"Coming to the case at bar, it is evident that paragraph (1) of section 2903b is the authority for the adoption of policies and rules of conduct regulating traffic. In contrast, paragraph (2) (authorizing certain acts of the Commissioner 'without the necessity of filing and publication') deals with the 'design, type, size and location' of signs, and grants the Commissioner discretion as to where, how, and in what manner the necessary notices are to be posted to inform the public of prohibited conduct and other restrictions promulgated pursuant to paragraph (1). It does not authorize the Commissioner to establish rules of conduct (here banning cyclists from a significant portion of midtown streets) merely by putting up signs to that effect. It is noted that it is the violation of the rules and regulations (not of the notices on the signs), that is stated to be a 'traffic violation.'
"By granting the public (through publication and notices to the members of the City Council, the chairpersons of affected community boards, and the media) an opportunity to comment on a proposal before it becomes effective, the Charter provision is an example of a legislative desire to give the citizenry a voice in the operation of government. Although no public hearing is mandated before a regulation becomes effective, the right to communicate views to the decision maker before the decision is made is certainly more in harmony with the democratic process than to permit a commissioner to change governing rules overnight without notice to the community or segment of the population affected.
"Here a decision was made to regulate conduct affecting a significant segment of the population. Although the public was informally notified of the ban approximately a month before the effective date of the Order, legal enactment thereof required its formal adoption as a regulation. The formalities for such adoption not having been complied with, the ban is unenforceable.
"In light of this determination, the court has not ruled on the other arguments presented by plaintiffs.
[...]
"Since the court finds, as a matter of law, that the Order was improperly promulgated, plaintiffs are granted summary judgment declaring the Order to be invalid, and a permanent injunction barring enforcement. The defendants' crossmotions to dismiss are denied."
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