"It is, therefore, quite clear that the Legislature of this state has recognized bicycles as a means of transportation over our highways, afforded protection to a bicyclist and subjected him to restraints. As civilization advances new methods of transportation upon and over our highways will no doubt be developed. A bicycle is one of those new developments and if they are to be excluded from the provisions of Section 3714, General Code, the Legislature should so provide. The statute makes no exception but provides that the streets be kept free from nuisance. We think the statute includes one riding a bicycle. Plaintiff had the undoubted right to travel over this street on a bicycle.
"There is another matter to be noted in passing. There is an ordinance of Conneaut prohibiting the riding of bicycles upon the sidewalks. A bicyclist, therefore, is required either to cease using same or operate it on the street. While this fact would not alone impose liability on the city provided a bicyclist was not of a class included in Section 3714, General Code, it is mentioned as a circumstance in the case. This court ... held that coasting might be considered an ordinary mode of travel in the absence of a restricting ordinance. While the facts in that case are not identical with the instant case, a principle is announced therein. ...
"We might observe further that, assuming this hole was four, five or six inches in depth and the size as indicated by the evidence, to hold such would not be a nuisance as a matter of law would be in our judgment exceeding our authority. Such hole might not seriously damage a car passing over it. On the other hand, no doubt every car traveling over a hole of this size and depth would to some extent be damaged, particularly a tire, although the hole might not be of sufficient depth to cause a wheel to collapse, or the cutting of a tire causing a blowout; nevertheless, such a hole would without doubt damage to a certain extent every car traveling over it in the usual mode. It could hardly be said that if a tire was cut by being driven over the hole that a cause of a action would not arise. A nuisance need not be of such proportions as to cause the smashing of a wheel or overturning of a car or cause personal injury in order to constitute an actionable nuisance; as said by our Supreme Court in the case of Taylor v. City of Cincinnati ...: '"Nuisance" is a term used to designate the wrongful invasion of a legal right or interest.'
"It is urged that a bicycle could be easily upset or damaged by a hole which would in no way interfere with an automobile or horse-drawn vehicle, and in order to keep the streets in reasonably safe condition for bicycles it would make it expensive for the municipalities. We might observe that it is a rare occasion when a bicyclist brings an action in damages against a municipality. As a now recall, this is the only case ever brought to my attention while serving upon the bench. If this be the general rule then municipalities are not overcrowded with actions of this character. We think the court committed no error in refusing to state to the jury that Section 3714, General Code, had no application to one riding a bicycle. We think that under all the evidence in this case a jury question was presented as to whether a nuisance existed in the street which was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries, and that reasonable minds might differ on that issue and as to whether plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
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