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Appendices
Dualists
Against Their Will: the Philosophy of Mind
of R.Tallis, R.Sperry, T.Nagel, J.Levine, C.McGinn,
G.Strawson
Scientistic-materialistic
prejudices exert powerful pressure upon philosophers who feel
unsatisfactoriness of materialism, but strive to maintain scientific
respectability and shun anything that somehow associates with religion. Since
1970th years, quite a few interesting philosophers formulated important
considerations and arguments directed against materialism; however some of them
continue to call themselves materialists and express the hope that materialism
nevertheless can be true, or even the belief that it should be true despite our
inability to understand how it is possible; some others call themselves
materialists while substituting the meaning of the concept
"materialism"; yet others search for a middle way between materialism
and dualism... The most interesting is so-called “misterianism” (T.Nagel,
C.McGinn, J.Levine) – the view that the mind should be property of the brain
though we are unable to understand how it is possible; it or either impossible
at all or demands some vast conceptual revolution which will radically change
our understanding both of mind and physical reality.
The maintenance of such
belief is much dependent on use (in discussions about the mind) of the concept
'physical' without clear definition of its content. Such use allows to assert
that the mind may be (or even should be) something physical despite
whatever arguments against this statement. It seems that arguments clearly
testify against physicalism (materialism); but misterians try to interpret this
situation epistemologically – as inadequacy to the tast of understanding
the mind of all modern reductionist approaches, or even human cognitive
capabilities generally – and to avoid the ontological (metaphysical) conclusion
about falsity of materialism.
In this Appendix I will
discuss some of the most interesting and popular theories such “dualists
against their will”.
Raymond Tallis and the Ghost in the
Machine
Raymond Tallis
(physician-neurologist, philosopher and cultural critic) in the excellent book “Aping
Mankind: Neuromania, Darwinitis and Misrepresentation of Humanity” fights
“Neuromania” (“the appeal to the brain, as revealed through the latest science,
to explain our behaviour” (P.5)) and “Darwinitis” (“an inflamed mode of
Darwinian thought” (P.5)), as well and scientism
(“the mistaken belief that the natural sciences (physics, chemistry,
biology and their derivatives) can or will give a complete description and even
explanation of everything, including human life” (P.15)) generally. Instead,
Tallis works (on my judgment, very successfully) to “develop an image of
humanity that is richer and truer to our distinctive nature than that of
exceptionally gifted chimp” (P.10). This distinctive nature may be summarized
by the statement that man is “the animal who does things explicitly and whose
natural medium is a community of minds extending geographically across the
globe and historically into the accumulated consciousness of the human race.”
(P.157)
Programmatic thesis of
the book, in yet one quotation: “…it's a mistake to pick out more elevated or
spiritual modes of behaviour, such as writing sonnets or composing a symphonies
or investigating the laws of nature or believing in God. …it suggests that our
differences are only marginal: evident in the top 4 per cent of our behaviours.
After all, few of us spend much time writing sonnets and most none at all. If
my difference from beasts depended on my ability to write symphonies or to
worship a god then I would not make the grade. … The point is that our
difference from beasts is wall to wall, permeating every moment of our day. We
are as remote from animals when we queue for tickets for a pop concert as when
we write a sublime symphony.” (P.150) In the book (as well as in many other his
books) Tallis masterly unfolds this thesis.
Among other things,
Tallis does much in a way of partial explanation of evolutionary development of
mind (consciousness) by revealing those bodily changes which prompted and
directed evolution from animal to human
minds.
But Tallis’ evolutionary
explanation of mind’s development is
not explanation of existence of the mind (of subjects,
bearers of mind, selves) – either human or animal. It is important to clearly
distinguish these two questions:
1. Given subjects able to have subjective experiences, what prompts
and directs development and enrichment of
these abilities (of subjective realm, mind, consciousness)?
and
2. Given the purely physical reality, how can it produce subjects able
to have subjective experiences? How these subjects can get into existence?
Tallis gives a good
account with respect to the first question; but it leaves the second in the
state that “may require us to see that it is more than a problem, or even to
see that it is more than "a hard problem". It is a mystery”. (P.145)
With respect to the
second question, Tallis’ emphatically argues: “The very notion of a complete
account of the world in physical terms is of a world without appearance and
hence a world without consciousness”. (P.143) And it is certainly not the image
of the world Tallis approves. He is well aware of “absurd position you get into
when you assert that the sum total of reality is physical reality”. (P.133) To summarize: “human beings are not
simply organisms but rather are embodied
subjects”. (P.109)
At the same time, Tallis
qualifies himself as “non-dualist atheist” (P.59) and emphatically objects
against “the (incorrect) notion that the only alternative to accepting that the
mind is identical with, or caused by, brain activity is dualism” (PP.89-90),
“dualism that holds not only that we are ghosts in a machine but that there is
"mind" free-floating in the world between bodies”. (P.229)
A can but wonder about
these objections. ‘Dualism’ means the
view that the mind is not identical with the brain activity and, generally,
with any physical processes whatever. The view that “human beings are not
simply organisms but rather are embodied
subjects” is the view which Gilbert Ryle depreciatingly dubbed by the
phrase “the ghost in the machine”.
And in traditional philosophical terms it is called “substance dualism”. So,
Tallis’ objections against dualism remind me of the widow who has flogged
herself (from the play of famous Russian writer Nikolai Gogol). And where did
Tallis got that fable about “"mind" free-floating in the world
between bodies”? Surely not from Descartes or Popper!
Òàëëèñ considers his
conception as an alternative to the widespread enough view “that to believe in
the self is to believe in a little man, a ghost inside the machine, that
somehow operates on the world although it is not part of it” – in
"homunculus". Tallis aspires “to develop an account of the self that
is both robust and homunculus-free” (P.263-264), “an account of enduring
personal identity that doesn’t require us to imagine a homunculus, or a
Cartesian ghost in the cerebral machine” (P.274). The aspiration is laudable;
the only pity is that Tallis mistakes the caricatures on the dualism, thought
up by its opponents, ("homunculus", “ghost in the machine”) for
dualism.
In fact, Tallis attempts
to give more concrete account of self’s emergence which can seem non-dualistic
since it tries to identify the self with the body despite that the body as a
physical system has no subjectivity. Tallis describes emergence of the self as
awakening in the body of “the existential intuition "I am this"”
(where "this" is initially the body as far as it is mastered).
(P.273) The problem with this account is that such an intuition is a subjective
mental state which, as well as any other subjective mental state, already
presupposes the existence of the mental subject, self. No intuition is possible
without someone “intuiting” it, – exactly as a feeling which noone feels,
thought which noone thinks, desire which noone desires. The body as a physical
system is but a huge multitude of molecules, atoms etc., moving and interacting in a certain ordered way according to
physical laws. Nothing more occurs in the body, – no subjective mental states,
including the existential intuition.
At least, for someone
who thinks otherwise, Tallis’ idea about the emergence of the self as the
awakening in the body of the existential intuition is quite unneeded: he/she
can simply assert that the body (while alive) is simultaneously both a physical
system and a mental subject? However, then the question arises: what is the
relation between the physical system of the body qua physical system and the mental subject? Obviously, Tallis’
hypothesis does not remove the question; concerning this question, nothing
changes if the mental subject begins his-or-her existence from the existential
intuition. And if Tallis acknowledges that they interact, that the mental
subject (the self) is causally efficient, is capable to influence the body and,
through it, the physical world, then we arrive at emergentist
dualism-interactionism, i.e., using
G.Ryle's metaphor, emergent “Cartesian ghost in the machine”.
Eventually,
Tallis describes his position as ontological
agnosticism, considering it as a possibility to avoid both “a physic-based
materialism” and “the mistake of embracing neutral monism or dualism as an
alternative to materialism” (P.359). Such a "solution" seems to me quite
inadequate; and I see its inadequacy not in the commendation of the position of
ontological agnosticism, but in considering this position as an alternative to materialism, dualism,
neutral monism, as well as panpsychism and idealism. If Tallis position was: “I
do not know and have no opinion as to whether the mind is some physical
processes (in the body, the brain of a person) or not, and also as to whether
there is mind-independent physical reality or the whole so-called physical
reality, including human bodies and brains, is but phenomena of my mind”, –
this would be complete ontological and
mind-body agnosticism. But Tallis’ position is quite different, since he
contends that the mind, the self is not some physical processes, but is
something different, and since he doesn’t accept the position opposite to
materialism – the position of idealism, according to which the brain, the body
and the whole physical world are mental phenomena. Thereby he takes the position of mind-body dualism. Surely, within the precincts of this position
many further questions and problems arise, and with respect to many of them it
is reasonable to take the stand “I don’t know”. Also, some limited version of ontological
agnosticism seems a reasonable position, since at the present we cannot offer a
satisfactory complete understanding of
the world in which frameworks the aforementioned further questions and
problems would find satisfactory solutions. But this version of ontological
agnosticism should be limited by mind-body dualism, i.e. should exclude all
possibilities incompatible with the recognition of non-identity between
physical reality (parts of which are the human body and the brain) and the
mind, the self. This excludes all varieties of ontological monism (materialism,
idealism, neutral monism). Also, it seems that panpsychism is to be excluded
too, on a bit different grounds (in particular, those adduced by Tallis
himself). Generally, whatever the arrangement of the world is, it should be
such that there was a room for at least
two qualitatively radically different fundamental kinds of reality, the
physical objects and the mental subjects (selves), and for their interaction.
I.e., the ontology of our world should be
at least dualistic, or it may be pluralistic.
R.Sperry’s Mentalism = Materialism + Under-quasi-irreducibility + Smuggling the Mind as Subjectivity
The eminent
neurophysiologist (the Noble prize winner for the researches
over the brain-splitted
patients) Roger William Sperry in the article "Mind-Brain Interaction: Mentalism, Yes;
Dualism, No" has
presented his conception of the solution of the mind-body problem.
The
article is polemics with the book of Karl Popper and John Eccles (who was also
the Noble prize winner in neurophysiology) “The Self and Its Brain”, which
defends interactionist dualism. Sperry sees in Popper's- Eccles’ book “joining forces
to affirm dualistic belief in the reality of the supernatural and the existence
of extraphysical, unembodied agents to challenge some of the most fundamental
precepts of science”. And he states his concern with “the kind of public
message that is conveyed, directly or indirectly, by their book … along with
Eccles's more recent volume The Human
Mystery and the potential impact of these on the intellectual perspectives
of our times”. The article is prompted by this concern and by “the fact that my
own views and writings are cited in support of some of the key concepts and as
being in alignment with dualistic interactionism”. However, Sperry also
dissociates oneself from materialism.
Sperry describes his position as monism and mentalism, “as the term 'mentalism' is used in psychology in contrast to behaviorism; not, of course, in the extreme philosophic sense that would deny material reality”. However, his description of his position at the beginning of the article looks like dualism-interactionism: “Psychophysical interaction is explained in terms of the emergence in nesting brain hierarchies of high order, functionally derived, mental properties that interact by laws and principles different from, and not reducible to those of neurophysiology. … Interaction of mind and brain becomes not only conceivable and scientifically tenable…” (Italics mine.)
It reads as the
acknowledgement that the mind (mental properties) is irreducible to the
processes in the brain (neurophysiology) and that it interacts with the brain.
It is admitted that the brain and the mind are not the same (are two different things). Such a
position is called in philosophy “mind-body dualism”. It is also admitted that
the brain and the mind interact. Such a position is called in philosophy
“interactionism”. However, Sperry flatly denies that his position is dualism
and insists that it is monism. From the further explanations it becomes clear
that it is really so, and that actually (if to use the words "not
reducible", "interaction", "brain", "mind" in their usual
sense) his theory does not acknowledges
the existence of mental properties which are genuinely irreducible to physical processes in the brain, and, surely, no interaction
between the mind and the brain (such interaction is impossible since the mind is the brain). However,
there is one small but important "but" to it.
As for interaction,
mind, brain and irreducibility, Sperry’s position gradually clears up beginning
from the middle of the article, and is eventually clearly formulated in the
subsection “Monism versus Dualism”: “Our theory describes the mental
states as being built of, composed and constituted of physiological and
physicochemical elements, and thus, in the sense of the definition, reducible
to these.”
If so, then what is the
meaning of earlier many-times repeated Sperry’s statements that emergent mental
properties are not reducible to neurophysiology, and that the mind (mental
processes) interacts with the brain? It turns out that they mean the following:
“The spacing and timing
of the parts with reference to one another largely determine the qualities and
causal relations of the whole but the laws for the material components fail to include
these space-time factors.”
I.e., in other words, the mental entities are irreducible to a spatiotemporally unordered multitude of the elements of the brain, but are reducible to the structured multitude which “includes space-time factors”! But any reduction with which science is concerned always “includes space-time factors”. It goes without saying that the brain it is not a mere multitude of atoms randomly heaped, but is a complexly spatiotemporally structured multitude of atoms. And it goes without saying that any reduction is a reduction of the properties of a system to a complexly spatiotemporally structured interactions and movements of the components of the system! And it is clear, that if someone reads Sperry’s statement that the mental properties are irreducible to neurophysiology, he/she understands it in that sense of the word reduction in which it is used in science, i.e. in the sense which “includes space-time factors”, – not in some entirely different sense of “philosophic, holist-reductionist dispute” (in which, it turns out, Sperry uses it). In the context of a discussion on the mind-body problem, the scientific meaning of the concept is presupposed: any dualist, when asserting that the mind is irreducible to physical processes in the brain, and any materialist, when asserting that it is reducible to them, means a reduction which “includes space-time factors”. So, Sperry’s statements about irreducibility only mislead a reader.
In the sense in which Sperry uses the concept “irreducibility”, any physical system, even
of a simplest sort, is irreducible to its components (for example, a meccano figure made of two details is not
reducible to these details). In the
terms discussed in the subsection “Materialistic Emergentism” of Section 6, Sperry’s “irreducibility” is not genuine irreducibility – even quantitative, let alone
qualitative. Moreover, it fails short even of being quasi-irreducibility (when a phenomenon is in principle reducible to the movements and interactions of the
constituent elements, but the reduction is not achieved because
of excessive complexity), for even all those phenomena to which
science has given an exhaustive reductive explanation are, in Sperry’s terms, irreducible to their components. (See also the subsection “Reductive Explanation” of Section 6.)
As
for "interaction" between the brain and the mind, it turns out that
with Sperry it mean nothing but that the brain as a complexly structured whole
(and its constituent subsystems) determine a dynamics of the low-level processes
in the brain (states and
movements of individual neurons, molecules, atoms). And this whole, as we already
know, is entirely reducible to the spatiotemporally structured multitude of
these low-level elements.
But what all this has to
do with the mind, mental states and processes (in the sense of subjectivity)?
Nothing at all. What Sperry calls 'the mind' is the brain or some (physical)
subsystem of the brain as a whole, described in functionalist terms – in terms
of “information processing”. Accordingly, 'mental states' are some
physical-informational states of the brain. And it is important to take into
consideration that – often misleading (and, it seems, having misled Sperry) –
ambiguity of the concepts 'information' and 'information processing' which we
have discussed in Section 5.
In a somewhat different
formulation, we can say that the physical
systems and processes such as the sound vibrations of air, books, computers or
brains, by themselves, besides their relation to human consciousness, do not
contain any information in the usual human meaning of the word
"information", and hence do no information processing. The "information" (in the
technical sense) which they contain are some physical structures to which
people, i.e. human consciousnesses, attribute by convention certain meanings, –
and only by dint of this they become – when interpreted by a person, i.e.
consciousness, in accordance with such conventions – information. "Information" contained in the
vibrations of air, books, computers, etc., is information for human
consciousness, not for air, books and computers. Likewise, "information" in the brain can be information only
for consciousness, not for a brain.
The
attribution of meanings to physical objects, processes, structures by dint of
which they become information is, in principle, arbitrary and is guided by
considerations of convenience. In principle, any object can represent any
information, if people agree to consider it as a symbol of the corresponding
meaning. There is nothing in the vibrations of air perceivable on hearing as a
sound stream which may be divided into the sequence of sounds 'm'-'æ'-'n'
or in the corresponding configuration of signs on a paper ('man') why they
should mean a man (and bear the corresponding information). In other languages
(on other people’s conventions), the same meaning is represented by other
sequences of sounds (Ukrainian: 'l'-'u'-'d'-'i'-'n '-'a'; Russian: 'tʃ'-'e'-'l'-'o'-'v'-'e'-'k';
Chinese: 'r'-'e'-'n') and other configurations of signs on a paper (Ukrainian:
'ëþäèíà', Russian: '÷åëîâåê', Chinese: 
). If there is a corresponding convention, any
physical structure, any kind of physical objects or processes can designate
anything you like (and to bear the corresponding information).
As for “information
processing”, to repeat, neither a
computer nor any other physical system do any information processing besides
the relations of their physical structures and processes to the conventions –
made by people, i.e. by consciousnesses – to attribute certain meanings to such
kinds of structures and processes. Nothing happens in such physical systems
but physical processes which change their physical states according to physical
laws. However, computers (their structures) were designed by human beings (i.e.
by consciousness) on the foundation of very complex mathematical and physical
theories (invented by human beings, i.e. by consciousnesses) in such a way that
it would be possible to create in their specific parts special physical
structures which – according to established (by inventors of a system, human
beings, i.e. consciousnesses) rules – mean certain initial information and
certain programs-algorithms of information processing, to launch the
interactions of the corresponding physical subsystems of the computer, and that
these interactions would result in the new physical structures such that their
interpretation according to the established rules gives information identical
with the results of performing over the initial information the sequence of
logical operations which corresponds to the algorithm of the program.
To summarize. The computers and their programs are
invented, designed, thought up by thinking human beings, i.e. by consciousnesses.
There is nothing in the computer and its work (“information processing”) which
would be irreducible to physical structures and processes – there is nothing
besides complexly organised physical structures and a huge multitude of
parallel and consecutive physical processes. All this becomes information and
information processing only so far as it is interpreted by human beings, i.e. by consciousnesses, according
to certain rules of interpretation established by human beings, i.e. by
consciousnesses. The rules of interpretation and the interpretation which make
the physical structures and processes of a computer into information and
information processing are something non-physical, existing and being
accomplished besides the computer and any other physical system.
The conclusion: the
interpretation of consciousness as the informational aspect of the brain
analogous to a computer software, information and information processing is
absolutely unsatisfactory.
So, Sperry’s
theory actually turns out materialistic (functionalist) and differs from usual
materialism not in the meaning but in the misleading "vocabulary" –
using the words "reduction", "interaction",
"mind" not in their usual meanings. But, there is a "but".
Sperry admits a
considerable difference of the brain from other complex systems (such as TV):
“the brain … is largely a self-programming, self-energizing system. It creates
its own superseding mental programs with its own built-in subjective generators
calling also on a lifetime of internal memories and an elaborate built-in
system of value controls and homeostatic regulators.”
In this description, we
are to mark out the following fragment: “the brain … creates its own
superseding mental programs with its own built-in subjective generators”. I would very much like to know: what are
these “subjective generators”? How they are arranged and how they work? How
they manage to generate the subjective? If Sperry would explain it, he would
solve the mind-body problem. As it is, he just smuggles the subjective (having
it heaped up – to pass through unnoticed – with a trash like “a
self-programming, self-energizing system”, “homeostatic regulators”, etc.) – i.e. the mind, the mental, the
phenomenal – into his, in all other respects quite materialistic, picture of
the world.[1] And thereby he brings all his
monism to naught.
The Subjective as Part of Objective Reality. Criticism of Thomas Nagel’s Dualismophobia
Among the works that
have most weakened the positions of materialism in academic philosophy of the
English-speaking countries of the second half of ÕÕ century and promoted the revival
of philosophical discussions about consciousness, one of the first places
belongs to Thomas Nagel's writings. However, in my opinion, Nagel’s writings
have one essential drawback which impedes (even for Nagel himself) clear
understanding of what Nagel’s arguments actually mean for the discussion
between materialism and dualism. This drawback pertains to the understanding of
the meaning of the word 'physical'.
In his famous article “What
Is It Like to Be a Bat?” (1974) Nagel argues for the thesis about “the inadequacy
of physicalist hypotheses that assume a faulty objective analysis of mind”.[2]
Nagel defends the thesis
that unlike the physical facts, subjective experience cannot be understood from
the outside of experience itself. Imagine, for example, a bat. Bats are blind
and use, instead of sight, echolocation (sonar) system. Can we imagine how it feels
subjectively? It seems that we cannot understand what the subjective experience
of the bat is like (how it feels), even if we know all physical about the
functioning of his echolocation system and brain. The specific subjective
experience of the bat is something that “we can never describe or understand”,
though it seems unreasonable to deny its “reality or logical significance”[3]: “Reflection on what it is like to
be a bat seems to lead us … to the conclusion that there are facts that do not
consist in the truth of propositions expressible in a human language. We can be
compelled to recognise the existence of such facts without being able to state
or comprehend them.”[4] Likewise, if there were some intelligent
aliens without sight – may be, with some bat-like system of spatial orientation
– they would not be able to imagine what it is like to be a human being and to experience
visual perceptions as human beings do, even if they knew all the physical facts
about the human visual system and the human brain. The specifically human forms
of experience (in particular, visual perception as a subjective experience)
would be the kind of facts that the aliens could not describe and understand,
inexpressible in their language (as they have no such experience, there are no
concepts in their language to designate it).
Nevertheless, in the same
article Nagel writes that “the inadequacy of physicalist hypotheses that assume
a faulty objective analysis of mind” is not a proof of the falsity of materialism;
it “proves nothing”: “It would be truer to say that physicalism is a position
we cannot understand because we do not at present have any conception of how it
might be true. … We do not have the beginnings of a conception of how it might
be true. … The idea of how a mental and a physical term might refer to the same
thing is lacking, and the usual analogies with theoretical identification in
other fields fail to supply it.”[5]
In my
opinion, these Nagel's statements (as well as the similar statements of other
authors about which we will talk later) are a consequence of the pressure of
the dominating physicalist views on one hand and of the vagueness of the
meaning in which he uses the central concept, 'physical', on the other.
Nagel himself remarks at
the end of the article “What Is It Like to Be a Bat?”: “I have not defined the
term 'physical'.” So what does he mean by this term while discussing throughout
the article the question about the possibility of the reduction of
consciousness (subjective experience) to the physical? Nagel tries to explain:
“Obviously it does not apply just to what can be described by the concepts of contemporary
physics, since we expect further developments. … But whatever else may be said of
the physical, it has to be objective. So if our idea of the physical ever expands
to include mental phenomena, it will have to assign them an objective character
– whether or not this is done by analyzing them in terms of other phenomena
already regarded as physical.”[6]
I think that my
disagreement with Nagel’s hopes of the possibility of finding a new conceptual
scheme which would allow to understand consciousness as something physical is
based on my appraisal of such a definition of 'physical' (through 'objective') as
inadequate. Instead, I advance the definition of physical as conceptually reducible to spatial locations
and their changes with time (a modification of Descartes’ “attribute
of extension”) which is quite in keeping with “the history of the question” and
precisely conveys what is the real issue in the discussions between the materialists
and their opponents. By the way, Nagel himself proposes the identical (with
mine) definition in the article “Panpsychism” (1979) (see Section 1, note 15);
but does not notice the principal difference between this definition and the definition
through 'objective', and in the other article, “Subjective and Objective”
(1979), he again identifies the opposition mental-physical with the opposition
subjective-objective.
I think that this
approach − an attempt to define 'physical' through 'objective' − is
unsatisfactory. It is misleading, since the term 'objective' is more often used
in the different meaning: something real, as it actually is, independently of
our knowledge and ideas about it, in contraposition to imaginary, or thought of.
So, the dualists and idealists think that consciousness exists objectively (the existence of consciousness is an objective fact), but this does not make it physical. Also, if a materialist
contends that the phenomenal, subjective aspect of consciousness does not exist objectively, he does not
mean that consciousness (as the realm of phenomenal, subjective) is not something physical (is something non-physical); he means quite
the opposite: that the phenomenal, subjective aspect of consciousness is not
what consciousness really is, but
what it merely seems (subjectively). So,
'physical' is not a synonym for 'objective'; the meaning of the term
'objective' ('objective reality') is wider and may encompass not only physical
reality, but consciousness (subjectivity) too.
To prevent
misunderstanding, I need to make a caution: the further discussion is not a
dispute about words: what the word 'objective' "really" means? It
means whatever we mean by it. Of course, I think that the interpretation which
I propose and explain in details below better corresponds to the language
practice. But nothing would be wrong if we have agreed to use this word in the
sense in which Nagel does – as a synonym to the concept 'physical'. If he
consistently used the words 'subjective' and 'objective' only in such a sense,
as synonyms to 'mental' and 'physical', not mixing it with the other senses
(objective is what really is, how it is really; subjective is how something
seems to us), he would hardly fail to see that his position, as described in the
article “Subjective and Objective”, is metaphysical and mind-body dualism disguised
by changed word usage.
So, my thesis is: the mental-subjective
(the mind and its states – sensations, emotions, thinking, desires) exists objectively, is part of objective
reality, – i.e. it is that is not merely
imagined or thought of, but really exists; but this does not mean at all that
it is physical.
The statement about the
objective existence of the subjective, about the subjective as part of
objective reality may seem paradoxical, but it just seems so because of the
ambiguity of the concepts 'objective' and 'subjective'. 'Subjectivity' may mean
mental character, belonging to a mind; and it may mean "how (what)
something seems to us, in contraposition to how (what) it really is". And 'objectivity'
may mean non-mental character; and it may mean "how (what) something
really is, in contraposition to how (what) it seems to us". It is clear
that subjectivity in the first sense (as mental character, belonging to a mind)
does not contradict with objectivity in the second sense ("how (what)
something really is").
So, my thought (if I
really think it) exists just as really-objectively as the table or the pencil
in front of me. The referent-object of
my thought – something I think about, such as I think it is – may exist or not
exist, but the thought exists; its existence is an objective fact. And it is really
(objectively) what it (subjectively) seems to be – a mental (subjective)
state-process of my mind. For example, if I think of a unicorn, the unicorn
does not really exist; but my thought of a unicorn, the idea of a unicorn in my
mind, the image of a unicorn in my imagination – though they are, surely,
subjective – do exist really (objectively). Do compare with the situation when
someone thinks that I think of a unicorn, whereas really I do not think about
it: in this situation what exists (objectively) is someone's (subjective)
thought that I think of a unicorn, but my thought of a unicorn doesn’t exist.
The position of dualism is
exactly that consciousness as the realm of subjective exists (really≡objectively)
and that it is not something physical. Subjective
and objective do not exclude one another.
These concepts are opposite only as two sides
of the cognitive relation: 'subjective' represents the subject of thinking
(cognition) – the one who thinks (cognizes);
'objective' represents the object of thinking (cognition) – that about which the subject thinks (what
is cognized). Our ideas are subjective as they belong to a subject, are his/her
mental states; at the same time, they may be objective as they represent – more
or less adequately – some object (are ideas about
something – let us recollect about the concept of intentionality). And they
objectively (i.e. really) exist and have certain contents, – they with their contents
are part of objective reality.
Objective reality includes subjects of consciousness (human selves) with
their subjectivity; the subjective, in its turn, comprehends in thinking various
parts and aspects of objective reality, including itself.
Let
us pay attention to the last phrase: the same person (as consciousness, a self)
may be an object and a subject simultaneously. This is self-consciousness. I
(as well as any other person) in the role of
a subject can think about myself, and thus make myself the object of my own thinking. Moreover, in some act of thinking
(thinking-2) I can think about myself as
the subject of some other act of thinking (thinking-1). In this case, in
the thinking-1 act I am the subject; and in the thinking-2 act I am the subject
of the thinking which has as its object me-as-the-subject-of-the-thinking-1-act.
And, surely, we can think about other subjects of thinking, thus making others-as-subjects-of-thinking the objects
of our thinking. And these acts of thinking mean that we think about the subjects
(of other acts and states) objectively,
that our thoughts about them can be true or false, i.e. may correspond or fail to correspond their objects (to remind:
in these cases, the objects are the subjects of other acts or states, including
ourselves).
I
think, that the main meanings of the words 'subjective' and 'objective' can be explained
as follows.
The terms 'objective' and 'subjective' are used
in such main meanings.
(1) If these terms are
used to characterize thoughts, ideas,
theories, then 'objective' means 'corresponding to an object'; 'subjective'
– 'such that expresses the desires, biases, moods, specific features of a
subject; a narrow, one-sided view of reality “from one’s own belltower”'. In
this context, 'objective' and 'subjective' can be considered as synonymous to
'unbiased' and 'biased'.
(2) They may be used as synonyms to 'how it really is' (objective) and 'how it seems to someone' (subjective). It is clear that in this
sense subjective may correspond or not correspond to objective. In this sense,
objective reality is 'real reality', or merely 'reality ', in contraposition to
its appearance or someone’s ideas about it.
In any of these two meanings, the pair of terms
'objective'-'subjective' is not synonymous to the pair 'physical'-'mental'.
(3) In the context of the mind-body problem, the term 'subjective'
means subjectivity as part of (objective,
in the sense (2)) reality − the subjective, mental states (thoughts, mental
images, sensations, emotions, desires), consciousness of a person. Surely, we can
agree to use the term 'objective' to designate all the rest – all that is not
mental. Nagel’s reasoning can be understood in this sense; however, he confuses
it with the sense 'objective' as 'as it really is'. I think that the use
of the term 'objective' in the meaning 'not mental' is not typical; besides, I
think it inappropriate because of the abovementioned confusion of meanings that
it creates and that is not to be allowed in discussions on the question about
the nature of consciousness.
So, objectivity is not definitive for 'physical'. Surely, physical is objective, but this does not
mean that objective is physical. Not only
physical may be objective; the content of the concept of objective (in the
meaning “how it really is”) is wider than the content of the concept of physical,
and encompasses subjectivity as mental reality and its subjects (selves).
We may attempt to approach
the problem of the definition of ‘physical’ from the opposite direction, by asserting
that the mind is the realm of subjective
(experiences and awareness) while 'physical'
is all that is devoid of subjectivity.
I think that it is really so, but not by
definition. The definition of physical as devoid of subjectivity would be unsuitable,
since it would incorporate the dualistic solution of the question about the
relation between matter and mind (beg the question). For, if we define physical
in this way, then consciousness (as subjectivity) cannot be something physical by definition; but this is improper: the
opponents of materialism need yet to show that consciousness is not physical.
Instead,
I propose – as such that, first, correspond to the traditional meanings of the
terms and, secondly, represent the sides of the relation which constitutes the
mind-body problem – the definitions of mind as the realm of subjective (experiences and awareness) and physical
as conceptually reducible to spatial locations
and their changes with time (see Section 1, subsections "The Concept of
Physical (Matter)" and "The Concept of Mind as Subjectivity").
Accordingly,
the pivot of the discussion is the question: whether subjective experiences are conceptually reducible to spatial locations
and their changes with time? Or, in other words: whether such things as
molecules, atoms, electrons, photons, etc.,
– things that are located and move somewhere in space, influence movements of
one another according to physical laws, and have
no ability of subjective experiencing and awareness, – may, when united in
some complex structures, constitute subjective experiences and awareness?
Whether subjective experiences and awareness may be nothing but complexly
structured interactions of such particles, which are devoid of the ability of
subjective experiencing and awareness?
These
questions are pivotal, meaning-providing for the discussion between materialism
(physicalism), dualism, idealism, panpsychism, etc. I do not know of any other definitions but those proposed
above that would make this discussion correctly understandable. (In particular,
the definition of physical as objective obviously does not satisfy this
requirement.)
The definitions proposed
above meet all requirements of the problem situation:
–
they
are clear-cut, unequivocal;
– they designate what is really at
issue in the discussions about the nature of mind and its relation to material
(physical) reality;
– the definition
of 'physical' adequately covers all the realm of physics and is independent of the current state and the
future development of physics;[7] besides, it
covers all unproblematically material systems and processes on the higher
levels of description (the whole of chemistry, and all there is to biology except
mentality-subjectivity; this includes all physiology and outwardly observable, qua bodily movements, behaviour of
animals and humans).
******
Taking the aforesaid into
account, let us analyse T.Nagel's deliberations about the mind in the article
“Subjective and objective” (1979).
The meanings attributed
by Nagel to the key terms are rather unclear. 'Objective' is something “from no
point of view”, in the perspective "from nowhere", while 'subjective'
is something inseparable from a certain point of view. Though Nagel assumes
that there are different levels of objectivity, eventually he identifies 'objective'
with physical or with non-subjective. 'Subjective', in its turn, is identified
with mind, or the self. The position Nagel attempts to
defend is that these two points of view – objective and subjective – should
co-exist without aspiration to "absorb" one another, because if we
see reality only from one of these points of view, we inevitable “analyze or
shut out of existence”, "leave behind", "omit" something
essential.[8] So, if we believe that the
"objective" point of view is comprehensive, we “analyze or shut out
of existence”, "leave behind", "omit" our own selves and
subjective experiences.
I
agree with these thoughts in essence, but I think (on the
reasons explained above) that the term 'objective' in this context is
inadequate, and would be better replaced with 'physical'. I have already said
that this is not just a matter of word-usage (if it was just about words, it would
not be worth spending the time). Something is essentially muddled in the
analysis of the problem of mind in this article: the identification of the
relation mind-physical with the
relation subjective-objective confuses
the author, obscures the real meaning of
his deliberations (prevents clear understanding of what they really mean), creates
the impression that this meaning is different. I mean that Nagel’s
deliberations really mean ontological
(metaphysical) dualism – the dualism of the
physical and the subjective as
two – equally real – kinds of realities,
but they are presented as if they are merely about the dualism of points of view. Now I will
explain this statement.
Physical
is everything that may be comprehended in the physical ("objective" –
in Nagel’s terminology) perspective. If there is something that cannot be
comprehended in the physical perspective, this "something" is
something non-physical. But, as Nagel recognises, our selves and their (our)
subjective experiences just are something that cannot be comprehended in the physical
("objective") perspective. So, our selves with their subjective
experiences are something
non-physical, really existing alongside
physical reality, – they are as real (are objective – in my sense) as physical
reality.
Nagel’s
statements constitute a simple syllogism:
1) our selves and
subjectivity are inevitably “analyzed or shut out of existence”, "left
behind", "omitted" in the “objective perspective”;
2) physical is objective[9];
Hence,
(Nagel does not make this conclusion, but it logically follows):
Our selves and subjectivity is something non-physical.
But this is a downright
metaphysical dualism!!!
Now we may imagine someone
objecting: “Well, what if they are not physical? After all, they are not
objective, – they just subjective (≡ imaginary, unreal, illusory).
Objectively (≡ really) they do not exist. So, it is not a dualism.”
This objection contains
a rather typical, for discussions about consciousness, scheme of the deception (and
self-deception?) by confusing two different meanings of the word 'objective'.
If 'objective' means
only non-mental, externally observable, and 'subjective' means only mental, knowable introspectively, then
subjective is just as real as objective. (If it was not so, then – I think
Nagel would agree – we shouldn’t be sorry about “analyzing or shutting out of
existence”, "leaving behind", "omitting" these illusions, what actually does not exist.
We should welcome it!) So, whatever way you turn them, Nagel’s statements mean
metaphysical dualism.
But Nagel manages not to
notice it. He writes, that the idea of soul is one of “metaphysical inventions”
such that “their obscurity prevents it from being obvious that the same
problems of subjectivity will arise with regard to them, if they really belong
to objective reality”[10]. And on this ground Nagel objects
against “annexation of the subjective to the objective world”, – i.e. against considering subjectivity (human
selves) as part of objective reality.
But this is passing the
buck! It would be better to look for an obscurity and concealing the obvious in
the opposite direction – in the identification 'objective'-'subjective' with 'physical'-'mind'. On elucidating the ambiguity and confusion due to this
identification, it appears that there is no obscurity in the idea of soul: the
word 'soul' means exactly what Nagel
(it seems, involuntarily, without realizing it) acknowledges our selves to be –
something non-physical which is the subject of subjective experiences and awareness.
And
I see no “problems of
subjectivity will arise with regard to the soul, if it really belongs to
objective reality”, – if we do not identify
the concepts 'objective' and 'physical', but understand the concept 'objective'
as synonymous to 'real', 'how-it-really-is', 'what really exists, such as it
really is', – to distinguish from subjective as imaginary (not existing really),
but not from subjectivity as mental reality and its bearers-subjects, selves.
In fact, I
would not object to the terminological convention according to which
'objective' would mean 'physical', – but if we accept such a convention, we
should recognise that full reality
consists of constituents (subrealities) of the two different kinds: objective
(≡physical) reality and our selves (subjective realities). So, contrary
to Nagel’s objection against annexation of subjective reality to objective
reality, we arrive at the same annexation, – it makes no difference whether we
call the reality which comprises the physical and the subjective 'objective' or
'full'. What matters is that 1) our selves are not physical and 2) they are just
as real as physical reality.
******
Perhaps, I was too
critical to Nagel’s deliberations which are dated by the decade of 1970-ies.
They could be considered as immature approaches to the problem of the relation between
objective and subjective points of view – posing the problem rather than its
solution.
In a later work, “The
View from Nowhere” (1986), Nagel has accomplished a high-quality analysis of
this problem which is free of most of the drawbacks discussed above. In this
work, Nagel criticizes quasi-objective scientism and arrives at the much more
objective (unbiased) view of objectivity and subjectivity.
The book begins with a discussion of the concepts of
objectivity and subjectivity with respect to viewpoints, standpoints, perspectives.
It is concerned not with objective reality, but with objective and
subjective viewpoints, views of reality. I think that these
Nagel’s explanations are very apt. Objective view is a view detached from person’s
own position (the word 'position' has here the double meaning – both as present
views and as person’s position in the world, society, etc.), while subjective view is a view from the standpoint of person’s
own position. (It is the first pair of the meanings of the words 'objective'
and 'subjective' among those I have listed above.) In fact, there is a similar
explanation in the article “Subjective and Objective”. But there are some essential
differences: in “The View from Nowhere” these meanings do not get mixed with
“objective reality” (instead, there is a mention of “in a narrow sense objective reality”[11]) and the two perspectives
are not considered as mutually exclusive. The first sentence is telling: “This
book is about a single problem: how to combine the perspective of a particular person
inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the
person and his viewpoint included”.[12] (To compare
with “Subjective and Objective”: there is no place for “the person and his
viewpoint” within “an objective view”.)
A bit
more about objectivity in quotations:
“To acquire a more objective understanding of some aspects of life or
the world, we step back from our initial view of it and form a new conception which has that view and its relation to the world
as its object. In other words, we place ourselves
in the world that is to be understood. …
a new conception … includes a more detached
understanding of ourselves, of the world, and of the interaction between
them. Thus objectivity allows us to
transcend our particular viewpoint and develop an expanded consciousness that takes
in the world more fully. … if we want to understand the whole world, we can’t forget about those subjective starting
points indefinitely; we and our
personal perspectives belong to the world.”[13]
Êàæåòñÿ, âñå ÿñíî.
It seems
that all is clear.
Objectivity
is transcending our particular viewpoints to develop expanded consciousness which gives fuller
understanding of the world as a whole, including
ourselves (our selves) as subjects of understanding who have this or that
viewpoint. To become more objective, we have to make efforts at
understanding of different viewpoints and seeing things in their perspectives.
As for subjectivity,
the talk is about two essentially different things:
(1) subjectivity
('subjectivity-1') as part of reality which is ourselves – our selves with
their subjective experiences, thinking, awareness, viewpoints;
(2) subjectivity ('subjectivity-2') as the characteristic of our views opposite
to objectivity is merely uncritical holding to one’s own viewpoint (which
usually is not quite one’s own, but rather uncritically acquired viewpoint prevalent
in one’s social surroundings), without an effort to rise above it and to
develop fuller understanding. Subjective-2 persons do not question their "own"
views and do not try really to understand
other viewpoints.
It is important not to
confuse subjectivity-2 and subjectivity-1. To become more objective means to
become less subjective-2, while remaining just as subjective-1 as before. To be
subjective-1 is to be a person. To be subjective-2 is to be prejudiced,
dogmatic, self-satisfied, not self-critical.
Also,
it is important not to confuse 1) transcending one’s own viewpoint
with 2) ignoring himself, and other selves as those who have viewpoints
(whatever they are) and various subjective-1 experiences. The first is the
expansion of our consciousness and development of fuller understanding of the
world, including ourselves (our selves). The second is narrowing of
consciousness and acceptance of blinkered perspective of seeing the world – the
perspective in which there is no place for ourselves (our selves). The first is
genuine objectivity. The second is quasi-objective scientism – a form of collective
subjectivity-2 which is too often fostered by modern scientific education and
corporative biases.
******
Nevertheless, I think
that in this work Nagel still has not get rid of some biases with respect to
dualism, and these biases have their roots it the distorting interpretations
and a deal of misunderstanding. (I mean the classical dualism of the mental self
and the body; Nagel, instead, gives a preference to a dual-aspect theory, which goes also under the name ‘property dualism’ and in fact turns out
to be a sort of panpsychism.)
Nagel states his belief
that “though the truth of dualism of mind and body is conceivable, it is implausible.
There are better alternatives, even if the best hasn’t been thought of yet. … the
relation between the mental and the physical is probably more intimate than it
would be if dualism were true.”[14]
Whether
there really are better alternatives? In addition to materialism and epiphenomenalism,
about which I have already told pretty much, in the following sections we will discuss
other major known alternatives in details. In my opinion, the analysis eventually
tells not in their favour. As for the best alternative which “hasn’t been thought of yet”, – there are serious reasons for scepticism. The
major fundamental alternatives are well-known (materialism, idealism, dualism, panpsychism)
and, logically, there remains no place for something principally new. Surely, it may well happen that the further elaboration
of one of these directions will change the balance in its favour, but as
matters stand at present, my judgment in the light of known arguments is that
the balance is in favour of dualism-interactionism. It needs to be noticed also
that dualism allows, in principle, any degree of intimacy in the
relation between the mental and the physical, besides identity; though it is to be acknowledged that too strong dependency of
the mind on the brain makes dualism less plausible. Nevertheless, as far as I
can judge, on balancing all known pros and cons, the alternatives are yet much
less plausible.
Certainly, my general
estimation of the balance is but my
estimation with which you (or Nagel) may disagree. But, as the balance is
formed by various "weights" on the opposite "pans" of our
cogitative "scales", we need to consider these "weights".
In particular, let us consider what Nagel calls “the main objection to
dualism”:
“The main objection to dualism is that it
postulates an additional, nonphysical substance without explaining how it can support subjective mental states whereas
the brain can’t. … First, postulating such a substance doesn’t explain how it
can be the subject of mental states. If there were a thing that lacked mass,
energy, and spatial dimensions, would that make it easier to understand how there
could be something it was like to be
that thing?.. Second, no reason has been given to think that if we could find a
place for mental states in the world by attaching them to a nonphysical
substance, we could not equally well find a place for them in something that also
has physical properties?”[15]
I
think that if it were actually the main
objection against dualism, this would mean that there are no serious objections
against dualism. To decline this objection, one need merely to think about how common
people, whose minds aren’t muddled by the “talks of substances”, usually
understand the idea of soul. To begin with, it is to be always kept in mind
that the soul is a human self, a subject of experiences, thinking, awareness, –
that mental individual (in the initial sense of the concept 'individual' −
indivisible) whose mental states they are. You are never to loose sight of the
fact that mental states are always someone's
mental states; they don’t exist of their own, without that subject (self) whose
states they are. The brain cannot be a subject of mental states – just because
the brain is nothing but a huge multitude of microparticles, which are spatially
located in a certain way (so that they form a very complex structure) and
change their locations according to physical laws, and all these particles feel
absolutely nothing and have no awareness. The soul (≡the self) can be a
subject of mental states merely because it is, so to say, by definition a subject of mental states; a subject of mental
conditions is the very meaning (or, at least, its main part) of the concept of
soul.
To demand an explanation
of how it is possible for the soul (≡the
self)
to be a subject of mental states is the same as to demand an explanation
of how it is possible for physical bodies to be spatially located, move, have mass,
etc.
The soul (≡the self) is not merely a “nonphysical
substance” – it is not "substance" at all, if the word is understood
by the analogy to a physical substance-matter, as if we are talking of some
stuff of which various things may be composed. The soul (≡the self) is not composed of any nonphysical substance-stuff. The soul (≡the self) is a subject of mental states.
At least, if we have
understood that materialism is mistaken, if we acknowledge that
1) any relative locations
of any number of any components which are not subjects of mental states
(selves) does not constitute a subject of mental states (a self);
2) subjects of mental states
(selves) exist,
then dualism – the distinction
between the self (the soul) and the body (the brain) – follows with a logical
necessity.
Now we may
tackle with Nagel’s question: why to think that we could not find a place for mental states in something
that also has physical properties? Taking into account the above discussion,
the question is to be reformulated: why to think
that we could not find a place for physical properties in something that also has
mental states? That is: why the self (the soul)
cannot have, alongside with mental properties, some physical
properties?
The answer is: Who has told that it cannot? It can. Moreover, from the point of view of interactionism, the self does have some physical properties, viz. – the properties to influence the brain in some complex way. It is just that no known physical entity is fit for the role of soul (self). (See the discussion of panpsychism in section 15.)
Joseph Levine and Metaphysical
Implications of the “Explanatory Gap”
…………………………………………………………………………