Junius

When I was arrested by the police without a warrant I was astonished. I could not believe that it was possible in Canada to drag the people from the street without reason. Canada, which I had chosen as my future country, in my eyes was the most civilized country in the world. I was even more astonished when the police left me at the St. Michel Archange mental hospital. I had protested in vain.

The nun who was at reception was grinning ironically all the time as if she meant, "Protest as much as you like. Since you are here, undoubtedly you are crazy". I thought at the time she was the one who was insane, or rather one of the more reasonable patients who were engaged to replace the regular hospital staff.

I soon found out that the nun was not the only one who looked at me as a mentally sick person. I received the same reception in the ward. My claims that I had not been examined by a psychiatrist and that I had been arrested without a warrant were like words directed at a wall. The nun and the nurses on the ward were not alone in their assumption that everybody who passed the threshold of the madhouse must be mad.

I thought that -- mad or not -- somebody would take care of me as a human being. I read before emigrating that criminals and even animals are protected from unjust and cruel treatment in Canada. Surely nobody, including psychiatrists, could abuse others as they liked. I knew that the psychiatrists were obliged to satisfy legal requirements in order to legalize my stay in the hospital.

They not only failed to ask anybody to take care of me as a human being, but they also obstructed all my attempts to get out or clear myself. (Dr. Raymond Legault, head of the ward where I was interned in Montreal, was vaunting in Court that I "could not communicate to anyone outside the hospital".

I expected some help and recognition from the legal authorities that my fundamental human rights and dignity had been infringed. Below I will comment on my relationships with the legal authorities and attorneys in this case.

Thanks to the nurses in the ward I learned that Mr. Louis Marceau, the Quebec Protector of Citizens, the Quebec equivalent of Ontario's Ombudsman (now a judge of Federal Court of Canada). was an official who could help in a situation like mine. At the first opportunity I had to communicate with someone outside the hospital, I phoned him asking him for the protection of my fundamental human rights.

I briefly pointed out the irregularities in my arrest and detention: that I had been arrested without a judge's warrant and held without a medical examination, and with a faulty Commitment Certificate. He was also advised by Rev. Claude LaVergne about my illegal internment.

A few weeks after our conversation I received a letter from Mr. Marceau in which he wrote that he "had proceeded to make an inquiry" and "did not see any irregularity". He stated that the Commitment Certificate was valid and the "Mental Bureau" had looked at my case. Therefore, he did not deem it necessary to see me.

Mr. Marceau's explanation that the law was properly applied regarding my internment is absolutely vacuous. I had never been the subject of any examination by any "Mental Bureau" during my whole internment. Mr. Marceau was inclined to seal my destiny and cover up for the psychiatrists' blunders and their abominable deeds.

Essentially, he did what Dr. Jacques Grenier had done. Mr. Marceau wrote that he had proceeded with an inquiry without seeing me. This is, again, the same as Dr. Grenier's "examination" -- an inquiry disregarding my allegations. Yet my friends and I charged the psychiatrists not only for irregularities, but also for committing a crime, for which we had substantial evidence.¹⁵¹

In short, the Protector's "inquiry" was the first and biggest blunder by the legal authorities. Hoping he would admit his mistake and help me solve my problem, my friends and I wrote to Mr. Marceau many times. We tried to convince him to see me, for the purpose of discussing how he could be of some help.

Only once, under pressure by the media, did he agree to proceed with an examination of the medical records for evidence of forgery and he had the task subsidized by Legal Aid of Hull, Quebec. But when the expert on handwriting, in order to make his final assessment, asked for the originals because he found that the records were forged, and when the media campaign was over, Mr. Marceau suddenly retreated and refused any further assistance.

More will be said about Mr. Marceau when I discuss the role of Ms. Daignault as my lawyer.

i. Turgeon, Alain. When I was still in the hospital, the secretary of Dr. Louis Roy, the superintendent of St. Michel Archange Hospital, referred me to a lawyer Alain Turgeon, who apparently promised to discuss the case with me. Subsequently, I found out that he was representing my wife, in her effort to get a court order prohibiting me from visiting with my children.

ii. Rusko, Michael. Mr. Rusko was the lawyer recommended to me by his friend Dr. Divic. He and Dr. Divic did a good gesture for me by going to Quebec City to defend me against my wife's allegations that I was mentally and physically unfit to see my children.

With his intervention and Dr. Divic's presence in court, the cowards did not have the courage to come to prove their point that I was sick. Instead of being more optimistic and aggressive after this intervention, inexplicably Mr. Rusko resigned and Dr. Divic stopped supporting me.

Moreover, Mr. Rusko, contrary to the professional Codes of Ethics, publicly, in Dr. Pivnicki's presence, at a birthday party spread falseand malicious information about me.¹⁵²

Surely, even if I had said something -- which I had not, it was unethical and unprofessional for the lawyer to pass this along to others.

In the Code is written:

The lawyer has a duty to hold in strict confidence all information acquired in the course of the professional relationship concerning the business and affairs of his client, and he should not divulge any such information unless he is expressly or impliedly authorized by his client or required by law to do so.

The lawyer must consider his client's interests as paramount and his client must be able to rely on the assumption that his lawyer will do so. That basic mutual understanding will undoubtedly create the confidence and trust that must underlie the lawyer-client relationship. In order to insure, preserve and protect this confidence, the law has recognized a special and unique privilege on communication between a client and his solicitor. It is provided at common law that communication, written or oral, flowing from a client to his solicitor is privileged information ...¹⁵³

Further, my attempts "to clarify" my alleged statements were unsuccessful. As we have read above, Lawyers are bound by their professional and ethical code not to reveal any information obtained.

I regret to conclude that both the above incident and the recorded conversations I had with Mr. Rusko suggest that he is a man who does not tell the truth.

iii. Goulston, Philip. Thanks to of Legal Aid of Ontario, Mr. Philip Goulston, a lawyer from Montreal, was hired to take care of my case in Montreal. He was actually the first lawyer to commence on my behalf, in the Superior Court of Quebec in Montreal, a lawsuit against the psychiatrists and hospitals involved in my internment. To my astonishment he commenced the proceedings with a faulty declaration (writ), in a sort of ignoratio elenchi¹⁵⁴, perfectly convenient for my opponents. Without consulting me, he wrote:

For his declaration, plaintiff states:

On or about November 12th, 1971, he was picked up by police in Quebec City and through an unforeseeable series of circumstances, brought before the Defendants, Dr. Dufour and Dr. Grenier, who signed a certificate of committal against the Plaintiff, having him committed to the Defendant Hospital H�tel Dieu de Quebec for an indeterminate period as being insane.

When I read the "Declaration", I could not believe that my lawyer had acted against my interest. I immediately signalled to Mr. Goulston that there was a substantial error in the declaration: I was not picked up by the police and afterwards brought before the Defendants, Grenier and Dufour, nor was I committed to Hospital H�tel Dieu. And, I did not know Dr. Grenier at all.

I kept asking Mr. Goulston and his successors to correct the "Declaration", which was finally "re-amended" on October 14, 1980, after 22 days of the trial. The new version still "did not precisely relate reproached breaches (to the accused psychiatrists)" according to Mr. Justice Boudreault. To be fair, I have to agree with the judge's opinion. Since I was literally kidnapped in a heinous way, my lawyers should have reproached the psychiatrists of having committed a crime.

Further, Mr. Goulston had asked for the absurdly low amount of $45,000 in damages. (The amount was increased by my last lawyer Mr. Wolofsky to $450,000).

The original "Declaration" was not the only cause of my disagreements with my attorneys. It was my firm opinion as well as that of Dr. J. Divic, Dr. D. Pivnicki, and other physicians, at that time, that my opponents were stalling ever since I had started the action in court.

I instructed Mr. Goulston to seize the medical records in order to prevent the defending psychiatrists from manipulating them. Then, with the shortest pre-trial preparation, we should have gone to court (having asked Mr. Marceau, the Protector of Citizen, and my children for collaboration, having given an expert in writing the complete medical records to determine falsifications, and having finally arranged one or two pre-trial examinations of the defending psychiatrists). Mr. Goulston ignored all my instructions.

I was in contact with some persons in Yugoslavia to be ready for any contingency: close relatives of my wife (aunt and uncle), my sisters, and my friends, who were willing and ready to travel to Canada to testify on my behalf.

After my long and tiring appeals, Mr. Goulston examined Dr. Filippo Juretic on October 24, 1973 without advising me. I had instructed Mr. Goulston not to proceed with the examination unless my adversaries brought the complete medical records. Since Mr. Goulston did not insist on having the records, Dr. Juretic got away with perjuring himself (about his relationship with me and the "threats" which allegedly I had made). Nevertheless, to a randomly put question, Dr. Juretic admitted:

Every proceeding, every attitude that he has taken up after his discharge (from hospital) describes a personality (myself) which can never change, and which cannot be defined as a psychosis. ¹⁵⁵

This was a confirmation of my opinion and a very favourable indication that those involved were vulnerable.

Again, after a long wait, Mr. Goulston subpoenaed Dr. Grenier, the first perpetrator of my internment. As in the examination of Dr. Juretic, my lawyer didn't consult me. He did not request that Dr. Grenier bring the complete medical records with him.

During the preliminary examination Dr. J. Grenier was asked, at my strong insistence, to produce the "history" allegedly written by himself and a record of his conversation with Dr. Roy. These exhibits were never produced in court.

Furthermore, on the "subpoena" to Hospital St. Jean de Dieu in Montreal, dated November 12, 1974, it is noted: "The defendant appeared and was interrogated." (Le défendeur comparait et est interrogé). This interrogation was not recorded in the court files.

Mr. Goulston was subpoenaed to testify for his part as my first lawyer. In his testimony as a witness in court, he was so evasive, that he avoided almost every question with the excuse of "poor" memory. For example, Mr. Stephen Clerk, an attorney for Dr. Juretic, asked Mr. Goulston:

At that time of your meeting (examination for discovery) with Dr. Juretic, did Dr. Juretic have an attorney of record in this file? -- I don't remember, he replied.

In fact, Mr. Clerk had been the attorney of record and present during the examination of Dr. Juretic.

On being pressed on the point of his own letter to A.M. Lawson, Q.C., Director of Ontario Legal Aid, he admitted that he had written:

Apart from some dubious written evidence, (there) is a private admission to me by one of psychiatrists (Dr. Grenier) being sued that this internment should never have happened: their recommendation was made by his nurse, based on hearsay evidence of violence.

One of the biggest disputes between Mr. Goulston and myself was whether Mr. Goulston should make a "private" examination, or properly re-examine Dr. Grenier in court for the admission to be recorded in the court records. Mr. Goulston finally avoided communicating with me altogether. Moreover, he did not even answer the letters written by Dr. S.K. Littmann, a psychiatrist and Mr. John Grudeff, Q.C., retired judge and part-time lawyer from Toronto.

As my countryman and friend who spoke the same language, Mr. Grudeff benevolently attempted to help me as an intermediary. Further, he expressed his readiness, if needed, to volunteer as counsellor and interpreter in court. Since he did not have a licence for representing cases in Quebec courts, he could not be my lawyer in Quebec, but he could serve as a private counsellor and interpreter. Because Mr. Goulston was dragging his feet, both Mr. Grudeff and Dr. Littmann at that time were of the opinion that Mr. Goulston was not reliable, "playing a double role", to use their words. They recommended that I should change my lawyer.

iv. Daignault, Nicole. Mlle. Nicole Daignault was a very aggressive lawyer at the beginning. She used to say, like Mr. Grudeff and Dr. Littmann, that Mr. Goulston was not an honest lawyer.

While Mr. Goulston was paid by Legal Aid, Mlle. Daignault, sure to win the case, agreed to be paid on in the event of a successful outcome, 10% of the damages awarded by the court.

At that time, acting on the advice of Dr. Szasz and through the Scientologists' cooperation, I had another experience with Mr. Marceau, Protector of Citizen. He was very harshly criticized on TV, newspapers and radio stations for his ignorance or unwillingness to help me during my internment. Finally he agreed to see me and discuss my grievances. Mr. George Dufour, an articling lawyer of Legal Aid in Hull, Quebec, and Mlle. Nicole Daignault arranged the meeting. Strangely, when I was with Mr. George Belanger, another articling lawyer from Hull, in the Ombudsman's lobby, Mr. Marceau would see only Mr. Belanger. As a result of Mr. Marceau refusing to see me, I had an even lower opinion of him.

The Protector (Ombudsman), after so much publicity, was forced to get involved in my case. He instructed Legal Aid, Hull, Quebec, to assist financially in the examination of the medical records for forgeries. He made agreed with Mr. Belanger that Mlle. Daignault should hire an expert on writing (forgeries) and send the medical records to his attention.

Mr. André Munch was the expert selected. Mlle. Daignault sent him copies of part of the medical records for examination. After finding that there "existed certain indication" of manipulation with the records, in his "Report on Analyses" (on Forgeries) Mr. Munch requested complete original records. At that time my lawyer simply vanished. I did not know where she had moved to and where my file was. This prevented me from doing anything to assist with my rehabilitation or bring my case to court for several years.

v. Brunet, Michel. After two years I received a letter from a lawyer named Michel Brunet, advising me that he was in possession of the file. I was in his office with my two sons and he promised to continue the examination of the forgeries and to write about the outcome to me and to my son Slobodan, who is now a lawyer. He never did anything.

vi. Gomery, John. Dr. Littmann then recommended Mr. John Gomery, Q.C., to me. He is now a judge of the Superior Court in Quebec, and was recently assessed as one of "the best judges of Canada!" He raised his contingency fee to 25% of the successful outcome. Although he had assured me that he would "settle" the case in a "few weeks", Mr. Gomery did nothing for two and a half years. Both Mr. H. Litowitz, a Toronto lawyer, and I, made many efforts by mail and telephone urging him to do something, but all our efforts were in vain. For a better assessment of Mr. Gomery, read Mr. Litowitz's letter in Appendix: Exhibit No. 27.

vii. Selig, Gordon. The last lawyer, Mr. Gordon Selig, was on the list of the Quebec Bar Association as an available lawyer in Montreal. He raised his contingency to 40%.

Mr. Selig's French was so poor that he could hardly speak in court. On two occasion in court Judge Boudreault helpfully suggested that he speak in English.

In addition, I had almost the same problems with Mr. Selig as I had with Mr. Goulston. We did not have an opportunity to work out a strategy for the case. During a rare meetings, Mr. Selig and I would waste time on irrelevant chatting.

Always being of the opinion that the written evidence is the best evidence, I suggested to Mr. Selig that he (1) introduce only my medical records as prima facie evidence in court, and to (2) object, at least formally, to the "out of the hospital records" evidence. I also suggested that he (3) object to the testimonies of the defendants' "psychiatric experts" and all persons who already gave statements during my internment; (4) read the records himself; (5) find a psychiatrist who would perform a rigorous examination of myself and my medical records, in case the court insisted on an "expert"; (6) contact my children and my wife to refrain from telling any more lies; (7) contact the Yugoslavian Embassy in order to eventually introduce the witnesses from Yugoslavia; (8) retain a competent interpreter to assist me in court; (9) insist that my adversaries committed perjuries and forgeries; (10) and insist that I was subjected to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. All my efforts and suggestions fell on deaf ears.

viii. Wolofsky, Judah. As a result of Mr. Selig's difficulties with the French language, he retained Mr. Wolofsky to act as the attorney in court. I must admit that Mr. Wolofsky is a brilliant lawyer, with an exceptional memory. Still, I believe that the most competent professional could not achieve positive results without a thorough preliminary examination, consultation and preparation. My hospitalization is a good example of what happens when people act randomly.

As usual I continued to pay other lawyers to serve as intermediaries to convince my lawyers that mutual communication and cooperation are essential. The letters of Mr. Grudeff, Q.C., and Mr. Litowitz¹⁵⁶ to my previous lawyers were forceful, but without results. The letter of Mrs. Frances Smookler, Mr. Selig's relative, was ignored.

Mr. Wolofsky acted on his own without consulting me or showing that he had studied the medical records. Even during court recesses, there was no discussion of the case. All of my witnesses were introduced without preliminary examination. I strongly insisted on Rev. LaVergne's appearance in court, but after his two appearances as my witness, both of us were wondering why he was not asked important questions relevant to my internment.

The most illustrative example of how Mr. Wolofsky and Mr. Selig were irresponsibly handling my case is the choice of the expert witness, Dr. Peter Roper. Dr. Roper was introduced without my authorization and consultation.

In general, instead of trying to find an easy and fast way to settle the case, all of my attorneys dragged their feet and wasted a great deal of time on gobbledygook. It was obvious that the psychiatrists involved also wanted to drain me financially and psychologically.These circumstances all contributed to the confusion which delayed the presentation of the case, and resulted in a considerable waste of time and expense.

We lost the case and Mr. Wolofsky, although he was feeling "outraged" by the way the judge wrote the judgment, did not wish to appeal. I did appeal, however, with the help of Roman Hromnysky, a schoolteacher and translator.

Although I was not satisfied with Messrs. Selig's and Wolofsky's representation, when the time came to appear in the Court of Appeal I requested them that they represent me because I was unable to find other lawyers.

I went to Mr. Wolofsky's office and in the presence of two witnesses we agreed to the following: in addition to the previous 40% contingency contract, I would deposit saving bonds of $7,000.00, He would do his utmost to prepare and brief me on how he would present the case in court. After I deposited my bonds I was never able reach him. My many calls and messages were unanswered. Two weeks before the date of the presentation of my case in the Court of Appeal I went to Montreal to see Mr. Wolofsky and discuss my case, but he was always "unavailable".

x. Schabas, William. In desperation I then hired a young and enthusiastic lawyer, W. Schabas to represent me in the Court of Appeal. I paid him an extra $3,000.00. but Mr. Wolofsky succeeded in blocking him.

ix. Leon Jedeikin. Mr. Jedeikin was an associate lawyer with Mr. Selig. Although he was present the first week of court, he was literally only physically present. While Mr. Selig at least tried to mutter something under his breath, this gentlemen did not even open his mouth for seven days. He did not approach me to say anything either prior to or during the trial.

Ultimately, I had no choice but to appear and represent myself in the Court of Appeal. Messrs, Wolofsky and Selig, without any pangs of conscience, robbed me of my $9,000 ($7,000 for the initial value of the bonds plus $2,000 interest).

How could so many psychiatrists, lawyers and legal authorities act so unethically and improperly? Is it possible that a reasonable person would unjustifiably accuse so many VIPs? On appearance, my whole story looks crazy. But, as I see it, if we take into consideration that psychiatrists are reasonable arbiters on intelligence and reasoning, the same psychiatrists involved had credited me as "dialectic", "intelligent above average", as a "brilliant physician" et cetera. Therefore I have "valid licence" that I am a reasonable person from the same "authorities" whom I accuse of having treated me as an unreasonable beast for six months. Personally, I do not think that I am "brilliant", neither am I stupid. I consider myself simply reasonable.

I am not a lawyer, nor do I have any basic legal education, but certainly as a reasonable physician I have to state that, quite aside from the faults in my medical records from a psychiatric point of view, my attorneys had never mentioned that in my case there was a violation of my most fundamental rights: Magna Charta (Art. 39), Habeas Corpus, the Canadian Bill of the Rights and Code of Medical Ethics. Reference to these laws might have impressed the psychiatrists to settle the case provided that my attorneys had taken a few precautionary, simple and inexpensive steps to prevent the psychiatrists from manoeuvring and filibustering in court.

However, from the first to the last lawyer, co-operation was non-existent. Why? To this question I cannot find an answer. Incompetence is inconceivable. While I expressed some doubt about Mr. Selig's competence and ability to take care of my case, it is impossible that so many other lawyers were also inept. My speculation is that just as those "medical criminals", as Dr. T.S. Szasz calls the psychiatrists who abuse their profession,, my lawyers were corrupted or intimidated or they were simply opportunists.

"Anyone can be a villain; it requires a terrible effort to remain a civilized man", said Leonard Sidney Woolf, husband of British writer Virginia Woolf.

Theoretically, and according to their code of ethics, lawyers must be honest, otherwise they should be disbarred. My distinct impression is that not only were my and my own opponents' lawyers dishonest, but a great many others are unscrupulous. They are more concerned about money than justice. Unfortunately, by aiding and abetting these frauds, the judges are largely responsible for corrupting the lawyers.

A brief review of my opponents' "officers of the court" is provided below. My case is a brazen example of "cooperation" between lawyers and judges. I will list all of them.

a) Couture, C. François, attorney for H�tel Dieu Hospital. This lawyer did not participate or "object" most of the time during the trial of my case. I felt that he implicitly admitted the responsibility of the hospital which he represented. I was surprised when he argued that the hospital should have no responsibility for my ordeal. He argued that even Drs. Grenier and Dufour were found responsible, the hospital had no connection with the psychiatrists. According to his statement, the doctors were not employed by the hospital. Yet according to the "résumés" produced in court by both doctors, Dr. Grenier was employed by the hospital's committee as a psychiatrist and chief of the Psychiatric Service of the hospital; and Dr. Dufour was first employed as a psychiatrist by the same committee. Later, he was appointed to succeed Dr. Grenier as Chief of the Psychiatric Service. Nevertheless, Judge Boudreault overlooked the written proofs (résumés) and accepted the lawyer's words.

b) Lacoursiere, Louis, lawyer for Drs. Grenier and Dufour. We saw how this lawyer, in front of the judge, taught his client Grenier to lie. Thus, both of them desecrated the Bible. For this shameful action the judge praised both of them, as their "credibility is being put to the test!" (Cf. Chapter IV: Drs. Grenier and Dufour -- Psychiatrists or Villains.

c) Cantin, Pierre, lawyer for Drs. Dorion and Roy and St. Michel Archange Hospital. Of all the defence lawyers, this one was the noisiest during the trial. He was shouting and "objecting" all the time in such an objectionable manner that even judge was forced to reprimand him repeatedly to be civilized. Note! While tolerating Mr. Cantin's outbursts, Judge Boudreault had found my "verbal aggressiveness" to be an indication of my mental illness. In fact, I was "aggressively" protesting against my unjust internment, something which is quite normal under the circumstances.

Previously I commented that Mr. Cantin, voicing charges which had never been raised by anyone else, tried to impute that I had kicked my wife or slapped somebody's face. Though his disturbances in court, he was successful in distracting my lawyer from his arguments.

d) Clerk, Stephen, lawyer for Drs. Juretic, Legault and St. Jean de Dieu. With respect to this lawyer, I have written how he submitted proven and admitted forgeries. He was the one who submitted documents to the judge showing the "accablantes" -- overwhelming, damning modifications.¹⁵⁷ He must have been a special favourite of Mr. Justice Boudreault, because instead of being condemned, he was commended as an exceptionally apt and competent lawyer!

After having waited eight years my case was finally placed on the roll of the Superior Court of Quebec in Montreal, and the trial commenced on October 17, 1979. The judge in this trial of first instance was Mr. Justice Pierre Boudreault. The trial continued for approximately a year and a half, until February 28, 1981. During this period, twenty-eight hearing days in court. The defendants were six psychiatrists (Grenier, Dufour, Roy, Dorion, Legault, and Juretic) and three hospitals (H�tel-Dieu and St. Michel-Archange in Quebec City, and St. Jean de Dieu in Montreal).

The task of trying my case was enormous even for Mr. Justice Boudreault. The very fact that so many people were involved -- nine defendants, their four or five lawyers, my two lawyers, in addition to numerous lawyers who had resigned, the Ombudsman, and a total of seven experts and some persons who were relatives of Government ministers (Mrs. Castonguay, Dr. D. Pivnicki, father-in-law of the Canadian Prime Minister B. Mulroney), three presidents of the Quebec Bar Association, a federal Member of Parliament and an Ontario M.P.P., police and a social worker -- meant that for any judge it would have been difficult to rise above the atmosphere of prejudice and conflicting interests. In this situation, one wonders why my lawyers or the judge himself did not suggest a trial by jury.

Judge Boudreault did not succeed in offering a fair trial. He committed many blunders right from the beginning. In general, the proportion and gravity of his errors were similar to those of the defendants.

Mr. Justice Boudreault overlooked prima facie¹⁵⁸ evidence: medical records and documents attached to medical records -- submitted by the very psychiatrists and hospitals involved in my erroneous internment. He disqualified the medical records as aide-mémoires, i.e. as unreliable documents and allowed oral testimonies in the court as more trustworthy evidence! In this respect, he had even contradicted his own references (Crépeau, Marshall, Picard, Bernardot, Kouri and others), who are unanimous that medical records are sole reliable documents about events regarding a patient's medical care. Moreover, even the Medical Code of Ethics (produced in court as Exhibit P-18), and the Civil Code of Quebec sustain my concept. Nevertheless, just as in George Orwell's novel Nineteen Eighty Four, whenever it was convenient for my opponents, the judge generously quoted from the same "aide mémoires" which he rejected when I tried to rely upon them.

Surely the psychiatrists knew the importance of the medical records well. They used subterfuges of all kinds in order to avoid delivering the records. Finally, after seven years when they were up against the wall -- they delivered the records that were doctored in an obvious manner. All this shows they committed a double blunder.

Instead of taking the best -- written -- evidence from the period of my internment, Mr. Justice Boudreault accepted all the defendants' pleas, many of which were fraudulent. He gave unwarranted importance to evidence which was unacceptable from a judicial, moral and rational point of view since this evidence included the concealment or deliberate destruction of medical records (by Dr. Jacques Dufour and Dr. Jacques Grenier) and the deliberate manipulation or forging of medical records by Dr. Filippo Juretic.

Judge Boudreault also neglected to apply the Mental Patients Institutions Act, 1964, S.R.Q., c. 166. Contrary to his judgment, the laws concerning mental hospitals, medical professionals and patients, and the by-laws of the institutions governing the medical profession, should be given priority in rendering a judgment. By ignoring these by-laws as well as the governing legislation, the judge set a dangerous precedent. He encouraged unscrupulous psychiatrists to abuse their profession and victimize innocent people. Thus, in effect, the judge sanctioned the medieval inquisitorial view of morality and reasoning, the inquisitor's criteria, and his methods of investigation, trial and punishments.

There are certain fundamental weaknesses in the judgment's text. For example, consider the nature of the proof. Who has the burden of proof? I tried to reply fairly to this question in my Factum (Statement of Facts) to the Appeal Court:

It is evident, for example, that the learned judge quite correctly describes the difficult situation of plaintiffs in cases in which the medical professionals are defendants. In this respect, he quotes from judge Lajoie, who explains that since plaintiffs who had been patients are à la merci of physicians and their assistants, the Courts have permitted them "to resort to proof by making presumptions as to facts".

Mr. Justice Boudreault does not apply judge Lajoie's dictum to the Plaintiff's case since he places on the Plaintiff the burden of presenting a "preponderance of evidence" to prove that he was "normal". Extensive evidence has been submitted to this effect and the Plaintiff's argument would have been still more compelling if the Court had not allowed the Respondents to submit questionable testimony such as "out of medical records" (hors du dossier). Judge Lajoie's advice seems to imply that to restore the balance to a situation in which medical defendants have an undue advantage, it might be the plaintiff's right to supplement medical records, rather than vice versa.

Mr. Justice Boudreault not only placed an undue burden on me and my lawyers. His logic in treating the evidence given by defendants is also often questionable. He often severely blames one defendant after another, but a few lines later in the judgment completely exonerates them as "competent, reliable, and conscientious". For example, Dr. Dorion is blamed for his failure to investigate my wife's hospitalization further, and also for the incomplete nature of his notes, but then is treated as if he were a faultless professional.

The same comment might be applied to the judge's treatment of Dr. Grenier. The first question is whether Dr. Grenier stated the truth during his examination for discovery or during the trial. Disavowing either of the testimonies proves that he is a liar, or in legal terminology he committed perjury, which constitutes a crime.¹⁵⁹

The second question is whether the doctor wrote the medical records honestly and competently. When he disavowed the original records, this proved that he was either dishonest or incompetent, or both.

It is interesting to note that in Dr. Grenier's case, the judge did not even blame him for his conduct, despite the clear and overwhelming evidence that he was the first one to be fooled by Dr. Dionne, instigator of my internment. For a better understanding of the judge's feelings regarding Dr. Grenier, I urge the reader to read Chapter IV.

Indeed, Mr. Justice Boudreault, in his own words, deems Dr. Juretic's forgeries, to be "évidence accablante" ("overwhelming evidence")¹⁶⁰ of the latter's wrongdoing. Yet almost in the same breath the same judge extols the psychiatrist, and his attorney Mr. Stephen Clerk, Q.C.(!), co-author of the "évidence accablante", as being honest, competent and trustworthy as well!

In addition,a translation of a letter written by me to my ex-wife was entrusted to Mr. Clerk. And, strangely, I was asked to pay for a distorted translation, which was produced in court as evidence supposedly against me. The contents of the letter do not indicate that the writer was a mentally sick person. On the contrary, the letter reveals a man ready to make all kinds of sacrifices for the sake of his family and begging his wife to restrain from meeting and drinking with people who could ruin the family.

Moreover, the judge permitted Mr. Clerk to type his clients' transcripts in his office!

I have already written about the credibility of my ex-wife, Dr. Grenier, Dr. Dufour and Dr. Juretic, and also of the informers Dr. L. Dionne and his wife, the Lyonnaises, and Z. Majcen.

In several instances, the judge questioned the credibility of my adversaries' witnesses, Mr. and Mrs. Lyonnais and my wife. Yet in his verdict, he accepted in substance the contradictory opinions of the same persons about the same events.

Indeed, he noted "credibility is a matter of judgment". I agree; but if the Judge has already commented that these persons are liars, how can he reverse his own opinion of the same persons and their stories about the same events?

Mr. Justice Boudreault was evasive and controversial in many parts of the judgment and sometimes he even contradicted himself. In the section of the judgment under "Uncontested facts" (Les faits non contestés) the judge omitted many facts that were uncontested, for example the presence of many contradictory diagnoses. And there was no proof of any violent acts during my entire hospitalization. On the other hand, he reached and included unsupported conclusions about facts which had been contested.

Mr. Justice Boudreault's most peculiar attitude was the way he dealt with the Commitment Certificate. Cf. Chapter VIII: The Value of the Documents and the Cock-and-Bull stories. First, he dismissed the medical records as aide-mémoires, i.e. as a scrap of paper without medical and legal value. Yet when a part of the Certificate was convenient for my adversaries, though literally false, the judge converted it into a "reliable" document! Moreover, he had included as an uncontested fact only the second page of the Certificate, while he failed even to mention the first, which carried the most damning piece of evidence against the psychiatrists.

Both pages are an integral part of the Certificate. The law provides both pages must be completed. The first page, from both a legal and medical point of view, is more relevant than the second page. Further, the Certificate was subjected to examination for forgeries and manipulation by Mr. A. Munch, an expert on writing.

The judge was also unfair in his discussion of numbered items from the International Classification of Diseases. First, he states he considers this classification "unimportant" (read the judgement page 195), but later he himself quotes from the very same manual the diagnoses Paranoïa - 297.0 and "Personnalité paranoïaque" - 301.0, while he omits "schizoparanoid" for which I had been interned. Of course, he cannot cite a number for the diagnosis for which I was interned, because it does not exist. This judge's juggling shows his evident partiality and raises the question as to his motivation.¹⁶¹

Another point showing his partiality is his use of neologisms such as "hors dossier"¹⁶² to legitimize my opponents' lies. He needed a term to justify his acceptance of witnesses' extraneous stories.

Consider yet another cynical example of how the judge rendered justice. It is clearly written in the medical records that I was confined to the hospitals all the time without any chance to go out. Dr. Legault was boasting in court that I was under such strict control that I could not communicate with anyone even if the Ombudsman of Quebec or Mr. Trudeau, prime minister of Canada at the time, "were willing to speak with me". Two independent respectable witnesses (chaplain of the hospital St Jean-de-Dieu Rev. George Ugel and Rev. Claude LaVergne, dean and director of St. Augustin Seminary) testified accordingly, and Mr. Justice Boudreault wrote about this. Nevertheless at the end of the judgment, the judge inferred that I was free to leave the hospitals at any time!

When they go beyond their competence, many psychiatrists are accused and ridiculed by their patients, ordinary people, psychologists, sociologists, legal professionals and even by their own colleagues. But they do not do this without the tacit or deliberate blessing of the legal authorities, or without having "the ears of our legislators and judges", as B. J. Ennis said.¹⁶³

In the judgment, on page 196.1 we read:

In regard to imprisonment, society has preserved for a long time several precise and detailed rules which have to be observed before an individual can be jailed. At the time of the events in question, we depended entirely on the Superintendents of psychiatric hospitals in the province (of Quebec), who were not given any carefully specified directions. When we refer to the law, we do not find in it any inclination to impose criteria which the Superintendents would need to follow in making their decisions. Of course, if we try to find some standards, we can refer to Article 12, which provides for the ordering of transport when a physician believes a patient's hospitalization is required for the protection of the patient's own life or public security, decency, and peace; and to Article 13, which makes the patient's restoration of liberty obligatory when he/she is considered not dangerous by the Superintendent. These short simple observations make us wonder whether the legislators had not conveyed to the superintendents a social role of providing protection rather than to ask that confinement be considered in the light of a therapeutic plan.

Translated by R. Hromnysky

Just imagine! The judge blamed the legislators for giving the superintendent a "social role", that is, a policing role to chase the people off the street "for the protection of the patient's own life or public security, decency, and peace!" Everybody is wrong, even "the legislators", but not the psychiatrists! Here again the judge displays his poor reasoning ability.

By citing Arts. 12 and 13 -- he does not say which law he is talking about -- it seems that the judge advocates that the superintendents ignore what "society has preserved for a long time (several detailed rules) before an individual can be jailed", as if the superintendents' patients are not "individuals". Without reading the law which the judge refers to, I could state categorically that no law in the world can authorize the superintendents to make whimsical decisions. Labelling and libelling individuals as mentally sick without an examination and arresting, imprisoning and torturing them without legal authorization are considered crimes everywhere in the world.

I must repeat again and underline: I was living in Hamilton when evildoers were plotting a "therapeutic plan", to imprison me "for the protection of the patient's (my) own life or public security, decency, and peace!" My life was secure in Hamilton and the public did not complain about me.

It is interesting to note that in the first hospital, Hôtel Dieu, where the decision for my imprisonment was actually made, as well as in the last, St. Jean de Dieu, where my liberty was "restored", I did not see the superintendent. I did Dr. Louis Roy, superintendent of St. Michel Archange Hospital, but, he did not perform any examination whatsoever. I remember my meeting with the doctor well. It is written in the records, a note of January 5, 1972, that he delivered to me "in person" (de main à main) a registered parcel. Considering his appearance (he was short and looking more like a labourer than an intellectual) and his awkward manners, I was sure he was a mailman. I was surprised later when the nurses told me that he was the superintendent.

Dr. Roy's performance in court was likewise disappointing. Both he and Dr. Juretic answered many questions with both a "yes" and "no" in court, so that it was impossible to tell which was correct answer.

My opinion of Mr. Justice Boudreault's judgment is that he failed to act as a judge. Instead of delivering justice, the judge tried to make sense of the senseless. The aggravating part of the judgment is that truth and lies, facts and idle talk, authentic, trustworthy documents and forged facts, have all been placed on the same plane of credibility. If we read the judgment closely, the judge in many instances accepts preposterous comments that no reasonable person could accept, while on the other hand, he underrates or simply ignores the term "evidence beyond reasonable doubt".

It is very obvious that the judge had a hard time writing the judgment. Besides his topsy-turvy rationale, the length of 213 pages is a lot for a "schizoparanoid", as I was labelled!

Since the psychiatrists could not prove that I was a "schizoparanoid", they simply skipped or rescinded the prefix "schizo". The judge took more than six months to write the judgment. According to the Civil Code of Quebec the judges should complete writing the judgment in six months. In my "exceptional" case, he procured special permission to exceed six months!

Further, the way the judge processed the pagination of the judgment needs to be commented. Namely we can see that the last page of the judgment is numbered 213, but, in fact, it contains 217 pages. The judge simply attached four pages after page 196 by numbering them 196.1, 196.2, 196.3 and 196.4, leaving the door open for adding more pages between 196 and 197. Since I was not familiar with legal proceedings I discussed the matter with many lawyers. They were "surprised" with the judge's "strange" manner of writing and paginating the judgment. Common sense dictates that every correction of any document necessitates an explanation. Further, the correction must be accompanied by a date and a written notice. A correction without a notice, such as the judge's, should be subject to speculation -- that the author of the document acted in bad faith.

The psychiatrists did almost the same with the medical records, and their acts were qualified by the judge as a "preuve accablante" (overwhelming, oppressive damning proof).¹⁶⁴ Yet we see that the judge allows himself to do things just as damning. He uses a double standard: Once he condemns as illegal these modifications accablantes, then he employs the same method for his own purpose. Because it is unclear whether page 196.4 is final, someone who wants to manipulate the judgment could add as many pages as he desire.

Besides, a judgment is more than a document. Therefore, corrections of any kind are impermissible. If it is necessary to make any change in the judgment, a decent and competent judge would rewrite the judgment and properly enumerate the pages. Today, with computers, this could be easily done. At the same time, it would avoid any suspicion regarding the doctoring of the judgment.

Another serious problem is how Mr. Justice Boudreault handled his own references. Besides the jurisprudence and the law "doctrines" mentioned in the context of the judgment, the judge gave the impression that he had "consulted" a considerable number of references listed on the pages 210-212. If he really "consulted" any of those works, that would be very commendable of Mr. Justice Boudreault, but the outcome of the judgment shows that he was boasting of knowing references that he never applied. If we look closely at all those references and read the judgment, we can see that, except for the work L'attribution d'une protection légale aux malades mentaux by V. Bergeron¹⁶⁵, none were mentioned in the context of the judgment. Why? Because not one reference was supportive of the way Mr.Boudreault dealt with the judgment.

The reader will recall that often in my discourse I relied upon and supported my views with the references of Mr. Justice Boudreault. Why? Because his references support my views and because there is a no more convincing, and pleasing victory than when you trounce your enemy with his own arms. The battle and the victory are all the more sweeter because I fell like David against many Goliaths.

As to the interpretation of Bergeron's work¹⁶⁶, I'll be blunt and say that Mr. Justice Boudreault is wrong or to be more direct, he is misleading. The author offers protection for mental patients from the unscrupulous psychiatrists, not the other way around.

The judge took a paragraph from the context of a book which looks as if Mr. Bergeron proposes that everyone "who is not self-critical", who was "in the past verbally aggressive", or "not cooperative", or "with diagnosis with inherent dangerosity", -- should be locked up in mental hospitals, thus to expose them to the mercy of depraved psychiatrists. If we accept the judge's interpretation of Bergeron, nobody would be out of the mental hospitals, including Mr. Justice Boudreault. (I am wondering where he found the term "inherent", since it was never mentioned in the medical records or during the trial).

Should we assume that the judge is a shrewd but dishonest, or inane, or naive or just an incompetent, or...? I recommend warmly to the reader to read the judgment and the references. He would have a better picture of the professional and moral qualities of judge Boudreault.

The faults or duplicity of the judgment clearly appear when we consider the entire panorama of what had happened:

1. Four months before my hospitalization I obtained a written reference from the psychiatrist, Dr. Filippo Juretic. He wrote that I was "an honest and brilliant physician and merit full consideration" (un médecin honnête et brillant et il mérite toute notre considération). In the context of this reference, it is clear that I was good enough to work in the Psychiatric Service of New Brunswick (sic!)(qu'il attend une réponse des Services Psychiatriques du Nouveau Brunswick.)

2. Four days after I had been confined, it was written in the medical records that the same Dr. Juretic "was surprised to see his friend and countryman, Dr. Delev, hospitalized in the Hospital St. Michel Archange", and that "according to him (Dr. Juretic), he doubted that Dr. Delev was a psychotic." Rather, Dr. Juretic thought that this is "a storm in a teacup".

3. In addition, when I was transferred to Dr. Filippo Juretic's hospital, he had never listed in his original medical records any symptom of a mental illness, except in forgeries which Dr. Juretic admitted, and -- the judge noted and described as disgusting evidence (preuve accablante).¹⁶⁷

4. Mr. Yvon Gervais, the social worker who wrote a psycho-social report on me, testified in court that he had recorded everything told to him word by word (mot à mot). Yet we find the same persons mentioned in his report later in court giving "additional" -- out of the record (hors dossier) testimonies that differed from his report.

5.The Code of Medical Ethics obliges physicians to write medical records. Therefore, the latter should be accepted as prima facie evidence.¹⁶⁸ On the other hand, the failure to write medical records, according to the Code, should be considered as derogatory conduct and incompetence on the part of the psychiatrists involved.

6. The authenticity of medical records as produced in court has not been questioned, including the "modifications" or rather forgeries made after I took action in the court. Therefore, the psychiatrists involved have accepted responsibility for everything written in the records.

7. The Commitment Certificate stated that "Dr. Delev was known as a schizo-paranoid to Dr. Jacques Grenier who had written (rédigé) and ordered his record to be sent to SMA (St. Michel Archange Hospital) ..." Yet Dr. Grenier admitted during the preliminary examination that he had never met me.

8. Dr. Grenier admitted having sent this record away after he wrote it. Yet it is impossible to find this particular part of the medical record.

9. In addition, on January 15, 1975, Dr. Jacques Grenier produced a fraudulent plea (plaidoyer)¹⁶⁹ in which he stated quite clearly that he "tried to interview" me. Yet no one had read this particular medical record or any other note about the alleged "interview" because it never took place. Therefore, Dr. Grenier gave an untrue bit of information. The judge lauded Dr. Grenier as being highly trustworthy and as never having been involved in my hospitalization.

10. A letter attached to the medical records and signed by Dr. Louis Roy, the Superintendent of the St. Michel Archange Hospital, stated that I was legally competent to sign documents of legal significance.¹⁷⁰

11. Although I was legally competent, my requests, both verbal and written, were being ignored during my hospitalization. Therefore, as a human being I was extremely abused by the hospital authorities.

12. Although I was legally competent to sign legal documents, my wife was asked to sign the documents concerning my confinement and later, the authorization for an "osteotomy" -- a surgical division or sectioning of the bones of my feet -- for removing corns from the toes (sic).

13. I was severely restricted from the first to the last day of my hospitalization, without any legal or medical justification.

14. These restrictions prevented me from leaving the hospitals. My appeals and petitions were simply ignored.

15. While I was kept rigorously confined, no formal judicial decision was made in writing as to whether I was in involuntary hospitalization (cure fermée), although such a decision is required by Article 9 of the Mental Patients' Institutions Act, 1964 S.R.Q., c. 166. The Commitment Certificates¹⁷¹ showed two dates of my involuntary patient status, November 12 and 22, 1971!

16. I was "definitely discharged"¹⁷² and this was approved by the Board of Review (Comité de révision). Yet one reads on the same page: "Transferred to St. Jean de Dieu (Hospital in Montreal) on February 17, 1971, escorted by Mr. Roger Bautin."

17. Dr. Jacques Dufour testified in court that he had not known of my existence before he met me in the hospital on November 12, 1972. Yet in the preliminary testimony of Dr. Grenier and also in the court testimony of my ex-wife we read that I had been known to him (au courant). In particular, one finds Dr. Grenier quite explicit about having "discussed" my case with Dr. Dufour before the hospitalization. Therefore Dr. Jacques Dufour committed perjury in court.

18. In his testimony, Dr. Dufour stated that he spoke to my ex-wife in the presence of the nurse, R. Lord, who later denied in court that she had been present during that conversation . Therefore, this is another instance of perjury by Dr. Dufour.

19. Before my hospitalization, I spoke little French and no English. This is evident eight years later from my testimony (in French and English) in the court.

20. My ex-wife spoke almost no French before my hospitalization. This can easily be verified by examining her court testimony eight years ago.

21. The police were not requested by anyone connected with my hospitalization to present any information, especially about the alleged incident of the threat with the axe. From a document produced in court, we gather that they had no record of me.

22. My children were never asked about my attitude or conduct.

23. In my ex-wife's view, I was a "good father of the family" according to the medical records. She repeated this opinion in many statements and phrasings: that I loved and adored my children, that the children reciprocated, et cetera.

24. Before my hospitalization, my ex-wife had already been hospitalized in the psychiatric department of L'Enfant Jésus Hospital.

25. Even Mr. Justice Boudreault's concise comments on my ex-wife's attitude and speech confirm without doubt that she is not well, or show that she is a hysterical person. Yet Mr. Justice Boudreault does not use his own judgment on my ex-wife but rather takes for granted the opinion of "experts".

26. My ex-wife gave different versions of the alleged threat with the axe. Therefore, she had committed perjury.

27. My ex-wife gave different versions of the exact time and place of the alleged violence -- beatings. Therefore, she committed another perjury.

28. Nowhere in my medical records is there any mention that I acted violently during my whole internment, even though it is written that I was physically attacked by patients and was suffering from their misconduct.

29. Dr. Juretic was requested to submit all the documents pertaining to the "episode of the axe" (l'histoire de la hache), but had never provided this evidence.

30. For the sake of the children I did everything to save the marriage. I never objected to any normal, human help of improving mutual relations between myself and my ex-wife -- including socio-psychiatric help, if necessary a family counsellor, and so forth.

Faced with irrefutable facts, the psychiatrists were embarrassed. Nevertheless, utilizing the "parameters" and "discretion" of the court (in the judge's exact words), Judge Boudreault vindicated the villains in an Orwellian manner, as if these were "honest, competent, intelligent, and honourable" men. In fact, there were daring lies, vulgar falsifications, metamorphosis of lie into truth and truth into lie, altering uncontested documents into falsification and vice versa. I lost the case because all these manoeuvres were not weighed in the scales of justice.

Further, the judge postulated that the oral testimonies -- outside of the records -- are more credible than the written records. This is preposterous. If Mr. Justice Boudreault's rationale is accepted, that would be a real tragedy: only liars would triumph in courts.

I am convinced of the following -- which is my maxim: Individuals can never so skilfully dissimulate their evil acts as with the intended or unintended help of others.

My account is an attack on both the unscrupulous psychiatrists and the legal authorities. I conceive it as well a proposition on how to protect innocent people from wicked individuals in the administration of mental hospitals and courts.

We have already seen how legal authorities have, in my case, given an implicit licence to the psychiatrists to do acts which civilized countries consider immoral and harmful, or even criminal.

If we look at my case in the light of Marchand's principles we see there is no other case in which common sense was disregarded in so many ways.

The inquisitors were blinded by their religious devotion, convinced of their "messianic" mission. They were worried about the "salvation of sinful souls". However, for many of the psychiatrists and legal professionals involved in my case one could not find any such rationale but pure and simple corruption or lack of courage to participate honestly in solving my case, or deep-rooted prejudice, or just lack of intelligence.

As is written in a letter by my friends, in abusing their power the psychiatrists committed criminal acts¹⁷³ which the political and judicial system seemed incapable of condemning or at least thwarting.

Could we presume that the judge was silly and committed "honest mistakes?" The way the judgment was written shows that it is impossible for a reasonable judge to make so many mistakes. I believe that the judge's idea was to salvage the criminals. Unfortunately for the criminals and the Judge, it had not worked that way.

After Mr. Justice Boudreault issued his judgment on August 14, 1981, I prepared my appeal to the Appeal Court of Quebec. Since I experienced many financial and technical difficulties -- not to speak of my weakness with the French and English language -- all the required documents were not submitted until 1987. I presented the appeal myself, because the lawyers (Messrs. Wolofsky and Selig), to whom I had just paid $7,000, had not taken any action.

On February 17,1987, I attended a hearing in front of Judges Vallerand, Tyndale, and Meyer of the Appeal Court, in Montreal. In general, I tried to summarize orally what I had already presented in writing in my Statement of Facts. I stressed that Mr. Justice Boudreault had made serious mistakes when he refused to accept written evidence that was proven beyond a doubt -- medical records, written by the defending psychiatrists themselves. The records as a whole indicated that I had not received a proper examination before my incarceration, that I had been arrested without a warrant, that I had been incarcerated without a judge's decision, and that my rights in the hospital were restricted even when I was a voluntary patient. In brief, the evidence showed I had been healthy. I made the point that in fact I had been kidnapped and tortured for six months without any reason for this. I demonstrated that the four versions of the Commitment Certificate were faulty and forged. I also pointed out those later records which Mr. Justice Boudreault nicely described as "modified", refraining to use proper word for forgeries.

The Appeal Court rejected my appeal. A very brief statement was given which merely stated that "... the conclusions of a judge in the first instance, founded on the credibility of witnesses, ought not to be refused upon appeal, unless it is proved that (he) committed an evident and dominant error which made false his appreciation of facts." The Appeal Court judges stated this, even though both in my Statement of Facts and in my oral expose I had pointed out so many errors by Judge Boudreault.

In addition, the Appeal Court referred to a recent Supreme Court of Canada case (Lensen v Lensen), which is absolutely different from my case. The trial judge's appreciation of witnesses' oral credibility had been accepted. The Supreme Court found that the trial judge, lacking other evidence, had to appreciate the oral evidence which was available. This, no doubt, is correct reasoning. But in my case we had much written evidence, which was more reliable than any oral testimony -- the best proof according to Civil Code of Lower Canada (Art. 1204). It states:

The proof produced must be the best of which the case in its nature is susceptible . Secondary or inferior proof cannot be received unless is first shown that the best or primary proof cannot be produced.

Art. 1234 of the same Code explicitly relates:

Testimony cannot in any case, be received to contradict or vary the terms of a valid written instrument.

In other words, a written document -- the best or primary proof -- cannot be substituted with oral testimony.

According to L. Ducharme, "This prohibition (to substituted written document with oral testimony) is not new, it exists since the Ordonnance de Moulin of 1566."¹⁷⁴ It could not be otherwise; common sense dictates it!

I must conclude that the Appeal Court in my case unjustifiably or maliciously condoned Mr. Justice Boudreault's judgment. They gave the green light to those psychiatrists who abuse their patients.

Prior to turning to the Supreme Court of Canada. I hired Mr. William Schabas as my attorney. In his statement, he generally supported the points I made to the Appeal Court, and added the argument that since I had been forcibly detained in hospitals, these institutions or their psychiatrists had no contractual obligation to treat me. There was no reason for me to be their patient. Further, my new attorney Mr. Schabas immediately focused upon the issue of Mr. Justice Boudreault's errors of fact including: his failure to give due weight to my arrest without a judge's warrant, the lack of judicial approval for my confinement, the fact that the Commitment Certificate existed in four different versions and the question of my voluntary status after February 17, 1972.

Accompanied by my attorney, on June 30, 1988 I attended a hearing before three judges of the Supreme Court in Ottawa. Mr. Schabas was allowed to speak for 15 minutes.

Without giving any reasons, the Supreme Court of Canada denied me leave to appeal. The basis apparently was that my case was of private, not national significance, but this is not correct.

There are at least two reasons why my case is definitely of general significance. Firstly, when judges such as Mr. Justice Boudreault commit grave faults, the nation's judicial system is compromised. Secondly, who could claim that any individual's unlawful six-month detention, with disastrous consequences to the person, is not a challenge to the country? The attention given to human rights infractions today disproves reasoning of this sort.

The only thing I can state is that the Canadian justice system totally failed in my case. The Canadian law "becomes man's badge of infamy, his confession of ineradicable perfidy", as Prof. Fuller said.¹⁷⁵