K E Y T 0 A N S W E R S

K E Y T 0 A N S W E R S

INTRODUCTION AND REMARKS:

All the statements are true. Sources of information explaining the answers are basically obtained from the judgment held by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico. You will also find, as a second source, Puerto Rico's and New York's law and jurisprudence. Additional reference material, besides the above is the translated record which tells you what happened during the hearing before the "Special Master"(Referee) just in reference to the judgment held by the Superior Court Carolina Part and the counts charged against me. Please note that apart of this hearing, the Supreme court of Puerto Rico did not allow any other kind of hearing before the courts of Puerto Rico.

I strongly believe I was biased by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico(the highest court). To know the truth you will have to read the judgment thoroughly analyze same and compare it with the laws and jurisprudence. If the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico controls the process, and they biased me, therefore there couldn't be any due process at all; besides who will review them? I believe that any court within the American Judiciary should apply the law at least in a fairly mode. I didn't contest this matter anymore since I was deeply involved with the New York courts.

Within the due process requirements is not only to provide the opportunity to be heard, etc., but to apply correctly the law. If it doesn't matter that you are not guilty in a criminal case, or that you have not committed any fault or violated any Code of Ethics or if you are not liable in a civil suit, if the Supreme

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Court of the state disregard rather they biased that can't be due process of law. Puerto Rico is an island of 100 x 35 square miles. Everybody knows each other very well. There is no way to pretend being naive about this.

However any Supreme Court within the American Judiciary have to show their errors when they come out with biased opinions. DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS:

The story began in the year 1977 before Superior Court Caguas Part. I was representing defendant Pedro Luis Santoni-Román, et al., in reference to a mortgage foreclosure of a lot of land guaranteed with a promissory note, affidavit 1798. See, in Puerto Rico in order to be a notary public you must be a lawyer.

Pedro L. Santoni-Román, et al., defendant and the plaintiff Rafael A. Grillo-Le6n, the last in behalf of the Estate of his deseased father Pablo Grillo Ramirez, retained the legal services of the Notary Public, Manuel Medina Aymat, Esq., who authorized two notarized promissory notes, i.e., one under affidavit 1798 and the other one 1809 (the last one 1809 had nothing to do with the case since it was never negotiated by Mr. Santoni-Román) . Plaintiff was foreclosing the mortgage together with the promissory note under affidavit 1798. In Puerto Rico every affidavit as well as a deed must have a number. The Notary Public has to do a life time registering book and must keep a chronological numerical order record for the affidavits, sworn statements, so forth. For deeds is the same, except that these are recorded and binded in a different book. The original document is attached therein and form

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part of the so called "protocol book". The Notary Public delivers only certified copies to the signers after the payment of dues to the state.

Back to the story. The case was dismissed two(2) times for lack of prosecution, except that the judgment for the second time expressely stated "with prejudice".

Four (4) years after plaintiff, Rafael A. Grillo-Le6n,et al., instated a separate action in another geographical forum, Superior Court Carolina Part, a court with the same level of authority like the first one.

Justice Julio Berrios Jimenez, of the Superior Court Caguas Part testified before the "Special Master" that the same date he signed the judgment, plaintiff lawyer Jorge Figueroa, Esq. and I appeared to his office so he could reopen for the second time the case, which the judge denied. About three(3) months after Mr. Santoni-Román appeared to my office to inform that he was moving to California and that he would like to pay me partial fees with the same lot of land at steak. Keep in mind that we are dealing with three(3) courts: 1- the Superior Court Caguas Part, 2- the Superior Court Carolina Part, and 3- the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.

The Superior Courts Caguas Part and Carolina Part are vested with the same hierarchical level of authority. The Superior Court is like the Supreme Court of New York and the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico is like the Court of Appeals, Albany, New York). For those days Puerto Rico didn't have an intermediate court like the

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Appellate Court of New York; now they have an intermediate court.

Now in reference to the answers,, please note that answers

written like this: 111) Page 4; Parr.211 means that the information is provided by the translated judgment dated on March 4, 1993.

Please also be informed that the deposition of Pedro Luis Santoni-Román was admitted into evidence by the "Special Master" and the credibility of the different testimonies given would depend a enormously upon said deposition which forms part of the record. I believe you may call the Supreme Court of Puerto and talk to Mr. Jorge Maldonado, Clerk for the Committee("Comisi6n de Etica y Reputaci6n") at (787)723-6033, Ext.2079. He may ask you for a written requisition. I guess you may have to fax him a letter requesting said deposition.

I hope this serves you as a guide to understand better the facts and the violation of due process, including the infirmity of proof and the none applicability of my case as a misconduct to New York's jurisdiction, in a chronological order by reading carefully the incidents occured in my case.

Should you need any additional information or explanation of any kind, please feel free to call me at any moment since I will unconditionally be willing to answer you same.

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SOURCES AND EXPLANATION TO THE ANSWERS

1) Page 4; Parr.2

2) Page 4; Parr.2-3

3) The opinion remained silenced; See Rafael A. Grillo-Le6n testimony at the "Transcription of the Hearing in its Essence", March 18,1991,page 36, lines 8-9.

4) Page 3; Parr.3 and 6

5) Matter of Law, American Judiciary. "Dismissal with prejudice usually considered an adjudication upon de merits and will operate as a bar to future action. 135 P.2d 71,7411

6) Rosember v Rae (1971) 28 NY2d 650, 320 NYS2d 522, 269 NE2d 192, on remand (1971, 2d Dept)36 App. Div. 2d 835, 321 NYS2d

227.

7) The Supreme Court's opinion remained silenced. Also see Justice Julio 0. Berrios testimony at the "Transcription of the Hearing in its Essence", March 18,1991, pp.58,59.

8) Page 4; Parr2 and 3

9) Page 6; Parr.2. Also see Also see Rafael A. Grillo-Le6n testimony,supra, page 40, last line to page 41,line 1 through 6. Plaintiff instated a separate action 4 years after the first judgment dismissing with prejudice took place.

10) Page 6; Parr.3; Line 4

ll)Page 6, Parr.2. See also Headley v Noto (1968) 22 NY2d 1, 290 NYS2d 726, 237 NE2d 871.

12)Page 5;Parr.5 Also see Holley v Mandate Realty Corp. (1986, lst Department) 12 App. Div. 2d 202, 503 NYS2d 350,and (1987) 69 NY2d 721, 512 NYS2d 365, 504 NE2d 692.

13)Page 4, 2nd parr.,line 10; and page 6, 2nd parr.,line 1.(Had close to 4 years to do so; instead they instated a separate action in a different Part). Failure to prosecute under CPLR §3216, plaintiff is required to demonstrate both justifiable excuse for late filing and good and meritorious cause of action. Juracka v. Ferrara (1988, 3rd Dept.) 137 App. Div. 2d 921, 524 NYS2d 885, app dismd. without op.(1988)72 NY2d 840, 530 NYS2d 555, 526 NE2d 47, app. den.(1989) 74 NY2d 642, 541 NYS2d 982, 539 NE2d 1110.

14)Matter of Law. See J.M. Rivera-Arvelo's "Transcript of The Continuation of the Hearing In-Depth" August 20,1991,page 41,

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lines 9-11. The Special Master and the Supreme Court remained silenced. Both courts were: "Superior", i. e., same level.

15)Page 6; Parr.2 The opinion remained silenced; See Rafael A. Grillo-Le6n testimony at the "Transcription of the Hearing in its Essence", March 18,1991,page 44, lines 8-10.

16)Matter of Law. In New York: Failure to prosecute under CPLR §3216. Juracka v. Ferrara,supra,13.

Effects of Order of Dismissal:

11 . . . is barred. . . "would not have entitled to obtain such relief by way of a separate action. . . 11 Headley v No to (1968) 22 NY2d 1, 290 NYS2d 726, 237 NE2d 871.

17)Page 6; Parr.2(Widow:"Consuelo León-Torres").

18)Page 3; Parr.5 and 6. Always available since 1977(for the first time), see admission by plaintiff by Rafael A. GrilloLe6n page 44, lines 8-10, supra #15.

19)Page 6; Parr.5 Also see Rafael A. Grillo's testimony,supra #18.

20)Matter of Law (refer to the above cited jurisprudence under

question #20.

21)Matter of Law. They are doctrines in Puerto Rico, see question #20 and in New York questions 22 through 26 as well.

22)See cases cited under question #22. Also the Law Dictionary, Third Edition, page 374, By Steven H. Gifis; Barron's Educational Series, Inc.,publishers, 1991.

23)Case cited. Law Dictionary, page 374,Third Edition #22,supra, under "privity".

24)Case cited. Law Dictionary, Third Edition #21,page 374, supra, under "privity".

25)Matter of Law. Law Dictionary, Third Edition #21,supra at page 374 under "Privityll.

26)Case cited. Law Dictionary, Third Edition #21,supra, page 374 under "Privity of Estate".

27)Page 4, Parr. 1, line 3. Remarks: The opinion "remained silenced" just mentioned them with no avail. observe when they skipped the first three allegations I alleged as part of the counterclaim at Caguas Part. They only entertained in allegation number 4.

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28)See case and Federal Rule 56, cited on question #28. also New York's Civil Practice Law and Rules §3212 and §3213. Law Dictionary, Third Edition #21, page 473, supra.

29)Page 7, line 1 and 3;See page 18(pages number were omitted from the transcript),"Transcript Of The Continuation Of The Hearing In-Depth", August 20, 1991 of J.M. Rivera-Arvelo.

30)Page 8, line 6. Also see deposition of Pedro L. Santoni-Romdn, taken on may 2, 1990.(not included as part of the record).

• See page 27-28(pages numbers were omitted),"Transcript Of The Continuation Of The Hearing In-Depth", August 20, 1991 of J.M. Rivera-Arvelo.

• See Also, "In-Depth Hearing Transcript" of Evaristo Alvarez and Hector Delgado-Rodriguez, of June 24 and 25, 1991, pp. 112, 113, 176, 177, 178, 200, 209, 213, and 214.

• See Justice Julio 0. Berrios testimony,supra #7, pp.58,59.

31)Page 8,line 6, Parr.2 and 3. See Law Dictionary, Third Edition #21, pp. 473-474, supra. Also Rule 3212(b) Civil Practice Law and Rules of New York. Succesive motions for summary judgment are disapproved, particularly where subsequent motion is based on grounds and factual assertions which could have been raised in first motion. Manning v. Turtel (1987, 2d Dept.)135 App. Div. 2d 511, 522 NYS2d 13. A cross motion has the same effect.

The opponent party should file a cross motion and 11 serve answering affidavit". Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Russo (1975) 83 Misc 2d 474; 372 NYS2d 944.

Also see Rule 3212: 11 . (b) it shall show that there is no defense to the xause of action or that the cause of action on defense has no merit .... the motion shall be denied if any Party shall show facts sufficient to require a trial of any issue of fact."

32)Matter of Law. See case cited under question #32. Also in New York, 11 The trial court erred in determining issues of facts solely upon conflicting affidavits and exhibits submitted in response to a motion for summary judgment. Skelly v. Carma Realty, Ltd. (1980), 4th Dept) 78 App. Div. 1005, 433 NYS2d 905.

33)Law Dictionary, page 64, Third Edition #21, supra. See Rules 4516,4517 and 4519 CPLR. This is what NY's jurisprudence has stated. Did not happen in my case:" Former testimony of a deceased witness. . . was heard in a tribunal where the other side was represented and allowed to cross examine,

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does not preclude . . . such testimony . . . if it complies with these requirements." Fleury v. Edwards (1960)11 AD2d 588, 200 NYS2d 675,(appearing in main volume). Also Skelly v. Carma Realty, Ltd.(1980),4th Dept) 78 App. Div. 1005, 433 NYS2d 905. Note:

The notary public Medina Aymat,defending himself, testified before his death. The Solicitor General took him apart a sworn statememt without following the procedures,offered same in evidence,admitted by the Special Master and eventually by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico as well.

H E A R S A Y

Former testimony of a deceased witness is admissible if it was:

a- given under oath,

b- referred to the same subject-matter, and

c- was heard in a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial

functions-not necessarily a court-where the other side was represented and allowed to cross-examine, may be used in a subsequent trial as a common-law exception to the hearsay rule, and the fact that the statute sanctions the admission of testimony previously given in a related "action" or "special proceeding" does not preclude the court from using such testimony under the common-law exception if it complies with these requirements. Fleury.v Edwards, 14 NY2d 334, 251 NYS2d 647, 200 NE2d 550 (expressly overruling doctrine enunciated in Fleury v Edwards (1960) 11 AD2d 588, 200 NYS2d 675, appearing in main volume).

d- where other side was represented and allowed to cross-examine Siegel v Waldbaum (1977) 59 AD2d 555, 397 NYS2d 144.

Rationale for retention of dead man's statute after barrier

forbidding any testimony by interested witness in litigation was dropped is that there is no one who can confront and cross-examine a witness . . . 11 Siegel v Waldbaum (1977) 59 AD2d 555, 397 NYS2d 144.

Affidavits of personal knowledge by decedent are inadmissible in subsequent trial because they are self-serving hearsay; affidavits which cannot in any sense be considered "testimony" cannot be admitted under exception for former testimony. Friedman v Sills (1985, 2d Dept) 112 App Div 2d 343, 491 NYS2d 794.

34)Page 12, parr.l,line 9. Those charges were never informed. First notice was given through the opinion held by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico.

See matter of law under question #34. Also counts #1 and #2 i in the opinion and judgment.

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Gerzof v. Gulotta (1976) 87 Misc 2d 768, 386 NYS2d 790, mod on other grounds (lst Dept) 57 AD2d 821, 395 NYS2d 26, app dismissed 42 NY2d 960, 398 NYS2d 146, 367 NE2d 653.

35)Page 6, parr 2.

36)Page 3, line 6

37)See judgment. Did not consider this matter. 38) It it if It 39)Page 7, parr. 3

40)Matter of Law. See page 9, parr. 3 and 4. 41)Page 4/foot note

42)See page 38(page numbers were omitted),"Transcript Of

The Continuation Of The Hearing In-Depth", August 20, 1991 of J.M. Rivera-Arvelo.

43)Matter of Law. See Fleury v Edwards, Siegel v Waldbaum (1977) 59 AD2d 555, 397 NYS2d 144, Siegel v Waldbaum (1977) 59 AD2d 555, 397 NYS2d 144 and Friedman v Sills (1985, 2d Dept) 112 App Div 2d 343, 491 NYS2d 794, supra #33.

44)Rule 39, Title 4, Law of Puetrto Rico Annotated

-"Act of Subsanation"(Act to Excuse or Repair). It is a Act of Excuse or Repair "the public instrument written by the Notary, without the intervention of the parties who executed same and without the prejudice of a third party, to correct a previous defects or omissions that a public instrument has. The Notary will state in the Act that the correction are related to facts or information observed [by him] or that otherwise acknowledge them personally and that do not affect the juridical transaction. (Translation made by myself.)

See §2047,2048 and 2049, Title 4, LPRA). Internet, go to www.lexjuris or LexJuris.com,and seek under law,"acta aclaratoriall (explanatory document).

See J.M. Rivera-Arvelo's "Transcript of The Continuation of the Hearing In-Depth" August 20,1991,page 40, line 8.

45)Pag. 9; Parr. 2

46)Pag 3, Parr. 8, line 5("the Special Master had the benefit of the testimony of the forensic document examiners . . . 11)

47)See J.M. Rivera-Arvelo's "Transcript of The Continuation of

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the Hearing In-Depth" August 20,1991,page 24, line 2.

48)Page 7, Parr.7.

In New York:"Doctrine of law of the case did not prevent Appellate Division from considering defendant's motion for summary judgment on its merits merely bacause Supreme Court had denied . . . prior motion for summary judgment dismissing certain affirmative defenses". Rock v. Capitol Air,Inc.(1987), 2d Dept) 128 App. Div. 2d 691, 513 NYS2d 191.

49)Page 1, Parr. 1, line 4 through 10.

50)Page 8, line 8. Also see "In-Depth Hearing Transcript" of Evaristo Alvarez of June 24 and 25,1991, supra, at page 73; 108,last parr. line 5; page 112 last line; page 118, lines 1 to 3. The Solicitor General's expert changed his version after hearing Rivera-Arvelo's expert witness, Hector Delgado rebutting him, page 137,176-178;188-200;209;213-214. Yet the Supreme Court insists not to give any special consideration to this particular situation, but only giving credit to the first.

51)The Supreme Court states that Santoni-Romdn and the notary Medina-Aymat "were friends . . . "Eventhough what happened under #50, the Court apparently blames Santoni-Romdn. Still has nothing to do with Rivera-Arvelo.

Also see the Solicitor General expert witness at page 97, line 1 to 3.

52)Page 9, par.l,lines 2-3.

Page 8, last sentence. Pedro L. Santoni-Roman admitted having given the promissory note to Ortiz Velázquez.

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DEPOSITION OF PEDRO L. SANTONX-ROMAN

(The following page of the deposition was translated by me for the purpose of provide you with an idea.) ("PI'stands for Question and "RI' for Answer [Response].

R. Si.

R. Yes.

R. Oh! Definitivamente.

R oh! Definitively.

P. ¿Quién le hizo entrega? [the payable notes]

P. Who did the delivery?

R. Si no lo hizo mi esposa el dia anterior lo hice yo, porque yo

R. If it was not my wife the day after I did it, because I never

no le confiaba eso a nadie más.

trusted those things to nobody else.

P. Lo cierto es que no fue el Lcdo. Jesús M. Rivera-Arvelo.

P. The reality is that it was not Atty.Jesus M. Rivera-Arvelo.

R. ;Oh No!, definitivamente, no.

R. ioh No!, definitively, no.

(Page 24 y 25 Deposition of Mr. Pedro L. Santoni-Roman)

P. Vamos específicamente a remontarnos a la fecha en que se

P. Lets go back specifically to the date in which those famous

hicieron los famosos 2 pagarés-1798... Corríjame si le informo

promissory notes were made: promissory notes-1798 ... Correct me if

mal lo siguiente.

I tell you wrong the following.

Fueron un dia a preparar el pagaré 1798, cuando lo firmaron

You went one day to subscribe the promissory notes, when you

mencionaban 9% de interés. ¿De qué forma se enteró usted de ese

signed they stated 9% of interest. How did you know of this

error?

R. Al otro dia.

R. Next day.

P. ¿Usted se lo señaló al Notario? ¿ El Notario se lo señaló

P. Did you point that out to the Notary? The Notary pointed out

usted?

to you?

R. Al otro dia cuando el Lcdo. Medina Aymat me llamó y me dijo

R. The next day when Atty. Medina Aymat called me and said that

que el documento no podia negociarse porque se habia puesto una

the document will not be negotiable because it was written

cantidad de intereses que violaba la ley. Asi fueron sus

down an amount of interest that was in violation of the law.

palabras en esa fecha.

Those were his words that date.

P. ¿No recuerda si llevó el pagaré original?

P. Do you remember if you brought with you the original

promissory note?

R. ¿Si yo lo llevé?

R. If I brought it to him?

P. Si se lo llevé al Lcdo. Medina Aymat.

R. If you brought it to Atty. Medina Aymat.

R. No, no se lo llevé.

R. No, I didn't bring it to him.

P. ¿En algúin momento recuerda usted haber destruido dicho

P. In any moment do you remember having destroyed said

documento?

document?

R. No, señor.

R. No, sir.

P. Cuándo prepararon el 1809, ¿hubo algún tipo de contratiempo?

P. When you prepared the 1809 were there any problem?

Ese es el Exhibit 3.

That is the Exhibit 3.

R. No, porque simplemente se estaba haciendo.... para todos los

R. No, because simple they were making. . .,for all the effects

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efectos era una segunda hipoteca.

it was a second mortgage.

P. Posteriormente usted mencionó que entregó el pagaré al Sr.

P. Afterwards you mentioned having given the promissory note to

Dominico Acevedo. Usted tenia dos pagarés 1798 y 1809. ¿Qué

. . . .

Dominico Acevedo. You had to promissory notes 1798 and 1809. What

. . . .

Remarks:

I believe Pedro L. Santoni-Roman's deposition should have been furnished to you.

See also page 27-28(page numbers were omitted),"Transcript Of The Continuation Of The Hearing In-Depth", August 20, 1991 of J.M. Rivera-Arvelo.

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53) See translated Opinion by the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico nothing states against Rivera-Arvelo in regards to the signature issue. See #50.

54) Dismissal with prejudice usually considered an adjudication upon de merits and will operate as a bar to future action. 135 P.2d 71, 74.11

55) No Finding of Facts over this particular are shown in the Opinion. Besides see it effects: Holley v Mandate Realty Corp. (1986, lst Department) 12 App.Div. 2d 202, 503 NYS2d 350,and (1987) 69 NY2d 721, 512 NYS2d 365, 504 NE2d 692, supra. Also See Law Dictionary,; Barron's Third Edition, page 140, By Steven H.Gifis,Educational Series Inc.,publishers, 1991:11 Dismissal with prejudice usually considered an adjudication upon the merits and will operate as a bar to future action. 135 P.2d 71, 7411, supra.

56) Page 7, line 3. Just mentioned it with no further analisys.

57)The opinion remained silently. Just slightly mentioned "with prejudicellit with no further analysis at page 4, par. 2. 58) Owner is the person who has legal title to property, 381 S.W.

2d 821, 826; tjhe person in whom ownership, dominion, or title of property is vested.

Tn this case the ownership was revealed by the public property registry records. So, also owner includes the owner of a real estate or other property,. . as revealed by public records. 284 N.Y.S. 777, 785.

59) Page 10, par. 1, line 1 through 5.

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60)Having Rivera-Arvelo a Judgment dismissing with prejudice the case before the Superior Court Caguas Part, same couldnly be reinstated anymore. Holley v Mandate Realty Corp. (1986, lst Department) 12 App.Div. 2d 202, 503 NYS2d 350,and (1987) 69 NY2d 721, 512 NYS2d 365, 504 NE2d 692, supra. Also see Law Dictionary,; Barron's Third Edition, page 140, By Steven H. Gifis,Educational Series,Inc.,publishers, 1991:11 Dismissal with prejudice usually considered an adjudication upon de merits and will operate as a bar to future action. 135 P.2d 71, 74.11

61) Page 6, par.3; page 8, par.2, lines 2-3.

62) See the opinion in reference to juridical concepts like: "with prejudice", "res judicatall, owner as appeared from the public property record registry where Mr. Santoni-Romdn was the owner of the property, "separate actionllprivity or privy", "summary judgment" not applicable when there are real disputes like frauds and its motion againt another motion of summary judgment(instead of a motion and cross motion alone), charges in the opinion never notified, "hearsay" by the affidavit of Atty. Medina Aymat, the States "expert witness" rebutted, so forth.

63)Page 6, par.3 and 4.

63) Page 8; Parr.2, line 2-8. Also see partial deposition of Pedro L. Santoni-Román,supra #49.

64) Page 3, par 1.

65) Rule 39, Title 4, Law of Puerto Rico Annotated

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-"Act of Subsanation"(Act to Excuse or Repair),infra. - See §2047,2048 and 2049, Title 4, LPRA). Internet, go to www.lexjuris or LexJuriscom, and seek under law "acta aclaratorial” (explanatory or exculpatory document), infra. - Also see Rivera-Arvelo's "Transcript of The Continuation of the Hearing In-Depth" August 20,1991,page 40, line 8.

66) In re Carlos M.Ortiz Velázquez, SCPR ("T.S.P.R.1l)-98-42; 98 DTS ("DSCII)042, April 15, 1998 the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico held that he had a lazy, slopy,inactive and indifferent attitude by not spreading out all his professional capacity and that this may go against the code of ethics, In re Carlos

M. Ortiz Velázquez. He was suspended again for the same reasons.

69- The Supreme Court of Puerto Rico decided in SCPR(I'T.S.P.R.1l)98-42; 98 DTS ("DSCII)042,April 15,1998 to suspend again Carlos M. Ortiz-Velázquez, however they did not enfazized the fact that he was previously punished in this case CP-88617,like they did to Rivera-Arvelo in reference to the so called "previous admonitions".

70- Never! They would never admit this.

71- They did in favor of some "special public figures":

a) In re: Rivera Cruz 126 D.P.R. 768 (1990)

b) In re: Juan R. Marchand Quintero 2000 DTS 134 (2000 TSPR 134) September 14, 2000.

72)Page 1-date of the opinion; page 14, par.2, lines 8-9.

"Indefinite suspension".

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Some New York's Jurisprudence about the Sufficiency of a suspension:

(a)" An attorney who had been suspended by court order from the practice of law would be reinstated notwithstanding the seriousness of his misconduct'. . especially the fact that the attorney had been already suspended for nearly four years from practice, and where it could properly be concluded that he had incurred sufficient punishment." Re Adler (1984, 3d Dept) 102 App Div 2d 1010, 477 NYS2d 528. (b)" An attorney who was convicted of two counts of mail fraud was entitled to reinstatement as an attorney. . ., where he had never been the subject of any other charges, and where he had already been suspended for over three years". Re Bronston (1985, lst Dept) 107 App Div 2d 164, 486 NYS2d 1. (c)" Court would suspend attorney for one year . . . 11 In re Weingrad (1994, lst Dept) 196 AD2d 300, 609 NYS2d 588, dismd (SD NY) 1994 US Dist LEXIS 5460 and app den, motion dismd 83 NY2d 756, 614 NYS2d 386, 637 NE2d 277 and petition for certiorari filed (Aug 8, 1994).

(d)" Attorney engaged in impermissible conflict of interest in violation of CLS Code of Prof Respons DR 5-105, and would be censured. . . . "Re English (1992, 2d Dept) 182 AD2d 185.f 587 NYS2d 34.

(e)" Attorney who accepted he would merely be censured."

In re Leonardo (1994, 4th Dept) 197 AD2d 59, 611 NYS2d 404.

(f)" Court would suspend attorney for 6 months where he . . .

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In re Solarsh (1994, lst Dept) 205 AD2d 73, 618 NYS2d 21. (g)" Court would impose 2-year suspension on attorney.....

In re Handel (1994, 4th Dept) 205 AD2d 270, 619 NYS2d 468. (h)" Court would impose 2-year suspension on attorney . . . 11 In re Mastine (1994, 4th Dept) 205 AD2d 2991 619 NYS2d 467. (i)" Court would suspend attorney for 5 years based on his guilty plea to fifth degree conspiracy and making apparently false statement for his involvement in scheme to pay rape victim to recant her accusation and withdraw charges where (1) victim had communicated her belief to him that original rape accusation was true and that her statements withdrawing charge would be false, (2) he drafted agreement and recantation, participated in payment of money, and personally presented recanting statement to judge, and (3) although he testified that he did not believe his actions to be illegal, he understated his years in practice to make himself appear less experienced and denied that victim told him her rape accusation was true until he was confronted with tape recording of conversation". Re Barrett (1992, 3d Dept) 183 AD2d 1076, 583 NYS2d 606.

(i)" Attorney convicted of misdemeanors of second degree criminal contempt and fifth degree conspiracy committed "serious crimes" within meaning of CLS Jud §90(4)(d) and would be suspended from practice of law for 2 years for professional misconduct". Re Mascaro (1993, 2d Dept) 189 AD2d 388, 597 NYS2d 133.

19A (k)" An attorney who was convicted of assaulting a Federal officer (a misdemeanor) and who, in partnership with a convicted and imprisoned client, engaged in an attempted fraudulent scheme to sell worthless securities would be suspended from the practice of law for a period of five years and until further order of the court. Re Thies (1982, 2d Dept) 84 AD2d 420, 447 NYS2d 14.

73)Page 14, Par.2, lines 8-9.

74)[for you to answer]

75)[for you to answer]

76)see answer #72, supra. 77)See answer #72, supra.

78)[for you to answer] Legal research doesn't show the opposite. 79)See jurisprudence on question #79.

80)In re: Andreu Ramirez,Cesar-98 DTS 188;99 TSPR 188.

Cesar Andreu happens to be a close relative (next of kin) to the President of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, Justice Josd A. Andreu, that of course, for obvious reasons, "disqualified" himself to form part of the decision. Finally, as it was expected it was decided to be applied prospectively. This case is very common and occurs very often. The difference has to do with his relationship. . . where as a good excuse the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico avoiding punishing him stated:"this is the first time the Court expresses itself towards this particular(it doesn't mean it didn't happen before, but now they have to "express"),we will apply the established norm, prospectively".

20A

Internet: wwwlexjuriscom. Look under "Jurisprudence", (year) .

83- "Under the full faith and credit provisions of United States Constitution Article 4 §1, and Judiciary Law §90(5) disbarment in another state does not automatically deny admission to the New York bar, nor is readmission to the bar in such state a prerequisite to admission in New York, the court retaining power to consider all factors bearing on character and fitness and to make an independent determination thereof. Re Kimball (1973, 2d Dept.) 40 AD2d 252, 339 NYS2d 302, reversed on other grounds 33 NY2d 586, 347 NYS2d 453, 301 NE2d 436.

84) "[I]ssue of a prior. . . [suspension]. . may not be relitigated in disciplinary proceeding, but competent evidence may be adduced to explain or mitigate the significance of [the suspension]. Re Hemlock (1976, lst Dept) 52 AD2d 248, 383 NYS2d 600.

85) 11 . . . upon a review of the facts it was clear that the

evidence was entirely insufficient to prove his quilt, the order of disbarment is vacated and the petitioner is reinstated as an attorney at law." Re Kaufmann(1928) 223 AD 299, 228 NYS 349.

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