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…materialism
is the philosophy of the subject who forgets to take account of himself.
Arthur Schopenhauer[1]
Many
people, including a past self of mine, have thought that they could
simultaneously take consciousness seriously and remain a materialist. ...this
is not possible, and for straightforward reasons. ...One might say: You can’t
have your materialist cake and eat your consciousness too.
Temperamentally, I am strongly
inclined toward materialist reductive explanation, and I have no strong
spiritual or religious inclinations. For a number of years, I hoped for a
materialist theory; when I gave up on this hope, it was quite reluctantly. It
eventually seemed plain to me that these conclusions were forced on anyone who
wants to take consciousness seriously. Materialism is a beautiful and
compelling view of the world, but to account for consciousness, we have to go
beyond the resources it provides.
David Chalmers[2]
…one should trust ... pluralistic
discord over systematic harmony... If arguments or systematic theoretical
considerations lead to results that seem intuitively not to make sense, or if a
neat solution to a problem does not remove the conviction that the problem is
still there, or if a demonstration that some question is unreal leaves us still
wanting to ask it, then something is wrong with the argument and more work
needs to be done …
…to create understanding, philosophy
must convince. That means it must
produce or destroy belief, rather then merely provide us with a consistent set
of things to say...
Thomas Nagel[3]
Preface
This book deals with the
mind-body problem – the problem of the relation between the mind as the realm of subjective experiences and the body (brain) as part of physical reality
(matter) – or, to be more exact, the problem of the nature of the bearer-subject
of mental states and processes (feelings, experiences, emotions, awareness,
thinking, wishes, etc.), the mental self, and its relation to the body (the
brain).
The problem consists primarily of questions
of the most vital importance for every sentient and thinking person, such as:
–
What am I? What is the human self? Is
it (am I) just a complicated aggregate of atoms moving and interacting due to physical
laws? Or is it (am I) something nonmaterial (a soul)?
These questions entail others, of no
less importance:
–
Is it possible for us (our selves-souls)
to continue personal existence after physical death? (Also, is it possible that
we were existing before our current earthly life?) Is it possible that there is
personal immortality?
Many philosophers
of different (including opposite) worldviews considered this as the most
important philosophical problem.
An influential 19-th century German
philosopher-materialist Friedrich Engels estimated the problem (although giving
it rather a misleading title – the "question … concerning the relation of
thinking and being"[4])
as “the great basic question of all philosophy, especially of modern philosophy”.
And he explained: “From the very early times when men, still completely
ignorant of the structure of their own bodies, under the stimulus of dream
apparitions, came to believe that their thinking and sensation were not
activities of their bodies, but of a distinct soul which inhabits the body and
leaves it at death – from this time, men have been driven to reflect about the relation between this soul and the outside world. If, upon
death, it took leave of the body and lived on, there was no occasion to invent
yet another distinct death for it. Thus arose the idea of immortality...”[5]
On the other hand,
consider the statement of a Spanish novelist and philosopher Miguel de Unamuno:
“…the longing not to die, the hunger for personal immortality … is the
affective basis of all knowledge and the personal inward starting-point of all
human philosophy, wrought by a man and for men.”[6]
Despite the diametrically opposite attitudes
towards the possibility of personal immortality, Engels and Unamuno agreed in
the view that the belief in personal immortality is antirational. In the Õ²Õ–ÕÕ
centuries, not only materialists, but also many thinkers who approved the idea
of personal immortality, thought that it is contrary to reason – that to
believe in immortality is to defy reason.
My own meditation on the problem has resulted
(long before I started serious study of the relevant philosophical literature) in
the different conclusion: materialism is false; subjective feelings,
experiences, consciousness cannot be physical processes; I, my self
as the subject of mental states and processes – that something which feels, experiences,
wishes, and thinks – is neither my body nor my brain but something non-physical,
which corresponds to the concept of a soul. Furthermore, it is natural to suppose
the possibility of its existence after physical death and, may be, before this life
(my reasons for this conclusion were roughly the same as those discussed in Section 3
“The Zombie Argument”). The subsequent study in the philosophical literature
on the problem (most of all, the arguments of Karl Popper, John Beloff, Thomas Nagel,
David Chalmers, Frank Jackson, John Searle) has strengthened this conclusion.
Generally, the
decade of the 1970 started a new tendency in the philosophy of mind: many reputable
nonreligious scientifically oriented philosophers, who are "temperamentally
inclined toward materialism" (see the confession of David Chalmers in the epigraph
to this book), arrived at the conclusion that materialism is incapable to
account for the mind, consciousness, subjectivity – for the fact that we are
beings who subjectively feel, have experiences, and are aware – instead of
being automata which automatically, without any subjective feeling and
awareness, execute some “biological program” (however complicated).
Many
philosophers of the second half of the ÕÕ century who have realized the inadequacy
of materialism and defended some form of dualism or pluralism (see the Glossary:
dualism, pluralism) nevertheless avoided
the traditional concept of soul. I consider
this avoidance as a manifestation of the fear of accusations in the gravest “deadly
sins” against science – mysticism and obscurantism. One such philosopher (to
whom I am greatly indebted), Karl Popper, has finished his article “Language
and the Body-Mind Problem” with the remark: “The fear of obscurantism (or of
being judged an obscurantist) has prevented most anti-obscurantists from saying
such things as these. But this fear has produced, in the end, only obscurantism
of another kind.”[7]
Let me explain this remark as I understand it.
During the last
several centuries, in the process of struggle against religious mysticism and
obscurantism, scientists and science-oriented philosophers have got under
strong influence of materialism. This doctrine pretends to scientific status, and
its adherents are prone to label whatever has some resemblance to religion or
conflicts with materialism as mysticism and obscurantism. Quite a few
philosophers and scientists who see the inadequacy of materialism are afraid to
state their view, lest they should be accused of obscurantism. This means that
in the modern scientific-philosophical community, religious obscurantism is
replaced with materialistic obscurantism. I hope this book will contribute to
its overcoming.
It is
important not to be afraid to call things by their names. In particular, the
concept of soul has to be rehabilitated. To ascertain the soul’s existence, we
need neither mystics nor appeal to religious authorities; all we need is
contained in our everyday experience. There are very weighty rational arguments
which show that the mind (consciousness), the self, is something non-physical, distinct from the body, although
in intimate connection-interaction with it. This “something non-physical,
distinct from the body, although in intimate connection-interaction with it”
was always called 'soul'.
There is yet another
modern “scientific taboo” (closely associated with the avoidance of the concept
of soul) that I trespass in this book – discussion of the possibility of
afterlife (J.Schwartz and S.Begley remark that it is considered sort of
indecent – “something no self-respecting scientist is supposed to do in public”[8]).
Many prominent
scientists were not afraid to oppose quasi-scientific materialistic stereotypes.
For example, the outstanding neurosurgery scientist Wilder Penfield, the founder
of modern neurophysiology Charles Sherrington[9],
the Nobel Prize winner in neurophysiology John Eccles, the Nobel Prize winner
in physics Eugene Wigner[10].
The book is
intended not just for professional philosophers, but for thinking people
without special philosophical education who strive to understand the world and
their own selves. ² have tried my best to expound clearly the main existing views
and arguments on the problem and to give an account of my own view and its
rationales, avoiding unnecessary technical terms. Those terms which I
considered expedient are explained where they first appear and in the Glossary
at the end of the book.
‘Gender-inclusive language’ notification
When talking
about abstract persons, I use
feminine
pronouns in sections 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17,
the second
appendix in Book 1, and the first appendix in Book 2;
masculine
pronouns in sections 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16
the first
appendix in Book 1, and the second appendix in Book 2.
The order is
reversed when talking of gods, demons, ghosts, aliens, robots, etc.
[1]
Schopenhauer A. The World as Will and Idea.
– Vol. 2. – p. 176
[2]
Chalmers D. The Conscious Mind. – ð. 168, õiv.
[3]
Nagel T. Mortal Questions. Preface. – pp. x-xi.
[4] Engels uses “thinking and being” as synonymous to
“mind and matter”. He equates being
(i.e. all that exists) with matter from the very outset and thereby
crudely begs the question.
[5] Engels F. Ludwig Feuerbach & the End of
Classical German Philosophy. (Italicizing
mine)
[6]
Unamuno M. The Tragic Sense of Life.
[7]
Popper K. Language and the Body-Mind Problem. – p. 402.
[8]
Schwartz J., Begley S. The Mind & The Brain. – ð. 45.
[9]
“That our being should consist of two fundamental elements offers I suppose no
greater inherent improbability than that it should rest on one only”
(C.Sherrington, quot. by: Popper K., Eccles J. The Self and Its Brain. – ð. 62.)
[10]
“It is interesting from a psychological-epistemological point of view that,
although consciousness is the only phenomenon for which we have direct
evidence, many people deny its reality. The question "If all that exists
are some complicated chemical processes in your brain, why do you care what
those processes are?" is countered with evasion. One is led to believe
that ... the word "reality" does not have the same meaning for all of
us.” (E.Wigner, quot. by: Schwartz J., Begley S. The Mind & The Brain. – ð.
vii.)