HISTORYAT A GLANCE |
Terror and Repression(Part 2.)
During this period, the government was also able to consolidate its position
in Kordestan. Fighting had resumed between government forces and Kurdish rebels
after the failure of talks under Bani Sadr in late 1980. The Kurds held parts of
the countryside and were able to enter the major cities at will after dark. With
its takeover of Bukan in November 1981, however, the government reasserted
control over the major urban centers. Further campaigns in 1983 reduced rebel
control over the countryside, and the Kurdish Democratic Party had to move its
headquarters to Iraq, from which it made forays into Iran. The Kurdish movement
was further weakened when differences between the Kurdish Democratic Party and
the more radical Komala (Komala-ye Shureshgari-ye Zahmat Keshan-e Kordestan-e
Iran, or Committee of the Revolutionary Toilers of Iranian Kordestan), a Kurdish
Marxist guerrilla organization, resulted in open fighting in 1985. The
government also moved against other active and potential opponents. In April
1982, the authorities arrested former Khomeini aide and foreign minister
Qotbzadeh and charged him In June 1982, the authorities captured Qashqai leader Khosrow Qashqai, who
had returned to Iran after the Revolution and had led his tribesmen in a local
uprising. He was tried and publicly hanged in October.
All these moves to crush opposition to the Republic gave freer rein to the
Pasdaran and revolutionary committees. Members of these organizations entered
homes, made arrests, conducted searches, and confiscated goods at will. The
government organized "Mobile Units of God's Vengeance" to patrol the streets and
to impose Islamic dress and Islamic codes of behavior. Instructions issued by
Khomeini in December 1981 and in August 1982 admonishing the revolutionary
organizations to exercise proper care in entering homes and making arrests were
ignored. "Manpower renewal" and "placement" committees in government ministries
and offices resumed widescale purges in 1982, examining officeholders and job
applicants on their beliefs and political inclinations. Applicants to
universities and military academies were subjected to similar examinations.
By the end of 1982, the country experienced a reaction against the numerous
executions and a widespread feeling of insecurity because of the arbitrary
actions of the revolutionary organizations and the purge committees. The
government saw that insecurity was also undermining economic confidence and
exacerbating economic difficulties. Accordingly, in December 1982 Khomeini
issued an eight-point decree prohibiting the revolutionary organizations from
entering homes, making arrests, conducting searches, and confiscating property
without legal authorization. He also banned unauthorized tapping of telephones,
interference with citizens in the privacy of their homes, and unauthorized
dismissals from the civil service. He urged the courts to conduct themselves so
that the people felt their life, property, and honor were secure. The government
appointed a follow-up committee to ensure adherence to Khomeini's decree, to
look into the activities of the revolutionary organizations, and to hear public
complaints against government officials. Some 300,000 complaints were filed
within a few weeks. The follow-up committee was The December decree, however, implied no increased tolerance for the
political opposition. The Tudeh had secured itself a measure of freedom during
the first three years of the Revolution by declaring loyalty to Khomeini and
supporting the clerics against liberal and left-wing opposition groups. But the
government showed less tolerance for the party after the impeachment of Bani
Sadr and the repression of left-wing guerrilla organizations. The party's
position further deteriorated in 1982, as relations between Iran and the Soviet
Union grew more strained over such issues as the war with Iraq and the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan. The government began closing down Tudeh publications as
early as June 1981, and in 1982 officials and senior clerics publicly branded
the members of the Tudeh as agents of a foreign power.
In February 1983, the government arrested Tudeh leader Nureddin Kianuri,
other members of the party Central Committee, and more than 1,000 party members.
The party was proscribed, and Kianuri confessed on television to spying for the
Soviet Union and to "espionage, deceit, and treason." Possibly because of Soviet
intervention, none of the leading members of the party was brought to trial or
executed, although the leaders remained in prison. Many rank and file members,
however, were put to death. By 1983 Bazargan's IFM was the only political group
outside the factions of the ruling hierarchy that was permitted any freedom of
activity. Even this group was barely tolerated. For example, the party
headquarters was attacked in 1983, and two party members were assaulted on the
floor of the Majlis.
In 1984 Khomeini denounced the Hojjatiyyeh, a fundamentalist religious group
that rejected the role assigned to the faqih under the Constitution. The
organization, taking this attack as a warning, dissolved itself.
with plotting with military officers and clerics
to kill Khomeini and to overthrow the state. Approximately 170 others, including
70 military men, were also arrested. The government implicated the respected
religious leader Shariatmadari, whose son-in-law had allegedly served as the
intermediary between Qotbzadeh and Shariatmadari. At his trial, Qotbzadeh denied
any design on Khomeini's life and claimed he had wanted only to change the
government, not to overthrow the Islamic Republic. Shariatmadari, in a
television interview, said he had been told of the plot but did not actively
support it. Qotbzadeh and the military men were executed, and Shariatmadari's
son-in-law was jailed. In an unprecedented move, members of the Association of
the Seminary Teachers of Qom voted to strip Shariatmadari of his title of
marja-e taqlid (a jurist who is also an object of emulation). Shariatmadari's
Center for Islamic Study and Publications was closed, and Shariatmadari was
placed under virtual house arrest.
soon dissolved, but the
decree nevertheless led to a marked decrease in executions, tempered the worst
abuses of the Pasdaran and revolutionary committees, and brought a measure of
security to individuals not engaged in opposition activity.
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