"It is further claimed that as a matter of law the bicycle was not equipped as required by ordinance and that the court should have so charged the jury instead of permitting the jury to pass on that question. ... It will be observed that the ordinance does not provide that the lamp must be attached to the bicycle nor whereon the lamp shall be attached. We are of the view that 'equipped' does not require attachment to the bicycle. What is the meaning of lamp as used in this ordinance. A lamp is defined as any device for producing artificial light. In this case, plaintiff had in his hand clasped to the handlebar a two-cell flash light which cast its rays, according to some of the testimony in the record, a number of feet upon the pavement ahead of the bicycle. Let us assume that plaintiff carried on this bicycle a large light which illuminated the pavement ahead much better than the ordinary lamp used upon a bicycle, and sustained the injuries, could it be said that because he did not have a bicycle lamp attached that he could not recover? Such could hardly be urged. There is nothing in the ordinance requiring the light to be of any particular candle power, but a good lamp which shall be kept lighted. Who is to determine whether such lamp is a good lamp and whether the bicycle was equipped with such? Unquestionably the jury. ...
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"The eighth assignment of error is that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury before argument as requested by defendant in the eighth request to charge. That charge is as follows: 'One who voluntarily goes upon a street which he knows to be dangerous is guilty of such negligence as to preclude a recovery in case of injury. And so I say to you that if you find that at the time of the accident the plaintiff knew of the existence of the hole in the pavement, and you further find that at the time of the accident said hole was dangerous, and that plaintiff knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known of said danger, then I say to you that it was negligence for the plaintiff to have run into said hole, and that such negligence would prevent the plaintiff from recovering in this action, and your verdict should be for the defendant.'
"The first sentence states that one who voluntarily goes out onto a street which he knows to be dangerous is guilty of such negligence as to preclude a recovery in case of injury. We think that is a dangerous doctrine to lay down and is misleading to the jury. We all know that, due to modern traffic, the street or highway is a dangerous place to be. Must we stay off the highway because of that fact and if we do not, but go upon the street, in case of injury must we be precluded from recovery even though we might have been at the time in the exercise of ordinary or the greatest degree of care? We think not, as again proximate cause is eliminated. At the present time and for the last month or so our highways in many places are and have been in a dangerous condition for traffic. If we have knowledge of that fact and go upon the highway and are injured must we be precluded from recovery? We think that the charge was misleading and properly refused. As to the fog, we have already made reference to this urged error; suffice it to say that plaintiff testified he had no knowledge of the hole in the street. ...
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"These being our conclusions, the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is hereby affirmed."
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