"This bridge, by the authority of the legislature of the state, was purchased by the two counties, Kent and Queen Anne's with the view and for the purpose of making it a free public bridge and thoroughfare, to be under the joint management and control of the county commissioners of the two counties. ... The act of 1890 (chapter 85) is supplemental to the original act of 1888 [authorizing the purchase of the bridge], and makes some changes in the manner of accomplishing the purchase, and as to how the bridge shall be managed and controlled by the commissioners of the two counties after the same should be turned over to them. From the time of the consummation of the purchase it is declared ... 'that thereafter said bridge shall be taken, held, and perpetuated as a free public bridge between said counties;' and by the fifth section of the same act it is provided that the commissioners of the two counties shall have full power and authority to make reasonable rules and regulations for the use of said bridge by the public, ... In July, 1890, after the sale of the bridge had been effected to the counties, and the bridge turned over to their control, the commissioners of the two counties met and adopted rules and regulations for the use of the bridge by the public, but the only one of which rules that has been inserted in the record is this: 'No. 9. Persons will not be allowed to ride a bicycle, tricycle, or velocipede over the bridge.' Notwithstanding this prohibition, the plaintiff ... rode a bicycle over the bridge from the Kent county side to the Queen Anne's side, and on his return he was arrested and held in custody by the defendants, --Perkins being the bridge keeper, and Henly a constable of Kent county; and that the arrest was made without the issuance of any warrant. ... It was further shown that the bridge is built of wood, and has wood railings, and is about one third of a mile long from shore to shore; ... It was also shown in proof that some horses, ordinarily gentle, are frightened at bicycles ridden by persons along the public highways, and that some horses never get accustomed to them; and that horses becoming frightened at bicycles ridden by persons on the bridge would endanger the lives of persons driving such horses. The plaintiff offered proof tending to show that, as a general rule, horses, ordinarily gentle, and well broken, do not become frightened at bicycles; that, while the bridge was a toll bridge, persons were accustomed to ride over it on bicycles, and no accidents occurred. The plaintiff objected to all the evidence offered by the defendants in justification, but the objection was overruled, and he then offered, upon the whole evidence, six prayers, the first of which was granted, ... and the defendants offered two prayers, both of which were granted, and by the second of which the court ruled that if the facts as shown in proof on the part of the defendants were found to exist, 'then the rule or by-law referred to in the evidence is a reasonable and proper rule or by-law; and the verdict must be for the defendants.' Upon the objection to the evidence and the rulings upon the prayers two questions are presented. The first and principal one is whether the county commissioners, under the power given by the fifth section of the act of 1890, (chapter 85) to make reasonable rules and regulations for the use of the bridge by the public, had the right to make any rule or by-law whereby all persons are denied the right to ride a bicycle, tricycle, or velocipede over the bridge; and, if they have the power, then, secondly, whether the ninth rule or by-law, given in evidence, and the manner of enforcing it, as shown in this case, was a proper exercise of such power.
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