between philosophy and sociology was just an outcome of the discursive process of self-definition that necessitates a discursive process of exclusion.

What genealogy revealed is that disciplinary boundary that separated philosophy and the social sciences is just a discursive boundary, a boundary that emerged in discourse and is therefore artifactual. If knowledge can be ruptured by discourse, then there is no reason why discourse could not re-suture its fragments. Indeed there are a number of present-day theorists who speculated, and some rather successfully, on the possibility of re-suturing the ruptured whole. For the project of re-suturing the rupture between philosophy and the social sciences, the author has in mind Jurgen Habermas who himself is theorizing at the juncture point in between philosophy and the social sciences.

The thoughts of Habermas concerning the need for the re-suturing of knowledge was occasioned by a crisis in philosophy brought about by the postmodern bias against the metaphysical, against the grand systems, and even against reason itself. If philosophy has to remain standing amidst the tempest of postmodernity, it has to re-structure, re-think and transform its own self. For Habermas, such a re-structuring, re-thinking and transformation should result into philosophy's closer alliance with the other disciplines, and its more relevant role in the service of reason and the lifeworld. Firstly, philosophy has to become the supplier (Zuarbeiter) of ideas useful as hypotheses for social sciences in particular and for other specialized areas of inquiry in general. Though Habermas only specified that philosophy's being a Zuarbeiter is only limited to 'ideas useful as hypotheses' this may be expanded a little to mean concepts, paradigms, theories, and interpretive frames. Secondly, and more basic than being a Zuarbeiter, philosophy has to transform itself into a mediator in between the several expert cultures. For Habermas, modernity has fragmented reason into three moments: (1) modern science, (2) positive law and post-traditional ethics, and (3) autonomous art and institutionalized art criticism. Such fragmentation resulted to the modernist inability to see the wholeness of reality. "Ignorant of sophisticated critiques of reason," he argues, "the sons and daughters of modernity have progressively learned to differentiate their cultural tradition in terms of these three aspects of rationality such that they deal with issues of truth, justice, and taste discretely, never simultaneously" (Habermas, 312). After the initial fragmentation, each moment went on developing its self more and more technically but at the same time more and more narrowly. One moment can no longer make sense out of the other moments' jargon and concerns, and worst the lifeworld could no longer make sense out of the moments themselves. With this fragmentation, asks Habermas "how can reason. . . go on being a unity on the level of culture? How can expert cultures, which are being pushed more and more to the level of rarefied, esoteric forms, be made to stay in touch with everyday communication?"(Habermas, 313). And for him, it is philosophy that has to mediate in between the expert cultures. "As far as philosophy is concerned," he concludes, "it might do well to refurbish its link with the totality by taking on the role of interpreter on behalf of the lifeworld. It might then be able to help set in motion the interplay between the cognitive-instrumental, moral-practical, and aesthetic-expressive dimensions that has come to a standstill today, like a tangled mobile" (Habermas, 313). Thus, Habermas is not only calling for theoretical cross-fertilization in between disciplines but on the vital and continuous need for their conceptual unification and mediation. Boundaries have to be opened if philosophy has to remain alive, if the social sciences have to grow, if reason has to remain whole and more sensible, and if man has to live in a meaningful lifeworld.

Prior to this paper's genealogical retrospect as well as to its gloss on Haberrnas' efforts in preserving philosophy, it already made two important findings with regard to the project of theorizing on the merger between philosophy and the social sciences. These are: first, that, philosophy and the social sciences share the same object of inquiry; and second, that at the level of theory, philosophy and the social sciences tend to converge. At this point, some more important findings are made that may be added to these previous two to be the third, fourth and fifth findings. The third finding, brought about by the genealogical retrospect, is that the seemingly monolithic boundary between philosophy and the social sciences is merely 19th century discursive formation, and this implies that if it is discourse that created such a boundary, it is discourse also that can dissolve such a boundary. The fourth finding, offered by Habermas, is that philosophy can possibly enrich the social sciences by supplying the latter with ideas useful as hypotheses, and by implication this may include concepts, paradigms, theories, and interpretive frames. The fifth finding, still offered by Habermas, is that philosophy can mediate the abstruse findings and discourses of the social sciences, with itself, with the other systems of knowledge, as well as with the lifeworld.

The fourth and the fifth findings, the ones offered by Habermas, invite some further look. It is a little obvious that Habermas' suggestions are still hedged on the classic arrogance of philosophy-an arrogance that can be traced back to the despotic days when it reigned as the queen of sciences. For him, philosophy is painted as something capable of endowing vital ideas to the social sciences, which the latter could not reciprocate. The consequent relationship between philosophy and the social sciences definitely will not amount into the ideal and balanced interaction envisioned in the third scenario's interactive juxtaposition in the spheres of theory and praxis. Here, though philosophy can plunge its influence deep into the theoretical and praxiological spheres of the social sciences, the social sciences could not do the same feat. But in fairness to Habermas, it must be pointed out that he theorized all these things in a continental setting where the traditions of philosophy and the social sciences were robustly existent. Such a setting when placed side by side by the bleak realities of the Philippine intellectual context would create a very pronounced contrast. Probably, by considering the existential realities of the Philippine context, a more powerful schema for the merger can be conceptualized.

E. The Third Scenario and the Existential Realties of Philippine Intellectual Sphere

Before finally theorizing on a scenario of the merger of philosophy and the social sciences within the context of the existential realties of the Philippine intellectual sphere, it would be advantageous to first bring out the structural imbalance between these two disciplines that to a large extent spells out the differences of their mode of existence in the same Philippine context. With regards to Filipino philosophy, its very own existence is already a big problematic. It is not surprising therefore to know of the number of Filipino philosophers who were so fascinated with the question 'is there a Filipino philosophy?'. Such a problem has no counterpart in Filipino social sciences, and a Filipino social scientist who would raise a counterpart question 'is there a Filipino social science?' will be deemed to be totally out of this world. The reason for this structural imbalance is the simple asymmetry between the discursive levels of the two disciplines. 'Discursive level' refers simply to the calibrated level upon which a professional or student is engaged in with regard to the system of knowledge. Specifically, these levels are (1) introductory study, (2) teaching, (3) research, and (4) theorizing. In philosophy, one can only say that indeed such a discipline exists, and philosophers exist, if there are professionals engaging themselves in the theoretical discursive level of philosophy. In the lower discursive levels of research, teaching philosophy and philosophers cannot be properly said to exist because the professionals engaged in these levels are more properly called 'philosophy professors' and not 'philosophers'; much less in the lower of level of introductory study that belongs to the turf of the students. Graphically, the chart explains this point.

In the social sciences, the case is a little bit different. In this discipline, one can already say that indeed such a discipline exists, and social scientists exist, if there are professionals engaging themselves in the research discursive level of the social sciences. Thus, the asymmetry between discursive levels emerges clearly: for philosophy and philosophers to exist, professionals have to reach the theoretical discursive level of the discipline, but for the social sciences and social scientists to exist, professionals reaching the research discursive level is already sufficient. It is this same structural imbalance that spells out the differences of the concerns of the two disciplines. Whereas Filipino philosophy is concentrating on theoretical discursive aspect, Filipino social sciences are more preoccupied with the research discursive aspect. The author strongly suspects that this imbalance of concerns, though seemingly innocuous and stemming from the nature of the two disciplines, is symptomatic of greater pathologies that may emerge in both disciplines. Philosophy should not go on and on with its concerns for theory to the point of sacrificing research, just as the social sciences should also not go on and on with their concerns for research to the point of sacrificing theory. This paper's proposed scenario for the merger of the two disciplines will be hedged on this same asymmetry.

In October of 1999, the author delivered a paper concerning the underdevelopment of Filipino philosophy at the Ikalawang Pambansang Kumperensiya sa Pilosopiyang Pilipino (Second National Conference on Filipino Philosophy), a colloquium organized by and held at the University of the Philippines at Diliman. This paper was intended to probe into the pathologies that are hampering the development of Filipino philosophy. To accomplish this task, the author made some finer tunings on the input-process-output conceptual frame that he earlier used in 1996. This time the conceptual frame peered deeper into the nature of the process component, or the method of inquiry, of philosophy. Here, philosophy is pictured as "a paradigmatic (in the Kuhnian sense of the word) reflection on reality (that is the human person, his internal world, and his external social world) that generates questions which call for a search in order to come up with an answer, and whose answer can be deposited back to tradition to be used in providing further paradigms and research methodologies" (Demeterio, 1999, p. 17, second parenthetical added). It is emphasized that "the circuit from tradition, to paradigm, to question, to search, to answer, and then back to tradition constitutes the lifeblood of philosophy" (Demeterio, 1999, p. 17).

Upon later reflection, it was found out that the conceptual frame intended for philosophy may also be applied to other systems of knowledge. As far as this conceptual framework is concerned, there are two fundamental pathologies that hampered the development of Filipino philosophy. First, is the poverty of paradigms and theoretical frames; and second, is the poverty of research methodologies. The author lumped these problems together as the 'linguistic problem' of Filipino philosophy that "refers primarily to our poverty in terms of philosophical theories and concepts. . . a poverty of philosophical language so to say" (Demeterio, 1999, p14). Philosophical language is indispensable for the development of philosophy because this language is the same system that would provide the professionals with concepts, paradigms, theories, interpretive frames and research methodologies. The poverty of concepts, paradigms, theories and interpretive frames point out to a very glaring difference between the continental philosophy that was presupposed by Habermas and the very lethargic and pathetic philosophy that we can observe struggling to exist on Philippine soil. Habermas' continental philosophy is a system teeming with concepts, paradigms, theories, and interpretive frames, and can readily afford to offer some to the social sciences. But a poverty of concepts, paradigms, theories, and interpretive frames need not be a big problem for Filipino philosophy, because it can easily borrow them from philosophical systems abroad, after all these things constitute the strength of philosophy as Habermas had earlier suggested. Though philosophy in the Philippines is almost totally devoted to the exposition of foreign philosophical systems, what Filipino philosophy professors emphasized is the answer component of these systems, presenting in effect one canned philosophy after another. Borrowing foreign philosophical concepts, paradigms and interpretive frames means more importantly borrowing the paradigm aspects of philosophical systems from abroad. In addition to this solution, Filipino philosophy's lenders should not be limited to foreign philosophical systems. If philosophy and the social sciences share the same object of inquiry, there is no reason why philosophy could not benefit from the concepts, paradigms, theories, and interpretive frames of the social sciences. It must be remembered that the social sciences' adequate history of theorizing, conceptualizing, and imagining man, his internal world as well as his external world is an enough guarantee of their having fine materials that can be borrowed as concepts, paradigms, theories, and interpretive frames. One possibility is that the social sciences may have in fact already surpassed philosophy in conceptualizing man and his worlds. In order for philosophy, therefore, to have a clearer picture of its own subject matter, it could advantageously borrow some things from the social sciences, transcending in the process Habermas' one-sided proposal.

The second problem, the one concerning the poverty of research methodologies, is very significant one. Gone were the days when philosophy used to rely solely on library research, arm-chair reflection, and arbitrary introspection. If philosophy were to focus on man and his worlds as its object of inquiry, then it needs sharper research methodologies to capture these objects of inquiry. If philosophy may have second thoughts concerning concepts, paradigms, theories, and interpretive frames from the social sciences, definitely the former cannot assail the latter's strength in terms of research methodologies. After all, if the Comtean utopia of aligning the social sciences with the natural sciences achieve one important thing, then that thing would be the fact now that the social sciences have an arsenal of very powerful research methodologies. Thus, the author's 1999 paper concluded: "If we do not have our own tradition, and we are convinced that Filipino philosophy has to develop, then we have to shamelessly borrow the right theories and concepts from philosophy, sociology and cultural studies.... If we are to borrow theories and concepts they have to be invested as paradigms and methodologies" (Demeterio, 1999, p. 15).

That is as far as the existential status of Filipino philosophy is concerned, but about the existential status of Filipino social sciences? The Filipino sociologist Randolf David wrote a very illuminating critique entitled Ang Pagkagapos ng Agham Panlipunang Pilipino (Philippine Social Sciences in Bondage). Though the essay was published for more than 15 years now, there are reasons to believe that his observations remained very true and relevant. David lamented the fact that Filipino social sciences have difficulties in overcoming the forces exerted by its colonial past. He insists that: "tanging maka-pilipinong panlipunang pananaliksik ang dapat pagbubuhusan ng pawis at pera ng mga makabayang intelektuwal. Ito'y hindi maisasagawa hanggat hindi tayo nakakaalpas sa pagkagapos sa lubid ng mga teorya't konseptong Amerikano na patuloy na lumalason sa ating kamalayan" (Only a nationalistic social research deserves to be the sole goal of the efforts and resources of our nationalistic intellectuals. But this cannot be achieved if we cannot transcend our bondage to the American theories and concepts that continuously poison our consciousness) (David, p. 7). With a genealogical retrospect, David writes: "ang disiplina ng sosyolohiya ay ipinakilala sa Pilipinas ng mga Amerikano at pinalawak ng mga pensionadong nagsipag-aral sa Amerika. Isa sa mga pensiyonadong ito si Serafin Macaraig, ang itinuturing na unang sosyolohistang Pilipino. Ang sosyolohiyang nakuha ni Macaraig sa Amerika ay isang uri ng pag-aaral na ginamit at patuloy na ginagamit ng mga Amerikano sa paglutas sa mga praktikal na suliranin" (The discipline of sociology was introduced to the Philippines by the Americans and expounded by the pensioners who were schooled in America. One of these pensioners is Serafin Macaraig, honored as the first Filipino sociologist. The kind of sociology that Macaraig got from America is a kind of sociology that was and is used by the Americans in solving their practical problems) (David, p. 7-8). With a distinctively Marxist mind-set, David continues: "ang disiplinang ibinunga ng pagsikap na lutasin ang ganitong suliranin ay ang Amerikan Sociology na ganap na naging kasangkapan sa pagpapaunlad ng kapitalismong Amerikano. Ang batayan ng sosyolohiyang ito ay isang uri ng pagtingin sa umiiral na kaayusan ayon sa mga problema't interes ng naghaharing uring kapitalista sa Amerika" (The resultant discipline from efforts in solving these problems is the American sociology which is a tool in the development of American capitalism. The basis of this sociology is a mode of view in the prevalent order in accordance to the problems and interests of the dominant capitalist class in America) (David, p. 8). In a closer reading, David was not actually worried more on the fact that Filipino social sciences is shackled in colonial bondage, than on the fact that Filipino social sciences is bound by the same chains that held American sociology in captive. If the American social sciences serve the American dominant class well, that is fine, but that is not a guarantee that the same style of doing social sciences will serve the Filipino well. What David feared is that the continuous cultivation of the American style social sciences on Philippine soil may in effect merely continue to serve American imperialism.

At its surface, David's article seems to decry the Filipino social sciences' untrammeled importation of theories and interpretive frames. This surface interpretation seem to be backed by David's idea that any continuation of importation would mean continuation of colonial bondage. A closer reading of David, however, would reveal an entirely different sense. In the same essay, what he detested is the blinder-effect of the narrow agenda of the American social-problems-oriented social sciences and their distaste for the more continental-style of theorizing. In the bottom line, the problem is not about foreign theories, but the lack of creative as well a innovative foreign theories. This closer reading is supported by the fact that David's critique of Filipino social sciences itself is only possible through the frameworks of Marxism and Psychoanalysis, theories that are definitely imported from the European continent. However, the surface reading of David's article, that alludes to the dangers involved with the persistent use of foreign theories, remains a serious objection that cannot just be shrugged off by invoking a closer reading of the same article. In fact there are a number of respectable Filipino intellectuals, like Virgilio Enriquez, Zeus Salazar and Prospero Covar, who indeed and explicitly denounced such borrowing based on a similar premise that such persistence would only reinforce the Filipinos' colonial bondage. But the Australia based Filipino anthropologist Raul Pertierra presents a more reasonable position. "Theoretical productions, like other forms of production," he says, "is best improved by building on existing models. As Filipinists we can contribute to a conceptual dialogue by familiarizing ourselves with the reigning paradigms and testing them against our experience of Filipino society" (Pertierra, p. 28). Since western theories and concepts will be deployed as paradigms and research methodologies, they will undergo some reflective tunings to suite the Philippine reality and questions. Thus their output would not be alien anymore, but tinged with the Philippine experience.

What the deeper interpretation of David's critique of Filipino social sciences is in effect a similar linguistic poverty that plagued Filipino philosophy. If Filipino philosophy is impoverished due to its dearth of theories, paradigms and interpretive frames, Filipino social sciences is and will also be impoverished due to its colonial abhorence for theories, paradigms and interpretive frames. What Filipino social sciences needs, therefore, is a massive infusion of theories, paradigms and interpretive frames.

F. Concluding Remarks

The strength of philosophy is in its paradigm and theory, but its weakness is on research methodologies. Conversely, in the Philippine setting, the weakness of social sciences is in their paradigm and theory, but its strenght is on the research methodologies. It is along these existential considerations were an appropriate schema of the merger between philosophy and the social sciences can be finally configured. Whereas Filipino philosophy can easily import these deficiencies from philosophical systems abroad, it can only acquire its much needed research methodologies from the foreign as well as local social sciences. On the sphere of the Filipino social sciences, importation of foreign theories, paradigms and interpretive frames from continental systems would mean in the bottomline importation of these deficiencies from philosophy, since these continental systems are steeped with philosophical elements. Filipino philosophy can therefore assist the Filipino social sciences directly by mediating in the latter's systematic infusion of theories, paradigms and interpretive frame.

G. Bibliography

David, Randolf S. (1985). "Ang Pagkagapos ng Agham Panlipunang Pilipino." Eds. Allen Aganon & S. Ma. Assumpta David. New Directions in Indigenous Psychology: Sikolohiyang Pilipino: Isyu, Pananaw at Kaalaman. Manila: National Bookstore.

Demeterio, Feorillo III A. (1996). Introduction to the Philosophy of Man. Mimeographed Textbook for San Beda College.

Demeterio, Feorillo III A. (1997) A. "Thesis Research and Writing for the Senior Philosophy/HRD Students of San Beda College." Scientia. Pp. 16-52.

Demeterio, Feorillo III A. (1999). "Re-Reading Emerita Quito's Thoughts Concerning the Underdevelopment of Filipino Philosophy." Scientia. Pp. 1-24.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg (1975). Truth and Method. New York: Seabury Press.

Habermas, Jurgen (1987) "Philosophy as Stand-in and Interpreter," Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman & Thomas McCarthy, Eds. After Philosophy: End or Transformation? Cambridge: MIT Press.

Judovitz, Dalia. "Philosophy and Poetry: The Difference Between Them in Plato and Descartes," Anthony Cascardi, Ed. Literature and the Question of Philosophy. London: John Hopkins University Press.

Kuhn, Thomas (1996). The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Livingston, Paisley (1992). "Literature and Knowledge," Jonathan Dancy & Ernest Sosa, Eds. A Companion to Epistemology. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.

Lofgren, Orvar, "On the Anatomy of Culture."

Pertierra, Raul. (1999). "The Practice of Theory and the Theory of Practice: Its Relevance for Philippine Studies," Diliman Review, Vol. 37, No. 4, p. 28.

Quito, Emerita (1993). "Pilosopiyang Filipino," Ensayklopidiya ng Pilosopiya. Manila: De La Salle University Press, pp. 187-195.

Quito, Emerita (1982). Teaching and Research of Philosophy in the Philippines. UNESCO commissioned paper.