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13. The Moral-Practical Aspect: the Problem of Responsibility
… then, you say, science itself
will teach man … that he never has really had any caprice or will of his own,
and that he himself is something of the nature of a piano-key or the stop of an
organ, and that there are, besides, things called the laws of nature; so that
everything he does is not done by his willing it, but is done of itself, by the
laws of nature. Consequently we have only to discover these laws of nature, and
man will no longer have to answer for his actions and life will become
exceedingly easy for him. All human actions will then, of course, be tabulated
according to these laws, mathematically, like tables of logarithms up to
108,000, and entered in an index; or, better still, there would be published
certain edifying works of the nature of encyclopaedic lexicons, in which
everything will be so clearly calculated and explained that there will be no
more incidents or adventures in the world. Then … new economic
relations will be established, all ready-made and worked out with mathematical
exactitude, so that every possible question will vanish in the twinkling of an
eye, simply because every possible answer to it will be provided. Then the
"Palace of Crystal" will be built. Then ... in fact, those will be
halcyon days.
F.Dostoevsky[1]
We are now to pay attention to morally-practical aspect of the problem
which (though philosophers who discuss the mind-body problem often forget it)
is not less important than theoretical, but, fortunately, can be elucidated much
more succinctly.
My thesis[2] is very simple: interactionism
is the only approach which agrees with the understanding of the
human being as responsible person and, hence, the only approach
which supports the idea of human dignity. All its alternatives are
destructive in this respect.
To see this, it is enough to ask the question:
“Whether actions of the human being are results of his/her conscious decisions?”
Obviously, only affirmative answer agrees with the idea of responsibility. The
human being is responsible for his/her actions only on condition and so far as
these actions result from his/her conscious decisions. (That is why insanes
aren’t hold responsible.)
Interactionism is the only approach which considers actions of the human
being (at least, a great part of his/her actions – those actions for which
he/she bears responsibility) as a result of his/her conscious decisions. Only
interactionism recognises that these actions have as their source consciousness
– Descartes’ “thinking I” (which not only thinks, but also
experiences sensations and emotions, wills, sets purposes for oneself, plans,
makes decisions).
And that is what alternative approaches tell:
Radical materialism-eliminativism openly denies the
existence of consciousness.
Functionalism is concealed eliminativism; it substitutes the content of the concept
of consciousness, eliminating from it exactly what demands an explanation and
creates the mind-body problem − consciousness in usual sense −
as the personal realm of subjectivity (sensations, emotions,
thoughts, desires, awareness as they are experienced subjectively). Instead, it
uses the word 'consciousness' in the entirely different sense: physical processes
in the brain which fulfil certain functions.
Epiphenomenalism, though it recognises the existence of consciousness as something
distinct from physical processes in the brain, denies its capability to
influence these processes and behaviour.
From the point of view of all three theories,
actions of the human being are entirely determined by physical interactions
(which occur purely automatically according to physical laws) of particles of
his/her body with one another and with external physical environment.
Consciousness as the realm of subjectivity (personal "world" of
sensations, emotions, desires, thinking as they are experienced and as we are
aware of them), “mental self” is considered either as nonexistent or as
incapable to influence anything.
The theory of identity of mental states with certain structures and processes in the brain happens,
in fact, to be an inconsistent, confused form of epiphenomenalism which
considers itself as materialism. Its supporters recognise the existence of consciousness
as the realm of subjective experiences and awareness, and also the existence of
physical structures and processes in the brain, but they think that the first
and the second is somehow-don’t-know-how the same thing. However, this hardly makes
any sense.
Suppose that we begin with adopting (for argument’s sake) the thesis of
the theory of identity that mental states are certain structures of the brain as
they are perceived subjectively. Now the very fact that certain structures
of the brain are somehow perceived subjectively, as well as all specific facts about
how various structures of the brain are perceived subjectively, – all these
are additional facts beyond the realm of physical facts, i.e. outside of physical reality. Adherents of the theory of identity
overlook this. Now, the theory of identity, like
epiphenomenalism, assumes that physical processes in the brain and
behaviour of the human being do not
depend in any way on the fact that certain structures of the brain are
perceived subjectively and on what these subjective perceptions are like
(how-it-feels).
All materialistic and epiphenomenalistic theories assume the causal closure
(self-sufficiency) of physical reality, so they leave no place for influence of
consciousness on human activity.
Finally, neutral monism (in
particular, what Thomas Nagel proposes, and to what David Chalmers admits his
sympathy) says us that there is some unknown mysterious incomprehensible-for-us
reality Õ which is neither matter nor mind, but which appears to the
mind in two forms – externally in the form of physical processes and
subjectively in the form of mind.
This theory has an obvious fatal flaw: for something to appear to the human
mind there must be the human mind to begin with; hence, the mind precedes the appearance.
The mind cannot be something derivative, secondary in relation to Õ,
X’s
appearance, since mind’s existence is the necessary precondition for any
appearance. The precondition necessary for any appearance cannot itself be an
appearance.
Besides, with respect to the problem of responsibility, the same unacceptable
conclusions follow from neutral monism as from epiphenomenalism and the theory
of identity. Neutral monism means that
1)There is some mysterious
comprehensive reality Õ;
2)There are two ways of perception of Õ
accessible to the human being – externally-physical P and introspective I;
3)The human behaviour is how a
certain part (set) of events which occur with Õ is perceived in
the externally-physical way; we will designate this set of events as B(X).
It needs to be noticed that human behaviour, from this point of view, is
not a set of real events as they really are (B(X)), but a set of externally-physical
perceptions of these events; we can designate it as P(B(X))[3]; it is important, that behavioural
events are perceivable by the human being only in this way; they are not perceivable
in the introspective way: I(B(X));
4)B(X) is a consequence of some other part (set) of
events which occur with Õ; these events are perceived in both ways: externally-physically
as physical processes in the brain and introspectively as mental states and
processes, the mind. If we designate this set of events as BM(X), then
what we usually call physical states and processes in the brain is a set of externally-physical
perceptions of these events P(BM(X)), and the mind is a set of
introspective perceptions of these events I(BM(X)).
So, in this prospect there is the causal chain BM(X)→B(X). The
question is: whether the mind influences behaviour? The answer is: no. All real
events occur in the realm of mysterious unknown Õ. Also, all real causes
are contained in this realm. One set of mysterious unknown events within Õ
causes another set of mysterious unknown events within X. The mind remains illusory epiphenomenon
− one of the ways of appearance-perception of some events, not an efficient
factor which may act as a cause of real events. The fact that BM(X)
sometimes appears (is perceived) in forms of mind I(BÌ(X)) does not
influence any real events in any way. The mind, and the physical too, are
appearances, not reality; they are
how something seems-appears (is perceived), not what it really is.
The reality is attributed only to some mysterious unknown Õ. So, neutral
monism happens to be an extravagant form of epiphenomenalism: unlike usual
epiphenomenalism it 1) considers the mind as epiphenomena generated not by
physical processes, but by some unknown mysterious Õ and 2) considers the
physical as another epiphenomena generated by Õ.
Really, in the prospect of neutral monism not only consciousness I(BÌ(X)),
but physical states and processes in the brain P(BÌ(X)) as well do not
influence behaviour of a person in any way! The real causal chain is not at the
level of these (epi)phenomena, but at the level of mysterious unknown and
unknowable reality X. There are
no causal chains neither from the mind to behaviour I(BÌ(X))→P(B(X)),
nor from physical states and processes in the brain to behaviour P(BÌ(X))→P(B(X)).
There are only causal chains from one part of unknown mysterious Õ to another its
part: BM(X)→B(X), and also from these parts to their externally-physical
and introspective perceptions BM(X)→P(BÌ(X)), BM(X) →I(BM(X)),
B(X)→P(B(X)).
The causal scheme of neutral monism is as depicted below.
David Chalmers in the article “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature”
(2003) writes that neutral monism both “is perfectly compatible with the causal
closure of the microphysical” and “acknowledges a clear causal role for
consciousness in the physical world: (proto)phenomenal properties serve as the
ultimate categorical basis of all physical causation”.[4] But such “an acknowledgement of a
clear causal role” is equivalent to its negation! In this prospect, consciousness
qua consciousness (and not just a set of some incomprehensible X-properties), the human "mental self"
do not play any causal role; all causal roles are played by some X-properties, about which we have no idea
and which we (for eyewash) have called protophenomenal. These X-properties perform all causal work in
what seems-appears as the physical world, and at the same time produce our
subjective experiences, desires, consciousness. From this point of view, we all
(our selves) as beings who subjectively experience, think, wish are not
active subjects, but passive products of some X-properties. Obviously, this is the
same epiphenomenalism in a bit different metaphysical frame.
On the other hand, if consciousness (the mind) influences processes in the
brain and human behaviour, then even if consciousness and processes in the
brain belong to some common Õ, they are its different parts or
properties, and, hence, dualism-interactionism is true.
It is worthy to pay attention to the following important moment. Consciousness
can fulfil a real causal role in the physical world only if “a holistic rather than an atomistic view of
consciousness”[5] is true: consciousness is not an aggregate
composed of parts which could exist separately, outside individual
consciousness; there is metaphysically indivisible mental unit – the self, which is a
bearer-subject of all those mental states and processes which are called
consciousness.