"We do not suppose that it could be seriously disputed that it is competent to the legislature in the exercise of its police power and general right to regulate the use of the highways of the state to restrict, and even forbid, the use of such vehicles as bicycles or tricycles on the highways, if they in fact be dangerous to the general traveling public. All individual rights are more or less subject to limitations and restrictions in their exercise, in the interest and for the protection of society generally; and if it be true that such vehicles as bicycles or tricycles are dangerous on the public highways, it would seem necessarily to follow that the legislature may reasonably restrict their use, rather than subject the public at large to the risk of danger in the enjoyment of a common right; and if such restriction may be made and enforced with respect to a common highway generally, a fortiori may it be made and enforced with respect to a bridge, such as that described in the evidence in this case. Indeed, it is a settled principle that it is the obligation to the public of those intrusted [sic] with the duty of maintaining and governing the use of the public highways to make and keep them as free of danger to the general public as can reasonably be done. Assuming, then, that the power exists in the legislature of the state, the question is whether the terms employed in delegating the power to the county commisioners be sufficient; the terms being that they 'shall have full power and authority to make reasonable rules and regulations for the use of said bridge by the public;' that is to say, such full power and authority as the legislature could delegate to them for the purpose of regulating the use of the bridge in such reasonable manner as would best subserve the interest and protection of the general traveling public. We are of opinion that the terms employed are sufficiently comprehensive to invest the commissioners with the power to make a by-law forbidding any person from riding a bicycle or tricycle over the bridge; and such rule or by-law, when made, must be taken as prima facie reasonable, and the onus of showing that it is unreasonable rests on the party denying its validity. It must be observed that the rule or by-law here attempted to be enforced does not deprive the party of the use of his property; it only forbids the riding of the bicycle or tricycle over the bridge. He can take or roll his bicycle or tricycle over the bridge, and then ride it at pleasure. He is only restrained from riding it over the bridge, because it may imperil the safety of others on the bridge with equal rights of passage with himself. He has no right to insist upon the use of his property or vehicle on the common highway in a manner that may likely produce danger or injury to others who are lawfully exercising their rights in the ordinary use of their property. If, therefore, it be true, as supposed by the commissioners, and found by the court in this case, that the riding of a bicycle or tricycle over the bridge would likely frighten horses and imperil the lives of passengers on the bridge, it was not only reasonable, but the duty of the commissioners, to forbid the riding of such vehicles over the bridge. This is not a new question, now for the first time presented. In the case of State [of North Carolina] v. Yopp ... the question was as to the validity of a statute which forbade every person to use upon the road of a particular company a bicycle or tricycle or other nonhorse vehicle, without the express permission of the superintendant of said road, etc., and it was held by the supreme court of that state that such regulation was clearly within the policy power of the state, and was in all respects reasonable and valid. In that case it was shown, as stated by the court, that the use of these vehicles on the road materially interfered with the exercise of the rights and safety of others in the lawful use of their carriages and horses in passing over the road; and that in repeated instances horses became frightened at them, and carriages were thrown into the ditches along the side of the road. In that case it was contended, as it has been contended in this, that confiding such power of exclusion (conceding the legislature to have the power) to the discretion of a subordinate officer was arbitrary and unjust; but the court said that the officer in control of the road was bound to exercise the discretion vested in him honestly, fairly, and reasonably, and for the sole purpose of effectuating the intention of the statute, and the protection of the public; and that there was nothing unreasonable in the exercise of his discretion in excluding the bicycle. ... We are clearly of opinion, therefore, both upon reason and authority, that the county commissioners had power, under the statute, to make a rule or by-law forbidding all persons from riding bicycles or tricycles over the bridge."
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