Copyright 1996
Revised May 1998
All rights reserved
The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death, a road to safety or to ruin. Hence under no circumstances can it be neglected.
--Sun Tzu, The Art of War
It is highly self-evident that superior technology is a tremendous asset in warfare. No one needs to be convinced that advanced weaponry can determine the outcome of battles, and thus alter the course of history. In fact, it is the reverse argument which needs to be made: technological superiority, though extraordinarily important, is not by itself a sufficient condition for attaining victory. Wise commanders know this; but too many of their fellow officers, and much of the general public, perceive superior technology as a panacea for every conceivable military situation. They lack the engineer's understanding of the limitations of technology, and an awareness of the extent to which any technology's utility is determined by the deftness with which it is used.
Possession of superior weapons can be an invaluable asset on the battlefield, to be sure, as can outstanding tools for enhancing communications, control, coordination, and intelligence capabilities. The Hyksos, armed with their wheels, conquered ancient Egypt; Henry V defeated the French at Agincourt with his longbows; advanced tools for aerial bombardment won the Gulf War. The danger emerges when a more advanced arsenal is used as a justification for assuming success in any venture.
Moreover, advanced technology has many other limitations. It can be of great use in intelligence-gathering, but it can be dangerous if technological wizardry (say, reading license-plates in Iraq from space) is used as a substitute for human spying. This is a present criticism of the CIA, that it relies too much on satellites and too little on people. Advanced technology can make it possible to communicate more effectively with commanders in battle, but it cannot compel them to obey their orders. These and other pitfalls ignore the very human dimension of warfare.
Most importantly, technology cannot define the aims of war. Clausewitz held that warfare was meant to serve political aspirations, and these must be carefully selected and constantly enumerated and evaluated if war is not to be an exercise in futility. Superior technology can be made ineffective by local leaders fighting the right kind of war, particularly a guerrilla war in which the adversary cannot be differentiated from the people one is trying to protect. Moreover, technology is no substitute for the will to fight. If the enemy is determined to win, and you are not, you will be inclined to leave when your first casualties are incurred. If the above warnings bring to mind the American experience in Vietnam, this is because that was my intent; but they apply equally well to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the U.S./U.N. intervention in Somalia, and a host of other conflicts.
Modern-day military and political planners sometimes believe that new technology has invalidated traditional strategic thought and principles. The recent Persian Gulf War gives the lie to this assertion, although new aerial and missile technology altered tactics to a great extent. It is a testament to the power of great thought that much of the strategic credit for victory was given by Norman Schwarzkopf to a Chinese general, Sun Tzu, who had been dead for 2,500 years.
The origins of the Gulf War merit some examination in the context of this essay. The conflict began in July 1990, when Iraqi troops massed along the Kuwaiti border. Despite this warning, and the prodigious quantities of advanced weaponry which Kuwait, like Iraq and Saudi Arabia, had purchased during the preceding decade, Kuwaiti forces were taken by surprise and collapsed quickly on the second of August, yielding the entire country to the Iraqis within hours.
Any ruler who keeps his state dependent upon mercenaries will never have real peace or security, for they are disorganized, undisciplined, ambitious, and faithless. Brave before their allies, they are cowards before the enemy.
--Machiavelli, The Prince
Kuwait's armed forces consisted primarily of non-citizen residents hired to defend a country which treated them, like most of the country's disenfranchised majority, as little more than slaves. The weapons which Kuwait had purchased were not integrated into any sort of defensive system; most were never used in battle, until they were captured by the Iraqis and used to bolster Saddam Hussein's army. It may be argued that no effort on the part of Kuwait could have enabled it to defend itself against a far larger neighbor. The experiences of Singapore and Israel indicate otherwise.
From time to time the superstructure of tactics has to be altered or wholly torn down; but the old foundations of strategy so far remain, as though laid upon a rock.
--A.T. Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History
Only an incompetent general would ignore the great military opportunities afforded by new technology, but all too many make the reverse sin of believing that their new gadgets can overcome all obstacles. An awareness of the potential power of advanced technology must be tempered by an equally strong awareness of the limitations upon that power--a cognizance which is best imparted by a thorough scientific education. A commander who neglects the advantages offered by science and technology is swiftly defeated, though not so swiftly as one who lacks an understanding of history, human behavior, or the nature of warfare.
Debbe il principe leggere le istorie, e in quelle considerare le azioni degli uomini eccelenti.
The prince should read history, and in this consider the actions of excellent people.--Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince
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