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Trial Report: Fifty-Four

This report covers the period Monday 3 September - Friday 7 September 2001

Appeal for donations. The Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) does not have sufficient funds to continue monitoring the Basson trial and producing these reports until the likely conclusion of the trial in December 2001. An additional amount of $13 000 is required. We appeal to readers of these reports to make small financial contributions. Please contact the CCR General Manager, Fiona Grant, at [email protected].

Monday 3 September

The first question put by Dr Torie Pretorius was how Basson had reconciled his dual role of a medical practitioner, who had sworn the Hippocratic Oath, and that of a career soldier who, at the very least, had supplied medication to the Security Police to be used to sedate victims of cross-border abductions. Basson said it had not been difficult for him to do so. Firstly, he did not take the traditional Hippocratic Oath – Pretoria University uses the more modern Physician’s Oath. Secondly, he accepted that anyone on whom the substances he supplied would be used, was an identified enemy of the state, and he had no problem with operations launched against legitimate military targets on foreign soil, in order to prevent them threatening the South African population.

Basson claims he only provided substances for use during cross-border operations two or three times – for example, when a guard or highly trained enemy operator had to be subdued. He said that his conscience was clear because by helping to neutralize enemies of the state he had saved the lives of South Africans.

With regard to the Civil Co-operation Bureau (CCB), Basson said that he had previously used the example of the CCB to illustrate the concept that in the intelligence community, financial cost is of little consequence. He said he knows nothing about the CCB’s operations or organisation. He assumes that the CCB had a chain of command, but all he knows is that it was a component of Special Forces, and that he never had anything to do with it.

Basson said that any covert operation required a security officer and a solid cover story. He said that the 81mm mortar bombs filled with CR which were used during the attack on Tumpo in Angola, were made from empty shells imported from Israel, while the CR canisters were made from steel obtained from Brazil. During the later phases of Project Coast, Basson himself acted as security officer and devised all cover stories and disinformation.

Pretorius put it to Basson that his defence had been planned with military precision. This Basson denied. Pretorius said the State would argue that Basson had devised an imaginative defence in his case, using the statements and testimony of all the witnesses against him and improvising his responses in order to exonerate both himself and the SADF.

Pretorius put it to Basson that when it was in his own interest, he had no problem whatsoever in misleading even legal forums, as he had done following his arrest in Switzerland, and that he had no qualms about deliberately misleading a court of law. No mention, for example, had been made of chemicals or drugs during the Swiss investigation into his activities after his arrest. Basson confirmed that was an investigation into an operational matter, and his deceptions were fully justified.

Pretorius questioned Basson about statements made in the press and attributed to him. Basson said that the South African media have reported what they have heard, but not necessarily understood. He said the media do not have the insight to report accurately on his situation. Basson said he had given journalist, Andrew P Jones, an exclusive three hour interview because, he said, Jones was prepared to listen to his side of the story.

Pretorius put it to Basson that in July 1998, South African journalist, Freek Swart, wrote that Basson had visited top secret military installations in Iraq, and knew where Saddam Hussein’s CBW weapons were stashed. This was correct, said Basson. Pretorius asked if, as reported, Basson had given this information to the United Nations team sent to Iraq to find and destroy Saddam’s CBW weapons and installations. Basson said no, he had given it to British intelligence.

Asked who the Swiss and German colleagues were who, as it was reported had, accompanied Basson to assist in the dismantling of a CBW factory at Felluja. Basson said they were two of Herman Blucher's associates. He said the visit took place in 1986 or 1987, and he (Basson) was merely an observer. Basson said the court should bear in mind that the Swiss, Germans, British and Americans all played key roles in helping Saddam Hussein build up his military capabilities.

On August 8, 1998, Freek Swart wrote another article in the newspaper Rapport, this one stating that Basson had entered into three foreign marriages of convenience as part of his devotion to duty. Basson claims this is correct – Claudine van Remoortere was one of his "brides" and the other two were Russian and Bulgarian. The marriages took place in 1988/89 and the women were paid by Military Intelligence for their assistance. The marriages afforded Basson freedom of movement and access to information, he said.

Asked what the difference between Special Forces and Directorate Special Tasks was, Basson said that Special Forces was a fighting force, while DST "arranged" that other people wage war. Special Forces was part of the greater SADF and subject to the same regulations, but operations were generally confined to small groups, and some rules could go by the board in the field. DST, on the other hand, had a mandate to do whatever was deemed necessary to disrupt South Africa’s enemies, Pretorius pointed out. Basson said that he was involved in the planning of medical support to DST and that he had attended operational meetings at DST only by invitation of the commander of a given operation.

Asked what his role as medical officer for military operations entailed, Basson said that it involved planning, providing personnel, intelligence, budgeting, identifying what endemic diseases troops could expect to encounter in a specific environment and ensuring that the proper treatment for such diseases would be available, and identifying where field hospitals and dressing stations should be situated. Basson said the SADF’s medical protocols demanded that any troop wounded in battle would be attended to by a qualified doctor within 15 minutes of sustaining the wound. That was the primary reason for establishing 7 Medical Battalion. He said his planning would also have to cover the range of medications needed and, in the event of intelligence warning that attack with white phosphorous could be expected, field dressings would first be soaked in blue nitrate.

In answering questions relating to the testimony of an earlier witness that Basson had been in Zimbabwe before the independence of that country, Basson said he was aware of allegations that chemical and biological weapons had been used in Rhodesia because in 1981, he was summonsed by the then chief director counter-intelligence and told that a container of poisons had been uncovered as part of an ANC arms cache. It was a green metal trunk and Basson had to examine the contents. Being still a novice, he landed up in hospital as a result. He was told that the ANC had captured the trunk of toxins from the Selous Scouts. It contained mainly insecticides, which were analysed at the University of Pretoria by Dr Willie Basson.

Asked if he had ever heard about poison being added to corn-meal. Basson said that during the mid-80s he heard that the Council for Scientific Research had been asked to test mealie-meal from Sector 10 of the Operational Area (Ovamboland) which had allegedly been contaminated with swimming pool chemicals. This made no sense to him, since the particular chemical supposedly used, is the one which measures pH level in pools, and it changes colour when wet, so the mealie-meal would presumable also have changed colour when used. However, he only knows what he heard, and has no personal knowledge of this event.

Pretorius then solicited Basson’s reactions to various documents found in the trunks.

Pretorius asked Basson when he had launched the peptide synthesis research in the Speskop laboratory. Basson said it was in about 1988, though he had studied literature on the subject since the early 1980s, and had known, even before completion of his specialisation, that it was possible to synthesise peptides.

Basson testified that he was the author of the psychological profile of the Special Forces operator. He said he had been asked to compile the profile when it was found that although medical doctors qualifying as Special Forces members had a 75% pass rate, other recruits had only a 50% pass rate. Asked why this should be, Basson pointed out that it was easier to turn an intelligent being into a strong and hardened military operator than to turn a physically strong person into an intelligent being. Gen Kat Liebenberg then asked him to draw up the psychological profile which was then used by a multi-disciplinary team, including psychologists and social workers, to evaluate candidates for Special Forces selection.

Basson’s original handwritten report on his inaugural visit to the United States to gather information for the CBW project, was found in one of his trunks. It covers a single week ending on May 9, 1981. While Basson admitted the report is written in his handwriting, he couldn't remember the report at all. Another important early visit had been to Taiwan. A report on this visit, too, was found in the trunks, dated May 26, 1981. But this was not a clandestine visit, Pretorius pointed out, Basson was officially invited to visit Taiwan’s military CBW installations. Correct, said Basson. The visit was arranged by then surgeon-general Nicol Nieuwoudt and he flew to Taipei from San Francisco, spent three or four days in Taiwan then returned to America. Later, he paid a similar visit to Israel.

Basson testified that he kept a mamba in his office at Speskop for some time. He denied that the snake was given to him by Dr Daan Goosen saying that Dr Philip Mijburgh brought it to him. Basson said he needed the snake because he was using the venom for peptide research in 1983 on animals in an outbuilding at Speskop.

Pretorius asked Basson what he knew of interrogation techniques within the military. Basson said that research was done on the subject by Chief of Staff Intelligence. And what had emerged from the research into interrogation techniques, asked Pretorius. That you cannot manipulate people, said Basson. The single most important lesson taught by Special Forces was: If the person interrogating you does not know what he is talking about, tell him any story that you like. Talk as much rubbish as you can within the first 24 hours after being taken prisoner, so that your comrades have enough time to get away.

Tuesday 4 September

Regarding cross-border abductions, Basson testified that a doctor was always assigned to an operation if Special Forces were involved. The first abduction for which Basson supplied sedatives was in 1983 or 1984, and he was involved in three or four incidents. Basson said he was asked first by Gen Kat Liebenberg and later by Gen Joep Joubert to provide the sedatives needed, but could not remember specifically which operations he was involved in. He said he never knew the identity of the abductees, but did remember that he was told during the planning for one operation that a guard of the target was a trained terrorist who had to be subdued.

Basson has no memory of being approached by Mike Kuhn of the National Intelligence Agency for medical support or medication needed by agents in various countries. As far as he remembers, the abductees for whom he supplied sedatives were members of either the ANC or South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO). Basson said that the sedatives of choice were cyclo-hexyl compounds, better known as phencyclidine, PCP or Angel Dust, a piperidine derivative made first at the University of Pretoria and then at Delta G Scientific by "one of the scientists" . The only feedback he would have received was that an operation had been successful,

Basson denied ever supplying beer or canned soft drinks laced with anything, to anyone. He said such items were prepared and used for research purposes only. He would have given syringes and substances for injection to operators if a situation had arisen in which five or six of them were able to hold down a target for 30 to 60 seconds. He would have supplied a Benzodiazepine, such as Medozalam, or Valium but, said he never did, since no such situation ever presented itself. Basson said he was aware that operators sometimes placed sedatives in cans of soft drink, but said he never supplied such items.

Basson denied ever supplying Theron with any operational medication, i.e. those designed for use in the field. The only medication he gave Theron was for his personal use. Operational medication, said Basson, would include such items as morphine, Ketelaar and a range of antibiotics. Basson said the cyanide capsules he gave Theron were to be issued to deep-reconnaissance operators who faced the possibility of capture by the enemy. Basson said that on six or eight occasions he supplied anti-anxiety medication to nervous operators who had to pass through border posts in African states. Typically, these would include Ativan, Valium, Benzodiazepines or a beta-blocker like Inderil.

Basson said cyanide was manufactured in either America or Europe, and bought periodically through chemical suppliers. He said it was kept in the medical stores at Speskop and issued against an operator’s signature, since, like a firearm, it could be used as a weapon. Basson said he thinks the cyanide might have been encapsulated at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories and said he did obtain cyanide capsules from Andre Immelman on one occasion, and might well have instructed Immelman to do the encapsulation.

Basson acknowledged that he was the "technology driver" at RRL, and that he decided which fields of research were to be pursued. He said the so-called compression lab at RRL was a P4 lab, while Delta G also had the chemical equivalent of P4 labs in the form of a series of mini-labs where scientists wearing protective clothing and gloves, were separated from the chemicals by a pane of glass through which they could insert their arms. No virus research was conducted at RRL, but Basson claimed it was contracted out to "other organisations" such as the Institute of Virology and various universities. He cannot remember if any virus research was done by Delta G or Roodeplaat Breeding Enterprises.

Basson said that Andre Immelman and his team tested incapacitants manufactured at Delta G from the outset, but not Ecstasy. The cocaine derivative which was to be mixed with BZ was tested at RRL, said Basson. Samples would have been taken to RRL either by himself or Philip Mijburgh.

By 1986/87, Basson conceded, Project Coast had concluded all the research that was necessary on lethal CBW substances for conventional weapon delivery, and there was no further need to work on Sarin, Tabun or VX. The VIP component of the programme, including anti-terrorism, continued, although this was actually quite a small component of Project Coast. He said research was done on the use of laser beams and the use of lightwaves to disorientate people, for example. Through his UK contacts, Basson had learned that this technique was first used during the Lancaster House talks to find a political settlement in then Rhodesia. Simply by altering the frequency of a single neon light and putting it out of synch with the others in a room, events taking place in that room could be speeded up. The flickering was intensely irritating and the technique had apparently worked against Robert Mugabe. Those in the know would merely desensitise themselves to the flickering beforehand. Similar effects could be achieved by the use of strobe lights and laser beams. Research into sound waves as a disorientating mechanism was passed on to the police, said Basson.

Basson said that when he introduced the concept of war games in order to evaluate both the offensive and defensive abilities of the scientists, he had a hard time explaining to them the basic military principle of red and blue plans. As a result, mini-staff courses were presented at both RRL and Delta G. First his doctors taught the scientists basic pharmacology, then Basson himself taught them the underlying principles of planning. He said he devised a range of scenarios as the basis for red and blue exercises dealing with the assassination of leaders. He said Schalk van Rensburg, James Davies, Immelman, Mike Odendaal and Adriaan Botha all took part in such exercises. Klaus Psotta took part while he was still at Delta G. When viable plans were produced, the actual toxins would be given to Basson. He could not recall how many he received from 1983 to 1992. Some were obtained from Mijburgh at Delta G, but also from Johan Koekemoer and Jan Lourens.

Basson said that Immelman generally gave him the toxins or, if he was not available Davies or Stian Wandrag would oblige. Thallium in alcohol and beer would have been among the products Basson received. The next step would be to establish tactical usage. Basson said he would leave the item in the sun at Speskop for a few hours, or place it under ultra-violet light for a period of time. Then he would give the item to a troop about to embark on a route march and order him to carry it until his return. On being returned by the troop, the substance would be tested again for effectivity.

Basson said that Cantharadine (also known as Spanish Fly) was used to simulate the blistering caused by exposure to mustard gas. He said digoxin was used for research on the movement of potassium in vivo. Many experiments were conducted, said Basson. Water purification, for example, was a major problem for Special Forces, and he used cholera bacteria to test the effectivity of various purification methods. He said he also researched a variety of ways to bring CBW agents in to South Africa clandestinely, not the physical infiltration routes, which were the domain of Military Intelligence, but the different containers that could be used such as deodorants, letters and so on.

Basson said he was instructed by Gen Kat Liebenberg to do research into special applicators after Liebenberg had heard or read that such things were possible. Basson had read about such gadgets by that time, and was told by Liebenberg to "make a few so we can see if they actually work". Basson said he gave the specifications and ideas to Mr Q for development. Liebenberg placed Mr Q on leave and he worked on this project at home, where Basson called on him from time to time.

Basson said that to be of any use, these applicators would have to be loaded with toxins, and that they were all designed for clandestine use. Basson admitted knowledge of only some of the items on a list compiled by Jan Lourens – an umbrella and pen with polycarbonate balls, screwdrivers poison ring umbrella with needle tip. He claimed to have no knowledge of a walking stick with small ball missile, a time release for a teargas canister, cigarette box with hidden blade, booby-trapped briefcase, silenced East Bloc weapon, car and other bomb mechanisms. All the toys made were, however, given to Basson for testing at RRL on animals. He estimated that production of the special applicators took place over a year.

Basson said that no such devices were ever used against any member of the South African security forces, politicians or VIPs. Basson claimed to have no knowledge about Trevor Floyd’s London mission to assassinate ANC leaders Ronnie Kasrils and Joe Slovo, though he admitted that Silatrane was made at Delta G on his instructions.

Basson said he did not know who Liebenberg was to show the special applicators to but, would have had no problem if they had been used on external targets or by an SADF member in self-defence.

Lothar Neethling had obviously played a major role in Project Coast, said Pretorius. Basson said Neethling had been one of the experts Basson could consult. Basson said that Neethling had first been a friend of his father, and later, they became friends too. Basson first met Neethling in 1983, and he acted as technical adviser and consultant to Coast. It was Neethling who introduced Bart Hettema to the project.

Asked what secret orders Basson had been given by Gen Kat Liebenberg, Basson said Liebenberg had instructed him to manufacture placebos which looked like Mandrax tablets and to make contact in the Comores with "the French group". Basson said he later travelled to both the Comores and the Seychelles, which were extremely important conduits for illegal arms smuggled to South Africa during the sanctions era. Other instructions he received from Liebenberg were to draw up the psychological profile of the ideal Special Forces operator and to supply sedatives for cross-border abductions, and to set up information channels in front-line states.

Basson said that the information channels had been created by placing 7 Medical Battalion doctors in various African countries. They were responsible for remitting medical information to DST, but in the process, gleaned valuable operational information as well while treating troops in the countries where they were based. Basson said that very often the intelligence from the doctors was of a higher standard than that of the intelligence officers themselves.

Basson said that from March 1981 to December 1987, he fell under operational command of the Commanding Officer of Special Forces but, he could also be tasked by the SADF Chief, Chief of Staff Intelligence, Police Commissioner, Security Police Chief and National Intelligence to supply their operational needs in respect of Project Coast.

Why would anthrax have been added to five cigarettes, asked Pretorius. Basson said he had given the instruction for this work to be done. He said the cigarettes were then taken to the pyrotechnical lab at Speskop, where they were ignited and burned in order to establish what temperatures the anthrax spores could survive and it was found that they could survive a temperature of up to 180 degrees C.

The only problem with that scenario, Pretorius said, was that the cigarettes with anthrax were handed to (policemen) Chris, Gert and Manie, according to the Sales List. Basson said he could not comment on anything that list contained.

The list is dated 1989 and Basson said that year began with attendance of a conference in Paris on the proposed CBW conventions. He said he wrote a speech for Foreign Minister Pik Botha to deliver on this occasion, but Botha chose to ignore it and made his own. Later in the year, from August to November, Basson was in America on extended leave.

What was interesting, Pretorius pointed out, was that Immelman had testified that not a single substance would leave RRL without Basson’s approval – yet the majority of items on the Sales List had been issued during Basson’s American trip. On August 4, cholera; August 10, Sodium Azide; August 16, cholera again, as well as sodium cyanide; 5 September, Cantharadine (Spanish Fly) to Koos; 13 September, Digoxin; 8 September, two snakes; 15 September, deodorant with brucella melatensis. Pretorius asked how all these substances could have been issued while Basson was in the US.

Basson said he is not convinced that they were issued.

Pretorius quoted the minutes of a 1987 meeting in the office of then defence minister Magnus Malan, where a select group of cabinet ministers were briefed about the availability of CR, and at which Basson was identified as the person to contact regarding riot control information and strategies. The SAP liaison with Basson would be in the hands of General Smit. Basson claims he has no idea what toxins Chris, Gert and Manie obtained from Immelman. He said that had he known they were receiving anything but the incapacitants he had authorised, he would probably have put a stop to the practice.

Despite claiming in previous forums that Project Coast was governed by more than adequate checks and balances to ensure that no abuse occurred, Basson cannot explain how Immelman could supply poisons to operators without authority. He said this must have been due to a misunderstanding.

Wednesday 5 September

Torie Pretorius began by confirming that Basson previously testified that by 1980, a year before the official launch of Project Coast, the toxicity of lethal chemical warfare agents was already so high that there was no need to develop anything more potent.

The judge then asked what Basson knew about CBW before his 1981 trip to the US. Basson said he knew the basic principles. As a student and during his specialisation as an internal physician, he had learned about such substances as nerve gases, mustard gas and organophosphates. It was only after he was appointed project officer that he began to study the philosophy of CBW, starting with research of existing literature in the libraries.

Asked when he visited Iran in connection with the necrotising entero-colitis, Basson said 1976 or 1977. He testified earlier that his rescue mission to Zaire took place about a year after the Iranian visit, and that he was sent to Zaire by the surgeon-general after the Americans requested help for their sick scientists at a secret jungle laboratory. Pretorius pointed out that the first recorded Ebola outbreak in Zaire was in 1976, and that the South African team was led by Professor Margaretha Isaacson.

Basson said that was not the one in which he was involved, though he claimed the two incidents are linked. His mercy mission was a few months earlier, and claimed that consequently, when the "official" outbreak occurred, he was asked by Isaacson and Professor Bob Swanepoel to join "their" team, because he already had experience in the treatment of haemmorhagic fever. [Editorial note: this is denied by Swanepoel].

Basson said the American scientists he treated were admitted to 1 Military Hospital and had haemmorhagic fever, not Ebola. Although it was suspected that they had Ebola, the serology showed that it was, in fact, a variation of Ebola. He was assisted in treating them by Dr Prozesky of Pretoria University. Basson said the patient, Del Conn, who was flown to South Africa under Isaacson’s care, was merely admitted to Rietvlei Fever Hospital "in transit" and almost immediately transferred to the US.

Basson testified that the mycotoxin which attacked the Iranian potato crop and killed hundreds or thousands of people, was not potato blight but a fungus, Tricotesine, found only in one other area of the world, South Africa’s Koue Bokkeveld region. The SA Defence Force team sent to Iran, which included Basson, had to identify the fungus, treat the victims and advise the Iranians on how to deal with the fungus. The entire exercise was co-ordinated by the then South African ambassador in Vienna, said Basson.

Pretorius asked Basson why, if all the poison contaminated alcohol, cigarettes and chocolates made at RRL had been required by Basson solely for training purposes or further experiments, had he requested a 2 litre bottle of Coca Cola containing a pathogen that could cause diarrhoea as late as 1992. Basson said he was still conducting experiments until 1992. Basson said he did not know why he would have requested 30 Phosphide tablets from RRL on May 30, 1989, and has no memory of six cans and three bottles of beer which he received, according to the Sales List, on June 21, 1989.

Basson said the training lectures he presented at Speskop and the Military Intelligence College were attended by Special Forces members whose job was to gather intelligence in foreign countries. Basson said his task was to educate them so that they would survive and to this end, he used chocolates, milk, whisky, tea, coffee, whatever was appropriate, laced with poison to illustrate his points. He said he took laboratory animals along for the lectures and drove home the dangers with "graphic illustrations" by feeding the animals the poisoned food or beverages. He said the students "loved it". Basson said he had not informed Schalk van Rensburg about his use of animals, because he did not take them from RRL. He bought white mice from petshops, then fed them poison chocolates, for example. Fish, too, were used.

Asked if he would see himself as an intelligence agent, Basson said he played an active part in various intelligence operations. He claimed that he had acted as a double agent.

Despite the fact that there is no scientific evidence to support his belief, Basson said he remained convinced that Sam Bosch was the victim of poisoning. Pretorius asked if, at the time, Basson was engaged in a dispute with "the English Mafia" over a consignment of Sassafras Oil, a deal which also involved contacts from the Far East. Basson said he was, �150 000 had been paid for the product, which was found to fall far short of expected quality when delivered. It was possible, he agreed, that Bosch may have been caught in the crossfire of this dispute.

Pretorius said he could not understand why the CCB , which fell under the direct command of Special Forces and was known to have used poison to eliminate targets, had never once asked Basson, the unquestioned expert in the field, to supply them with any toxins. Basson said it could have been that they did not use poison or that they had another source.

Thursday 6 September

Basson began by admitting that it would have made no physiological sense to encapsulate any incapacitants as part of Project Coast. He said Andre Immelman might have encapsulated some substances as part of the tests conducted on animals, but there was no encapsulation on large scale. Nor was any physiological evaluation of the effect of incapacitants done on humans as part of Coast, not even by Lifestyle Management, despite the fact that it had been put to Dr Johan Koekemoer during cross-examination that it made "perfect sense" for physiological evaluation to be done in the form of encapsulated incapacitants.

The infrastructure to manufacture both tablets and capsules did exist, and was run by Steven Beukes, but was not used to produce samples for physiological tests. Pretorius asked how the physiological evaluation of the incapacitants been carried out on humans. Basson said that tests on methaqualone had been carried out internationally over a long period of time. He said BZ had been tested as part of the American CBW programme and documents relating to the results had been obtained by Project Coast. He said later the Russians evaluated the BZ variant produced in South Africa, and these documents, too, were obtained. The same applied to MDMA variants, tested by both the Americans and Russians.

Basson claimed that the Russian evaluation of Ecstasy began in the mid-1970s and was a lengthy process. Basson claims he obtained documents about the tests in person when he visited the Academy of Sciences in Moscow during 1990/91. He said that the Americans evaluated BZ in its original form. The South African variant included Carboxy-Methoxy-Benzoxytropane – abbreviated as CB which stabilised the BZ and reduced aggression levels. The aggression was picked up during physical evaluation which Basson saw in Moscow and Leningrad during 1990/91, when the Russians tested the pure substance on groups of 10 troops, using both a powder and liquid form of BZ, the latter delivered by aerosol.

Basson said he estimated that 24 incapacitants were manufactured by Project Coast, and said he believes some were fed to test animals in capsule form up to 1988/89. Basson said the encapsulation machine operated by Beukes was initially installed at Speskop, then moved to a section of Delta G Scientific rented by Medchem Pharmaceuticals. He said it was originally purchased to encapsulate medication for the resistance movements in neighbouring states.

Basson said it was possible that Beukes may have encapsulated some incapacitants. Basson said that Project Coast produced derivatives of Cannabinoids, benzodiazepines, Methaqualone, Phenotiazimine, Cocaine and Phencyclidine as part of a continuous project by Delta G to alter the molecules of the substances, which were then tested at RRL.

Basson testified that Delta G had the capacity for large-scale production of various incapacitants, but only two (methaqualone during 1986/87 and MDMA in 1992) were manufactured in more than laboratory scale. Basson conceded that 70% of the substances made had the potential for abuse as street drugs. He said he was not a regular visitor to Delta G, due to the security risk, and although he told Delta G what research was to be done, he had nothing to do with how it took place. Basson received research reports on a monthly or three-monthly basis.

Basson said that all the MDMA and methaqualone produced at Delta G had to be delivered to him personally. He claimed it was stored at the SAMS medical depot in Dequar Road, in a storeroom to which only he had the key, and that the premises were under military guard. Mandrax, BZ, Cocaine, Ecstasy and CR were stored there. He estimated that 17 or 18 tons of CR were produced over a two to three year period.

He said that incapacitants had been a central theme of CBW doctrine for 30 to 40 years. LSD had been considered as a CBW agent during the 1950s, while amphetamines were first tested by the Germans during World War 2. Basson did not know at what point Ecstasy was examined as a possible incapacitant but said it was possibly during the 1950s. He said that the Edgewood Arsenal code for Ecstasy indicated that it was tested by the Americans during the 1960s and 1970s.

Basson said that some psychotropic drugs are known to cause permanent damage, such as certain BZ derivatives, which may even trigger psychosis. He said tests on animals had proved this, and that further research was done. He said that recommendations about which incapacitants were to be produced by Project Coast were made by members of the Technical Work Group, the final decisions taken by the CMC. Basson said that Ecstasy causes a sense of euphoria, while Mandrax (methaqualone) dulls all emotion and may even induce sleep. BZ causes altered perception, hallucination and emotional mood swings. Cocaine has the same effect as Ecstasy, but is more intense. Basson claimed that by mixing Cocaine with BZ, the aggression levels were lowered – for example, troops would not be inclined to shoot their own comrades. Why, asked Pretorius, had it been decided to concentrate on these four incapacitants? Basson said it was because the substances used had to be compatible with the pyrotechnical demands, and a selection of psychotropic drugs was wanted. He said the effects of BZ can last "for days". The effects of Mandrax differ according to the various derivatives. Ecstasy, an amphetamine, is essentially a "feelgood" substance, as experiments all over the world, in the US, Russian and the UK, but not necessarily in South Africa, have shown. Basson said that once exposed to Ecstasy, rioting hordes "would not want to throw any more stones".

During his bail hearing, Pretorius pointed out, Basson had said the supply of drugs to Project Coast was in terms of an arrangement with the Police Commissioner. Basson said the arrangement had been with several Commissioners of police as they changed office, including Mike Geldenhuys, Johann Coetzee, Hennie de Witt and Johan van der Merwe. Basson said he had signed for the drugs supplied by the Forensics Laboratory, and fetched them himself, except in extraordinary circumstances, when this task was carried out by Philip Mijburgh. While heroin and methadone, for example, would be supplied only a few grams at a time, 500 000 Mandrax tablets and nine tons of cannabis were obtained from the SAP. A large quantity of methaqualone in powder form was also supplied.

The Mandrax was given to Mijburgh or the scientist in charge of the methaqualone research at Delta G, and the active ingredient would be extracted during a complex process. Basson said Project Coast needed the formula for Mandrax because the manufacturers, Roussel Laboratories of France, refused to supply the SADF.

Basson claims that Lothar Neethling issued a certificate of indemnity, signed by the Minister of Police, for the drugs, CS and CR teargas produced by Project Coast. This was a requirement of the CMC and was probably issued in 1984 by then Minister of Law & Order Louis le Grange. The certificates, given to the CMC, indemnified Project Coast from prosecution for work on any substances up to and including Schedule 9.

Friday 9 September

The existence, or not, of written ministerial authorisation for Project Coast to produce vast quantities of potential street drugs, remained in dispute. In a statement made to Colonel Neels Venter in 1993, following discovery of drums of methaqualone in a deserted plant at Delta G Scientific, Basson insisted that such authorisation had been issued.

He claimed that at the start of the project, he and then surgeon-general Nicol Nieuwoudt spoke to then CID chief General Zietsmann and explained that the costs involved in the CBW programme would be considerably reduced if raw materials in the form of confiscated street drugs could be obtained from the SAP for experimental purposes. The objective was to ensure consistence and predictable results from the incapacitants envisaged, before launching mass production.

However, documents used during the January 7, 1993 briefing of Defence Minister Gene Louw on the CBW programme specifically deal with the potential abuse of street drugs, pointing out that the substances involved are subject to stringent international controls, and that if the incapacitants are to be further developed, the incumbent Minister of Law and Order would have to authorise substances "which are already in our possession".

Basson claims this was because there was a new political dispensation, and that the earlier permits would have had to be renewed by the minister responsible. He denied that he furnished Niel Knobel with the names of scientists who might have to be offered legal assistance, because they had been involved in the production of the drugs, saying his concern was that staff of Delta G Scientific could face civil claims when it became public knowledge that they had worked with hazardous materials in the middle of an industrial park. At the time, the names of all SA Defence Force members involved in classified projects had to be given to the Defence Minister amid official concern over various allegations in the media about covert operations. For some time, Basson pointed out, the former Defence Minister had publicly denied even knowing of the existence of the Civil Cooperation Bureau.

Basson could not remember when he drew up the list of names of employees, but thinks it must have been during 1995, after Georg Meiring became SADF Chief. The document is undated, but the State contended that it was only compiled after Basson’s arrest in January 1997. Basson denied this.

Basson said the methaqualone produced at Delta G was stored at various sites and quantities were withdrawn from the stores for weaponisation as needed during 1988/89. At that time, the weaponisation was halted, due to adverse side-effects when the substance was tested on primates, and further research was done to find an improved variant.

Basson said that the evaluation and weaponisation to pre-production stage for mortars was done at Speskop, where the pyrotechnical tests were carried out by himself, Hekkies van Heerden, Bill Grieves and members of the Army’s Engineering and Ammunition corps.

Basson said he and Van Heerden devised the formulas for weaponisation according to which the methaqualone was compacted into tablet form before being aerosolized. The tablets varied in size and the intention was to weaponise a maximum of 500 to 2 000 projectiles, including hand grenades, 81mm mortar bombs and 155mm projectiles. He said the payload of an 81mm mortar was around 500g, that of a hand grenade 350g. No further physiological tests were done on the weaponised methaqualone since adequate testing had been carried out previously by both the Americans and the Russians.

Basson testified that Special Forces and SAP Task Force volunteers did participate in smoke tests on an "informed consent" basis. The first tests were done in 1989, he said, but again, side-effects were observed, and it was decided to seek yet another variant, which was successfully found in 1991/92. Tests were done on baboons at Roodeplaat Research Laboratories first, then on human subjects. Basson said the only incapacitants ever used during armed confrontation were the CR mortars used at Tumpu in Angola.

Basson said strict control was exercised over the methaqualone at Speskop, with registers of all use being kept. He said that of all the substances weaponised, methaqualone proved the most difficult, and the total 900kg produced by Delta G was used. Basson explained that the acceleration of the incapacitant programme coincided with the political negotiations from the end of 1991, and instead of running until 1994/95 as had been planned, the weaponisation had to be completed by the end of 1992.

Basson said the purchase of all raw materials for incapacitants was his responsibility. In order to obtain the four tons of BZ, as well as Sassafras Oil, Pretorius pointed out, he must have had to identify the major drug barons and deal with them. Basson agreed saying that he was able to call on his Libyan, East German and Russian principals, the British, Swiss intelligence and Jerry Brandt, in order to identify potential sources. He said the 80kg of Cocaine were bought in Peru through a "high-placed government official" with no SADF links at the price of $250 000 to $300 000. No import permit was issued for the drugs to be brought into South Afrrica, but Basson claimed that Lothar Neethling knew about the deal. He said the Cocaine was shipped from El Paso and Austin in Texas to South Africa under a consignment of bananas which were allegedly sold to recoup some of the costs incurred.

Basson said the Cocaine was stored at the Defence Supply Depot and "highly satisfactory" pyrotechnical tests were carried out by Basson and his Ammunition Corps assistants. He said the Cocaine was bought in April/May 1992, and from the middle to the end of 1992, tests were conducted on both the Cocaine alone, and the Cocaine/BZ mixture.

Basson said the BZ was acquired through his Libyan Principal, who both identified the supplier and negotiated the deal, at a cost of between $2-$3-m. BZ, he said, was weaponised to the pre-production stage. The only substances not weaponised, said Basson, were the last consignments of methaqualone, and the MDMA produced under Project Baxil, because Coast ran out of time. Pyrotechnical tests on the Ecstasy were conducted during 1992, but the final data on this substance was obtained from his Russian sources. He said BZ was weaponised in hand grenades, 81mm mortars and 155mm projectiles, though in the case of the latter, the process went only as far as filling the canisters.

He claimed that pyrotechnical testing and weaponisation of the BZ took place in what was known as the Pilot Plant at Speskop, which had been demolished and rebuilt in 1986. He claimed that three tons of BZ were used, one and a half tons of them just to find the formula. Basson said Neethling was aware of the BZ development.

According to the drug destruction certificate, 1 000kg of methaqualone were dumped in the sea. Basson explained that this was made up of two separate 500kg consignments, the first of which was delivered in 1991.

In a letter to Knobel dealing with Basson’s contract appointment to Project Coast after he was fired from the SADF, he noted that on November 9, 1992, 500kg of methaqualone were on hand, and that the next batch was in the pipeline, but that the suppliers had launched a campaign to embarrass both him and the South African government.

Was it not true, asked Pretorius, that the supplies in the pipeline were actually seized in London and had to be destroyed. Basson denied this saying there were a number of attempts by the Croatians to severely embarrass South Africa, for example through a consignment of arms shipped through Botswana. Those had been seized in London, and he had informed the Swiss authorities of this when he was arrested in December 1993.

On learning of the arms seizure, Basson said he had managed to get hold of Roger Buffham and Dr David Chu, and they had gained access to the British Customs warehouse where the arms were being held, and had removed them. This, he said, happened in April, May or June 1993, and in the process, Buffham and Chu helped themselves to a consignment of fur coats as well.

Basson said he was not involved in any arms deals with Croatia, but through his dealings with that country, kept an eye on developments on behalf of Chief of Staff Intelligence.

Basson testified that all the MDMA (Ecstasy) produced as part of Project Baxil was delivered to Basson. A total of one ton of MDMA was produced. He said his request that Delta G employees be offered indemnity from prosecution arising from their work, was needed because by that time, Delta G was already privatised and no longer a military front company. As MDMA was a Schedule 6 substance at the time, permits ought to have been obtained from the Medicines Control Council, but there was no time to do so, so Knobel and Neethling arranged authorisation between them.

Basson said the BZ/Cocaine blend had never before been weaponised in this way. Project Coast’s methaqualone derivative, tested on the police until 1988, was also unique, but because of the increased aggression levels, which lasted for days after exposure, the new improved variant would have been tested in 1993. Physiological tests were done on animals, and the human subjects were tested in a closed room, where smoke was ignited. Basson said he never issued instructions for encapsulation of Ecstasy "in South Africa or anywhere in the world".

Despite having previously testified that he demonstrated four mortars loaded with BZ, methaqualone, Ecstasy and Cocaine in the field in front of the Speskop buildings, Basson said there was no Ecstasy mortar. He said Speskop did have an ammunition test range, but the mortar bombs were not actually fired, the incapacitants were merely ignited to create smoke.

Pretorius tried to get exact answers about the purchase of the BZ. Basson said that four tons had been bought in April/May 1992, and 1,5 tons were used just to find the correct formula. The drug destruction certificate lists 900kg of BZ being dumped in the sea but Basson claimed this was the BZ variant, destined for weaponisation during 1993. He said the 2,5 tons of the original BZ left after the formula was found, went to Delta G for development of the variant and the final yield was approximately one ton.

Basson said the ratio of weaponised BZ to Cocaine was 10:1, yet 37kg of Cocaine were allegedly dumped after "hundreds" of 81mm mortars and hand grenades had been loaded with the BZ/Cocaine blend.

Product P, of which 12kg were dumped, was identified by Basson as Phencyclidine, PCP or Angel Dust. He claimed there must have been up to 200 mortar bombs in the cardboard boxes, as each can take up to 80 bombs.

Pretorius pointed out that a minimum of 88kg of Ecstasy remain unaccounted for. Basson explained this by saying that it could be because it was used for experiments, or perhaps Delta G did not deliver an exact ton.

Basson said that after being fired from the SADF, he began exploring various business interests in 1993, working as a consultant, offering his expertise in project management and looking into various financial and import/export deals. At some point, Jerry Brandt told Basson he had met Sol Pienaar, who had excellent contacts within the ANC that could lead to lucrative business opportunities. Basson offered to lend this group money to set up Global Capital Investments. He lent Wentzel R60 000, Brandt and Pienaar R30 000 each, and made up the balance of the R160 000 start-up capital with an investment of his own. The loans were repayable at 20% interest, and formal agreements were signed. Basson claimed he cut his ties with Global after their first deal.

Basson said that Libgro was a company he and Mijburgh set up to market project management services in Libya. Basson claimed he paid for his first trips to Libya himself and the Principals bore the costs.

Pretorius will conclude his cross examination of Basson on Monday 10 September and Anton Ackermann will continue on the Tuesday thereafter.

 

This report has been prepared by Chandré Gould and Marlene Burger. Chandré  Gould is a research associate at the Centre for Conflict Resolution working on the Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. Marlene Burger is monitoring the trial  as part of the CCR Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. The Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project is funded by the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Norwegian Government.

 
Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa
Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: [email protected]

 
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