CHAPTER XII
THE WITHDRAWAL FROM EUROPE
5th-25th June, 1940

I very much believe that England. .. will finish by having nearly all Europe her enemies.
Nelson to Sir Gilbert Elliot. 16^th May 1796.

THE rescue of the original British Expeditionary Force was by no means the end of the evacuations from western Europe, and control of the narrow seas and of the approaches to these islands continued, during the remainder of June 1940, to be of paramount importance to the rescue of large numbers of British and Allied troops and civilians from the onrush of the enemy's land forces.

After the evacuation of the main British Expeditionary Force and the surrender of all the French forces north of the Somme the enemy was free to turn south and attack the defensive positions which the French had taken up on a line which broadly followed the courses of the rivers Somme and Aisne and continued to the Maginot Line forts in the east. The new German offensive started on the 5th of June. Using far greater forces than those which now remained to the French the enemy broke through in a number of places. The Maginot Line was outflanked and the French defence disintegrated. Paris fell on the 14th of June and the great ports of Cherbourg, Brest and Nantes were plainly threatened by the deep penetrations made by the German armoured divisions. On the 17th of June the French Government, in which Marshal Petain had succeeded M. Reynaud, asked for an armistice. On the 22nd a surrender was signed, by whose terms the entire French coastline from the Belgian to the Spanish frontier passed into enemy hands, and the French fleet was to be 'collected in ports to be specified, demobilised and disarmed under German or Italian control'.

It had been the policy of the British War Cabinet to return the B.E.F. to France as soon as it could be reorganised and re-equipped. There were already two divisions in France. The 1st Armoured and the 51st (Highland) Divisions had been to the south of the Somme when the Germans broke through to the coast at Abbeville, and they had become separated from the rest of the British forces under Lord Gort. There were also about 150,000 men employed at bases or on the lines of communications, many of whom were now no longer required. It was decided firstly to evacuate all those who were no longer needed in France, and to remove as much of the surplus stores and equipment as possible. The fighting formations remained under French orders. The 52nd Division was sent to France as re-inforcements, and the movement across of the 1st Canadian Division was started.

The French surrender, when it came, produced the need immediately to bring back the British fighting formations as well as all the base troops. The reconstituted forces of our Czech and Polish allies had also, if possible, to be rescued, and many thousands of British and Allied civilians saved from capture and internment.

An operation called 'Aerial' was therefore planned with the purpose of bringing home all the remainder of the British Expeditionary Force from the ports of north-western France. It quickly had to be extended to every important port as far south as the Spanish frontier. Coming so soon after the prodigious effort of Dunkirk and the serious losses suffered during those nine days of unremitting toil and hazard, these new evacuations placed a further strain on the already over-taxed forces of the southern naval commands. The flotilla vessels necessary to provide proper escorts for all the troopships simply did not exist. But control of the narrow seas and of the western and south-western approaches to these islands could still be exercised by virtue of the broad influence of our maritime power represented by the Home Fleet at Scapa Flow, by the local operations of the light forces stationed in the south and by our home-based air power. It has already been mentioned that the German fleet at this time possessed insufficient surface strength wherewith to dispute that control. In fact Admiral Raeder did not attempt to use his few surviving ships for that purpose. But it does seem remarkable that the seven U-boats which, it is now known, the enemy sent to work on the routes between the ports of western France and our home bases should have been totally unsuccessful in disputing our control of those routes. Such, however, was the case. It thus happened that we were able to bring back to these islands nearly 200,000 more British and Allied troops, besides many civilians, and to save as well a considerable quantity of military equipment and transport.

A minor operation which can conveniently be considered as part of the new series of evacuations was the blocking of the port of Dieppe, for which plans had to be made very hastily. Once more Captain G. A. Garnons-Williams was in command in the destroyer Vega and, on the 10^th of June, two out of his three blockships were successfully sunk in the approach channel, though the mining of the third ship just outside prevented the blocking of the inner entrance to the port.

But before Dieppe had been blocked troops were being embarked at Havre. The plan for Operation 'Cycle', as it was called, followed the same general lines as its many similar predecessors, and a demolition party had accordingly been sent across before the end of May. The enemy started to bomb the port and town early in June and on the 7th did a great deal of damage. The order was given to start embarkation on the 9th, and Admiral Sir William James, the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, on that day sent the destroyer-leader Codrington, six more British and two Canadian destroyers, and a number of smaller warships to meet off the coast in the very early hours of the 10th. Large numbers of schuyts and small craft were also sent across, beach parties were landed and senior naval officers appointed to take charge afloat and on shore in the port. After a twenty-four-hour postponement the work proceeded smoothly, except for the damage and dislocation caused by the enemy's bombing. On the 11th the personnel vessel Bruges was destroyed by air attack, but next day strong patrols of home-based fighters were sent across, and the enemy bombers then kept clear. The heaviest lift was made on the night of the 12th-13th, and by dawn on the latter day the evacuation was completed. Of 11,059 British troops embarked at Havre nearly 9,000 were taken direct to Cherbourg.

Meanwhile the French force of which the 51st Division formed a part had been separated from the main French armies by an enemy thrust which captured Rouen and the lower Seine. The 51st Division fell back with the French towards Havre, sending part of the division ahead to cover the port. These reached their destination and were later evacuated, but the remainder of the French and British forces were cut off by German armoured divisions which turned north from Rouen and reached the coast near St Valery-en-Caux.

Admiral James had arrived at Havre on the 10th of June and quickly realised that evacuations might be necessary from one or more of the small ports further east. He therefore sent destroyers along the coast to reconnoitre, and it was an ominous sign that they came under fire from enemy guns installed on the cliffs near St Valery .The Ambuscade was damaged by them that evening. Admiral James signalled home that he expected that large numbers of men would have to be taken off from St Valery, and he made his preparations accordingly. The 51^st Division and the French were moving there at this time, but roads were congested and progress slow. As they took up defensive positions to cover evacuation enemy tanks broke through to the cliffs which commanded the little port and the beaches. The rescue plainly had to be done that night, if at all.

At 6 p.m. Admiral James accordingly told the Codrington that 'evacuation from St Valery is to commence this evening'. Two hours later the commander of the 51st Division reported that this night would probably offer the last chance. All his men who could be extricated and spared from the perimeter moved to the beaches and the harbour, all of which were under enemy fire. There they waited throughout the night - but no ships came in. Towards dawn the General had to move them back into the town, and at 7.30a.m.on 11th he signalled to Admiral James that there was still 'a faint possibility of withdrawal...being accomplished' the next night. The Admiral replied that fog had prevented the ships from getting in the night before and that every effort would be made next night. But it was too late. The French General had ordered a surrender, and although the 51st Division held on for some hours longer, and even started a last attempt to dislodge the enemy from the cliffs, there could now be only one end. Some 6,000 men of the Highland Division, including Divisional Headquarters, were forced to lay down their arms - the only instance during this campaign where a considerable body of British troops fell back to the sea but could not be rescued.

Though a great fleet of 67 merchant ships and 140 small craft had been assembled, most of them lacked wireless equipment, and the fog made it impossible to control them by visual signals. Only at Veules, at the eastern end of the perimeter, were any number of men taken off and that, too, was done under heavy fire. In all 2,137 British and 1,184 French troops were rescued. So ended a sad episode - sad because of the splendid quality of the troops involved and the narrow margin by which their rescue was frustrated. Had they arrived twenty-four hours earlier all might have been well. Again the destroyers led the operation and again it was they who bore the chief brunt of the enemy air attacks. The Bulldog, Boadicea and Ambuscade were all damaged in Operation 'Cycle'.

The decision to bring home the remainder of the British Expeditionary Force (Operation 'Aerial') was taken on the 15th of June. The ports of Cherbourg, St Malo, Brest, St Nazaire and La Pallice were to be used; the evacuations from the first two were to be directed by Admiral James from Portsmouth while Admiral Dunbar-Nasmith, Commander-in-Chief, Western Approaches, directed the remainder from Plymouth. This time it was hoped to embark transport, guns and equipment as well as the men.

Admiral James considered that he had far too few flotilla vessels to organise a convoy system. He therefore arranged for a continuous flow of independently-routed troopships, motor-transport and store-ships to sail between Southampton and Cherbourg or St Malo, while coasters crossed from Poole and schuyts from Weymouth. The few available warships patrolled the shipping routes. Between the 15th and 17th most of the 52nd Division embarked at Cherbourg, and on the 18th 'Norman Force', a composite force of various formations, arrived and followed suit. Meanwhile demolition of the fuel reserves at Caen and in the port was started, two destroyers covered the withdrawal of the rearguard and home-based fighters patrolled overhead. Late on the afternoon of the 18th the last bodies of men embarked and the last transport sailed. In all some 30,630 men were brought home, including the 9,000 already taken to Cherbourg from Havre. This time the enemy's air power was successfully kept in check and no ships were damaged. Meanwhile embarkation had also been proceeding at St Malo, whence the 1st Canadian Division sailed for home on the 16th. By the evening of the 17th 21,474 men had been embarked without loss and, early next day, the final search was made for stragglers. Demolitions were continued until the enemy’s advanced troops were almost at the gates of St Malo.

While Admiral James was thus concluding the evacuations organised from Portsmouth, which had started so unhappily at St Valery but ended more successfully, his colleague at Plymouth was organising the even larger rescues from the ports of the Biscay coast. On the 16th of June British naval officers arrived at Brest and St Nazaire to take charge of the embarkations. The Admiralty attached particular importance to the departure from Brest of the new and nearly completed French battleship Richelieu.

Though neither the French authorities nor the headquarters of the British Expeditionary Force realised at first the need to get the troops embarked without delay - the latter was in fact planning to leave in ten to fourteen days' time - the Cabinet ordered the operation to start on the 16th of June.

Some personnel ships were already in the port and Admiral Dunbar-Nasmith was sending over more, including the large liners Arandora Star, Strathaird and Otranto. Numbers of small craft were also assembled in west country ports, though the need to use them did not this time arise.

Embarkation started as soon as the order was given from London, and proceeded rapidly. On the 17th the senior naval officer at Brest was told that the job must be finished that evening and, after a very busy and rather confused day, he succeeded in getting all the troops embarked and the shipping away within the prescribed time. Some ships which were not completely filled were sent south to St Nazaire, while others returned home. The evacuation was actually ended prematurely. Had it continued for another twenty-four hours many more vehicles and a greater quantity of stores could have been loaded in the motor-transport and storeships. But our intelligence was at fault in believing the enemy to be much nearer than he actually was. As regards men, complete success was accomplished. The total of British fighting men embarked was 28,145, a large number of whom belonged to the Royal Air Force. In addition 4,439 Allied soldiers were rescued, making a total of 32,584 from Brest. The ships which carried these large numbers to safety suffered no losses at all. It is, however, to be remarked that the enemy's air activity over Brest during the evacuation was confined to occasional minelaying, which caused inconvenience and some delays while channels were swept by the trawlers sent over for that purpose but had little effect on the operation as a whole. Had the Luftwaffe's heavy bombers intervened the story might well have ended differently. All the troopships had to be routed home independently as no flotilla vessels were available to escort them, but the enemy's submarines took no greater part than his bombers in disputing control of the sea routes home from Brest.

On the 18th, the day following the end of the evacuation, demolitions were carried out in the port by the French in co-operation with a British party, and at 4 p.m. that afternoon the French fleet sailed. Unfortunately most of the ships steered south to Casablanca and Dakar; a few came to British ports to carry on the fight. By the 19th the great naval base was clear of shipping and the demolition party was withdrawn in the destroyer Broke.

Evacuations from St Nazaire proceeded concurrently with those from Brest, but presented peculiar difficulties owing to the strong tides and navigational hazards of the River Loire. Moreover the second new French battleship, the Jean Bart, was in the St Nazaire dockyard, and it was unthinkable that she should fall into the enemy's hands intact. It was believed that between 40,000 and 60,000 British and Allied troops were retreating towards Nantes, which lies some fifty miles up the river from St Nazaire. Since navigational and tidal difficulties were bound to render embarkation slow it was decided to make a start on the morning of the 16th of June. Three destroyers - the Havelock (Captain E. B. K. Stevens, commanding the 9th Destroyer Flotilla), Wolverine and Beagle - were then present and the liners Georgic, Duchess of York, Batory and Sobieski (both Polish) were already waiting in Quiberon Bay, some twenty miles north-west of the Loire estuary, where there was a good anchorage for large ships but anti-submarine defences were wholly lacking. On the 15th Admiral Nasmith ordered across the liner Lancastria and a number of cargo ships. A large concentration of valuable shipping was thus assembled in or near Quiberon Bay, highly, if unavoidably, exposed to air or submarine attack. After a short delay, caused by enemy aircraft mining the channel, embarkation started on the afternoon of the 16th and, by the evening of that day, about 13,000 base troops with their stores and transport had been got on board four liners and certain cargo ships. The Georgic, Duchess of York and the two Polish liners then sailed for home.

That day the enemy's bombers attacked the shipping in Quiberon Bay, but only succeeded in damaging the liner Franconia. Loading of stores proceeded during the night, and more ships were sent across from England or down from Brest by Admiral Nasmith. The destroyers Highlander and Vanoc also joined the flotilla under Captain Stevens.

The next day, the 17th, revealed a scene of great activity with flotilla vessels and small craft, French as well as British, ferrying troops out to the big ships waiting in the roads, while still more ships were arriving to play their part, and our fighters patrolled in the sky. A successful morning's work produced high hopes of accomplishing yet another successful evacuation without loss. But this was not to be. At 3.35 p.m. there was a heavy air attack and the Lancastria, which had embarked 5,800 troops, was hit, caught fire and sank fifteen minutes later with great loss of life. About 3,000 men perished in the waters of the Loire-the most grievous single loss suffered during all these hazardous operations. It is not clear why so many lives were lost from a ship which sank fairly slowly in a crowded roadstead. True there were not enough lifebelts for the exceptional numbers embarked, and the waters were covered by a film of burning oil fuel, but the Master of the Lancastria has testified that no panic occurred, and small craft were certainly present in some numbers. An anti-submarine trawler, the Cambridgeshire, saw the ship struck and went at once to her assistance. She estimated that she rescued between 900 and 1,000 men. Why more of the small ships did not follow suit is obscure, but as enemy air raids were almost continuous between 3.45 and 4.30 p.m. they may have been so busy defending themselves and their consorts that they never realised what had happened to the Lancastria. But it is unlikely that the full reasons for the tragedy will ever be completely explained. Mr Churchill has told how it came about that the news of it was so long withheld.

In spite of these losses the embarkation proceeded during the afternoon and evening and on into the night of the 17th. Soon after dawn on the 18th a convoy of ten ships with 23,000 men on board sailed for Plymouth. Only 4,000 men now remained ashore.

Reports of the speed of the enemy's advance were, as at Brest, greatly exaggerated and this led to a decision to hasten the end of the evacuation. At 11 a.m. on the 18th twelve ships sailed in convoy with the last troops and by early afternoon the operation was ended, except for the usual search for stragglers by small craft. Again the end was premature and again much more transport and equipment could have been saved had we possessed accurate intelligence of the enemy's movements.

At noon on the 18th the destroyer Vanquisher arrived with Vice-Admiral T. J. Hallett on board. He had been sent over to ensure that the Jean Bart sailed or, if necessary, was destroyed. The French base and dockyard staff worked hard to get the great ship undocked and away early on the 19th; they intended to destroy her themselves if that could not be accomplished. Admiral Hallett sent tugs ahead to help with the undocking and waited anxiously in Quiberon Bay. Though the battleship was late in reaching the rendezvous with the Vanquisher she finally turned up with a French destroyer escort. Admiral Hallett remained in company until she had turned south - for Casablanca.

Meanwhile, on the same afternoon, Admiral Nasmith heard that 8,000 Polish troops were waiting at St Nazaire. He at once sent seven transports and six destroyers for them. But only 2,000 men were, in fact, there and much of the shipping so urgently collected was therefore hazarded needlessly. Embarkation thus actually continued from St Nazaire for a full forty-eight hours after its official end. In all 57,235 troops, of whom 54,411 were British and 2,764 Allied, were brought home from St Nazaire and Nantes.

Well before the last man had been lifted from St Nazaire evacuations had started from La Pallice which, with the adjacent ports of Rochefort and La Rochelle, forms an important naval base. On the 16th the British senior naval officer for the port arrived by destroyer; but no personnel ships had entered by the next morning to embark the 10,000 troops whom Admiral Nasmith had been told to expect there. The ships had, in fact, been diverted to Brest or St Nazaire. Accordingly cargo ships were requisitioned and the waiting troops embarked at once in them; all their transport was abandoned. The convoy sailed very early on the 18th but, once again, the evacuation was ended too early. The Commander-in-Chief, hearing that more troops were expected, then sent ships south from Brest and embarkation was resumed on the evening of the 19th. In spite of air raids 4,000 Polish troops left that night. On the 20th it again appeared that the job had been completed; but again reports of further arrivals reached the Commander-in-Chief, who once more sent transports and destroyers to fetch them. Actually very few were found at this third attempt, and the shipping collected for them was finally diverted still further south to the ports of the River Gironde. It is easy to see how greatly the difficulties were increased by the faulty information on which Admiral Nasmith had to work. In all 2,303 British and a large number of Polish troops were brought back from La Pallice.

This evacuation actually completed the plan to withdraw the B.E.F. originally visualised in Operation 'Aerial'; but the collapse of French resistance and the request for an armistice made still more rescue work essential with the least possible delay if the last of the Allied troops, much valuable shipping and all British civilian refugees, embassy and legation staffs were not to fall into the enemy's hands. These last and hastily improvised operations began from the ports of the River Gironde and moved finally to Bayonne and St Jean-de-Luz near to the Spanish frontier.

To get some sort of organisation started in these ports the cruiser Arethusa arrived at Le Verdon from Gibraltar on the evening of the 16th of June while the destroyer Berkeley, which had brought over from England all the senior naval officers for the ports and distributed them down the coast, went up the river to Bordeaux to act as wireless link. All British and some Allied shipping was cleared from the port the next day and the embarkation of refugees commenced. Admiral Nasmith had meanwhile diverted to the Gironde sufficient shipping to lift the Allied troops (chiefly Polish and Czech), whose arrival on the coast had long been expected but whose movements were by no means clear to the Commander-in-Chief at Plymouth. Dramatic meetings were now taking place in Bordeaux, where the First Lord (Mr A. V. Alexander), the First Sea Lord and Lord Lloyd had arrived from England to endeavour to persuade Admiral Darlan to move the whole French fleet - including the ships still in the Mediterranean ports - out of the enemy's reach. Mr Churchill has told the story of this unsuccessful mission.

During the 18th and 19th ships were sailed with some thousands of refugees and Allied troops, but the majority of the former had already been diverted to Bayonne. The British Embassy and consular staffs came down river from Bordeaux, many of them in the Berkeley, on the 19th and embarked in the Arethusa. The Ambassador himself, Sir Ronald Campbell, stayed at Bordeaux for a few more days, but on the 23rd he left for Arcachon. He eventually sailed for England from St Jean de Luz in the Galatea (flagship of Rear-Admiral A. T. B. Curteis, commanding the 2nd Cruiser Squadron). The Arethusa returned home on the 20th with the President of Poland and many of his Ministers on board.

Meanwhile embarkations continued at Le Verdon and, early on the 20th, Rear-Admiral F. Burges-Watson arrived in the destroyer Beagle with a demolition party for Bordeaux, and steamed at once up the river. His chief object was the destruction of the great oil stocks at the port, but difficulties arose at once with the French authorities and were accentuated when, on the 22nd, the armistice terms became known. They then firmly refused to allow any demolitions to be carried out. Admiral Burges-Watson was about to use surprise to fulfil his orders when the Admiralty cancelled them. Three days later the Admiralty ordered Admiral Nasmith to send a destroyer force to Bordeaux to destroy the oil stocks, but again it was cancelled, this time by decision of the Cabinet.

Meanwhile the embarkations at Le Verdon were not progressing entirely smoothly, since most of the Polish troops had arrived at this port instead of at Bayonne where the shipping was now awaiting them. Admiral Nasmith took rapid steps to bring the ships and the soldiers together and, by the morning of the 23rd, the last 6,000 Poles had been embarked and the personnel vessels sailed.

On the 19th of June Admiral Nasmith sent four large liners - the Batory and Sobieski (Polish), the Ettrick and Arandora - to Bayonne for the refugees known to be assembling there and for the Polish troops believed to be moving towards that port. During the next two days some 9,000 of the latter embarked and sailed in the two Polish transports, but it was then decided to shift the evacuation to St Jean-de-Luz where the port facilities were better. Meanwhile ample shipping to accommodate the remaining refugees and Polish troops had arrived from home, or from the Gironde ports. But bad weather delayed progress with the embarkation until the 24th, when the French authorities ordered that, on account of the armistice terms, all evacuations must cease by noon on the 25th. At 2.30 that afternoon the last troopship sailed for home. In all about 19,000 soldiers - almost all Polish - were brought home from Bayonne and St Jean-de-Luz.

That evening a sad accident occurred. While manoevering, the anti-aircraft cruiser Calcutta, to which Admiral Curteis had transferred his flag, rammed and sank the Canadian destroyer Fraser with heavy loss of life. But all the other troopships and warships arrived home safely.

While these evacuations were in progress on the Biscay coast large numbers of refugees and some Czech and Polish troops had assembled at various places on the south coast of France. On the 23rd of June the Admiralty ordered that as many as possible should be embarked in whatever shipping could be collected for the purpose, and taken to Gibraltar. Two destroyers of the Mediterranean Fleet were sent to organise the work, which was finished by the following midnight. Some 10,000 Allied troops and civilians, mostly crammed in small cargo ships, were carried to Gibraltar between the 24th and 26th of June and thence, ultimately, to the United Kingdom.

It will be appropriate to conclude the story of the withdrawal from Europe by telling how, in accordance with a recent Cabinet decision to bring to England all men of military age, women, and children from the Channel Islands, embarkation was started there on the 19th of June and continued till the 22nd. All types of ships from large liners down to small craft were used, and the operation was conducted by Admiral James from Portsmouth in conjunction with the Home Office. By the 23rd of June it was known that all who wished to leave the islands had done so and the evacuation was ended. In all 22,656 persons were removed under the official scheme, but a good many more probably used private transport. The shipping sailed unescorted, but the enemy made no attempt to interfere. On the 30th the Germans landed in the Channel Islands and, for the first time for many centuries, a part of the British Isles passed temporarily under enemy rule. But this sad event was undoubtedly necessary: the Admiralty had insisted that the islands could not be supported while the enemy held the whole of the adjacent French coast.

Thus ended not only Operation 'Aerial' for the withdrawal of the remainder of the B.E.F. but a number of other hastily organised and extemporised evacuations of a like nature. In the main they were successfully carried out and the losses suffered were astonishingly small. The evacuation from Dunkirk so impressed the free world, and has remained so long and so justly in the thoughts and imagination of its people, that the scope and scale of the series of operations described in this chapter seems never to have been fully realised.

In Operations 'Cycle' and 'Aerial' 191,870 fighting men were I brought to England, of whom 144,171 were British, 18,246 French, 24,352 Polish, 4,938 Czech and 163 Belgian. If to this figure is added the totals for the preliminary evacuations from Dunkirk (27,936) and that for Operation 'Dynamo' (337,829), a final figure of 558,032 men is reached. Of this total 368,491 were British and 189,541 Allied troops. Moreover a large number of civilians also safely reached home from many different starting points. Except for the Channel Islands (22,656) no accurate assessment of the civilian total can be given, but it is known that some 10,000 passed through Gibraltar from French Mediterranean ports. It therefore seems likely that between 30,000 and 40,000 British subjects also reached their homeland at this time. Furthermore, though much equipment was abandoned, and some of it needlessly, no less than 310 guns, 2,292 vehicles and 1,800 tons of stores were saved. The effects of this prodigious rescue on the course of the war are incalculable. The small scale on which the enemy reacted was, indeed, remarkable, but it must be remembered that many of the Luftwaffe's bombers had been withdrawn to prepare for the assault on Britain.

But it was not only for the rescue of the soldiers that these operations deserve to be remembered. The psychological impact upon the free peoples was immense, for it had been shown that Hitler's all-conquering armies could be denied the full fruits of their land victories by the skilful and determined application of maritime power. In the United States, whose President and people had been watching with breathless absorption the progress of the struggle in Europe, the effects were profound and undoubtedly contributed to the readiness with which great and generous help was soon to be given to a sorely pressed but wholly determined Britain.

Thus were the ports and estuaries of the French Biscay coast, through which the Navy had in 1814 supplied Wellington's Army advancing from Spain, used to embark the last British fighting men from Europe a century and a quarter later. And the foothills of the western Pyrenees which, after twenty years of war, had seen the long-awaited invasion of Napoleon's France by one British army, now saw the complete withdrawal of another.