Trial Report: Forty-One

This report covers the period Friday, 23 February - Thursday, 1 March 2001

Friday 23 February 2001

Dr. Torie Pretorius, was not required to present legal argument to support his application to present testimony about the use of drugs during interrogation (so-called "chemical interrogation"). The Judge and defence legal team agreed that such evidence could be presented if it related to the broad conspiracy charge which the state has laid against Dr. Basson.

Adv. Ackerman, who is leading the state's case on the fraud charges against Basson, re-called Christopher Marlow. Marlow was asked to testify about the date when he transported the Libyan Minister of Foreign Affairs from the airport to Nelson Mandela's Johannesburg home. Marlow said that the visit had to be after 1993 and gave reasons for this. In cross-examination Adv. Cilliers accused Marlow of lying and said that the meeting took place before May 1993.

Junior state prosecutor, Werner Bouwer called Roelf Louw to testify. Louw, was a member of Army's Directorate Projects. In or about 1986, Louw was instructed to carry out a project study on nuclear, chemical and biological defence for the Army. Based on his findings, the SADF decided he should not pursue the nuclear component, that the biological component would be the responsibility of SAMS and that the Army would assume responsibility for the chemical component.

Louw was then appointed project officer for Academic, the Army's defensive chemical warfare programme. A March 24, 1988 memorandum from Brigadier A Savides, Director Army Projects, gives notice to 23 colonels and brigadiers - including Brigadier W Basson, SAMS Directorate Operations - and senior Armscor managers that a briefing is to be held on March 30 on defensive CBW. According to the memo, the Defence High Command had ordered that acquisition of defensive CBW equipment should proceed in order to make certain operational units battle-ready while Academic gets off the ground.

Significantly, although Basson is among those to attend the briefing, Louw says that at this stage, he had no knowledge of Project Coast, even though he had previously been involved in various CR projects - Newly, Key, Fargo, Keyboard.

As Academic project officer, Louw consulted Basson, using him as a mentor and adviser, and former surgeon-general Niel Knobel was briefed occasionally on the progress of Academic, but this was neither routine nor in depth.

From September 1, 1988 to January 1996, Louw was seconded to Armscor, and managed both Academic and Project Galvanize from there. Galvanize was funded by the Defence Research Council and entailed research into defensive CBW. A letter dated November 5, 1990, from Louw to Savides deals with the impact of the proposed shutting down of Academic, Galvanize and various related projects, and notes that since April 1, no funds had been budgeted for Academic, and that the SADF was considering closure of Galvanize "because no (CBW) threat is envisaged". The SADF was engaged in widespread cutbacks at the time, says Louw, and all existing projects had to be re-motivated. Both the CBW and the conventional threats had downscaled dramatically by this stage, he said.

On May 9, 1990, Louw compiled a progress report () on the state of all CBW-related projects, ranging from research to procurement. Academic was originally an Army-only project, he says, but was later extended to cover the entire SADF, with each of the four arms of the Defence Force - Army, Navy, Air Force, SAMS - contributing R3,5-m to the project's annual budget.

Academic was officially shut down on March 31, 1990.

Louw testified about the weaponization of CR by Swartklip Products and said that as far as he was aware this was the only chemical agent weaponized.

Louw testified about the purchase of NBC suits and CR through an intermediary company, Intramex.

During cross-examination Louw was asked about the use of CR in Angola and he said that he had been reliably informed that 81mm mortars of CR were used during Operation Packer, the withdrawal from Angola.

Monday 26 February 2001

Dr Phil Meyer, previously barred (earlier testimony November 23, 2000) from testifying about chemical interrogation, returned to the stand to do so. An SA Defence Force doctor from 1981 to 1989, Meyer was stationed at 1 Military Hospital, Pretoria, from 1981 to 1984, he spent 1985 as a member of 7 Medical Battalion at Special Force headquarters, where his chief task was supervising the packing and despatch of medical supplies to Unita, and was attached to Military Intelligence from 1986 to 1989, most of which he spent in the Namibian operational area and Angola, as chief of Unita medical services.

He said that Ward 15 at 1 Military hospital was an "extremely sensitive" ward, where members of Unita and other foreign patients - "from African states, for example" - were treated from time to time. Part of Meyer's responsibility was to admit these patients, and inform the Commanding Officer of their presence, condition and treatment. Access to Ward 15 was strictly restricted.

Meyer revealed that during 1983 - while in charge of the casualty department at 1 Military Hospital he attended a course presented by Military Intelligence in conventional interrogation techniques. At the end of 1984, Meyer was transferred to 7 Medical Battalion, and Basson became his commanding officer.

Around the end of August/beginning of September 1985, Meyer was ordered to accompany Basson and Dr Deon Erasmus (now practicing medicine in Canada) to Ward 15. He assumes his presence was required due to his training two years earlier in interrogation techniques. At the hospital, the three men went to a small private ward. An unidentified black man, attached to an intravenous drip, was in the bed. Meyer was told that the patient had ANC connections, but that his precise role was unclear and he had to be interrogated to establish who and what he was. He said that either Basson or Erasmus injected a substance into the drip and one or the other then asked the patient various questions, working from a standard military interrogation list.

Meyer was vague about who did what, and said he could not remember what substance was used. He said the patient was fully conscious at first, but became drowsy after administration of the substance. The session lasted about an hour, but according to Meyer did not produce the desired responses, or any information of value. The next day, he returned to the hospital, with Basson and Erasmus, and the procedure was repeated, again for about an hour, and again without producing satisfactory results. None of the doctors wore surgical masks, and their faces were visible to the patient at all times.

At some point during the interrogation sessions, there was a "discussion" to the effect that the patient would "have to be sorted out" afterwards. To prevent him from identifying those involved, or telling anyone about the interrogation procedure, he would have to be "taken out" (murdered), Meyer said. He never saw or heard anything about this patient again.

Meyer said that his religious convictions made it impossible for him to reconcile himself to this type of activity, and about two months later, took his concerns and reservations to General Niel Knobel - not yet surgeon-general, but acting in that capacity in the absence of Nicol Nieuwoudt at the time. He told Gen Knobel he was not prepared to take part in such procedures, and did not want to be associated with them in future. He was then transferred to Chief of Staff Intelligence, and within months Meyer was informed that he was to be sent to the operational area. He said he believed this transfer was the direct result of telling Gen Knobel he was not prepared to go along with chemical interrogation and the consequences thereof.

During cross-examination Adv. Cilliers questioned Meyer's version of events and stated that the use of sodium pentathol was generally accepted in medical science as "a diagnostic aid in identifying/eliminating malingering, particularly in conflict situations." Meyer agreed that such substances were used in the operational area, specifically when time was of the essence in extracting information.

Cilliers said that chemical substances were used, for example, if a patient presented with respiratory distress. Before a doctor performed a tracheotomy or intubation, he would first administer pentathol to establish whether the patient was not, perhaps, a malingerer. Or if a patient thought he had been poisoned, perhaps was even showing some symptoms of poisoning, a doctor would first administer pentathol to establish if the symptoms were not, perhaps, purely psychosomatic, and so that he could question the patient about the circumstances in which the apparent poisoning might have taken place - in other words, to determine the truth of the patient's condition prior to administering treatment. Pentathol was used by doctors as a diagnostic tool, said Cilliers, and the practice was not at all strange to military doctors working in combat conditions. [Note: this is by no means an accepted medical practice. Pentathol is not a diagnostic tool and can't make the differential diagnosis between malingering and other disease. There is not any body of scientific knowledge to support it's "diagnostic" use.]

Basson formally denies ever being involved in the chemical interrogation of anyone for any but medical diagnostic reasons. He confirms that diagnosis by chemicals was generally used in combat conditions, but says chemicals were never administered to anyone for "improper" purposes.

The next witness was clinical toxicologist Gerbus Muller of Stellenbosch University, who originally testified on June 8, 2000. Muller was asked to testify about the alleged poisoning of Rev. Frank Chikane on the basis of having examined his medical records. He was also asked to review the medical records of Enoch Dlamini and Gibson Mondlane, both of whom the State believes were poisoned. Muller said that Rev Chikane's medical records indicate an acute case of organophosphate poisoning.

Cross examination was brief with Cilliers suggesting that Muller was guessing the cause of illness in the cases before him, which Muller denied.

Dr Johan Koekemoer, an organic chemist formerly employed at Delta G Scientific, was recalled next, after testifying originally on October 29, 1999. Koekemoer was asked about the delivery dates of the MDMA and said that the first batch was delivered in August 1992 and the last on January 4, 1993. Cilliers challenged these dates during cross examination.

The last witness was pharmacist Steven Beukes (original testimony October 29, 1999). During earlier cross-examination, it was put to him that when he encapsulated large quantities of an unknown substance in June 1992, Ecstasy or MDMA did not yet exist in Delta G Scientific's manufacturing repertoire. Since testifying originally, however, Beukes has found his electronic diary, and was able to put exact dates to encapsulation of the unknown substance. The diary covers the period January 1992 to January 1994, and entries were made contemporaneously.

Filled capsules were delivered on February 21 1992 (10 000), February 24 (40 000), March 2 (30 000), March 5 (30 000), March 30 and 31. On April 1, Beukes delivered 100 000 capsules. No further deliveries are recorded until September 14 to 23, 1992.

Beukes says throughout the time he rented space at Delta G Scientific, no other substance was encapsulated. The only other capsules he handled, were 540 000 already filled with ampycillin, which he simply had to repackage in larger containers. This was in July 1992.

Tuesday 27 February 2001

Prosecutor Dr Torie Pretorius informed Judge Willie Hartzenberg that he wished to lay the basis for an argument on why a 166-page transcript of the National Intelligence Agency's interview with Basson should be admitted as evidence. The defence team previously admitted that Basson was not under any duress during the interview, and agreed to it being tape-recorded.

Pretorius explained that the transcript contains "approximately 15" confessions by Basson which relate directly to some of the charges against him. The State wished these confessions to be placed on record, but given the accepted court rules governing admissibility of taped evidence, would first have to show that the transcripts were an accurate reflection of the interview, and eliminate any challenge by the defence that the tapes might have been tampered with.

To that end the prosecutor called witnesses from the National Intelligence Agency who were present during the interview, and the person who transcribed the tapes. Their testimony concurred that while the tapes were not a verbatim record of the interview, the salient points were correctly reflected in the transcript. Adv. Cilliers challenged the witnesses memories and called the veracity of the transcript into question. The witnesses who testified were Kobus Engelbrecht, Michael Kennedy, Thea du Plooy and Johan Alberts.

Wednesday 28 February 2001

State prosecutor Dr Torie Pretorius's bid for admission of the transcript of the National Intelligence Agency's three-day "debriefing" of Basson on January 17, 18 and 19, 1994, evoked harsh criticism from Judge Willie Hartzenberg.

It was clear from the evidence led on Tuesday, said the judge, that the transcript was nowhere near a 100% record of the lengthy debriefing. At best, it was a summary of the taped interviews, and if the testimony of Johan Alberts was to be believed, intended primarily for his personal consumption.

Defence counsel Jaap Cilliers stated that he was opposed to the use of the transcript and argued that he had been unable to find a legal precedent for admission of a transcript when the original tapes were not available for verification, and there was good reason for courts not allowing such evidence: the omission or insertion of a single word could change the entire complexion of what purported to be a true record of a taped conversation. Cilliers also said that he believed that Kennedy had not been truthful in his testimony.

At 3pm, in a brief but decisive ruling, Hartzenberg said the document could not be admitted as evidence, nor used by the State as a reference point while leading testimony. He said that since Kennedy claims to have such a reliable memory of the debriefing, there should be no need for him to refer to the document when testifying.

Thursday 1 March 2001

At 11.20am the State closed the evidentiary stage of its case against Basson.

The penultimate witness was Magdele Jackel, who in mid-1985, was appointed Senior Staff Officer Interrogation at Military Intelligence headquarters, where her immediate superior was Colonel Dries van Tonder. Jackel's task was twofold: interrogation of detainees/prisoners of war and training of SADF members in the art of interrogation.

Most of her experience was gained through interrogation of Swapo prisoners of war in Ovamboland, where she had regular contact, for example, with intelligence officer Dave Drew at both Ondangwa and Fort Rev. She confirms earlier testimony by Johan Theron about the interrogation room at Fort Rev being equipped with a one-way mirror.

As an instructor, she trained one group of doctors and operational medics from the Recconnaissance Unit and Special Forces in interrogation techniques. Among the students on this course was Dr Phil Meyer. [Testimony Monday February 26 on the use of chemical interrogation] Jackel knows Basson, having first met him when he delivered a lecture on one of her training courses.

Only once during her career was Jackel involved in the interrogation, in South Africa, of an ANC member. This was in 1987, by which time she was "aware" that anesthetics could be administered to detainees during interrogation sessions. The ANC man was believed to be a defector, but although Jackel and a colleague were satisfied, after interrogating him, that his change of heart was genuine, there was still suspicion in some quarters that he was masquerading as a defector in order to infiltrate the SADF as a spy.

Jackel said she took her dilemma to Basson, a brigadier at the time. She saw him at the SAMS training college in Voortrekkerhoogte, and asked if he could help her determine once and for all whether the man was a genuine defector or not, by administering an anaesthetic during interrogation. Basson told her this could be done - but that Jackel should realize and be aware that once the procedure had been applied, the man "would have to say goodbye" (groet). There was no question in Jackel's mind that what he meant, was that the man would have to be killed.

In cross examination Adv. Cilliers expressed astonishment that she had never seen fit to consult the "SADF expert" when interrogating people. Had she done so, she would have known, as Nieuwoudt testified, that there was "no such thing" as effective chemical interrogation, and this testimony confirmed Cilliers' instructions from Basson. Jackel insisted that chemical interrogation did exist and was used, and that she was aware of this even while working in Ovamboland.

Adv. Cilliers said that Basson has no memory of any discussion with Jackel on chemical interrogation, says Cilliers, but if she had ever asked him about it, he would have told her "there is no such thing".

The last witness called by the State was Michael Kennedy, making his third appearance in the stand.

He was first asked if Basson had ever approached NIA about alleged threats to his life. Kennedy said that in December 1996 Basson had done so and as a result, a surveillance team was assigned to watch Basson and members of his family for their own safety.

In August 1983, as deputy counter-espionage section chief, Kennedy was a member of the Counter-Intelligence Co-ordinating Committee, on which senior officers from Military Intelligence and the SA Police served. The committee was informed that what was believed to be a deep cover ANC spy had infiltrated the Zanza Building, where all cross-border SADF operations were planned. The name of the suspect was not known, and an intensive joint investigation was launched to identify the spy. It took several months before the spy was identified as Roland Hunter.

During the 1994 debriefing of Basson, when the name "Hunter" came up, alarm bells went off in Kennedy's head, both because he had been involved in the earlier investigation, and because the method of proposed elimination described (by Basson) was familiar to Kennedy. During the early 1980s, he had been involved in an investigation into the death of another SADF member, Garth Bailey, whom Kennedy suspected had been killed with snake venom, though he was never able to prove this.

Kennedy said Basson told NIA that he had been required/instructed to "be involved in" the elimination of Hunter, and that the plan was for Hunter to be taken to the Caprivi and killed with Mamba venom in such a way that it would look like he had died from snakebite.

Another matter which Kennedy remembers being discussed during the debriefing, is the dumping of chemicals in the sea. Kennedy had prior information that Basson had been involved in the dumping of chemicals in the Atlantic Ocean, from an aircraft operating out of Air Force Base Ysterplaat. During the debriefing, Basson told NIA the aircraft had actually taken off from Air Force Base Waterkloof, and that the chemicals were dumped in the Indian Ocean.

A matter of particular importance to Kennedy was the question of human experimentation, as he was seeking information about the CBW programme and alleged abuses. Basson told NIA that he and two or three other people had been the subject of human experimentation during Project Coast.

Kennedy said that several times during the interviews the NIA agents asked Basson if he had not realised that he had been involved in murder. His response was the same throughout: "They" were all military targets, and therefore, "it was not murder".

In cross-examination, Cilliers again accused Kennedy of being dishonest. While Kennedy had used the words "required/instructed" regarding the proposed elimination of Hunter, Cilliers said it was surely possible that the actual words used by Basson could have been that he "had knowledge of" such a proposal. Basson denies ever having received any instructions to eliminate anyone. He also denies ever telling Kennedy otherwise.

Human experimentation had taken place as part of Project Coast, said Cilliers. The effects of the new generation teargas, CR, had to be tested, and members of the police task force were often used for this purpose, along with members of 7 Medical Battalion and Basson himself. There was thus nothing sinister about Basson mentioning human experimentation during the debriefing.

Proceedings ended with Cilliers making admissions in respect of more bank accounts - in South Africa, for companies such as Blowing Rock Consolidated Investments, Wisdom Erf 129 "etc", and the Blackdale account in Luxembourg. The defence also admits that NBC suits manufactured in terms of the SADF contract carried consecutive personal identification numbers, along with the year of manufacture - for example, the last suit off the production line on December 31, 1987, might have been numbered 766/87, with the first one off the line on January 1, 1988, being numbered 767/88. An admission was also made that one Smith, a storeman at Delta G Scientific from 1985 to 1993, had checked the company's records, but found no entries for Product M or Quinazoline, but that it was agreed by all parties in court that there were deficiencies in Delta G's record-keeping.

The defence also admitted that the shareholdings of companies as reflected in forensic auditor Hennie Bruwer's report are correct according to the share registers and company records, but this does not mean the defence admits that the documents reflect the true position.

The defence also admitted that, had he been called to testify, former Office for Serious Economic Offences director Jan Swanepoel would have said a controlled and methodical system was applied when the contents of Basson's trunks were documented. The defence disputed this, however, in light of Etienne Lamprechts having conceded that the situation was actually "chaotic" when the documents were unpacked.

After handing in a 78-page list of all exhibits filed with the court, senior prosecutor Anton Ackerman said despite the fact that he had thought "this day would never come", the State rested its case.

By agreement, the court adjourned until Wednesday, March 14, when Cilliers will present the first of a series of legal arguments for dismissal of charges against Basson. The first argument will cover only the drug charges - 25, 26, 27, 28, 29 and 30.

This report has been prepared by Chandré Gould and Marlene Burger. Chandré  Gould is a research associate at the Centre for Conflict Resolution working on the Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. Marlene Burger is monitoring the trial  as part of the CCR Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. The Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project is funded by the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Norwegian Government.

Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: [email protected]