Trial Report: Sixty-Three - Report on the judgement in
The State vs Wouter Basson delivered on 11 April 2002

On 11 April 2002, thirty months after the start of Dr Wouter Basson�s trial, and after approximately 300 days in court, Judge Willie Hartzenberg pronounced the former head of South Africa�s chemical and biological warfare programme not guilty on all charges.

When the trial began on October 4, 1999, Dr Wouter Basson faced 67 charges of trafficking in drugs, fraud, murder and conspiracy to murder, emanating from his activities while head of Project Coast from 1981 to 1993. Six of the murder charges were dropped before Basson entered a plea, on the basis that the alleged crimes had been committed on foreign soil (Namibia, Britain, Swaziland, Mozambique) and were thus beyond the jurisdiction of the Pretoria High Court. In addition, Basson�s defence team argued successfully that along with all other members of the South African security forces, Basson had been granted indemnity from prosecution for deeds perpetrated during the war in Namibia. A proclamation to this effect had been issued by the Administrator-General of South West Africa, Louis Pienaar, five months before the 1989 elections that led to Namibia�s independence. Defence advocate Jaap Cilliers said the proclamation had been incorporated into the Namibian constitution.

Basson pleaded not guilty to the remaining 61 charges. In June 2001 he was granted an interim acquittal on 15 of these, and was acquitted on the remaining 46 charges on April 11, 2002.

In accepting Basson�s version of events surrounding the alleged abuse of the CBW project, the judge rejected the testimony of 153 witnesses called by the state, affidavits by another 40-50 witnesses and thousands of supporting documents.

In a move unprecedented in South African courts, Hartzenberg allowed the presence of cameras in court on judgment day, and the event was televised live by South African broadcasters.

Analysis of the written judgment indicates Hartzenberg summarised each day�s testimony contemporaneously, and the bulk of his final judgment consists of a detailed summary of the evidence presented, with little relative evaluation of witness�s testimony. Where comparisons are made and discrepancies highlighted, they are by and large those dealt with during cross-examination, and thus those which favour the accused.

A striking feature of the judgment is the amount of space and attention afforded to "concessions" made by state witnesses during cross-examination by the defence, as opposed to a lack of attention to the eight-week cross-examination of Basson himself. Basson�s evidence in chief is extensively reported in the judgement, which endorses much of the testimony as truth.

The only reservation expressed by the judge is that he "formed the impression" that Basson was "not entirely frank" regarding his testimony on the fraud charges, claiming lack of memory in respect of anyone still alive who was involved in the transactions under review. The judge concluded that Basson had testified in "such a manner as not to implicate anyone else" but said it would be "all but impossible" to decide where he had lied and where not. Hartzenberg expressed no reservations about Basson�s testimony in relation to the allegations of his involvement in human rights violations.

A striking feature of the judgment is that it contains numerous factual errors, including incorrect names being given to witnesses and companies, as well as chronological inaccuracies.

The judgement also errs with respect to the motives attributed to two key witnesses who testified against Basson on the human rights charges, namely Mr K and Johan Theron.

According to Hartzenberg�s judgement, the prospect of being granted immunity from prosecution in return for implicating Basson in murder "was worth a wheelbarrow full of gold" for Mr K. However, Mr K�s actual testimony was that following his severing of ties with Barnacle (forerunner of the Civil Cooperation Bureau) in August 1982, it would have taken "a wheelbarrow full of gold" for him to get involved "with those people" again.

As for Theron, the judgment claims that he was one of several witnesses who had a gun held to their head by the state, and hence he had "no choice" but to testify, and implicate Basson, "after his gruesome deeds were uncovered by the Truth Commission." In fact, the TRC did not investigate Theron�s involvement in human rights violations.

Other factual errors include:

• Reference to FBI agent Mary Rook as a Special Agent for the CIA.
• Reference to the Special Forces Club in as the Special Courses Club.
• Reference to a chemical Iraqi attack on an Iranian village named as Valapjar. No such village exists and the reference may be to the chemical attack by Iraqi forces against the Kurds in early 1988 at Halabja.
• Reference to witness Henri van der Westhuizen as Henri Van Rensburg.

The judgement endorsed the following claims that were made by Basson:

• Basson assisted Iran with the containment of an outbreak of a deadly potato blight (a rare fungus) in the mid-1970s.
• Basson was involved in the rescue of American scientists from a secret laboratory in Zaire after they had fallen prey to their own experiments with haemmorhagic fever.
• Basson and General Lothar Neethling discovered that "some sections" of the Swedish International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) received funding from Moscow and operated as a front for Russian government propaganda.
• Project Coast�s Co-ordinating Management Committee was deliberately misled by Basson regarding his travel plans in the event that there was a spy in their midst.
• Genetic engineering was carried out at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories on viruses, which were altered to make them resistant to known treatments.
• A small sample - or the formula - of a "super-toxin" developed by the Russians and which could penetrate all protective apparel for chemical attack, was acquired by Basson and analysed by (unnamed) scientists at Delta G Scientific. When they found that a 14-step process was needed to produce the agent, Basson was able to "reassure the Americans", who were in a panic at the time, that there was no danger of this substance being produced on mass scale.
• There was one verified chemical attack against Unita troops in Angola, and weaponised CR was used once by SADF troops during Operation Modular (1987/88). Mention is also made of Basson�s claim that there were "multiple" attacks in Angola, and that "people died from exposure to nerve gas".
• There was a P4 laboratory at RRL, equipped with glass reactors, which were of East Bloc origin, and a tissue culture division.
• Viruses were genetically engineered at RRL to make them resistant to known treatments or cures.
• Toxins added to items such as chocolates and cigarettes were used during "war games" introduced by Basson to test the abilities of both RRL and Delta G Scientific.
• Basson was entrusted with the laundering of $250-million in cash on behalf of his "financial principals" - Libyan, East German and Russian secret agents - and purchased valuable real estate on three continents for them.
• Libyan intelligence, in the person of Abdur Razzaq, gained a foothold in South Africa from as early as 1988, entering the country via the then independent homeland of Transkei and using the Jetstar and/or King Air and/or Piper Seneca flown by Aeromed to traverse the country.
• From 1990, Razzaq played the leading role in the affairs of the principals, and in 1988, through Razzaq, Basson met Yusuf Murgham, whose responsibilities included monthly payment of ANC cadres in exile in Southern Africa.
• A condominium in Orlando, Florida, was bought at Razzaq�s request when he needed a base from which to launch his intelligence operations in North and South America.
• The company called Genavco was established to enable "the Libyans" to buy six Boeing aircraft from the Belgian Air Force for between $40-m and $50-m. However, the purchase did not take place.
• Roger Buffham�s company, Contemporary Design Systems and David Chu�s company, Medchem Forschungs, were set up with capital supplied by one of the principals, Dieter Dreier.
• The South African companies, Systems Research and Development and Aeromed, were set up with capital supplied by the Libyan principals.
• Two farms in Mpumalanga were bought to allow the principals to study fungi and other aspects of agriculture with the view to developing biological weapons.
• The Tygerberg Zoo was bought to further research into the use of heavy metals and pheromones for crowd control. The principals were furnished with the results of this research.
• Florida attorney David Webster met two of the principals - Dreier (in Orlando) and Razzaq (in London). He was introduced to surgeon-general Nicol Nieuwoudt in his Pretoria office by Basson, and hence could not have had any doubt that Basson was actively involved with the SADF.
• Scientists in Iran were engaged in advanced peptide research and while negotiating with Iranian agents for a state-of-the-art peptide synthesiser, Basson was offered an amount of human growth hormone that "would have taken 300 000 bodies" to produce, and this could only have taken place in Siberia "since that�s the only place you have so many bodies".
• Chemical Agent Monitors (CAMs) were obtained for the SADF and UNITA with the assistance of Heyndricks and his boss, Jan Marsk, Dreier and Buffham. At some point, the SADF was asked by the Israeli Defence Force to provide them with one of these CAMs.
• Basson would have supplied a false end-user certificate to Iran if the proposed sale of NBC suits involving the companies Tagell, Copperdale and Blackdale had materialised, but the entire deal was actually set up to hide his purchase of the peptide synthesiser.
• Basson was involved in a project led by German and Austrian scientists during the 1991 Gulf War, which determined that the Americans had used BZ against members of Iraq�s Republican Guards. BZ was found in their urine samples and video footage of Iraqi forces emerging from their bunkers showed facial expressions and a gait commensurate with the profile of BZ exposure. The probe concluded that the Americans had used a BZ variant, which had also been tested in South Africa, but rejected because of the dangers of use. In 1992, 500kg of BZ had been bought through Razzaq.
• At the end of 1991, Basson entered negotiations with contacts at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow for the purchase of 500kg of methaqualone. By 1992 it had become clear to him that the Russians would not be able to supply the product and hence negotiations with Croatian government officials were launched instead. On December 23, 1992, he brought the 500kg of methaqualone from Croatia back to South Africa in the Jetstar and placed it in an SADF depot. Former Swiss intelligence chief General Peter Regli brokered the deal as part of a larger transaction in terms of which he was to acquire enriched uranium from the Croatians.
• Late in 1989/early in 1990, thousands of NBC suits - made by the Belgian company, Seyntex - were donated to Unita by Razzaq. [After implementation of UN Resolution 435 which led to Namibian independence and the withdrawal of both SADF and Cuban forces from the Angolan theatre of conflict.] Distribution of the NBC suits to Unita was halted when the SADF adopted a policy of supplying only humanitarian aid to the rebel movement, and the suits, which remained in Pretoria, were sold on behalf of the principals. The funds were ploughed into the WPW/Wisdom groups. A payment of R100 000 to RRL managing director Wynand Swanepoel, for example, was used to buy a house in Pretorius Street, Pretoria, which could serve as offices for the principals.
• Hundreds of 120mm mortar bombs were loaded with CR at Speskop and donated to Jonas Savimbi to form his last line of defence. Proximity fuses costing more than $3 million were bought and fitted to these bombs.
• Baboon foetuses from RRL were used by Basson in his peptide synthesis research.
• On his inaugural fact-finding trip to America in 1981, Basson made contact with an American government official who facilitated access for Basson to classified Library of Congress material. The documents used during his trial were "not even two percent" of those he had acquired and compiled during the lifespan of Project Coast, and those retrieved from the files of foreign associates such as Webster, Bernard Zimmer, Buffham and Chu were all false. They must have destroyed the real documents.
• SADF documents produced in court contained errors, e.g. documents indicating that funds were to be shifted from Project Coast�s 1992/93 budget to the 1991/92 financial year for the acquisition of chemicals, were incorrect. The funds were actually moved from the 1993/94 budget to the 1992/93 financial year (and thus covered the Croatian deal).
• Three incapacitants were developed as part of Project Coast�s research and "the British" were impressed when Basson briefed them in 1994 about the work done by the project.
• Weaponisation of the methaqualone, which was produced by Delta G Scientific in 1988 as part of Project Mosrefcat was halted when it was established that the use of the substance heighten aggression.
• Weaponisation of all incapacitants, with the exception of CR, was carried out at Special Forces Headquarters by Basson, Hekkies van Heerden, Bill Grieves and "a number of youngsters" from the SADF Ammunition Corps.
• Project Coast was the name of the offensive CBW programme. When Basson left the SADF in December 1992 and Colonel Ben Steyn took over as project officer, the name was changed to Project Jota, and the purpose became purely defensive (i.e. from the start of 1993).
• Research records from RRL were captured on fibre optic disks by Data Image.
• In 1985, pharmacist Steven Beukes made 100 000 Mandrax placebos on the orders of the commanding officer of the Special Forces, to be used by operators to infiltrate the drugs-for-arms routes used by the ANC�s armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK). Basson did not tell Beukes that the substance he was turning into tablets was inert, because the need-to-know principle applied.
• The judge found that it was "highly unlikely" that Basson had offered 100 000 Mandrax tablets to Danie Phaal in 1992 for him to sell. In light of the legal wrangle in which Phaal was embroiled at the time (CCB agents were threatening to expose covert operations unless they were paid their full pension benefits). Basson would not have made such an offer to Phaal, as it would merely have added grist to the mill of the legal battle. The state based its entire case on Charge 30 on "pure speculation".

In relation to the human rights violation charges the Judge found that:

• The suspects in the assassination of Renamo Secretary General, Orlando Christina, had not been interrogated through the use of drugs, as alleged by the state.
• The legal argument relating to the charge of Basson�s alleged involvement in the murder of Victor de Fonseca was "na�ve". According to the Judge, as soon as forensic tests on the exhumed remains of Victor de Fonseca showed that the amount of Thallium in his body was insufficient to have been the cause of his death, the state should have realised that there was "no hope" of convicting Basson.
• While it was "entirely likely" that the Reverend Frank Chikane�s clothes had been contaminated with some or other substance, the state had failed to prove that it was paraoxon, (which had emanated from RRL, and had been given to Chris, Gert and Manie by Andre Immelman or that Chris, Gert and Manie had smeared anything at all on Chikane�s clothes). Tests by the FBI had failed to find any trace of a toxin on Chikane�s clothes.
• As a cardiologist, it was highly unlikely that Basson would have condoned a plan to induce a fatal heart attack in Dullah Omar by administering an overdose of Digoxin. Furthermore, Basson knew that Omar�s medication, Inderil, was pink, not white. [The judgment takes no account of the evidence regarding this charge, namely that none of the witnesses called testified that Basson saw either the pills or the powder involved, and thus was never in a position to realise that they were the wrong colour.] In any event, Digoxin was a legitimate medication and its proposed use could thus never form part of the alleged conspiracy to kill enemies of the state by means of toxic substances. The CCB�s plans to murder Omar, namely by using a Makarov pistol and his heart medication, fall outside the alleged conspiracy to use toxins as instruments of assassination. There could thus be no suggestion that Basson was involved in such a conspiracy to assassinate Omar.
• As far as the Dukuduku incident is concerned, the judge "would have liked to see the death certificates signed by Bothma after he certified the three victims dead". They would probably have said something like: "Unidentified black man. Cause of death: overdose of Scoline and Tubarine while not attached to ventilator". He wondered, said the judge, if the death certificates would also have had to be thrown into the sea - or perhaps they were to be kept on file somewhere.
• The plan to feed poisoned Jungle Juice to a detainee at Ondangwa was "decidedly odd". Why could the man not simply be killed at Ondangwa? If he was part of an experiment, why had he not first been flown to South Africa before the substance was administered? Phaal was a poor witness. He contradicted himself whenever he found himself in trouble on the witness stand, and hence the entire state case regarding Basson�s involvement in this incident was rejected.

The judgement states that the only reason Theron and other CCB operators had implicated Basson in the murders they committed, was to save themselves from prosecution. Dr Kobus Bothma had an additional motive, namely trying to save his career as a doctor.

The judge found that:

• as the CCB�s medical co-ordinator, Mr R had only acted as courier for legitimate medical supplies;
• the CCB was shutdown in 1989;
• there was no proof that Basson had known about any abuse of substances supplied by RRL and there was no proof that Basson was aware of the activities of the Civil Cooperation Bureau during the late 1980s, or that they made use of poisons;
• Project Coast had been a phenomenal success and its achievements are a national asset that should be preserved for future generations;
• American and British CBW experts were amazed, when briefed by Basson, at what had been achieved on a relatively small budget;
• Libya, East Germany and Russia played an important role in supplying the project with equipment and chemicals. Other foreign suppliers were Czechoslovakia, Croatia, China, the USA, Britain and Iran.
• The peptide synthesiser was used for research on both brain-altering substances and AIDS. The only caveat regarding the peptide synthesis was that it should not result in permanent brain damage. The peptide synthesiser had also been a "handy resource" in the weaponisation of chemical substances.
• The CMC did not want to know who Basson was dealing with or how he obtained what was needed. None of the members ever complained about his activities, and he was authorised to employ theft, bribery or black market deals.
• Pyrotechnical tests on incapacitants were conducted to the prototype stage. The process was only halted due to the change in the political situation. As part of this process, large quantities of BZ were purchased. The reason the forensic auditor Hennie Bruwer could not find a record of payment of $2,4 milllion for a BZ variant, was because the funds came from elsewhere within the SADF, and not from Project Coast.
• Basson ought to have provided Knobel with more information about his activities and contacts when the Office for Serious Economic Offences began their investigation. The state�s entire fraud case was based on the forensic report, and at the core of the case was the letter from David Webster to Basson stating that the attorney would act as Basson�s nominee as president of the WPW Group. The whole fraud case rested on this document, and any challenge to the state�s premise that "Basson = WPW" was the source of serious discord and had, in fact, led to the state seeking the judge�s recusal from the case.

The court accepted without reservation that the "gruesome" murders described had been committed, but found that Basson was not involved in them, and that the meeting with General Fritz Loots at which he allegedly agreed to supply Theron with drugs, never took place. Theron was "a decidedly strange man", said the judge, who had taken a scientific approach to Operation Dual, he said that the idea of placing poisoned beer at taxi ranks in the Eastern Cape at random was a plan so bizarre that it could "only have been thought up by the same man who devised Operation Dual and single-handedly executed that plan".

According to the judgement Basson was an "excellent" witness while Trevor Floyd and Danie Phaal were poor witnesses.

According to the judgement, the state had "not understood the purpose of super-toxins being made at all". When prosecutors discovered what substances had been produced at RRL, they simply made the deduction that this could not have been for any innocent purpose - there must have been an underlying nefarious intent. No significance could be attached to the fact that Basson had been asked to help wind down the CCB.

The judgement endorses Basson�s claim that he did not know what was in the four steel trunks stored by Samuel Bosch, and did not realise, until after his arrest in January 1997, that Bosch was custodian of the trunks. Basson had taken whatever steps were necessary for destruction of Project Coast documents, and he neither packed the trunks nor knew what was in them.

The judge said that both incapacitants and irritants were essential components of a CBW programme, along with NBC suits. He said that the weaponisation of incapacitants is a difficult process as, ideally, the substance should be ingested through the nasal mucous membranes and endorsed Basson�s claim that Ecstasy had to be manufactured by Delta G Scientific because acquisition of a formula was not good enough, since all formulas made available by other programmes contained deliberate errors.

According to the judgement, at the end of 1986, the WPW Group was set up because Basson needed to procure substances and materials abroad as all ties between the SADF and Delta G/RRL had been severed. Weaponisation of the incapacitants was part of this process, along with the need to acquire CAMs and wet detection kits for the operations Hooper, Modular and Packer. Everything, according to the judge, was going well - until "a new president came along in 1989" and FW de Klerk�s February 2, 1990 speech heralded a new political dispensation for South Africa. Production of incapacitants was accelerated in anticipation of the international convention being signed and weaponisation was to be concluded prior to that date. Meanwhile, the privatisation of the front companies was also set in motion.

Hartzenberg found that a secret laboratory had existed at Speskop (Special Forces headquarters), that the work claimed by Basson was done there and that the laboratory was dismantled and all the equipment destroyed when Project Coast was shut down.

Regarding the peptide synthesiser, the judgement states that prosecutor Anton Ackermann had been "so incensed" by the accused�s claim that it had been bought that "he literally became tongue-tied every time he had to use the term in court". The judge said that the state had gone out of its way to publicly humiliate the accused during cross-examination regarding the fact that in order to obtain his MB ChB degree, he had only needed Chemistry I. According to the judge, former Delta G scientist, Lucia Steenkamp was blatantly antagonistic towards the accused, and that, for the most part, Hennie Jordaan shared her sentiments. The judge said that neither of them had any idea of the advances that had been made in peptide synthesis during the project�s lifetime, their knowledge being eight or nine years out of date. In addition, he said that they had not known that equipment was available that could synthesiser 96 peptides simultaneously, self-correct and monitor the microbiological development of peptides. Clearly, Basson had conducted research on peptides which neither Steenkamp nor Jordaan had been told about.

There was no question in the judge�s mind that the peptide synthesiser had been bought and later swopped for 500kg of methaqualone. He was at a loss to understand the state�s insistence that the equipment never existed, or that Basson was not qualified to undertake such research.

The judge found that the certificate issued by Military Intelligence verifying the destruction of Project Coast�s drug stocks, was genuine and reflected the true state of affairs at the time. How else, asked the judge, could incapacitants have been weaponised? The state had argued that these substances did not exist, but the judge claims that they must have. The judge therefore found that BZ was bought and paid for with the funds which forensic auditor, Hennie Bruwer incorrectly identified as being used to purchase the Croatian methaqualone.

According to the judgement, claims by the state that financial controls were dismally lacking throughout the lifetime of Project Coast were based on the "wildest speculation imaginable".

The judge found that cocaine had been smuggled into South Africa for Project Coast had been hidden under a consignment of bananas because the chemicals sprayed onto the bananas to preserve them in transit, confuses drug sniffer dogs.

He also found that Basson was a secret agent. The state�s claims that he romanticised events and spouted fantasies about his exploits, were "absolute hogwash".

According to the judge, the state had effectively scuppered its own case. At the outset, it had claimed that none of the equipment mentioned in the fraud charges, had ever been acquired by Project Coast. As the case proceeded this position shifted and the state began to backpedal and claimed that if the equipment had in fact been bought, then it had not been paid for with the funds which the accused claimed were used. There was, however, no escaping the fact that the alleged R36 million fraud represented almost the entire amount of Project Coast�s funding which was sent abroad.

Regarding some of Basson�s foreign associates, the Judge found that Dr David Chu was a money-launderer and dishonest having known that he was a sanctions-buster for the SADF. Bernard Zimmer�s protestations of innocence regarding Project Coast were equally false. Webster knew he was moving "funny money", and was happy to perform the services for which he was well paid. The same applied to his wife, Jane. Van Remoortere, said the judge, was an opportunist who would say anything, in the judge�s opinion, to save his own skin.

The state claimed it would have been "unheard of" for Basson to work with Libyans, Russians and East Germans as part of Project Coast, but the court knew, for example, that he had travelled to both Russia and Croatia. In the case of Orda AG vs Nuclear Fuels Corporation of South Africa, it had emerged that South Africa sold uranium to Russia at a time when no diplomatic ties existed between the two countries. As in [Eschel] Rhoodie case, it was a known fact that normal Treasury controls and regulations were sometimes by-passed when politics dictated that this was prudent, and Basson had the added burden of having to bypass international sanctions as well.

There was an enormous responsibility on the prosecutors not to become involved in criminal investigations, said the judge. They were expected to remain objective, and not to secure a conviction at any cost. The state had tried to relate everything involving the accused to the alleged fraud, for example the return of the peptide synthesiser twice to Europe for repairs. The prosecution would have done well to "sit down and think things through before jumping to conclusions". As part of the seven-year investigation, two senior advocates had travelled to Canada for the sole purpose of consulting with Bothma on two aspects of the case. Why could an investigator, either from South Africa or from Canada, not have dealt with this matter? That would be the normal procedure. In his opinion, said the judge, the time was not yet ripe for prosecutors to play the role of investigators.

The state immediately gave notice of intention to seek leave to appeal against the outcome of the case. On Friday, May 3, Hartzenberg granted leave to appeal only against his refusal, in February 2000, to recuse himself from the case on the grounds of bias. Preparation of this appeal is currently under way. Should the state be successful, the effect will be nullification of the entire trial after the date of Hartzenberg�s refusal, including the verdict, and the state is likely to initiate a new trial.

Hartzenberg did not grant the state leave to appeal, at this time, on some 38 points of what they argue are legal errors on his part.

On May 3, Hartzenberg granted indemnity from prosecution to 24 of the 30 state witnesses who testified in terms of Section 204 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Those indemnified are: Rita Engelbrecht, Jan Anton Nieuwoudt, Henri van der Westhuizen, Joof Booysen, Pieter Botes, Mr C, Slang van Zyl, Calla Botha, Staal Burger, Wouter Jacobus Basson (aka Christo Britz), Mr T, Mr R, Colonel Matie van der Linde, Dr Daan Goosen, Dr Andre Immelman, Dr Klaus Psotta, Steven Beukes, Charles Zeelie, Nanny Beyers, Boela Burger, Eric Kennelly, Mr Q, Dr Mike Odendaal and Dr Jan Lourens.

Indemnity was not granted to Johan Theron, Danie Phaal, Trevor Floyd, Mr K, Dr Kobus Bothma and Grant Wentzel.

This report has been prepared by Chandré Gould and Marlene Burger. Chandré  Gould is a research associate at the Centre for Conflict Resolution working on the Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. Marlene Burger is monitoring the trial  as part of the CCR Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. The Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project is funded by the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Norwegian Government. Additional funding for trial monitoring was made available by the Swiss Campaign for cancellation of the Apartheid Debt and Reparations for Southern Africa.

Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: [email protected]