The aircraft production inside Romania was also gaining momentum, although it still needed time to reach its maximum capacity.In the spring of 1940, 160 more aircraft arrived in Romania, according with contracts signed earlier. ARR had grown into the strongest airforce in the South-Eastern Europe ( except for the Soviet Union ). The order of battle known as " Hypothesis 32" stated that in June 1940 the ARR had 556 more or less modern planes in its arsenal : 92 fighters, 113 bombers, 35 long-range reconnaissance aircraft, 214 reconnaissance and army cooperation aircraft, 28 seaplanes. Liaison and transport planes made up the rest. Orders for 558 more aircraft were given to the major Romanian aircraft manufacturers : IAR and SET.

However, all was not well. With so many aircraft types in service, produced in various countries ( Romania Germany, Italy, Poland, France and Britain ! ) its no wonder that spare parts were a problem and maintenance was difficult even in peace time. Records show that only 75% to 80% of all planes were actually ready for action at any given time. One other problem was the fact that ARR was still organized after the French model into mixed groups. These groups contained both fighters and bombers ( or reconnaissance aircraft ) which made coordination difficult and sometimes created confusion about what was the group's real mission. French influence was also present in areas such as pilot training, fighter and bomber tactics and operational doctrine.

In November 1940, after Romania had joined the Axis, Luftwaffe elements arrived in Romania for the first time. Eventually a reinforced air defense division with 2 flak regiments, one fighter group, liaison units as well as engineer units tasked with building air raid shelters and airfields. All of these were placed under the command of Lt. General Wilhelm Speidel and had two main tasks : to protect the Ploiesti oilfields against any possible Soviet or British air attacks and to train ARR personnel accordingly. German instructors set up their base at Pipera airfield and started to train Romanian fighter and bomber pilots. Particular attention was paid to Celulã ( Romanian for Rotte ) and patrol tactics for fighter pilots and bombing techniques for bomber pilots. Once Hitler took the decision to attack the Soviet Union, the Germans decided that more training was necessary to bring ARR personnel up to Luftwaffe standards, since Romania was considered right from the start as an active ally in the coming war. German modern planes were delivered and their crews were sent to Germany for a two-months training course. ARR was reorganized after the Luftwaffe model, creating fighter, bomber and reconnaissance units, each with clear missions. Between October 1940 and June 1941, a total of 1500 airmen and 500 flak troops were fully-trained in Romania or Germany.

In mid June 1941 Gruparea Aerianã de Luptã ( meaning "Aerial Combat Grouping"), abbreviated as GAL, was created for the coming offensive. It incorporated the very best planes and pilots the ARR had to offer : almost all the available bombers ( 4 bomber groups totaling 11 squadrons ) and most of the fighters ( 3 fighter groups totaling 8 squadrons ). The GAL was divided into 4 flotillas and, with its 253 aircraft, represented the main striking force of the ARR throughout the Bassarabian campaign ( although just 205 planes were ready for battle on June the 22nd 1941 ). In order to ensure the air defense of Romanian territory, two Air Regions were created : the 2nd and 3rd Air Regions. Obsolete fighters ( such as the PZL P-11's and P-24E's ) were kept behind the front to cover these Air Region.

The tables below shows the full battle order of ARR at the start of Operation Barbarossa :

The "Aerial Combat Grouping" was incorporated into Luftflotte IV ( the German 4th Air Flotilla ) and on June the 22nd it entered combat alongside the rest of ARR's forces. Luftflotte IV had some 400 planes and the ARR about 672. On the other side, the VVS ( the Soviet airforce ) had concentrated forces which, at least on paper appeared to be far superior. The 67th, 69th and 82nd Bomber Regiments were based in southern Bassarabia, on airfields near the cities of Bolgrad and Bulgarica. Further to the north were situated the bases of the 55th Fighter Regiment, the 45th Bomber Regiment ( around Tiraspol and Balti ) as well as the 87th, 187th,149th Fighter and the 86th and 224th Bomber regiments. Altogether, the VVS could call upon some 1300 fighters, bombers, reconnaissance planes and various other types of aircraft.

At midnight ( zero hours ) on Sunday the 22nd of June, 1941, a message came to GAL's headquarters : " The actions of our airforce on the east front will begin as agreed with the German command, on the dawn of June the 22nd 1941. Directive number 34 will be executed. Operations will be organized so that the ( temporary ) border will be crossed simultaneously by all bomber and reconnaissance formations at 4 o'clock in the morning, under the codename "Ardealul". The fighters will be on alert starting from dawn, flying defensive patrols. I shall await your report tomorrow, that being today in the morning, after the first sorties have been flown...". GAL's commanding officer, General Constantin Celareanu, responded immediately : " GAL is ready and able to execute Directive number 34 ".

For start, the ARR had to win air supremacy over Bassarabia and Bucovina, as well as to attack Soviet airfields, troop concentrations and supply depots. Between the 22nd of June and the 4th of July, wrestling control of the skies was ARR's primary concern. This was achieved thanks to the efforts of Romanian Bf-109E's, IAR-80's and Hurricanes, which quickly proved to be far superior to VVS's main fighter, the I-16 Rata ( the Russian plane was nicknamed"the rat" ). After this, emphasis was switched to flying close air support missions in support of ground forces. This phase ended by the 19th of July, when the ARR started to concentrate on attacking retreating Soviet troops.

There was fierce combat behind the frontline as well. In the first days of the war, the VVS tried to launch numerous raids ( although each one was carried out only by a handful of planes ) deep into Romanian territory. The main targets were the Constantza harbor, the strategically vital bridge over the Danube at Cernavoda, the capital, Bucharest, and, last but not least, the all-important oilfields and refineries around Ploiesti. However, since the raids had adopted a predictable pattern ( almost always coming from the Black Sea, in daytime ) and were carried out by obsolete planes, flying at very limit of their combat range, little or no damage has been done to any target. The Romanian and German pilots tasked with air defense also took advantage of this situation and managed to score an impressive number of kills.

On the 16th of October, the Romanian army marched into Odessa, and ARR's first campaign could be considered over on all fronts.

In the 118 days of this first campaign, the ARR had flown more than 17000 sorties, many of which faced bad weather. 217 air battles took place during this period over the skies of Bassarabia and Romania, and 82 Soviet planes were sent down in flames. Romanian fighters and bombers also destroyed 108 VVS aircraft on the ground, whilst the AA artillery shot down 52 more, bringing the total to 242 planes destroyed. Romanian pilots actually claimed 332 victories in the air and more than 150 planes destroyed on the ground ( more than 600 airplanes if we count those claimed by flak ) , but this seems to be exaggerated. ARR lost 43 planes ( 7 shot down by enemy fighters, 4 by AA artillery, 18 missing and 13 destroyed on accidents ). Human losses stood at 35 airmen killed in action and 82 missing in action, which was 6.8% of total.

During the siege of Odessa, Romanian pilots claimed to have shot down a total of 215 Soviet planes and destroyed 51 more on the ground. Bomber pilots managed to sink one Russian warship and crippled two more. 40 ARR aircraft were lost for various reasons.

However, combat experience showed ARR leaders they still had some problems to work out. One major issue was the lack of dedicated ground-attack aircraft, which hampered efforts to support ground troops. Also, the variety of aircraft types in service led to a lot of maintenance problems. Because most airfields were not very close to the frontline, ARR's performance, although good, wasn't as good as it could have been.