As we know, the final result of a medical examination is a diagnosis and a treatment (therapy) thereafter. Making diagnoses requires many qualities from the psychiatrists: Skill, competence, diligence in searching and applying a proper method to examine the patients and, above all, honesty. Physicians are to take care of their patients, cure and alleviate their sufferings and pains.

"The physician must practise his profession according to scientific principles and exclude empiricism"⁶¹ , as written in their code.

Experimenting upon patients or behaving unprofessionally is unethical and punishable. Nevertheless, physicians are very often faced with problems which are common to any human being. For example, even competent, honest and diligent physicians, with the best will to help, could overestimate themselves or simply make mistakes, or as the legal professionals say, they may make honest misjudgments. Thus, they could unwillingly harm their patients. This is called a human, honest error, for which we cannot blame the physician. In my case, a mistake of this sort is out of the question. Otherwise I would not sue anyone nor write these lines. There were many psychiatrists and parapsychiatric workers involved, and they had more than enough time -- six months -- to observe, assess, and reassess me. If they were conscientious, they would have come to the correct final conclusion.

It is worthwhile to briefly review the diagnoses made by the psychiatrists during and after my hospitalization.

Although Judge Boudreault disqualified the records as aide-mémoires, the very references of the same judge reveal that the medical records are the most reliable evidence of the quality -- professional and ethical -- of the physicians. Therefore, I will rely first on the medical records and judge's references, and then on the statements given by the psychiatrists in court.

It is clear that the psychiatrists were not in agreement on a diagnosis, which per se is uncontestable proof that they did not act in accordance with the criteria described by Mr. Justice Boudreault's references. In fact, every psychiatrist furnished a different diagnosis, and some of them gave different diagnoses on the same occasions. The following is the list of the diagnoses as recorded by the psychiatrists:

(1) On the Commitment Certificate of November 12, 1971,⁶² one reads that I was "known as a 'schizoparanoid' to Dr. Jacques Grenier".

(2) In his examination for discovery Dr. Grenier called my condition "paranoia".

(3) The signatory of the Certificate, Dr. Dufour, seemed to accept the "schizoparanoid" diagnosis, but in court he was talking about a "paranoid psychotic state" (état psychotique paranoïde).

(4) On November 12, 1971, not more than one hour after Dr. Dufour signed the Certificate, Dr. Boucher wrote: "Our impression at the moment of the interview: paranoiac state."⁶³

(5) Dr. Pierre Dorion, psychiatrist on the ward where I was incarcerated, notes on November 15, 1971: "Impression:⁶⁴ paranoiac state or transient situational disturbances"(sic) (Impression: état paranoïaque ou troubles transitoires situationnelles).⁶⁵

(6) On November 16, 1971, Dr. Dorion noted: "Impression: paranoiac state."

(7) The Mental Bureau stated on November 22, 1971: "Paranoiac state." I did not see any "mental" bureau during my entire hospitalization.

(8) Dr. A. Tremblay, on January 27, 1972 in his very extensive notes does not offer a diagnosis, but continues with a peculiar question to me: "What do you conceive your illness to be, where does it come from, how do you expect to be cured?" While in other branches of medicine, physicians answer these kinds of questions, according to Dr. Tremblay I should know the etiology and treatment of my diseases. My ignorance of my "diseases", and claims that I did not feel sick and saw no need for treatment (Dr. Tremblay wrote, "he denies his illness") -- is considered proof per se of the "disease"! This doctor is not alone in his senseless reasoning. Psychiatrists are sharply criticized by some of their colleagues,⁶⁶ for this perverse reasoning.

(9) Dr. Dorion's final diagnosis was: "paranoiac state."

(10) On February 17, 1972, although still allegedly in a paranoiac state, according to the discharge slip I was discharged definitely (libéré définitivement)⁶⁷ by the Review Board (Comité de révision). I was, in fact, transferred from one hospital to another (St-Jean de Dieu, Montreal) for "inflexible disciplinary policy for adaptation" i.e. to reconcile me to my fate as a mentally sick person.

(11) On the very first day, namely February 17, 1971, in St. Jean de Dieu Hospital, Dr. Jean-F. Filotto, head of Admissions, met with me and admitted me, but did not fill in the appropriate medical records. Instead Dr. Juretic, although he did not see me, wrote⁶⁸: "Provisional diagnosis (sic): paranoia." We have here a repetition of the initial blunder: Here Dr. Juretic wrote the diagnosis in the same manner as Dr. Grenier did. In fact, we have, again, an absurd situation. Dr. Dorion, after more than three months of "examinations", discharged me with a final diagnosis of "paranoia". But now we see a "provisional diagnosis". Did Dr. Dorion hold me caged with a shaky diagnosis or did Dr. Juretic write something just for the sake of writing? Looking closely at this admission slip, as it is, we might surmise that Dr. Juretic is hallucinating: He asks himself an opinion about the case; he instructs himself to contact "personally" a head of some ward, and so forth. Actually this is the first indication that Dr. Juretic took it upon himself to cover up the poor ethics of his peers.

(12) The next day, on February 18, 1972, Dr. Filippo Juretic wrote: "The patient is not psychotic"⁶⁹, (Le patient n'est pas psychotique) and the rest of the description suggests a perfectly mentally healthy person: "lucid, well oriented, vigorous intellectually", and so on. No diagnosis.

It is to be noted, however, that the last 2 lines, added later, were subject to Mr. Justice Boudreault's comments⁷⁰. Dr. Juretic said in court that after I had instigated the proceedings, he added the following two lines in order to be "clearer": "Multiple paranoid and delirious interpretations in spite of a lucid exterior, complicated by dangerous aggression". The judge described in the Judgement those "modifications" as an "évidence accablante" against Dr. Juretic.⁷¹ Translated into English, the term "évidence accablante" means -- according to Larousse⁷² -- "overwhelming, damning proof, crushing, sweltering charge".

One does not have to be a psychiatrist to know that the meaning of the two last lines does not fit with the context of the note. If a patient is "not psychotic", as is written in the previous paragraph, then it is contradictory to say the patient is "paranoid and delirious" and vice versa.

This page, and the other two pages concerning my release, were the subject of an examination by an expert on forgeries who reported that the doctor had doctored the records and Judge Boudreault was of the same opinion. Nevertheless the judge found Dr. Juretic to be a "diligent, competent and an honest psychiatrist"(sic)!

(13) On February 23, 1972, it is written: "Treatment form" (formule de cure): "Situational depression -- voluntary treatment -- on a form signed by Dr. Filippo Juretic; but on the same day, Dr. Juretic wrote in "Medical Prescriptions": "Not permitted to leave the room; not permitted to use the telephone.⁷³"

(14) On February 29, 1972: No diagnosis. Dr. F. Juretic wrote: "Thus, as far as his attitude goes, nothing needs to be changed" (Donc au point de vue son attitude rien à changer). This remark begs the question: If I did not need to change my attitude, then why was I there among the most disturbed patients?

From February 23, 1972 until May 2, 1972, the day of my discharge, no diagnosis was recorded!

(15) Finally, Dr. Filippo Juretic discharged me from the hospital on May 2, 1972 with the diagnosis: "situational depression"⁷⁴ (dépression situationnelle).

I noted another manipulation on the discharge slip. He added "psychotic" between "situational" and "depression". He also added psychotic, paranoid personality, and schizoparanoid.

Mr. Justice Boudreault also classified these last two lines as "modification" and "overwhelming proof"⁷⁵ (preuve accablante) of Dr. Juretic's lack of credibility. But in my opinion, this is proof of a manipulation or falsification of the medical record.

It is clear that I was incarcerated for six months not only without an appropriate psychiatric examination but also without valid medical and legal documentation.

In court, Dr. Dufour, and the "experts", Drs. Grantham and Villeneuve, tried in their testimony to impute to me "a psychotic disintegration", "decomposition", and "disturbance of the thought". These terms contradict the entries in the medical records.

It is impossible for anyone to be in a state of disintegration, perturbation and decomposition of thought and still be lucid and well-oriented (lucide and bien orienté). It is also impossible for a person to be in a state of disintegration for only thirty minutes -- as Dr. Dufour claimed his examination of me lasted. Nowhere in the medical records can we find that I was in a "state of disintegration", not even once during six months of hospitalization.⁷⁶

The initial diagnosis for which I was arrested and coerced was "schizoparanoid". Let us assume that Drs. Grenier and Dufour had in mind schizophrenia of the paranoid type.

As I have already stressed, the discrepancy between schizophrenia and genuine paranoia is so immense that it is impossible for any medical practitioner to make a mistake. Certainly, for a psychiatrist to act as Dr. Dufour did, is unquestionable proof of incompetence and dishonesty, even flagrant crime. The implicated psychiatrists did not use the term "Personnalité paranoïaque" in the medical records, except in records forged after I took action in court.

Despite the obvious inclination by my ex-spouse and psychiatrist to portray me as having a bad personality, in the medical records I am unwittingly described as a positive, healthy, personality: a good physician who makes more than a specialist, a good father and man who cares about his family, he adores his children and they adore him.

The letters written by my children, friends and my ex-wife's family provide a better picture of me (Cf. Chapter X: Res Ipsa Loquitur -- Others' Assessment of Myself).

If no valid diagnosis was established as the psychiatrists implicitly admitted, there must have been another reason to keep me in hospitals for six months.

After my discharge from the hospital Dr. Roy wrote to me and stated that:

It was established to the satisfaction of medical authorities that you had ideas not conforming to reality as regards to the fidelity of your spouse ... and these ideas brought in you a violent behaviour which required your hospitalization rather than incarceration.

This letter raises many questions. Dr. Divic gave a short account of his opinion in his letters of December 27, 1973 and January 24, 1974 regarding whether I was psychotic and whether the hospitalization was appropriate. Let me also direct readers to Dr. J. Kolb.⁷⁷ Dr. Kolb describes a doctor (a patient) who among other things accused his ex-wife of infidelity. However, the unrealistic ideas of Dr. Kolb's patient regarding the infidelity of the ex-wife are only of slight consequence in the realm of the total clinical picture of this patient. The history of this patient's life, beginning with his mentally burdened parents, until the day of his hospitalization, is described by Dr. Kolb with irrefutable proof, and shows the need for his hospitalization.

I return, at this point, to the above-mentioned quotation of Dr. Roy, which on the surface was the rationale for my hospitalization. I repeat that, except for my ex-wife's unwarranted accusations, there was absolutely no justification for my hospitalization.

These questions come to mind: How did Dr. Roy and others arrive at the conclusion that "my ideas were not in accordance with reality" as regards to my ex-wife's fidelity? How did they arrive at a solid conclusion that she was faithful to me? To answer the question of my ex-wife's fidelity, it would be necessary for the psychiatrists to conduct some inquiry or investigation. While my "sick ideas" were accepted, the most reasonable thing for the psychiatrists to have done would be to examine the object of these notions -- my ex-wife. Since they did not do so and had no proof of my ex-wife's fidelity, they could not logically arrive at the conclusion that my ideas were sick.

Is there an exact and scientific method to ascertain the infidelity or fidelity of a spouse? I can, as a physician, answer categorically in the affirmative. I suggested such an examination to the psychiatrists, and later in the court through my lawyers. But they, as Dr. Juretic put it, "wanted to prove what they wanted", i.e., to use only those means which would attest to my "sickness".

In a proper psychiatric examination we must apply, first of all, common sense. We have to be sure that the person, who declares others to be mentally sick, is not himself mentally sick. Secondly, besides our observation of the informant, we have to ask him whether he has been the subject of psychiatric treatment, Thirdly, we have to ask the informant, in my case my ex-wife, whether she has been faithful to the spouse. Fourthly, we have to conduct objective examinations regarding the possibility of venereal diseases in both spouses; and fifthly, we should make an examination on the paternity of the children (if the spouses have any).

In my case, it would have been simple for the psychiatrists to ask my ex-wife whether she had ever been mentally sick. If they had only made a call to L'Enfant Jésus Hospital, they would have found that my ex-wife had been hospitalized there as a hysterical person. After finding out the information about my ex-wife, they would have found important relevant facts to enable them to arrive at more objective conclusions in a short time. (Lying and faking are the most characteristic "symptoms" of hysteria). They might have also questioned my children or police about my "dangerosity".

In short, there were countless ways and possibilities to ascertain whether I was rightly hospitalized.

I was never morbidly jealous, and the infidelity or fidelity of my ex-wife, per se, was not an important consideration. The question of my children, regarding their particular fate and how to love them -- these were the questions which tormented me and torment me still. If these queries are the fruit of some lunatic imagination, then perhaps by such a definition I am ill. According to the logic of the psychiatrists involved, I should be kept in a mental institution forever. Yet, I am free. Many psychiatrists have examined me since my release from the hospital, and none of these men have recommended that I seek treatment or that I be hospitalized. Instead, all of them found me to be quite normal!

As a physician I have had numerous opportunities to examine and recommend internment for mentally sick people. Most of them would visit me after their hospitalization to show their appreciation and thank me for helping them when they were sick. In other words, though mentally ill persons generally deny their sickness, probably because they are aware of society's prejudice, they are aware that something is wrong with them.

Sometimes I think that it would have been better if I had really been sick, for the very sick people are usually happy with their delusions and hallucinations.

In addition, Dr. Thomas S. Szasz, Professor of Psychiatry at the State University of New York Upstate Medical Centre, a member of the editorial board of consultants of The Psychoanalytic Review, an author of over 25 books, known worldwide, plus more than 250 articles and book reviews, writes about psychiatry and personality:

The term "mental illness" is also widely used to describe something quite different from disease of the brain. Many people today take it for granted that living is an arduous affair. Its hardship for modern man derives, moreover, not so much from a struggle for biological survival as from the stresses and strains inherent in the social intercourse of complex human personalities. In this context, the notion of mental illness is used to identify or describe some feature of an individual's so-called personality. Mental illness -- as a deformity of the personality, so to speak -- is then regarded as the cause of human disharmony.

What is the norm, deviation from which is regarded as mental illness? This question cannot be easily answered. But whatever this norm may be, we can be certain of only one thing: namely, that it must be stated in terms of psychosocial, ethical, and legal concepts. The idea that chronic hostility, vengefulness, or divorce are indicative of mental illness is an illustration of the use of ethical norms (that is, the desirability of love, kindness and a stable marriage relationship). Finally, the widespread psychiatric opinion that only a mentally ill person would commit homicide illustrates the use of a legal concept as a norm of mental health. In short, when one speaks of mental illness, the norm from which deviation is measured is a psychosocial and ethical standard. Yet, the remedy is sought in terms of medical measures that -- it is hoped and assumed -- are free from wide differences of ethical value. The definition of the disorder and the terms in which its remedy are sought are therefore at serious odds with one another. The practical significance of this covert conflict between the alleged nature of the defect and the actual remedy can hardly be exaggerated.

In his book Psychiatric Justice Dr. Szasz writes as follows:

The diagnosis of schizophrenia is not otherwise than as ink marks on a piece of paper. It is a name. But that the disease exists, no. I don't believe it.⁷⁸

In Schizophrenia: the Sacred Symbol of Psychiatry he writes:

"Schizophrenia" has never been, is not now, and probably never will be a bona fide medical diagnostic term ... Psychiatrists don't know what "schizophrenia" is, and don't know to diagnose it ... "Schizophrenia" has more to do with freedom and slavery than with health and disease ... the ceaseless manufacture of disease names in psychiatry, together with a total lack of evidence of them -- from agoraphobia to schizophrenia -- is the greatest scientific scandal of our age.⁷⁹

Typically, an individual cannot be involuntarily confined to a mental institution simply because of his/her anticipated -- or even demonstrated -- dangerousness. There has to be a finding first of mental disorder and then an associated propensity of predicted likelihood for engaging in dangerous behaviour.⁸¹

The fundamental requirement for involuntary psychiatric hospitalization is that the patient must be both mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others. This psychiatric principle is legally sanctioned and applies not only in Canada but everywhere. Was this principle applied to my case? What kind of medical examination did the psychiatrists conduct to detect my "mental illness" and "dangerosity"? What kind of therapy did they perform, apart from practising coercion and causing me mental and physical suffering? I was obedient and docile at the time of my arrest and throughout the entire period of my hospitalization.

Bruce J. Ennis, a lawyer heading the Civil Liberties and Mental Illness Litigation Project in the United States, writes:

On the other hand, in a mental commitment case, the prospective patient is not charged with committing any specific act capable of proof or disproof. He is charged with being mentally ill or dangerous. If he is hospitalized, it is usually not because of something he has done, but because of a status attributed to him by a psychiatrist. His liberty is therefore dependent upon the personal values and biases of the particular psychiatrist who examines him.

Some psychiatrists believe that all hippies are mentally ill. Others disagree. Some psychiatrists believe that a person is "dangerous to himself" if he eats too much (or too little), or smokes cigarettes. Others limit the label to persons who have attempted suicide in the more conventional manner -- slashing a wrist, or jumping from a window. British psychiatrists, when shown films of potential patients, tend to label mentally ill those who are unusually active or aggressive. American psychiatrists, viewing the same films, tend to pick out those who are unusually withdrawn and non-aggressive.

Obviously, the cultural background of the examiner weighs heavily in his evaluation of a prospective patient.⁸²

Likewise the Law Reform Commission of Canada points out that: "The limitations of our predictive ability in this area must be frankly faced." Recent studies reveal "unanimity -- that clinical predictions of dangerousness are, at best, suspect and, at worst, totally unreliable."⁸³

Let us return to my case.

The accusation that I was "dangerous" had been brought exclusively by my ex-wife. It was based on one alleged incident with an axe, which my ex-wife described with so many contradictions that one wonders how she was able to dupe so many people?

The very "axe" she referred to in one of her versions of the events, was not found by the police. In the second version she stated that the axe was found. She also gave different versions of the exact time and place and instances of the supposed violence. If we read her statements it would be difficult to determine when the incident had happened -- two weeks or two months prior to my internment.

Once she expressed that the children were sleeping during the incident, another time she declared that when "the police found the axe, the children were crying ..."

Further, according to the "Information⁸⁴" given by my ex-wife before my internment and her allegations during the internment, there was no mention of any injuries of any kind, while she testified in court that the violence caused her to bleed from the mouth. Apparently she "forgot" to report it eight years before!?

Whether the version given before my internment or that given during her testimony in court is accurate, from a psychiatric and legal point of view is irrelevant. The first and foremost question is whether the psychiatrists conducted the proper psychiatric examinations and followed all the legal steps required for involuntary hospitalization. Drs. Grenier and Dufour had at least two weeks, if not two months: 1) to verify the allegations of my ex-wife; 2) to ask the police about the "assault with the axe"; 3) to question the children about the alleged assault and the relationship among the parents; 4) to question the neighbourhood and my friends in Quebec City; 5) to contact the school authorities, where I was studying in Hamilton; 6) to contact me in person, or my landlord (in Hamilton); 7) to ask L'Enfant Jésus Hospital about the mental state of my ex-wife; and, 8) finally, they had more than enough time to communicate with my own and my in-law's families in order to ask for their opinion about our marital relationship.

Dr. Grenier and Dr. Dufour were less concerned with their professional obligations and more concerned about my incarceration.

If they were really convinced that I was a sick and dangerous person, they should have acted urgently in order to prevent a real "dangerosity" before I came back to Quebec. In other words, they should have communicated with the authorities (psychiatric, judicial, police) in Hamilton, where I was actually living. The security of my ex-wife would be more assured since the distance, about 1000 km, would be an insurmountable obstacle for me to execute my "sick idea" to kill her.

Was there any need for compulsory treatment or hospitalization on November 12, 1971, the day on which I was arrested and confined to hospital? Certainly none at all!

Contrary to the note in the Commitment Certificate that I was "noncooperative", I never objected to getting any help, including real psychiatric help, to improve our marital relationship. In the letter of November 2, 1971 to my ex-wife⁸⁵ I proposed that both of us obtain an examination and treatment, psychiatric or otherwise, to help save the family.

If a patient is cooperative and willing to submit himself to psychiatric examination and treatment, common sense dictates that in this case the psychiatrists have no need, and it is unprofessional and inhuman, to incarcerate such a patient.

Further, on the day of my arrest, namely November 12, 1971, Dr. Dufour did not note in his Commitment Certificate that I was violent, nor he could prove this in court. There was no proof at all that I was dangerous to anybody, before or on the day of my arrest.

The policeman, Mr. Jean Cliche, who arrested me, testified in court that he "remembers eight years later ... there was no violence, nothing at all". Even my ex-wife testified that I was "kind during the two days" preceding the confinement. Nowhere in my medical records is there any proof of any act of violence by me. Since no proof of any physical violence existed, there was no need for force or coercion at all.

It has been, unfortunately, not infrequent for individuals to be railroaded into a mental hospital without proper examination. Thus, we read in Dr. E. Fuller Torrey's The Death of Psychiatry⁸⁶:

Incredible as it may seem, our judicial system is committing individuals to institutions -- for indeterminate periods -- on the basis of proceedings of just a few minutes' duration. Furthermore, this occurs not as an isolated event, but every working day ... Can you imagine the outcry if this many people were being involuntarily confined for any other reason? But there is no outcry for these people -- after all, they are "crazy". They really don't deserve the full benefit of our legal system! Better to save our valuable court time for people who have smoked marijuana and committed other such serious crimes. If this is justice in a democracy, then what is it like in a totalitarian state? Ivan Denisovich was given a fuller hearing before he was sent to Siberia.

I believe my status as a landed immigrant was a large element in the psychiatrists' blunder -- diagnosis without an examination. They would not have had the courage to chase Canadian citizens from the streets, and keep them in hospitals at their whim and fancy.

Besides, when Dr. Dufour was "on duty", I believe that it was Dr. Dionne who gave him a low opinion of my intellectual capacity. For all these reasons, the psychiatrists did not worry about any legal or other consequences in case I turned out to be neither a mental case nor a dangerous person.

It is noted in the medical record that one of them, Dr. Dorion, even had an idea to deport me. By deporting me, they would get rid of all the consequences if my internment was later found to be erroneous.

Here we have an opinion about my treatment from a leading Canadian psychiatrist:

Dr. G.F.D. Heseltein, chairman of the department of psychiatry, University of Western Ontario, expressed total amazement at the so-called medication. Dr. Delev's case would hardly be ground for committal or even treatment. ... he was 'cured' by pills that are given to little ladies who only go out on Sundays.⁸⁷

Dr. E. Fuller Torrey elaborates on the "treatment" in psychiatry:

Witch doctors and psychiatrists perform essentially the same function in their respective cultures. They are both therapists; both treat patients using similar techniques; and both get similar results. Recognition of this should not downgrade psychiatrists; rather it should upgrade witch doctors.⁸⁸

In the medical records we find the names of many medicines, but all are followed by the abbreviation H.S. meaning "at bedtime", or P.R.N. meaning "as the occasion arises". In other words, all these medicines are sleeping pills.

Elsewhere, one reads again about drugs such as Deprex 25 mg T.I.D. (three times a day) and Elavil 25 mg B.I.D. (twice a day) -- which are according to pharmacology, mild anti-depressive medication, or I "was 'cured' by pills that are given to little ladies who only go out on Sundays", -- as Prof. Heseltein wrote.⁸⁹

My depression was caused by my internment. The way the psychiatrists "treated" me was like trying to extinguish a fire with gasoline. Or we could take the example of a person exposed to an excessive temperature, when, instead of taking him away from the source of the heat, we attempt to reduce his temperature with compresses or aspirins.

In court the psychiatrists insisted that they had provided treatment beyond reproach, but what was it? In all the instances reported in my medical records, they acted in a manner contrary to the Code of Ethics and medical science.

Thus, one reads about "a plan to know how to reorganize his life independently of the family" (sic). This was written, but it was unclear what the plan envisaged and how it was to be executed. Was my suffering in mental hospitals and my deportation to Ontario considered a "therapeutical plan"?

Further, Dr. Dorion wrote "his character became sick ...". If I understood this passage correctly, he found that my character became sick during hospitalization. In other words, he and the others who contributed to my internment, contributed to the deterioration of my character; they kindled my depression.

Yet he pretends to be a healer of my character. I think the doctor's conception about the meaning of the word "character" and his role as a healer is confused. First, I do not believe a person's character can be changed within a few months or even years. Secondly, neither do I believe that the present drugs or any therapies can treat "sick characters", unless Dr. Dorion assumed the role of the agent of Orwell's thought police, which is what he essentially tried to do. If we presume that the doctor was right and my character really became sick because of the internment, then the most logical and best cure would be my release.

The oddest thing in this mix-up was that Dr. Dorion was at least 20 years younger than I was. Not only is it impossible for a young man to change the character of a man 50 years old, but my impression was that the doctor did not know what he was writing about!

Later, at the St.-Jean-de-Dieu Hospital, although I was not "psychotic", i.e., not mentally sick, Dr. F. Juretic pretended to give me "psychotherapy in order to remove him physically from his family because the procedure of separation is before the court ... His children adore him and we believe that he adores his children, too." On the other hand, he complained in the court that I considered him to be a "good for nothing", which is true. The opinion which I held during my internment became a firm conviction after reading the note. Yet if we put all these together under the scope of logic, we must ask the question: How could a reasonable psychiatrist perform psychotherapy on a patient who had no regard for the doctor?

He took it on himself to separate me from my family until the procedures for separation were completed, and until my children's or my feelings were reversed. The psychiatrists wanted to manipulate the feelings between myself and the children rather than cure me.

I can state as a physician that these kinds of "treatments" are more than immoral and extremely harmful. These "treatments" brought me and my friends to the conclusion that the psychiatrists involved were not physicians, but criminals.

One's family life should be his private concern; it is certainly not up to the psychiatrists to detain a husband until he "accepts the separation as a unique solution", as written in my medical records. Here, we find again a discrepancy between the psychiatrists' actions and the principles of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 12), which says:

No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.

Coercion was used to physically remove me from my family until a legal separation was effected, and a cat and mouse game was attempted.

I not only suffered from the separation from my children, but I also suffered psychologically in other ways. For example, all the visits were severely restricted.

I was also threatened with the senseless, but vicious osteotomy⁹⁰. During my hospitalization Dr. L. Roy, Superintendent of St. Michel Archange, wrote that I was "mentally sufficiently well to sign documents of legal importance".⁹¹ Yet I was pressed to undergo surgery for removing a corn from my foot -- against my will! As a physician in Yugoslavia, I used my nurses often to perform the "operation" without a single drop of blood and without touching the bones. As a matter of fact, the "operation" consists of scratching the corn with any sharp instrument, which, with a little patience, could be performed by anybody. At the time I did not need any surgery.

And, because I was not happy with the "inflexible disciplinary policy" or to use the judge's words, I was not "cooperative" in the implementation of such treatment, for which the word barbaric would be euphemistic, the judge displayed his annoyance by praising the villains as being good psychiatrists.

No, there was no treatment at all. All these "treatments" which I had endured during my hospitalization were imposed just to make life hell for me.

My case is very revealing about just how far psychiatrists are prepared to go. At the beginning they blundered, and then, in order to exonerate themselves, they resorted to all kinds of dirty means including criminal ones. They destroyed my family and my personal life. How would people feel in a situation like mine? Instead of answering myself, I shall quote an article which appeared in the Montreal paper "La Presse"⁹² and elucidates a divorced man's feelings well:

Don't Let Divorce Crush the Male Partner

Divorce, according to Dr. Robert E. Litman, is a greater ordeal for men than for women, because the man is not only separated from his ex-wife, but also from everything that constitutes a home: from his children right down to the washing machine.

One of the two spouses had to be declared guilty. Generally, it was the man who assumed this role. As Dr. Litman, lecturer at a symposium on suicide, proceeds to explain: 'He felt crushed by his ex-wife, by the court, and by the lawyers, and in some cases he thought it was better to kill oneself.'

Furthermore, Dr. Paul H. Blachly, psychiatrist at the University of Oregon, added that the loss of hope, faith and dignity are the main factors that bring about states of depression in a man after divorcing. 'The older a person is, the more firmly rooted are his ideas, and the more inclined will he be to depressions following a divorce'. (Translation by Roman Hromnysky)

I have been "crushed and trampled upon" much more than the men referred to in this article.

Dr. J. Divic and Dr. H. Arndt, both professors at the University of Toronto, in their report at the International Congress of Psychiatry in Mexico City, have presented the cases of 65 persons, "almost all" of whom showed prolonged psychopathology after a fire disaster in Montreal. According to the professors, the "extra-psychic disasters" -- a blaze -- caused "intra-psychic disasters", i.e. psychotic disturbances. The researchers "soon realized that almost all of the survivors showed symptoms of anxiety and/or depression which," in their opinion, "warranted psychiatric evaluation and psychiatric treatment". The treatment "consisted of pharmacotherapy and supportive psychotherapy. Besides, where necessary, family psychotherapy was administered."

Dr. Divic was quoted in the letters "Friends of Dr. Delev"⁹³ as a psychiatrist willing to help me, yet he did not apply his theories and conclusion to my case. He deserted me in the middle of my "extra-psychic disaster", to let me suffer forever. Later, in the court, he admitted that he did not conduct a proper psychiatric examination in my case!

For so many years I have waited for this frightful affair to be justly resolved. It is too much even for a person most resistant to psychic shock. The medical records clearly show that my hospitalization was absolutely futile and pernicious.