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1. The Basic Concepts: Physical and Mental
(Matter and Mind/Consciousness)
Human
experience points at the two main aspects (or parts) of reality.
The first one
– physical
reality – is constituted by space and bodies occupying some place in
space and changing it with time (i.e., making physical movements) due to
physical laws. This reality is called matter. In particulars, the human
body, nervous system, and brain belong to it.
The second one is experience itself as personal subjective experiencing and awareness, the personal realm of subjectivity which encompasses our feelings,
emotions, thinking, wishes, awareness and understanding of the world and the self;
our selves as the bearers-subjects of
feeling, awareness, thinking, and willing. This personal realm of subjectivity is called the mind or consciousness.
A terminological notification (convention): 'mind',
'consciousness'
I use the word 'mind' to
denote all subjective experiences and
subjective awareness.
The word 'consciousness' is
often used in philosophical literature in the same meaning. However, it is as often
used in the narrower meanings of awareness
or thinking or the content of awareness. That is why I give
preference to the word 'mind'. On the other hand, as many authors quoted in
this book have used the word 'consciousness' in the same meaning, when
discussing their statements, I sometimes use it as well.
The mind
(consciousness), the self as an
entity that feels, is aware, thinks and wills, is something most familiar to
us, something of which we have direct knowledge (unlike physical reality, about
which we know but indirectly – through mediation of organs of perception, the
brain and the mind). At the same time, the mind and its various states (feelings,
emotions, thoughts, and wishes) are something very mysterious. They cannot be observed
from the outside, seen, or palpated; they have no size, form, and colour; they
can not be measured by a ruler or some more complex device. Throughout many
centuries, philosophers have debated on what is the mind (consciousness) and
what is its relation with the material world, physical reality – the world of
physical bodies, which have certain sizes, forms, colours, and spatial locations
relative to one another, change their locations with time, and can be observed
from outside, seen, palpated, measured, photographed, and depicted.
We know, from
science, that the mind (mental states) is dependent on certain physical
structures and processes in the body – the nervous system and the brain. However,
if we observe (through some special device) how the nervous system and the
brain work, we will see some physical bodies which move, change their form,
contract, or expand – but we cannot see feelings or thoughts. Feelings can only
be directly felt by someone as her own feelings; thoughts can only be thought
by someone and be present in her conscious awareness as the content of her own
thinking – both feelings and thoughts are unobservable from outside.
Certainly,
we can observe outward manifestations
of feelings. However, outward manifestations of feelings are not feelings
themselves. By seeing someone’s face expression, we can guess what she feels. However,
we do not see pain, grief, or joy – we only guess about these feelings as far
as we know from experience how a person usually (often) looks and behaves if
she feels pain, grief, or joy. We would not know what are the feelings of pain or joy (how they feel),
if we ourselves never felt them, if we only observed from outside people’s looks and
behaviours or processes in their brains.
Many people
(in particular, many scientists) believe that feelings and thoughts, which are
unobservable from outside but are experienced (felt, thought) immediately, are
the same with the physical processes in the nervous system and the brain, which
can be (in principle, through some special device) observed from outside but
are not experienced immediately. They believe that the human being is nothing
but a very complicated automaton – a physical system that is operated entirely
by physical laws.[1] This
position is usually called materialism and its adherents –
materialists (sometimes other names – 'physicalism'
or 'physical determinism' – are used). Materialists believe that the
mind is nothing but the physical processes in the brain. I will call this view the
brain theory.
The most influential alternative to materialism is dualism – the view that
the mind (consciousness, self) is something non-physical, and hence, the human
being is the compound of a physical body and a non-physical mind (mental self).
The most usual and popular form of dualism is the belief that human beings,
besides body, have souls. Some philosophers-dualists avoid the talk of souls. In
my view, this is infelicitous, because the notion of soul means exactly a non-physical bearer-subject of mental
states and processes – feelings, thinking, willing, etc. So, I will call
the view that the mental self, the bearer-subject of consciousness (mental
states) is something non-physical the soul theory.
A terminological notification (convention): 'materialism'
and 'dualism'
Each of the words 'materialism' and 'dualism' can have somewhat
different meanings in different contexts. In particular, it is expedient to
distinguish, on the one hand, ontological
materialism and dualism as views about the
nature of reality (the world) on the whole and, on the other hand, mindbody materialism and dualism as main
alternative views about the relation between the mind (consciousness) and the body
(the brain).
A mindbody "ism" not always combines with its ontological namesake.
For example, some people combine the belief that the world was created by God
and the belief that the humans are purely physical systems and the mind
(consciousness) is nothing but physical processes in the brain. So, they
combine ontological dualism with mindbody materialism. Mindbody dualism can be
combined with ontological pluralism – for example, in Karl Popper’s theory of "three
worlds". There are also other possible combinations.
In this book, I usually use the words 'materialism' and 'dualism' in the
mindbody meanings, if another meaning is not specified explicitly or obvious
from the context.
The Concept
of the Physical (Matter)
The concept
of matter covers all things and processes that are perceived through external senses (those of sight, touch, etc.).
However, it also signifies many other things and processes, which really are not
perceived (immediately) through the external senses but are supposed to exist
and to be of the same nature and submit to the same natural laws as things and
processes perceived through the external senses. As an example, we can take
such microelements as atoms or electrons or some very distant stars or planets that
nobody has ever seen. Some of them cannot be seen even through the most
powerful microscopes and telescopes. Science discovers their existence by their
influence on other material objects according to physical laws.
What then is
common for all things and processes that are called material? How can their
common nature be described in the most exact way?
Some
philosophers propose defining matter through the property I have mentioned
above – that of being perceivable through external senses. Let us take, for
example, the following definition by V.I.Lenin: “Matter is a
philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by
his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our
sensations, while existing independently of them.”[2] There are several grave deficiencies with such
a definition. First, a definition of matter that involves perception
(sensations) cannot be properly applied to all things and processes that are
acknowledged to be material, because a great multitude of such things and
processes are not really perceived sensually (immediately). Second, it is
logically incorrect to define matter through perception (subjective), because materialism
assumes that the existence and properties of material objects are completely
independent of perception (are completely objective). The Russian philosopher
A.F.Losev justly remarked: “There is absolutely nothing subjective in the
concept of matter, and the materialists themselves assert that matter is eternal
and that it existed before life and before living things with all their
perceptions and their sense-organs. ... The reference to the link with
sense-organs does not, therefore, help in any way.”[3]
If our perception is definitive for the concept of
matter, then matter is by definition
secondary to perception. Such a definition may be acceptable only from the
idealistic point of view.[4]
To have some neutral starting ground to discuss the question of the relation between
matter and mind, we have to define matter not through perception, but through objective properties. We need to get a clear
understanding of what matter is by
itself, objectively, independently of perception. Otherwise we put
ourselves in danger of getting hopelessly muddled.
I suppose
this problem can be adequately solved by the physical definition of matter: matter
is physical reality – everything (and nothing but) that can be
described exhaustively by physical
properties, such as spatial coordinates, size, form, direction of movement, velocity,
acceleration, mass, electric charge, etc. (For the moment we leave open the
question of the existence of some other reality.)
This
definition can also be countered with some objections. Thus, A.F.Losev pointed
out the existence of different physical theories of matter and their changes
with the historical development of physics. I think this objection misses the
point. The existence of different physical theories
of matter – different theories about the structure and organization of matter –
does not make impossible a common meaning
of the concept of matter that is presupposed in all these theories and
remains invariant (unchangeable) in the process of the development of physics. Atoms
were once believed to be the smallest indivisible particles of matter. Then it
was discovered that atoms consist of smaller particles, which, in their turn,
consist of yet smaller ones − so it is not known whether there is a limit
of divisibility at all. Such a property of matter as electric charge was
unknown in the times of
Descartes’
equivalent of the concept of matter is the
substance characterized by the attribute of extension (in contrast to mind
as the substance characterized by the attribute of thinking). Sensu stricto, such a definition of
matter is not quite correct, for modern physics tells us about the existence of
such material microparticles that are geometrical points in space rather than
extended things. However, Descartes’ idea can be corrected:
for the concept of matter, spatial
and spatiotemporal properties – such as spatial coordinates, size, form, velocity,
acceleration etc. – are
definitive
A terminological notification (convention): "spatial
properties", "spatiotemporal
properties"
Here and henceforth I use the word-combinations "spatial properties" and "spatiotemporal properties" to signify a thing’s spatial
location (coordinates, size, form) and its temporal
derivatives (such as velocity, acceleration, etc.).
I will use the word-combination "spatial properties"
to signify only such properties. I
will not use it in some wider sense embracing
whatever has anything to do with space (as,
for example, concerning the mind, the property
to interact with a physical body located in a certain place). If you meet somewhere in the text the statement
that the mind and all that belong to it (thoughts, emotions, sensations, etc.) have no spatial properties, this
means that they are not located in a certain place and have no certain size and
form. Certainly, it can be said that they have spatial properties in the above-mentioned
wider sense, but I do not use the word-combination
"spatial properties" in that
sense.
All other physical properties (such as mass, electric charge, or field-properties) are
auxiliaries introduced for the purpose of describing how (with what
regularities) physical bodies move (i.e., how their location in space changes with
time) and how they, with mediation of space, influence one another’s movements.
They are either properties to move in some law-abiding
way, or properties to influence movements of other physical bodies and undergo
movemental influences caused by other physical bodies or space in some law-abiding way. In this meaning, all physical
properties are reducible to spatial location and its changes with time. ² will
call reducibility in this meaning conceptual reducibility to spatial
location and its changes with time (or to spatiotemporal relations).[5]
For example, the concept of mass
signifies such a property of physical bodies: whenever a body X interacts with a
body E, which is adopted by convention as a standard (unit) of mass, the proportion
of accelerations of the bodies Å and Õ is constant. This proportion is called the
mass of the body Õ. In a like manner, the concept of electric charge can
be defined. Physical fields are spatiotemporal distributions of the property of
space to influence movements of physical
bodies in some regular way. So, if the
future development of physics will reveal the need to introduce some new
physical properties, they will not principally
differ from the old ones, in the sense that the new properties as well as the old
ones will be conceptually reducible to spatial properties and their temporal
dynamics.
Thus, notwithstanding the historical
changes (development) of physics, there remains some invariant that is
definitive for the concept of physical, or matter. Descartes called it the attribute of extension. To be more
correct, we can call it the attribute of
spatial location – or, yet more precisely, the conceptual reducibility to spatial location and its changes with
time. This means that the contents and raison
d’etre of all concepts that signify-describe material (physical in a wide sense)
reality is exhausted by (reduced to) their role in descriptions
and predictions of spatial locations of physical bodies and their changes with
time.
Accordingly,
if the content and raison d’etre of
some concept are not reducible to the
concept’s role in descriptions and predictions of spatial
locations-and-movements of physical bodies, then this concept means something non-physical, non-material. But
this is just the situation with such concepts as 'consciousness', 'sensation',
'feeling', 'pain', 'joy', 'love', 'thinking', 'wish', 'idea', 'theory', 'meaning',
etc. The meaning in which we usually
use these words is conceptually irreducible
to the temporal dynamics of the spatial locations of physical bodies. Because
what we usually mean by these words exists,
it follows that materialism is false.
It is important to notice that the conceptual reducibility to spatial
location and its changes with time holds not only for those properties and laws
that are dealt with in the science of physics (properties and laws that are physical
in the narrow sense), but also for all other properties and laws (regularities)
that are physical in the wide sense, or
material. This category encompasses all chemical
properties and laws – for they are all nothing but regularities of physical movements of atoms, ions, and other
microscopic physical bodies. The concept of matter (of the physical in the wide
sense) as conceptually reducible to spatial locations and movements encompass
also all those biological properties
that belong to the physiology (locations
and movements of physical bodies – cells, molecules, ions, atoms – inside
animal or human bodies) and the behaviour
of animals or human beings (changes of spatial locations of such physical
bodies as paws, tails, heads, arms, legs, etc.). The same goes for instincts and reflexes as some regular
patterns of behaviour, i.e., of physical movements of various parts of the body. They are
all physical in the wide sense, although to describe them we use terms of
biology, not of physics.
Thus, 'material', 'physical' in the wide sense that is pertinent to the discussion
between materialism and its alternatives, means conceptually reducible to spatial locations and their changes with time
(movements).
Essentially, the
physical (matter) boils down to but one basic property – spatial location that
changes with time. All other physical properties, as well as all physical laws,
are a conceptual superstructure built on this basic property – measures, patterns,
regularities that we discover in the processes of changes of spatial locations
of various bodies (relative one another), and designate with various names,
such as 'mass', 'electric charge', 'electromagnetic field', 'the law of
gravity', ..., 'instinct', 'reflex', ...
In a bit more detail, physical reality or matter is:
1) space with several (three, according to usual conception) dimensions,
which correspond to the same number of directions for the measurement of sizes (length,
width, and height in three-dimensional space) and distances (three projections
on the Cartesian datum lines) – a sort of universal container for all physical
bodies;
2) physical bodies as bearers of spatiotemporal properties (relations): location
in space, movement (change of spatial location with time), and influences on
one another’s movements;
3) all properties (relations) that are conceptually reducible to spatial
location and its changes with time. These are such properties as:
– spatial location:
distances and directions toward other physical bodies or points in space (Cartesian
coordinates), size (length, width, height), form;
– temporal derivatives from spatial location: velocity,
acceleration, etc.;
– constant patterns of movements;
– constant measures and patterns of influences of
physical bodies on one another’s movements: mass, electric charge, etc.;
– constant measures and patterns of influences of
space on movements of physical bodies – physical (gravitational, electromagnetic)
fields.
It is important to notice that such properties as mass, electric charge,
etc. (measures and patterns of
influences on movements) belong to the category of material or physical (in the
wide sense) not in virtue of what they do,
but in virtue of what they are – not because they influence movements, but
because they are nothing but constant measures or patterns of influences on
movements. If we ask: What is mass or electric charge in itself, besides spatiotemporal relations and influences? The
right answer is: nothing. The concepts of mass and electric charge are
introduced exceptionally for the
purposes of description and prediction of such relations and influences; this exhausts their meaning. That is why
mass and electric charge are physical properties.
This directly concerns the question about the nature of mind: is it
physical (material) or not? It is exactly in this respect that the usual
dualism-interactionism – the theory supposing the existence of the nonphysical mental self (soul) and its interaction
with the body (the brain) – is opposed to materialism and epiphenomenalism. Materialists
and epiphenomenalists believe in the “causal closure of the physical”: the
physical cannot be influenced by something nonphysical. Interactionists believe
that 1) there is no reason why the nonphysical cannot influence the physical,
and 2) the mind is nonphysical and it interacts (influences and is influenced) with
the physical (the human body, the brain). The concept of physical has to be
defined in such a way that leaves this issue open, that does not beg the
question by "deciding" it in advance by definition. It would be incorrect to define the concept of
physical in such a way that whatever influences physical processes would be
physical by definition.
If something influences
physical processes (movements), this is
not a reason for categorizing it as physical. However, if something is nothing but a constant measure or
pattern of influences on movements (is conceptually reducible to spatial
location and its changes with time), this is
a sufficient reason to categorize it as physical.
If the mind (consciousness) is nothing but some
patterns of behaviour or/and of physical movements inside the body, then it is
physical. However, if it is “in itself” something else (besides),
which influences behaviour and physical movements inside the body, then
it is not physical.
In fact, it seems that subjective feelings or thoughts, unlike mass or
electrical charge, are something “in itself”, besides influences on the movements.
We know about them independently of any knowledge about the spatial locations
and movements of physical bodies. And there is nothing in whatever multitude of
spatial locations and movements to infer subjective experiences and conscious
awareness. This gives reason to think that the mind (consciousness), as the
realm of the subjective, is non-physical, although we know that it influences
physical events – our behaviour.
In
connection with the aforesaid, it is appropriate to warn against one fairly frequent
mistake.
The mistake
consists in this: starting with a (true) statement that Õ has physical
properties one draws the invalid conclusion
that X is physical (material); this conclusion, in its turn, serves as a premise
for the conclusion that all
properties of X are physical.
For example: from the (true) statement that humans have physical
properties (those of their bodies) one draws the conclusion that humans are
physical (material) beings and, so, their minds too are physical. Such a
conclusion is invalid. Having physical properties does not mean being (nothing
but) a physical (material) entity. The entity in question can be
dual-natured, having both physical and nonphysical properties, or consisting of
two parts, physical and nonphysical. The fact that human beings have physical
properties is equally consistent with both materialism and dualism. The fact
that someone has a body does not mean
that she is (nothing but) a body.
Or let us suppose that human beings have souls. The folk psychology
usually imagines a soul as having some bodily properties – a body-like
appearance. A soul is often attributed with a bodily aspect, a so-called "thin
body". Suppose that these notions are true. Does it follow that the soul
is physical? By no means. What is decisive for the distinction between physical
and nonphysical is not the presence/absence of physical properties, but the absence/presence
of nonphysical properties.
Thus, it is wrong to think that if something has spatial (and in
general, physical) properties, then it is physical (material), and all the rest
of its properties have to be categorized as physical. On the contrary, if
something has some nonphysical (conceptually irreducible to spatiotemporal) properties,
then it is nonphysical or dual. The existence of something having both physical
and nonphysical properties would mean the falsity
of materialism.
The same can be formulated in the form of a statement
about the contents and meanings of the
relevant concepts (this is pertinent because quite a large part of modern debates
on the mind-body problem turns around the meaning/content of such concepts as 'mind',
'consciousness', 'feeling', 'pain', etc.):
If the content of a concept is entirely
or partially independent from the purposes of description and prediction of
spatial locations and their changes with time (physical movements), i.e., is
conceptually irreducible to the spatiotemporal properties, then this concept means something non-physical or dual. (Surely,
the concept with a nonphysical meaning by itself is not sufficient to refute
materialism; it is necessary that there really existed something that corresponds
with its nonphysical meaning.)
Notice: conceptual
reducibility ≠ logical (deductive) reducibility
It is important to distinguish conceptual
reducibility from logical, deductive reducibility
(deducibility). The physical laws and corresponding properties (mass,
electric charge, etc.) are conceptually
reducible to observable spatial dynamics of physical bodies (changes of
their spatial locations with time) but are
not logically reducible to (deducible from) it.
The content of general theories (about universal laws of nature) and the corresponding concepts (designating those properties that
these theories introduce) are conceptually reducible to the observable facts that these theories
and concepts generalize and predict. This means that all the meaning and purpose
(raison d’etre) of such theories and
concepts (for example, a supposition about the existence of a certain law
of nature) consists in generalizations and predictions of such observable facts.
Every physical concept (of a property
or a law) is a theoretical construction, such that its meaning consists entirely
in generalizing and predicting observable spatial locations of physical bodies and
their changes with time (movements).
On the other hand, general
theories and the content of the corresponding concepts are never logically (deductively) reducible to (deducible from) any
multitude of really observed facts. It is so, because every general theory
contains hypothetical statements (predictions)
about an infinite multitude of facts that
were not observed by anyone (in particular, of future facts).
For example,
The Problem of Fundamental Intrinsic Properties (Quiddities)
The concept of
the physical as
conceptually reducible to spatial relations and their dynamics (changes over
time), as explained above, may need to be modified in the light of the problem of fundamental intrinsic properties. The
problem is roughly as follows.
Admittedly, all cognizable properties of physical objects (in
particular, all properties about which physics tells) are either spatial
relations, or aspects of their dynamics (changes over time), or dispositions of
objects to influence the spatial dynamics of other objects and to undergo the
corresponding influence on their part in a certain law-abiding way. However,
the idea that physical objects have only such
properties can be logically unsustainable.
If we suppose that all physical objects
(at the fundamental level of physical reality) are bearers of only such
properties, it turns out that their identity is wholly a matter of their
spatial relations and dispositions relative to other physical objects, whose
identity is wholly a matter of their spatial relations and dispositions relative
to other physical objects, etc. ad
infinitum. Thus, physical reality as though dissolves in mutual spatial
relations and dispositions of something intrinsically qualityless, −
something that is, apart from these mutual relations and dispositions, nothing.
Many think that this is absurd and logically impossible; so they think that fundamental physical objects should have specific properties
of another kind − fundamental intrinsic properties, which are
technically called
"quiddities". On the supposition, quiddities are neither spatial nor dispositional properties;
however, they ground the identity of fundamental physical entities, and determine
their dispositional properties in the context of the most
fundamental laws of nature: 1) a fundamental physical entity is real,
exists, is something rather than nothing insofar as it is a bearer of some intrinsic properties-quiddities and 2) its
dispositional properties are determined by fundamental laws of nature (more
fundamental than the most fundamental of those known to modern physics) that
establish mutual dispositions between fundamental physical objects as bearers
of certain intrinsic properties-quiddities.
However, there is a serious problem with quiddities,
if we assume their existence: they should be utterly incognizable. All that we
can know about physical objects by external observation are some aspects of
their spatial relations and dynamics (changes over time) of these relations; and
to explain them, we suppose the existence of certain laws of nature and the associated
dispositional and spatial properties. As for intrinsic properties-quiddities,
we have no cognitive access to them – they are utterly incognizable Kantian
"things in themselves".
It is tempting to suppose that these intrinsic properties-quiddities
have the same nature as the only intrinsic properties we are familiar with –
subjective qualities of our mental states, experiences. However, as the idea of
subjective mental states without mental subjects (the idea of experiences that
no one experiences) has no sense, this would mean that fundamental physical entities
(perhaps, leptons and quarks) have subjective experiences. The theory that attributes mental properties-experiences to matter
at the fundamental level is called panpsychism. As a rule, panpsychism is considered
as a separate direction, distinct from materialism. In the following discussion
concerned with the alternative of materialism and dualism, I will talk not
about matter (physical reality) of panpsychism, which has subjective
experiences, but about matter (physical reality) of materialism, which has
no subjective experiences and awareness at the fundamental level.
There is also another, non-panpsychistic version of the theory of quiddities, according to
which fundamental physical entities has intrinsic properties-quiddities that are not subjective properties of
experiences, because fundamental physical entities have no experiences. If this
version is true, quiddities are quite unlike anything we are familiar with from
experience; as a consequence, we cannot know what they are, and cannot even
imagine what they can be like.
Many advocates of the non-panpsychistic version of the theory of
quiddities suggest that although quiddities are not experiential properties,
they somehow constitute experiences of such complex physical systems as the
human brain. If so, we can call quiddities protomental properties. This theory is
called panprotopsychism (because on the supposition, protomental properties are
ubiquitous). As a rule, this view is identified with the direction of neutral
or Russellian monism, or considered as a version (along with panpsychism) of the latter. However, it may
be considered also as a version of materialism (probably, a considerable part
of philosophers who call themseves materialists would agree with it).
Nevertheless, in the
following discussion concerned with the alternative of materialism and dualism,
I will omit complications that are due to the possibility of panprotopsychism;
I will discuss them later, in the chapters
of the second book about neutral monism or Russellianism.
Primary and
Secondary Properties
To avoid
confusion, we need to distinguish the properties
of material objects as they are by themselves from the properties that are relations of material objects to the mind
(their influence on the mind, the way they are perceived). As examples of
properties of the second kind, we can take taste, smell, or colour. These
properties are due, on the one side, to some physical properties of perceived material
objects and, on the other side, to gustatory, olfactory, or visual perceptual
experiences, which belong to the mind. Such properties are traditionally (since
the ÕVII century, when Rene Descartes and John Locke pointed out the importance
of this distinction) called secondary, in contrast to primary
properties, such as size, form, weight, and solidity, which belong to
material objects as they are by themselves, independently of perception. Perhaps,
it would be better to use the word-combination 'relational properties' (instead
of 'secondary'), for they characterize relations between material objects and the
mind. They are equally determined by both sides of the relation: on the one
side, by primary properties of the material objects that are perceived, and on
the other side, by the subjective perceptive
constitution of the human mind.[6]
For
example, let us consider such a property as colour. Is colour a physical (material)
property, or is it a sensation? Prima
facie it seems that colour is a property of a thing itself, but arguably it
is not quite so. The concept of colour, as used in ordinary language, means not
a physical property of things, but their property-disposition to evoke in
the human mind (in normal conditions) some specific sensations.
We need to distinguish
1) the physical properties that make a person have a certain sensation of
colour, and 2) a sensation of colour. We may call the properties (1) ‘colour’
in the purely physical sense, distinct from the ordinary sense of the word ‘colour’
that is bound to sensations of colours.
Colour in the
purely physical sense is a frequency of the electromagnetic wave of the stream
of light (microparticles-photons) reflected by a body, i.e., a frequency of the
sinusoid that describes the distribution in space and time of magnitude and
direction of the influence of a stream of light on movements (acceleration) of physical
bodies that have electromagnetic properties (in particular, those contained in eyes).
Thus, differences between colours are, from the physical point of view,
differences of frequencies of such sinusoids.
Obviously, nothing of the sort is meant by the
word 'colour' in the ordinary sense. Colour in the ordinary sense is the property
of a thing to cause in our minds a certain sensation. Our sensations of colours tell nothing about whatever
sinusoids and accelerations, i.e., about colour in the purely physical sense. Now,
we know from physics that our sensations of colours are evoked (in our minds) by
those physical properties of things that we have designated as “colour in the purely
physical sense”.
On the other hand, these sensations – how we see various colours, how
they look for us – belong to the mind. Our minds have a property
to subjectively perceive-experience the
corresponding physical properties (colours in the physical sense), to match
them with specific subjective experiences.
The Concept of Mind as Subjectivity
I will use the concept of mind (consciousness) and all
concepts that pertain to it (those of feelings, emotions, thinking, desires,
understanding) in the usual sense of common speech – as a personal realm of subjectivity
– how it is for a subject (person)
– to feel, experience emotions, think, will, be aware of something, etc.
These meanings should be clearly distinguished from the
concept of mind that dominated the philosophy of mind and “mainstream
psychology” of the 20th century – the behaviouristic-functionalist concept
of mind, which identifies mind (consciousness) with the corresponding forms of behaviour
and with functional structures of the intra-bodily physical processes
responsible for these forms of behaviour. From the point of view of behaviourism
a certain sensation or emotion (for example, a feeling of pain or pleasure) is
not how we experience it subjectively (how it is for a person – to feel
pain or pleasure); it is nothing but external manifestations of these feelings –
how a person who has them behaves. From the point of view of functionalism, a sensation
or emotion is nothing but a functional structure of those processes in the
brain that cause these external manifestations, behaviour.
It is clear that these concepts
of mind – common sense versus
behaviouristic-functionalist – are very
different by meaning, despite the same spelling. We can imagine a body that is
an exact physical copy of the body of some person, but has no subjective experiences
and subjective awareness. Various parts of this body make exactly the same externally
observable movements (behaviour), and exactly the same physical processes occur
in its brain – but all this occurs without any feelings and understanding (in the usual, subjective sense),
automatically, as a result of interactions of parts and particles of the body according
to physical laws. Just as well, it is possible to imagine a mind that is capable
of subjective experiences and thought without a brain, and without a body.
For the moment, we are not discussing the question: Is
it really (as a matter of the existing natural order) possible for such a body
(brain) to exist without a mind, or for a mind to exist without a brain? Here,
we are concerned only with making it clear that the concepts of mind (of consciousness, feelings,
emotions, thinking, understanding) have quite different meanings from whatever concepts of behaviour,
processes in the brain, and their functions. The concepts of mind (of consciousness,
sensations, emotions, thinking, understanding) mean, in the usual human
sense, not patterns of behaviour or processes in the brain or their functions, but
how we experience something subjectively and our subjective awareness, thinking, understanding, how it for us.
Thus, I will use mental concepts in this usual – not behaviouristic-functionalist
– sense.
Against Behaviouristic-Functionalist Substitutions of the
Meanings
of Psychological Concepts
D.Chalmers draws a similar distinction, but uses other
terms: the phenomenal concept of mind, which means subjectivity, and the
psychological concept of mind, to designate ‘mind’ in the behaviouristic-functionalist
sense (i.e., behavioural or functional correlates of mind).
This choice of terminology is very symptomatic of the
state of psychology in the 20th century that was caused by the dehumanizing
influence of materialism, positivism (the theory that all knowledge should be
reducible to results of external observations, and that all ideas and theories that
do not satisfy this demand are meaningless nonsense), and scientism generally –
as striving to squeeze humanities into the patterns of natural sciences. Although
the concept ‘psychology’ etymologically (by origin) means a science about
the soul, in the 20th century the mainstream strived to oust from
psychology not only the idea of soul, but even the notions of mind and consciousness
in the usual human – i.e., phenomenal, subjective – sense. Chalmers, himself an
alumnus of the “school” of “cognitive science”, notes that owing to the influence
of behaviourism and Freud, in psychology of the 20th century “the
idea that explanation of behaviour is in no way dependent on phenomenal notions”
was “established as orthodoxy”, and “the move from behaviourism to computational
cognitive science for the most part preserved this orthodoxy.”[7]
I will not support this terminology, for I think that it reflects not a progressive
and natural development of psychology, but a temporary scientismic perversion,
and I hope that psychology will succeed to release itself from it. Instead, I
will use the term 'psychological' in the sense that is usual for most of people,
synonymous with 'mental' – that stands for various aspects of human
subjectivity.[8]
A terminological
explanation: two meanings of 'phenomenon'
The adjective 'phenomenal' is derived from the noun 'phenomenon'.
It is important to keep in mind that the noun 'phenomenon' is used in
two very different senses:
(1) in the sense of common language and science – for example, when we
talk about natural or social phenomena – 'phenomenon' is merely something that
has place in reality (in nature, society, etc.).
(2) in the specific philosophical (Kantian) sense, 'phenomenon' is the
concept that designates mental
representations of reality – how reality appears to a person, in human
forms of perception and thinking; in this sense, 'phenomenon' is opposed to
reality as 'noumenon', 'thing-in-itself'.
The adjective 'phenomenal', as it is used in this book, is derivative
from 'phenomenon' in the sense (2), not in the sense (1). The same goes for the
noun 'phenomenology' (either as 'a science about the phenomenal' or as 'a complex
phenomenal system').
Unlike this, the word 'phenomenon' will most often be used in the sense
(1), if the other sense is not stipulated directly or obvious from a context.
Are the "Bodily" ("Physical") Experiences Bodily (Physical)?
There is a
widespread mistake about sensations (visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile),
and such a feeling as pain. Such sensations are often described as bodily or physical, and this may
mislead, make us accustomed, as a matter of course, to the idea that they
belong to the body, i.e., are nothing but some physical processes or states.
It is telling that many people who are inclined to believe
that emotions (joy, grief, love, hatred), thoughts, and will are states of the soul
(not of the body) also believe,
on the other hand, that perceptual sensations and pain are states of the body (not of the soul). However,
if the soul, as something distinct from the body, really exists, if our minds
(mental selves) are something else than physical processes in the brain, then placing
"bodily" ("physical") sensations on another side of the
"boundary" from emotions, thoughts, and will is mistaken.
"Bodily" ("physical") sensations
belong to the realm of mind as well as emotions, thoughts, and will. However,
they have a certain specificity that justifies the application to them, in some
sense, of the adjectives 'bodily' or 'physical'. Viz.: they are such states of mind that are most directly caused by
physical processes in the body. However, this does not mean that they are
physical processes in the body. (From the point of view of a well thought-out
dualism, they should be considered as reactions of the mind, or self, or
soul on certain physical processes in the body.) In the context of the question
about belonging to the realm of the physical, there is no principal difference
between "bodily" ("physical") sensations and "spiritual"
feelings. “Bodily” ("physical") sensations are "in the same
basket" with emotions, thoughts, and will – they all are mental states and
processes (states and processes of the mind, or the mental self).
Let us take, for example, such a "bodily"
feeling as pain in a foot.
We know that for this feeling, there are corresponding
physical processes (certain changes of spatial structures – spatial movements
of cells and their parts) in the chain of nervous cells from the foot to the brain
and inside the brain. However, what we usually mean by the word 'pain' is not
these physical processes, but a feeling of pain, how-it-feels subjectively.
People feel pain and know about this feeling quite irrespectively of whether
they know anything about the corresponding physical processes in the nervous
system and the brain. Therefore, pain-as-a-feeling (a subjective experience)
belongs to the realm of mind (just as well as emotions, thoughts, and desires).
Pain in a foot, just as well as pleasure or love,
belongs to the mental, to the mind; it is felt by me (a mental subject-self), not
by my foot.[9]
If materialism is right, all mental states and
processes – emotions, thinking, and will, just as well as "bodily"
("physical") sensations – are some physical structures and processes
in the brain. If dualism is right, all mental states and processes, including all
so-called "bodily" ("physical") sensations, are states and
processes of a specific non-physical reality (the mental self, or the soul)
that is intimately connected with the brain and reacts to its physical states,
but is not structures and processes of the brain.
Non-spatiality of Mind
Materialism
contends that all that exists is physical reality. Opponents of materialism argue
that it not so: our thoughts, sensations, emotions, and also scientific
theories, contents of fiction books, musical symphonies, etc. – all that
pertains to the concepts of mind and of spiritual – are neither bodies that are located in space in a certain way, nor something conceptually reducible
to spatial structures and relations
between bodies and changes of these structures and relations with time
(movements).
The concepts
of mind, consciousness, feeling, thinking, idea, theory, etc. mean something non-spatial, i.e., not
characterized by spatial location (coordinates, size, form), though it may be connected
with material objects located in space (the mind – with the body, especially the
brain, of a person; a scientific theory – with books in which it is expounded, etc.).
The mind is characterized, in the first place, by a subjective quality of its states (experiences, awareness, understanding,
etc.); and the creations of the human
spirit (science, art, philosophy, religion) are characterized by their meaning that
the human mind is capable to grasp.
The first philosopher who had clearly formulated and
argued for the thesis about the non-spatiality of mind was Descartes. Recently
this point was discussed at length by one of the leading modern philosophers of
mind, Colin McGinn, in the article “Consciousness and Space”.[10]
The article begins with a clear and succinct explanation of the thesis of
Descartes, as expressing “our ordinary understanding of the nature of mental
phenomena … as non-spatial in character”. (p. 93)
Let us consider, for example, some visual experience. Though
it is connected with certain neural spatial structures in the brain, the
experience itself is not located somewhere in physical space. For example, if I
imagine a red spot, this mental red spot “is not located at any specific place;
it takes up no particular volume of space; it has no shape; it is not made up of
spatially distributed parts; it has no spatial dimensionality; it is not solid.
Even to ask for its spatial properties is to commit some sort of category
mistake, analogous to asking for the spatial properties of numbers.” (p.94)
This statement may need some further explanation and
specification. It means that the imaginary red spot is not located anywhere in
physical space: however carefully scientists scan my brain, they will not
find there that red spot. On the other hand, it may be said to be located in a special
space – the phenomenal space of my mind. If I imagine some complex
visual picture, its different elements will be somehow located in the imaginary
picture in my mind. For example, I can imagine a red spot at the left of or
below a green spot. However, all this is not present anywhere in physical
space: when I imagine a red spot at the left of a green spot, there is neither a
red nor a green spot in my brain. Elements of experience, subjective
perceptions, qualia are not located in physical space, although they can
be described as located in the phenomenal space of the mind. Phenomenal spaces
exist outside physical space, in minds, not in physical reality.
Non-spatiality
of mental phenomena “is connected with the fact that conscious states are not perceived. We perceive, by our various sense
organs, a variety of material objects laid out in space, taking up certain
volumes and separated by certain distances. We thus conceive of these perceptual
objects as spatial entities; perception informs us directly of their
spatiality. But conscious subjects and their mental states are not in this way
perceptual objects. We do not see or hear or smell or touch them…” (p.94)
McGinn also
considers a possible objection: it may be said that though we do not attribute
to our mental states and our selves (subjects-owners of mental states) precise
location, we attribute to them approximate location: “We certainly do
not suppose that I am in some other
place than my body, and we locate my thoughts nearer to my head than to my feet.
So, perhaps we do grant spatial characteristics to consciousness, at least of a
rudimentary sort.” (p.96) To this objection McGinn remarks that it actually does
not affect essentially “the intrinsic non-spatiality of the mental”. For if we "locate"
our selves where our bodies are located, and our thoughts in our heads rather
than in our feet, it is not because we can observe our selves or thoughts in a
certain place, but because we know about the causal relationship between the respective
physical objects and our mental states: “I am where that body is whose physical
states bear most directly on my mental state; and my states of consciousness
are situated in the vicinity of that brain whose activity is most directly implicated
in the causal relations controlling my mental life.” (p.96) Thus, it is a
matter of spatial location not of my self or my thoughts, but of those physical
objects that are most directly and intimately connected with my self or my
thoughts. My self and my thoughts remain things without form, size,
coordinates, i.e., in fact, without their own spatial location.
Another objection is that we locate some mental states precisely enough.
For example, we talk about pain in a foot, and I can tell precisely enough
where exactly my foot is hurt. However, this is merely inaccuracy of common-language
statements. “Pain in the foot” actually is not a thing that is located
somewhere in the foot. “Pain in the foot” is a mental state, a state of the mind
evoked by some injury of the foot. In the case of pain in the foot, we locate not
the feeling of pain, but its source, those physical injuries that evoke it.
It is known that a person with an amputated foot can feel “pain in the foot”: the
feeling is the same, and the mind mistakenly locates its source as the foot, although
that foot is no longer there. It is also possible to evoke a feeling “pain in a
foot” by certain specific influences directly on the brain – though in fact the foot itself is all
right.
******
I think that the above considerations – which explain and ground the thesis that the mind (mental states) is (are) non-spatial, or that their spatial localization is not intrinsic but derived, wholly in virtue of the spatial localization of the body with which it is associated – need an essential corrective. The point is that we (our selves) as mental subjects, in perceiving the physical world, perceive it from a certain spatial point of view. Of course, this spatial point of view is determined, at least in the usual conditions, by the spatial location of a person’s body and, in particular, its perceptual organs. However, the body and its organs, while having a spatial location, have no point of view. A spatial point of view is something peculiar to ourselves as mental subjects, minds.
Let us notice that typical folk notions and evidences of near-death experiences (for details, see Book 2, Section 15) often tell about a soul that, on leaving the physical body of a person, observes what happens around – of course, from a certain spatial point of view. It can move, so changing its spatial point of view within the physical space.
On the other hand, the spatial point of view of a mental subject (mind) need not necessarily be – and actually not always is – related to the physical space in which our physical bodies are contained. For example, in a dream, a mental subject perceives the dream-events from a certain spatial point of view within the phenomenal space of the dream – the one that does not exist physically but exists only in the mind of the subject, although it is perceived by the subject as real, existing independently of herself. Also, folk notions of the beyond (afterlife), as well as corresponding evidences of subjects of near-death experiences, involve a spatial point of view of the subject (soul), although within an otherworld (real or illusory) space.
[1]
One of the most influential philosophers-materialists of the ÕVIII century,
J.O. de
[2]
Lenin V.I. Materialism and Empirio-criticism. – p. ….
Lenin had also given another
definition of matter, which does not correspond with the common, traditional
meaning. We will discuss it later – in Section 6.
[3] Losev
A.F. The Dialectics of Myth. – p. 112.
[4]
As, for example, that of Schopenhauer: “…everything objective,
everything external, since it is always only something apprehended, something
known, remains also always indirect and secondary, therefore absolutely never
can become the ultimate ground of explanation of things or the starting-point
of philosophy. Philosophy necessarily requires what is absolutely immediate for
its starting-point. But clearly only that which is given in self-consciousness
fulfils this condition, that which is within, the subjective.”
(Shopenhauer A. The World as Will and Idea. – Vol.3. – p.59)
[5]Cf.: T.Nagel: “…we must consider what makes a newly
discovered property of phenomenon physical. Since the class of known physical
properties is constantly expanding, the physical cannot be defined in terms of
the concepts of contemporary physics, but must be more general. New properties
are counted as physical if they are discovered by explanatory inference from those already in the class. This
repeated process starts from a base of
familiar, observable spatio-temporal phenomena …” (Nagel T. Panpsychism. –
p. 183) (Italicizing mine.)
[6] Cf.: C.Taylor: “…examples which played a central
role in Descartes’ thought: secondary properties, and bodily sensations. The
mistake of obscure and confused thought is to see these as "in" the
bodies concerned. The normal, unreflecting person thinks of colour or sweetness
as being in the dress or the candy; places the pain in the tooth, the tingling
in the foot. The real ontological locus of all these, Descartes asserts, is in
the mind. They are all ideas which are, indeed, brought about by certain
properties of dress, candy, tooth, foot, but their place is in the mind… The
body isn’t red in the way it is square.” (Taylor C. Sources of the Self. –
p.162)
[7]
Chalmers D. The Conscious Mind. – p.14.
[8] Christopher
Aanstoos, in the article “Mainstream psychology and the humanistic
alternative”, gives a very interesting review of tendencies in psychology in the
20th century, dividing it into three main streams: “the mainstream”,
orthodox Freudianism, and humanistic psychology.
“The mainstream”, which
dominated educational and scientific institutions throughout largest part of the
20th century, and still remains dominant, has passed two
stages of development: behaviouristic and
functionalist. Aanstoos aptly characterizes them as “rat psychology” and “computer
psychology”. Behaviouristic “rat psychology”
is a study of the behaviour of animals and human beings on the scheme stimulus-reaction,
i.e., a study of what behavioural
reactions will follow various stimuli, of how to evoke a wanted behavioural
reaction, of how to develop wanted conditioned reflexes, of methods of
behavioural training and methods of manipulating the behaviour of animals and
human beings. The corresponding theoretical models were developed mostly on the
basis of experiments with rats. (In the Soviet context, it would be proper to
call this current “Pavlov’s doggies psychology”.) Functionalist “computer psychology” – cognitive psychology
– is the presently dominant academic current that considers the human mind as the
processing of information by a computer. Critics of “the mainstream” emphasize
its futility: the bulk of its results
are trivial and unsuitable for the
purposes of psychological assistance to people.
Dehumanizing scientismic
tendencies and manipulative treatment of a person are also characteristic,
though in a smaller degree, of the second most influential current in
psychology of the 20th century – orthodox Freudianism. (Freud was a
convinced adherent of mechanistic materialism. He believed that in the future,
the development of natural sciences would enable us to explain the behaviour of
a person on the basis of the knowledge about physical and chemical processes
and about structures of her body, without an appeal to the traditional –
phenomenal – notions used by people to describe their mental states and
problems. However, he also recognized that at the present moment this was
impossible, and that psychology could not yet do without such notions and
methods that were based on them.)
The third current (or
rather a number of different currents that have a similar main tendency) –
humanistic psychology – is focused on understanding human psychological
problems and needs in all their complexity and variety, without squeezing them
into some biased pseudoscientific scheme, and on granting an appropriate
psychological assistance.
Unfortunately,
the prospect of a drastic humanistic turn in modern psychology is problematic,
because “the mainstream” keeps dominant positions in universities, including
decisions about educational and research programs and directions of financing.
I think that this problem cannot be solved "locally" by psychologists
alone; what is needed is a struggle “on all fronts” for the liberation of
science and society from scientism in general, and from materialism and
remnants of positivism in particular.
[9] Cf.: J. St. Mill: “… those of
mental phenomena – of the various feelings or states of consciousness of
sentient beings. These ... consist of Thoughts, Emotions, Volitions and
Sensations; the last being as truly states of Mind as the three former. It is
usual, indeed, to speak of sensations as states of body, not of mind. But this
is the common confusion of giving one and the same name to a phenomenon and to
the proximate cause or conditions of the phenomenon. The immediate antecedent
of a sensation is a state of body, but the sensation itself is a state of
mind... Whatever opinion we hold respecting the fundamental identity or
diversity of matter and mind, in any case the distinction between mental and
physical facts... will always remain as a matter of classification; and in that
classification sensations, like all other feelings, must be ranked as mental
phenomena. The mechanism of their production, both in the body itself and in
what is called outward nature, is all that can with any propriety be classed as
physical. The phenomena of mind, then, are the various feelings of our nature, both
those improperly called physical and those peculiarly designated as mental...”
(J.S.Mill. From A System of Logic. –
p. 57.)
[10]
McGinn C. Consciousness and space. Further in this subsection I will follow
McGinn, supplementing, where it is needed, his explanations with my comments.
The pages of quotations are indicated in parentheses: “(p. …)”