| � "What did They Wear?" Part 3 'Bayos, Boxes and Plates' By Bill Skillman First let's review our history. Hiram Berdan first proposed that each man would bring their personal target or hunting rifle with them and the U.S. Army would pay a $60 bonus for doing so. Unfortunately, Berdan did not get this inducement authorized by his superiors before he placed this notice, among other promises, on the advertising broadsides that were distributed throughout the 8 Loyal states. By August the Michigan (Co. C.) and New Hampshire (E) boys arrived at Weehawken, New Jersey with their guns in hand, only to find they had been "humbugged" and Berdan's promise of the $60 was not forthcoming. Most the boys elected to wait for the government to provide their firearms, and so had to content themselves watching the shooting exhibitions at Camp of Instruction from the sidelines. The idea of using one's own rifle made sense, as each man was familiar and confident using it. The downside was that the variety of rifles of differing calibers, weights, and complexity made resupply by a U.S. Arsenal a nightmare. When companies C. and E. marched forth to battle at Lewinville and Munson's Hill (September 1861) these discrepancies became apparent. Loaded down with full knapsacks, accoutrements, ammunition and toting a rifle averaging 18 pounds, the men quickly became fatigued. During the skirmishes, the men acquitted themselves well but their slow-loading rifles (averaging 1-2 shots per minute) were outmatched by the faster loading infantry rifles. Another problem emerged when the men had to make their own ammunition by each night by melting lead ingots in a pot and then carefully pouring the molten lead into a mold. Imperfect balls were tossed back to be recast--a labor-intensive and time consuming process. Then the formed balls would be placed into a leather pouch where jostling and bouncing together they could "get out of true" (leading to decreased accuracy). While the range of each shot could be adjusted by adding or reducing the amount of powder poured from a brass flask/animal horn, this also decreased the rate of fire and limited flexibility during rapidly changing battlefield conditions. Whenever the marksman got within the range of infantry rifles it to their peril. One Massachusetts (Governor "Andrews") sharpshooter company was literally shot to ribbons when they carried their target rifles into Millers Cornfield at Antietam. One of the survivor's declaring "our rifles were little better than clubs!" It became apparent to Berdan that another approach had to be taken. He finally caved in to Army pressure and took steps to reshape his Sharp Shooters along the lines of the traditional European skirmishers. This change of tactics brought an end for the need of precision target and hunting rifles (except in rare "static" situations--the USSS retained 10-20 "heavies" which were kept until needed in the regimental wagons). Men who brought their own target rifles were permitted to keep them, but the search for a new firearm which used standardized bullets, powder charges, and was "grunt-proof" (apologies to my Vietnam veteran friends- meaning a weapon that could operate under any condition regardless of the user) was in order. The first official rifle of Berdan's USSS was the controversial 1856 Colt-Root Revolving Rifle. One of the more unusual arms of the War, the Colt-Root featured a .56 caliber, five shot rotating cylinder like the famous Colt revolvers-the hammer affixed on the frame like the military arms. The Berdan's never really accepted the rifle, complaining that it spewed out shards of lead and gas as the ball cleared the chamber and entered the breech of the barrel. One sergeant shot off three fingers in a "chain fire" accident which lead to a blunt communiqu� from Michigan's Adjutant General (Jno. Robertson) to Hiram Berdan stating that "the men are hereby ordered to turn in their flasks and accept the new cartridges for the Colt gun". Ironically, men from the 21st Ohio used the Colt-Root rifles with devastating effect at Chickamaugua during the critical actions on Snodgrass Hill. For most of the second day, while the Union Army was crumbling around them, they held off Longstreets Corps at the cost of 43,000 rounds of ammunition. When finally ordered to withdraw the wounded Buckeyes who remained behind were shown the utmost respect by their captors who thought, "you'all had a division up here". The Ohio boys loved their "5 shooters" and carried them throughout the war. With the flasks gone the men needed to carry their new Ordnance-prepared ammunition in something. They were issued the Pattern of 1855/1861 cartridge box, (also used by units fielding the Springfield and Enfield rifles). This box had a pair of loops sewn on the back allowing it to be carried on the belt, in addition to a pair of buckles attached on the bottom of the box. A leather "cross belt" when passed over the soldier's left shoulder allowed the box to 'ride' at the right hip. The soldier secured it into place by buckling their waist belt around it. So back to my original question: What did they wear? I was stunned at what I discovered. It is apparent from examining the Ordnance Returns of the various USSS companies, that a number of men preferred to hold onto their strap mounted Pattern 1855/61 cartridge boxes well into the War. The Company F. returns for May 1863 show 47 cartridge boxes and by January 1864, there are 53 boxes, with 36/16 cross belts accounted for during the same time periods. This suggests that 77% of the Green Mountain Boys carried Pattern '55/61 cartridge boxes in 1863, while only 30% were on hand in January 1864. Captain Marble (of the Wisconsin Company) reported in March 1863 (Sword incorrectly cites 1862) 58 "cartridge boxes" and 23 "cross belts", or a 40% average. Unfortunately, I don't have the Michigan USSS Ordnance records to obtain an accurate accounting for our purposes. But using the standard everyday Berdan (SEB) rule, up to � of us reenactors could take the field with the shoulder strap Pattern '55/61 box for a mid-War impression. As a side note, but just as important. The number of round "eagle plates", listed as "US" plates affixed to the cross belt were in the distinct minority for both companies, (only 3 present in the VT reports). The number of plates affixed to the exterior of the cartridge box was 22 for 47 boxes in 1863 and 42/ 53 in 1864 for the VT Company. The second cartridge box issued to the USSS accompanied the Sharps rifle shipments. This requires a small sidestep by itself. With the order of the 2000 Sharps pending, Richard Lawrence (President of the Sharps Firearms Co.) informed Ordnance Chief Ripley that he could procure the leather accoutrements and angular bayonets that were left out of the Berdan order. The cost of the additional cartridge box, bayonet and scabbard would add $3.50 to the total. Researchers believe that Emerson Gaylord, a board member of Sharps Firearms Co., and contractor of U.S. Army goods himself, was the supplier. But before you go out and have all your leather gear stamped with "Emerson Gaylord & Sons" read on. Like the Berdan uniforms, precious few Sharps cartridge boxes are known to exist. An excellent reproduction is produced by the C&D Jarnigan Co., based upon an original belonging to collector Paul Johnson, (it measures 7-1/4" x 4-5/8" x1-3/8", the front flap measures 7-1/2 inches across). The "Berdan Sharps Box" is similar to the earlier Pattern 1841 (issued for the "Mississippi" Rifle) as both only have belt loops sewn on the back. Noted Berdan researcher, Curt Schmidt, at first thought that the two cartridge boxes were identical, and hypothesized that the War Department had "recycled" the 1841's. However, conversations with Mr. Johnson clarified the issue. Unlike the Pattern 1841, the Berdan box has 2 rivets, one at the base of each loop, to support the weight of the 40 Sharps cartridges. James Stamatelos also had a "mysterious" cartridge box in his collection with a name stenciled onto the inside flap, "W.B. Green Raymond, N.H.", along with some .52 caliber linen cartridges. Of course, the "W.B. Green" was Willie B. Green of Letters from a Sharp Shooter fame, which established that these unusual boxes were indeed the (Berdan issue) Pattern 1862 Sharps Boxes. Lets go back and find out how many Berdan/Pattern 1862's were on hand during the 1863-1864 inspections. By the process of elimination, we find only 11 belt worn boxes in 1863, while the number jumps to 37 by January 1864. Captain Marble reports 35 covering that period. With the Pattern 1855/61's capability to be worn on a belt or by shoulder strap, we can't be absolutely certain that the above numbers truly reflects the number of men using the Pattern '62 Sharps box. But strong evidence suggests the men wore boxes as they were originally intended (designed and issued). Curt Schmidt suggested that some men may have worn two boxes, (the Pattern '55/61 on the hip and the Pattern '62/Sharps box on their belt). While this would have given a sharpshooter access to 80 rounds, I believe that the combined weight would have made such a practice impractical out in the field. At least Curt's theory is not born out by the Company G and F Ordnance records, (however, I know a few reenacting Berdans who stuff 100 blanks into their cartridge box for an afternoon battle!). Cpl. Pfeiffer of Co. B. gained some personal insights between the reenacting and original Berdan's by substituting lead ingots in his cartridge box (to duplicate the load of 40 REAL rounds), and packed even more into his knapsack (for 60 rounds). He then marched around for a full day. Terry exclaimed; "I almost died carrying all that weight around! How'd those guys do that ?!" Individual soldiers carrying huge quantities of ammunition is a late 20th Century phenomenon prompted by high-capacity, select-fire rifles (M-14/M-16 for the U.S.; Ak-47/AK-74 for the Soviet Bloc) combined with the "spray and pray" philosophy of nuetralizing zones of resistance. However this attitude conflicts with the 19th Century tenets of "Light Troops", which emphasizes rapid maneuvering, stealth, and on precise shooting. While the Pitzer's Wood action at Gettysburg is noteworthy because the USSS expended 95 rounds per man within 20 minutes, this was the exception (and precisely why it made the history books), for most Sharp Shooter engagements. If one compares casualty figures, and factors in the time elapsed and amount of ammunition expended, the results begin to look more like a modern day firefight. Let's look at why. First, General Birney appointed Hiram Berdan (over the more experienced Trepp) as overall commander of the expedition, then Berdan marched the battalion along the Emmitsburg road in violatation of every rule of 'secret missions', he then naively threw his out-manned (6 to 1) battalion against a full brigade of Rebels deploying 300 yards away. It is not too difficult to see why the veteran NY, VT, and MI boys threw themselves behind the nearest tree and let go with a 'wall of lead' until they nearly emptied their cartridge boxes. Being almost out of ammunition let them legitimately 'break contact' from the Alabamans and then high-tail it backto Union lines. For years afterward the survivors recalled the incident as "a recon-nonsense". Which brings us to bayonets those dreaded implements of War feared by Borden Milk tins everywhere. The angular bayonets issued with the Sharps were relegated as can openers, candleholders, entrenching tools, and on one occasion to scare the living bejesus out of the Rebels (Auburn, VA Oct-1863)! Many of you are familiar with the infamous USSS 'bayonet controversy' already, so let's talk facts. The VT boys had a total of 6 bayonets for 47 men (and 7 scabbards) in May 1863, and 11 bayonets and scabbards by January 1864, (which earned them a bad inspection report and lead to the assignment of Major Mattocks to "shape up" the USSS in March). Captain Marble records show 52 bayonets/scabbards for 58 rifles in March 1863, (coming on Berdan's near-court martial). Berdan narrowly retained his command by rescinding the "bayonet question" (which he had left to the discretion of the boys) and ordered a new issuance of bayonets for the regiment. Resources: Schmidt, C. Shots from the Skirmish Line Vol. 1 No. |
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