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4. More about “the Same Thing Seen from Different Points of View”

One of the main ways of explanation and defence of monism[1] (usually, materialism) is the statement that the mind and the body (the brain) is the same thing, but seen from different points of view. As the simplest illustration, we can follow an example given by Stephen Law: a traveller who saw the same mountain twice from different sides thinks that he saw two different mountains...[2]

One of the first proponents of the theory of “the same thing seen from different points of view” was the Dutch philosopher of the XVII century Benedict Spinoza, a supporter of the philosophical position of neutral monism. On his view, the soul and the body (as well as God and nature) is the same thing perceived through the prisms of two different attributes, of thinking and of extension. In the XX century, a similar theory was influential within the philosophy of neopositivism; it was the theory of two languages – “the view that physics and psychology are two ways of constructing theories, or languages, out of some neutral ‘given’ material, and that the statements of physics and of psychology are (abbreviated) statements about that given material, and therefore translatable into one another; that they are two ways of talking about the same facts[3].

In Section 2, we have already discussed some arguments against this theory. Let me remind the main point.

When we have to do with two descriptions of the same reality in different ways, one of them (the more fundamental, detailed) is always translatable into the other by purely logical and mathematical means, without any additional mediating information. Let us take, for example, water in a glass. All its physical properties are obtainable by purely logical-mathematical means from the knowledge about H2O molecules (their physical properties, number, and relative locations). The mass of the water is the sum of the masses of all its molecules (the mass of a molecule multiplied by the quantity of the molecules) in the glass; the temperature is the average kinetic energy (the mass of a molecule multiplied by its squared speed) of the H2O molecules in the glass; the volume is constituted by the distances between the molecules and can be easily calculated if we know the quantity of the molecules and the average distance between them. The fluidity of water is the easiness of moving H2O molecules relative one another (it is reducible to the relative locations of the molecules and the dynamics of the forces of attraction and repulsion between them), etc. It is easy to understand, using logics, that they are the same. The case of the relations between the processes in the body of a person and his subjective experiences is quite unlike this. (For a more detailed discussion – see the next section.)

Let us consider some more arguments.

In the case with the mountain the traveller really saw the same mountain, but in a sense, he saw not the same thing. Let us suppose that he saw the western and the southern slopes of the mountain. It is clear that the western slope of the mountain is not the southern slope of the mountain, and vice versa.

Let us consider in this context the example with my friend John. (See Section 2, subsection “My Friend John and the Masked Man”.) My friend John and the one who has robbed the bank is the same person. But in a sense, my friend John and the one who has robbed the bank is not the same thing. I can know everything about John qua my friend while knowing nothing about John qua a bank-robber. To be my friend, John does not need to be a bank-robber; and to be a bank-robber he does not need to be my friend. It is clear that to be a bank-robber is not the same as to be my friend, and not a part of being my friend. So, John qua my friend and John qua a bank-robber is not the same thing, though he is the same person.

The mountain is a complex object that has many different parts, aspects (such as different slopes), properties. The fact that these different parts, aspects, properties belong to the same mountain does not undo their being different, does not make them the same. The same is true about John: he has such different aspects as that of my friend and that of a bank-robber.

I wear a red hat and black boots. They both may be united by one concept – “my wear”. But this does not mean that my red hat and my black boots is the same thing.

Likewise, we can unite in one concept – the concept of a human being – mental and physical properties, states and processes (the mind and the body), but this will not eliminate their principal difference; they will remain properties, states and processes of two different natures. Both the mind and the body is the human being. But the mind is not the body (if we understand ‘body’ as meaning a purely physical object).

Some philosophers propose to consider the mind as a system of non-physical properties or states of the brain. In principle, we can say so; but by this we would change the meaning of the word “brain”: the brain in the new meaning is a thing of dual − physical-and-mental − nature that unites the physical system of the brain with the non-physical mind. Such an approach is called ‘property dualism’. In more details we will discuss its attractive and weak aspects in Section 9, Book 2. For a while, I will make just one remark: this theory leaves the main question unanswered: how the brain, which consists of purely physical elements that interact according to physical laws, can obtain non-physical properties (states) of the mind?

One possible objection is that it is not always the case that the different perceptions mean that the objects or properties perceived are different. It happens that the same object, or the same property, is given to us in different perceptions and is perceived differently.

Let us consider some such situations when the identification is well-grounded.

1) Relating different perceptions to the same material object

Let us consider some common material thing. If we look at it with bare eyes, we will not see much of what we will see if we look at it through a superpowerful microscope. This example shows that the same thing, if viewed through different prisms, may look differently but is, nevertheless, the same thing.

A material thing is characterized by spatial properties, such as location, size, and form. We can not only have different (for example, visual and tactile) perceptions of a material thing (different perceptions could mean that different parts, or aspects are perceived), but also to obtain the same information about it through different perceptions. For example, it is possible to determine the form and size of a thing not only visually, but also (with closed eyes) on touch. So, it is possible to perceive the same parts, aspects and properties of the same thing through different perceptions which are quite unlike one another. Is not the situation with sensations and physical processes in the nervous-brain system similar?

No, it is not. These situations differ essentially. In the first case, there is something that serves as reason for relating different perceptions to the same object (reason for the identification of the object of the first perception with the object of the second perception) and that is lacking in the case with sensations and physical processes in the nervous-brain system. This reason for relating different perceptions to the same physical object is that these perceptions ‘inform’ us about the same properties.

The major reason for relating different perceptions to the same physical object is the property that is the most essential for the identity of physical objects – spatial location. In the case of looking at the water in the glass once with bare eyes and then through a microscope, the reason for the identification is the fact that we look at the same place (surely, provided that during this time interval there was no substitution of one thing with another).

This situation is of the same kind as in the case with the mountain observed first from afar and then from a close distance. Surely, if you are close by, you can see more details of the part of the mountain that is before you (more of different parts and properties); however, some parts of the mountain that you saw from afar can now happen to be beyond your vision.

The reason for relating different perceptions to the same physical object can also be the sameness of other physical properties that we observe in both perceptions.

For example, you see a thing and so learn about its size and form. Then you close the eyes, and you are given to palpate a thing, either the same or different one. You estimate on touch that its form and size are approximately the same as those of the thing you saw first. This may serve as a reason to suppose that it is the same thing. Surely, this supposition may happen to be mistaken, even in the case when the perceptions are qualitatively identical. (For example, I see a chair; then I close the eyes; someone replaces the chair with another, very similar; I open the eyes; it seems to me that I see the same chair, but in fact it not so.) Anyway, the reason for the identification is the (estimated) sameness of some properties or the absence of essential (recognizable) differences in properties, – even if our knowledge of these properties can be obtained in different ways, through different perceptions.

The case with mental states (sensations, emotions, thinking, and desires) and physical processes in the nervous-brain system is very different. There is no similar reason for identification: mental states as such (as they are felt, experienced subjectively) have no common properties with those things that may be seen when physical processes in the nervous-brain system are observed through some scanning device. (This follows from the fact which I had highlighted before: in the common language, statements about sensations, emotions, etc. bear no information about physical structures and processes of the nervous-brain system, although we understand perfectly well what these statements are about, – that is, they bear some other information.) We can as well defend the contention that my red hat and my black boots is the same thing, though their perceptions are different.

In this light, it should also be clear why the theory of two languages – the language of physics and of psychology which allegedly describe the same facts – is mistaken. In fact, physics and psychology deal with facts that are obtained in two entirely different ways, and the knowledge about them does not contain any common information, – and therefore, there is no reason for their identification.

If we got into another country and do not know its language, to learn this language and to be able to translate from it to our language and vice versa, we need to compare the ways of expression of the same facts (identified through the same qualities) in the two languages. However, in the case of mental and physical facts we have to do with facts about qualities that are not merely different, but incomparable. (To remind: if we have no additional mediating knowledge, our knowledge about sensations and other mental states tells nothing about physical processes in the nervous-brain system, and our knowledge about physical processes in the nervous-brain system tells nothing about sensations and other mental states).

If we understand the meanings of statements of one language and the meanings of statements of another language, and if both languages have means to express facts of a certain kind, then we can translate a statement about a fact of this kind from one language into a statement of the other language with the same meaning (that expresses the same fact). We understand the meanings of statements about physical processes and the meanings of statements about sensations, emotions and thoughts, but we cannot translate one into another, because they tell about different facts.

So, when speaking about physical and mental states and processes, we are talking in one (common Ukrainian, Russian or English) language about different facts, not in different languages about the same facts.[4]

2) Identification of a substance or material object with a system of elements. Also: the physical theories of heat, sound, and colour

Let us consider a classical example – the identity of water and H2O. We know that water is an aggregate of H2O molecules in certain physical conditions (that are defined by two parameters – atmospheric pressure and temperature; for example: normal pressure and temperature in the range between 0 and 100 ºÑ).

The reason for the identification of water with an aggregate of H2O molecules is that all physical properties of water are logically deducible from (reducible to) the physical properties of H2O molecules and the laws of their physical interactions.

So, we can, with a high level of accuracy, calculate all properties of water that are expressible in numerical values (volume, weight, temperature, etc.), if we know the weight and size of an H2O molecule, the average distance between these molecules, their average kinetic energy, the laws of physical interactions, etc. Also, if we know the physical properties of interactions between H2O molecules, we may show why water is liquid; for this, we need knowledge about the dynamics of forces of attraction and repulsion between the molecules (or ions).

A similar situation holds for all cases of material systems. Surely, it has to be taken into account that the lack of sufficiently detailed information about the structure and physical properties of elements of the system, or the complexity of necessary calculations can make us unable to carry out the full reduction. But, for the identification to be justified, at least two conditions should be satisfied:

1) the theory about the composition and structure of the system agrees with our experience concerned with the system;

2) it explains this experience better than any other known alternative theory.

 

These two conditions hold also for other classical examples of identification – the identification of heat with the average kinetic energy of gas molecules, of sound with specific air vibrations, of colour with the frequency of electromagnetic waves (of light) that are reflected from a surface and arrive at the retina of the onlooker’s eyes.

In common language, the concepts of heat, colour, sound are based on the corresponding sensations, subjective experiences (how it feels when it is cold or warm, when you see something red or green, when you hear a certain sound). The common concepts of heat, colour, and sound are, in their foundation, phenomenal, qualia-based (based on subjective experiences). We can say that the common concepts of heat, colour, and sound mean secondary qualities, which belong to things or our environment not as they are by themselves, but in their relation to the mind. Or we can say (which will be truer to the common language meanings, because usually people talk of heat, colours, and sound as if they are out there, are properties of physical objects or of the environment) that heat is an objective property of the environment that usually evokes a subjective experience of warmth in a person; red colour is an objective property of a thing (surface) that usually evokes in a person a subjective experience of redness, etc. The scientific theories of heat, colour, and sound reveal such objective (physical) properties of things or the environment that are (as far as scientists can judge at the present stage of the development of knowledge, according to the best up-to-date scientific theories) the most closely correlated with the corresponding subjective experiences. So, both conditions are satisfied; we have weighty reasons for the identification, and no weighty reasons to deny the identity.

 

Unlike this, in the case of the materialistic theory of mind, the two main conditions (as designated above) that constitute reasons for identification are not satisfied. The problem with the theory (that the mind is processes in the brain) is that it does not explain the mind as the realm of subjectivity (subjective experiences, desires, thinking, awareness) at all. It doesn’t explain at all, why subjectivity exists and how it can exist; instead, it contends that all that actually occurs are automatic (according to physical laws) interactions and movements of various elements of the brain, none of which is endowed with subjectivity. In this picture, there is no hint on subjective experiences and awareness; there is no place for subjectivity. This theory is unique in a sense – the theory of mind that tells about whatever you like except the mind proper, subjectivity.

 

The properties of water, heat, colour, sound may be reduced to physical processes and properties by means of eliminating from our corresponding concepts all that is contributed by the mind, by human forms of perception, – relieving these concepts from their phenomenal contents that refers to subjective experiences of a person. But it is impossible to do the same with the mind, because it interests us exactly as the realm of subjective experiences and awareness. As T. Nagel fairly noted

“It is impossible to exclude the phenomenal features of experience from a reduction in the same way that one excludes the phenomenal features of an ordinary substance from a physical or chemical reduction of it – namely, by explaining them as effects on the minds of human observers. If physicalism is to be defended, the phenomenal features must themselves be given a physical account. But when we examine their subjective character it seems that such a result is impossible.”[5]

T. Nagel illustrates this thought with the mental experiment we have already discussed – aliens who have no vision, but can obtain the same physical information through other perceptions:

“A Martian scientist with no understanding of visual perception could understand the rainbow, or lightning, or clouds as physical phenomena, though he would never be able to understand the human concepts of rainbow, lightning, or cloud, or the place these things occupy in our phenomenal world. The objective nature of the things picked out by these concepts could be apprehended by him because, although the concepts themselves are connected with a particular[6] point of view and a particular visual phenomenology, the things apprehended from that point of view are not: they are observable from the point of view but external to it; hence they can be comprehended from other points of view also... Lightning has an objective character that is not exhausted by its visual appearance, and this can be investigated by a Martian without vision.”[7]

When considering this example in the context of our discussion, it needs to be noticed that unlike rainbows, lightnings and clouds as physical phenomena that may be understood "from the outside", in detachment from the visual experience underlying the corresponding human concepts, visual experience itself – as it is experienced subjectively – cannot be possibly understood "from the outside of" itself (for example, understanding of visual experience is impossible for Martians without vision). And it is so not only for visual experience, but also for the whole of mind (for all forms of experience) as the realm of subjective experiences and awareness.

 

******

P.S. It is appropriate to notice that in fact, identifications like “heat is the average kinetic energy of molecules” are often not discoveries of exact identity of what corresponds to the concept on the left side (in the sense in which it was used and, probably, still is used in ordinary speech independently of the discovered "identity") and what corresponds to the concept or description on the right side. What goes on is rather the combination of,

on the one hand, discovery of approximate identity in the sense that the coverage of the first (the possible referents of the ordinary concept of heat) coincides for the largest part (but, probably, not completely) with the coverage of the second;

on the other hand, introduction of a new concept (in the present case, the physical concept of heat as the average kinetic energy of molecules) that is designated by the same word as the corresponding preceding concept (the ordinary concept of heat) but has a different meaning; so that the coverage of these concepts (their possible referents) coincides for the largest part, although not completely.

Thus, if a certain physical concept is, in some sense, a correlate of the same-word ordinary concept, such a correlation can be but approximate, inexact, incomplete. For example, heat in the physical sense (the kinetic energy of molecules) and heat in the common language sense are not exactly the same, with respect to both the meanings and the coverage (referents) of the concepts.

What makes for their identification is the discovered fact that the average kinetic energy of molecules (“heat” in the physical sense) is the physical property our environment that is much more than anything else responsible for our sensation of warmth, on which the ordinary concept of heat is based. The word “heat” in the ordinary language sense means either the sensation of warmth or the property of an environment or thing that evokes this sensation (for example, if we are talking about warm or hot air). But this is either (in the first case, of the sensation) entirely not the same or (in the second case, of whatever it is that causes the sensation) not quite the same as heat in the physical sense (the kinetic energy of molecules).

The kinetic energy of molecules in our environment is really the main external cause of the sensation of warmth. But it is not the sole cause. Let us take, for example, water and air at a temperature of 1°Ñ. In the physical sense, their heat is the same; however in the common sense, water is much colder (the difference is due to the physical property of heat transfer).

Thus, strictly speaking, heat in the ordinary language sense (that we are familiar with independently of our knowledge of physics) is not exactly identical with the kinetic energy of molecules; we can say that the kinetic energy is only a constituent, though the most important one, of heat in the ordinary sense of the word. Unlike it, heat in the physical sense is the kinetic energy of molecules by definition (that was introduced because of the explanatory relevance of the kinetic energy for the sensation of warmth), but it is not quite the same as heat in the ordinary sense.

 

For Matter, There Are No Appearances (Subjective Points of View)

Really, the same thing, process or property can be perceived differently. The same can appear differently in different subjective perceptions. But for this to be possible, it is necessary that there were different forms of subjective perception which belong to the mind. We can refer to different forms of subjective perception in order to explain how it is possible that water and an aggregate of H2O molecules (a lightning and a powerful electric discharge, etc.) is the same thing. But it is impossible to explain the mind this way, merely because any such explanation necessarily refers to the mind itself (different forms of subjective perception). I.e., such an explanation would be inevitably an explanation of the mind through itself, instead of through physical processes (matter).

A satisfactory materialistic theory of mind must explain how some physical structures and processes can constitute the mind, how the mind and some physical structures and processes can be the same without referring to subjective perceptions. For the task of this theory is exactly to explain subjective perceptions qua subjective, the very existence of subjectivity only through physical (material) structures and processes (not through subjective perceptions). But it is impossible, for any statement that some X and some Y is “the same thing seen from different points of view” makes reference to different subjective perceptions.

Except if we accept the point of view of idealism (according to which ‘physical’ objects are nothing but specific phenomena of the mind, a part of the mind perceived by the mind itself in a specific way), the mind and material processes cannot be the same in different subjective perceptions, – merely because all subjective perceptions belong to the mind, not to physical objects.

Behaviorism and Functionalism

Two of the main materialistic directions in the XX century are behaviorism and its successor, functionalism.

Behaviorism identifies mind with behavior. For example, on this view, pain is nothing but some complex of interconnected forms of behavior or dispositions to behave in certain ways (a shriek or moan, certain changes of face expression, actions directed at the elimination of the cause of the irritation and at the alleviation of the injury, etc.).

This theory, as well as all other materialistic theories, is vulnerable to “the zombie problem”: we can imagine a humanlike creature that in situations in which the human person feels pain, behaves in the same way but feels nothing – has no subjective experience of pain. So, to behave in certain ways does not mean to have the corresponding experiences. Experiences are something besides behavior.

In behaviorism, this problem is even is more obvious than in other versions of materialism: behaviorism obviously contradicts the fact that we know about pain mainly because we feel it and are directly (introspectively) aware of it, not through external observations of behavior. If experiences were but behavior, which is externally observable, we could not directly know about our own experiences; we could know only about experiences of those people whose behavior we observe. As for this, there is a jest-story: After a sexual act, a behaviorist says to his partner: “It was so pleasant to you! Superb! But tell me, please, how it was to me?”

Another weak point of behaviorism is that different people having the same mental state (subjective experience) may behave very differently; so it turns out practically impossible to establish an unequivocal correspondence between various mental states (experiences) and forms of behavior.

The last two problems are circumvented by the successor of behaviorism, functionalism − the most influential modern materialistic theory that is closely connected with computer technologies. In this theory, the mind is considered as an analogue of a computer program, a sort of “software” of the brain. This program receives a stream of input data from the nervous system, processes it according with a complex algorithm and produces a stream of data output – the signals that set in motion various muscles. Like in behaviorism, the mind has exclusively behavioral functions. However, unlike behaviorism, functionalism does not directly identify specific mental states (certain kinds of sensations, emotions, desire, etc.) with specific forms of behavior.

From the point of view of functionalism, specific mental states can be identified with certain functional blocks – analogues of subprograms (functions) or blocks in the algorithm of the overall program. Each such block-subprogram 1) receives an input information from the nervous system or other functional blocks or both, 2) processes this information according with its algorithm and produces an output information for the system of muscles or for other blocks or both. Our (introspective) awareness and identification of different sensations and emotions, from the point of view of functionalism, also are such functional blocks.

In particular, functionalism can offer its own version of the theory of “the same thing seen from different points of view”, which can be illustrated on the example of pain with such a scheme (to remind: SRNP are signal-regulative neurophysical processes in the brain):

 

Materialistic (functionalist) model:

1) the sensation of pain:

2) visual observation of the physical processes responsible for the sensation of pain:

Let us compare it with the corresponding model of dualism.


Dualistic model:

1) the sensation of pain:

2) visual observation of the physical processes responsible for the sensation of pain:

The schemes are almost identical functionally. The essential difference is only that in the dualistic model, there is real subjective experience and awareness of pain, while in the materialistic (functionalist) model there is only their functional imitation (manifested in various physical movements, external and internal). Signal-regulative neurophysical processes in the brain (SRNP "pain", SRNP “awareness of pain”, SRNP "image", SRNP “awareness of images”) are merely physical interactions and movements that occur automatically according to physical laws. Unlike these functionalist imitations, pain and visual image are subjective experiences as they are felt by everyone; and our awareness of something is a mental state that occurs and is experienced subjectively.

In the dualistic model, there is a human person who really feels (subjectively experiences) and is aware of pain and visual images. In materialistic (functionalist) model, there is a zombie that subjectively feels nothing and has no awareness, but is operated by a program that very well imitates the behavior of a person who feels and is aware.

These criticisms of behaviorism and functionalism can be summarized by Thomas Nagel’s statements:

“A physical explanation of behavioral or functional states does not explain the mental because it does not explain its subjective features: what any conscious mental state is like for its possessor.”[8]

“...the subjective character of experience … is not analyzable in terms of any explanatory system of functional states, … since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that behaved like people though they experienced nothing. … I do not deny that conscious mental states and events cause behavior, nor that they may be given functional characterizations. I deny only that this kind of thing exhausts their analysis. … It is useless to base the defense of materialism on any analysis of mental phenomena that fails to deal explicitly with their subjective character.”[9]

 

The Phenomenal Mind (Consciousness) as an Illusion of an Illusion of an Illusion...

In their attempts to explain how the mind can be some physical processes in – or functions of – the brain, materialists often regard the phenomenal notion of mind (and all more specific phenomenal notions, such as the notion of pain as a subjective experience) is an error of perception that is generated by introspective first-person awareness.[10] Colin McGinn describes this point of view as follows:

“A pain, for example, is nothing more than a firing of certain fibers in the brain... The two are not merely correlated; they are identical. Admittedly, pain does not seem like that when looked at introspectively, but introspection is a source of error and illusion, and not to be trusted in revealing the true nature of consciousness. The materialist agrees that our own awareness of our pains does not represent them as merely neural activity, but this is dismissed as an error of perception. The true nature of pain is not apparent to our first-person awareness of pain; rather, its nature is revealed by third-person examination of what is going on in the appropriate part of the brain. The way we are aware of our minds from the inside is held to be positively misleading as to what our minds are really like.”[11]

From this point of view, the mind, consciousness, in the usual meaning of the words, (in particular, subjective experiences and introspective awareness) is but illusions that we have when we are introspectively-subjectively aware of our subjective experiences. But this statement is obviously self-contradictory: it both affirms and denies (states it to be an illusion) that we are introspectively-subjectively aware of our subjective experiences. It reminds me a joke about the mayor who has declared that the talks that there are homeless people in the city are slanderous rumors disseminated by those who have no place to live in.

If the phenomenal mind (consciousness-subjectivity) is an illusion, whose illusion it is? Can an illusion exist by itself, without a phenomenal mind (consciousness)? If illusions exist only in consciousness, and consciousness is an illusion, then consciousness is not merely an illusion, but an illusion of an illusion of an illusion ... ... ... (ad infinitum).

It is difficult to think up something more absurd. But, as Descartes wrote, it is impossible to imagine so absurd or implausible a theory that it was not defended by some philosopher.

******

Surely, materialists can merely ignore the absurdity of their theories and contend that no subjective experiences (qualia) and subjective awareness, no consciousness (in the usual meaning of the word) exist. John Beloff explains this on the examples of pain and of the visual image of a red spot:

“…if the behavioural aspects of pain did, in fact, comprise the whole of what we mean by pain we could all, no doubt, aspire to being stoics! The crux of the pain problem – what makes some of us cowards – is precisely the nature of pain qualia. Even so, a determined behaviourist … can brazen it out without conceding that there is such a thing as a private or subjective dimension to pain. …materialists and behaviourists are not stupid. They are as much aware as we are that what they are saying is outrageous, in the sense of defying something deep rooted in our thought and language, it is just that they are undeterred. Dennett, at the outset of his lengthy treatise, warns us that his efforts at ‘demystification’ as he calls it, will be viewed by many as an ‘act of intellectual vandalism’. But, if we cannot formally refute the materialism or functionalism…, neither can its proponents persuade us to deny or overlook that red patch that refuses to go away. …I can do no better than John Searle (1992) when he says (p.8), ‘ ... if your theory results in the view that consciousness does not exist, you have simply produced a reductio ad absurdum of your theory.’”[12]

Reductio ad absurdum – in formal logics, the method of proof that consists of supposing the truth of a statement in order to show that it entails absurd (or known as false) conclusions and, hence, is false (its negation is true). The method is widely used in geometry under the name "proof by contradiction". It has the following form:

Theorem: T.          

Proof: Let's suppose that not-T. If so, the conclusion X follows. X contradicts the axiom A. Hence, not-T is false. Hence, T is true, quod erat demonstrandum.

In our case, T is the statement that materialism is false, not-T is the statement that materialism is true; X is the conclusion that the phenomenal mind, consciousnesses as the personal realm of subjectivity does not exist; A is the existence of the phenomenal mind, consciousnesses as the personal realm of subjectivity.



[1] Monism – the philosophical doctrine that the nature of reality is basically uniform: all that exists is variations of the same fundamental reality (substance). Monism is opposed to dualism and pluralism, which presume the existence of two or several fundamentally different kinds of entities. There are three varieties of monism:

1) materialism – the doctrine that everything is matter, physical reality;

2) idealism – the doctrine that everything is Spirit, Reason, etc.;

3) neutral monism – the doctrine that everything is some ‘neutral’ thing that appears in some situations as matter (physical reality), while in others as mind (mental states).

[2] S. Law. What Is the Mind?

[3] Popper K. Language and the Body-Mind Problem. – p. 396.

[4] Cf.: K. Popper: “… the idea of a mutual translatability had to be given up long ago. With it, the two-language solution disappears. For if two languages are not inter-translatable, then they deal with different kinds of facts. The relation between these kinds of facts constitutes our problem, which can therefore only be formulated by constructing one language in which we can speak about both kinds of facts.” (Popper K. Language and the Body-Mind Problem. – p.396.)

[5] Nagel T. What is it like to be a bat? – p. 167.

[6] specifically human – inherent for people and alien, impossible for Martians

[7] Nagel T. What is it like to be a bat? – p. 172-173. Italics mine.

[8] Nagel T. Panpsychism. – p.188.

[9] Nagel T. What is it like to be a bat? – p.166-167.

[10] A first person (²) is a person who experiences pain and is aware of his experience, to distinguish from a third person (he or she) – a person who can observe from the outside the behavior or (by means of some device) physical processes that occur in the brain of a person who feels pain.

[11] McGinn C. The Mysterious Flame. – p.19.

[12] Beloff J. The Mind-Brain Problem. – p.513

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