Trial Report: Twenty-Five

This report covers the period Friday 11 August to Thursday 17 August, 2000

Friday, 11 August 2000

Wally Van Heerden of the Auditor-General's office continued to give evidence that he had started on Thursday 10 August. During questioning by the prosecutor, it emerged that the National Intelligence Agency had been investigating Basson and Project Coast for some time prior to the Office for Serious Economic Offences (OSEO) investigation.

One of the key questions emerging from the OSEO investigation was how the auditor, Petro Theron had failed to pick up any irregularities during the years he was the auditor. According to Van Heerden, and despite Theron's testimony to the contrary, Theron did serve as the Project Coast auditor from November 1987.

Van Heerden said that when Basson was forced to take early pension in December 1992, after the Steyn Commission report he was also under investigation by Military Intelligence in relation to possible fraudulent activities .

According to Van Heerden, neither he nor the Auditor General's office was ever informed that Basson was a signatory to the various bank accounts uncovered by the forensic audit (conducted by Hennie Bruwer), nor that he had an interest in any of the Wisdom/WPW companies mentioned in the indictment. If Project Coast funds were channelled through these bank accounts, and even if there were reasons why the project managers did not see fit to inform auditor Theron about them, the Auditor General's office should have been fully apprised. The only way the Auditor General's office could have determined that no one connected to the project was on the receiving end of financial gain, was if they had been in possession of all information. The State does not enter into contracts with its own employees, and there was a non-negotiable onus on Basson to declare all and any interests he had in companies doing business with Project Coast. He had not done so, even when specifically questioned during the OSEO probe.

From a project security point of view, Van Heerden said it was strange that foreign bank accounts for the WPW/Wisdom group had been opened and run by Basson using his own identity and address. The whole point of using secret accounts was to hide the military links, and Van Heerden finds it incomprehensible that Basson, for example, bought two apartments in Brussels, and a King Air aircraft, using his own identity.

In cases where funds originally earmarked for one purpose were diverted and used for another, due to prevailing circumstances, it was incumbent on the project officer to fully inform the auditor and/or Auditor-General of these facts. This applies to the peptide synthesizer, funds used to buy DNA probes and Thymus peptide instead, and especially to the use of project funds as security for a loan to buy the Jetstar.

In cross-examination, Adv. Cilliers put it to Van Heerden that once project funds had been paid to the supplier/agent, it was of absolutely no concern to the auditors what happened to the funds thereafter. If a supplier wished to record in his company's books that payment for goods had actually been for purchase of share capital, in order to disguise his help to the project, and even if Basson, as was his mandate, assisted in creating such a cover story, supported by documentation, this had nothing at all to do with the auditors. The only question to be asked was: Did Project Coast receive what was paid for? Van Heerden differed, saying the structure of payments also fell within the audit ambits.

The argument went back and forth until Judge Willie Hartzenberg intervened, putting it to Van Heerden that the auditors would only have had reason to probe the flow of funds if goods were not received, and that clearly, if they were, the further disbursement of project funds paid to a supplier/agent could not possibly be of any interest, and that in that scenario, any obligation on Basson to disclose "assistance" in facilitating the flow of funds, would fall away. Cilliers agreed saying that furthermore, Basson had merely acted in accordance with his mandated cover-story, namely that he was a successful international businessman.

Monday, 14 August 2000

Cross-examination of Wally van Heerden continued. Adv. Cilliers put it to Van Heerden that it was not until 1990 that authorisation of front company bank accounts had to be obtained annually from the Minister of Defence. Van Heerden disputed that saying that amended regulations issued in 1992 required authorisation by the Treasury, but up to that time, the Defence Minister was the responsible person. He rejected the suggestion by Cilliers that Project Coast was exempt from such regulations, since there is no reason why Coast alone should have had special consideration, there is nothing on record to this effect. Cilliers ended the session with a formal denial by Basson of any fraud being perpetrated or any theft of Project Coast funds.

In re-examination, Anton Ackerman challenged Cilliers' claim that the Auditor-General should have had no interest in the use of project funds once they had been paid to the supplier/agent, pointing out that in numerous cases, the funds had moved from the alleged middle-man to companies and bank accounts within the WPW/Wisdom group, in which Basson had both a controlling interest and signing powers, and that it was Basson, as shown in documents already filed with the court, who then determined how the money was to be used. Van Heerden said this would not only have been irregular, but should have been disclosed by Basson during audits.

The next witness was Dr Hennie Jordaan, who holds a Ph D in medicinal chemistry from New York State University. Jordaan's testimony focussed on the peptide synthesizer and work done at Delta G in that regard. Jordaan said he doubted that Basson, himself, had the skills to synthesize peptides despite him having a high regard for Basson as a doctor. Jordaan disputed Basson's claims that a sophisticated peptide synthesizer was needed for the synthesis of mood changing peptides, which is alleged to have cost the state R2million. Jordaan said the most sophisticated machinery would have cost a quarter of that amount. He also said that peptide synthesizers were freely available to South Africa, despite sanctions, and that there would have been no reason to acquire one clandestinely.

In relation to the purchase of 500g of Thymus, Jordaan said it was a huge amount of the peptide to have been purchased, saying such an amount would only be bought for large scale immunization. However, he could see no reason for this to have been used in a large scale immunization programme, and said it was unsuitable as a chemical warfare agent. In addition, he said that Delta G would have been able to synthesize that amount of Thymus within two months had it been required.

Jordaan said that the DNA and RNA probes,. which Basson and his defence counsel claim were to be used to calibrate the peptide synthesizer, could not have been used for this purpose and if they had been needed for research into brain manipulation, a multi-disciplinary team of scientists would have been necessary. One person alone could not possibly conduct such research. At the very least, the team would have to include a chemist, bio-chemist, molecular pharmacologist, various physiologists and clinicians.

Tuesday, 15 August 2000

Jordaan continued giving evidence. He said that he had been involved in the development of a unique process of synthesizing PMK, from which MDMA (Ecstasy) was made. The development was not a success and the work was handed over to Dr. Johan Koekemoer to continue.

Jordaan said he was unaware of the large scale manufacture of BZ at Delta G although he was aware of the synthesis of small amounts of the agent. In Jordaan's view, weaponisation of Ecstasy would have been futile, since it is a salt and would not disperse freely when combined with the high explosives needed as a propellant. As for weaponisation of Ecstasy in 120mm mortar bombs, Jordaan has "never even seen a mortar".

Regarding the alleged sale of technology for PARA-CHLORO-ORTHO-CRESOL (PCOC) in February 1993 for �500 000 paid to Blowing Rock Controlling Investments in two equal cash installments of �250 000 by Dr David Chu, Jordaan says if the deal involved a substance supposedly developed at Delta G, he can confirm that they did look at a process to manufacture PCOC, a chlorination product made from Phenol, a by-product of the oil-from-coal process perfected by Sasol. PCOC is a dual purpose product: an antiseptic not unlike Dettol but which is no longer widely used, and a broad leaf weed-killer, MPCA, which has also fallen out of favour and is now produced only on a small scale in South Africa. The product is probably at least 100 years old, said Jordaan, and Delta G's research, based on readily available literature, was aimed at finding a way to manufacture the active ingredient of Dettol. However, it was not a cost effective exercise and the project was abandoned.

Cross-examination of Jordaan will take place on Wednesday morning.

The next witness was Christoffel Bezuidenhout, commercial and marketing manager since 1983 with Fuchs Electronics, manufacturer in South Africa of proximity fuses.

Bezuidenhout told the court that, in the case of mortars, electronic proximity fuses determine the height above ground at which detonation occurs. This is pre-programmed, and the most effective height above ground is 3-4 metres. Bezuidenhout rejected the claim, put to the court by defence counsel, that the 120mm mortars loaded with CR and supplied to Unita, were fitted with foreign-bought proximity fuses that caused detonation 250m above ground. Firstly, if the bombs served only as a carrier, and did not contain high explosives, the proximity fuse accelerator would have to be removed - not only an extremely costly exercise, but one which would seriously hamper the target accuracy of the projectile. More importantly, no proximity fuse could detonate at a height of 250m above ground. The absolute maximum height is 60m, and then the fuses have to be specially made. They cannot merely be modified.

Bezuidenhout said that until 1992, Armscor was Fuchs' biggest client in respect of proximity and timer fuses. All contracts were classified "confidential" rather than secret or top secret. As far as price is concerned, as recently as 1996/97, Fuchs supplied the SANDF, via Armscor, with 3 229 proximity fuses at a cost of R3,1-million. The defence, has previously claimed that R3,8-m of the proceeds from the sale of protective suits was spent on buying proximity fuses for Unita 10 years ago.

Cross-examination by Adv. Tokkie van Zyl began by establishing that while Bezuidenhout is an expert on fuses for conventional weapons, he has little or no knowledge of chemical weapons. About 95% of business currently conducted by Fuchs is in the export market, which it entered in the late 1980s via Armscor. At that time, the inability to trace product was an important factor, due to sanctions, and a Fuchs-made proximity fuse could be traced by a numbered code stamped into the product. Thus, according to Van Zyl, if the SADF was supplying weapons to Unita but did not want the South African origin to be detected, it would have been better not to purchase proximity fuses locally.

Wednesday, 16 August 2000

The cross-examination of Hennie Jordaan began. Adv. Cilliers put it to Jordaan that he was not aware of Basson's abilities in the field of chemistry, and said that Jordaan did not know of the SADF's chemical and biological warfare programme despite having worked at Delta G Scientific. Jordaan disputed the latter claim saying that he was aware of all the military projects conducted at Delta G as they had been the subject of discussions amongst scientists at the facility. With regard to Basson's abilities, Cilliers cited Basson's M Sc thesis entitled "Aspects of the Human Immune Response to Tripolyzone Species" as evidence that Basson did have the ability to synthesize chemicals. Jordaan drew attention to the fact that this the subject of a biological project, not a chemical one. He added that an M Sc in awarded for the science, not for chemistry.

With regard to CR, although Jordaan was involved in the initial work relating to the chemistry of the agent, he was not involved in the research into weaponization of CR. Cilliers claimed that there was a separate facility where pyrolytic tests were done. Cilliers also drew attention to the fact that three versions of CR were developed: a quick-acting version, a delayed-action version and one which caused excessive nausea but less damage to the eyes, nose and mouth. Jordaan confirmed this.

Cilliers asked Jordaan if he was aware that by mixing nerve gas with microlised powder in aerosols, the toxin is inhaled, causing terrible damage to the internal organs of victims, while leaving little or no trace externally, in the form of burns. He said that when Iraq began using this method, the international community initially thought Baghdad had created a new chemical weapon or substance, but then they realised it was just a new delivery system. According to Cilliers, Dr Gerald Bull worked on - and helped - Basson in this regard. Cilliers drew on this example to support his contention that alternative facilities existed where research was done on delivery methods for the chemical warfare agents produced. Indeed, regarding Jordaan's previously expressed opinion that MDMA, a salt, would not bond successfully with high explosives in weaponised form, Cilliers said a method was devised by which the substances bonded on detonation.

Cross -examination turned to the subject of the peptide synthesizer. Cilliers argued that while work of the sophistication allegedly conducted by Basson may not have been reported on in the scientific literature of the early 1990s, this did not mean that research of this kind was not taking place. He also said that peptide synthesizer's of the sophistication of that housed at the Special Forces headquarters may have been available at the time, but not on the open market.

The next witness was Corrie Ferreira, an Army colonel who has been the Defence Force's technical ammunition officer for the past 22 years and holds qualifications in explosives technology. Ferreira describes himself as an expert on the carrier shells used for CR and pyrotechnics and has unrestricted access to all Defence Force ammunition depots serving the Army, Air Force and Navy.

Ferreira told the court that electronic proximity fuses are not used on CR, smoke or tracer shells, since a high explosive booster is required for proximity detonation and this totally destroys and renders ineffective the contents of the shell.

According to Ferreira, not a single 155mm projectile loaded with CR was ever issued to any SADF unit, and all 1 373 were "destroyed" by being emptied of CR and re-loaded with smoke. Ammunition supplied to Unita by the SADF was dispatched via Military Intelligence, which obtained it direct from Armscor's factories or via the various SADF ammunition depots in a project named Operation Spyker. He said that records of all supplies to Unita now repose in the military archives, there is no record of a single 120mm mortar with proximity fuse being issued to Unita at any time. As part of Project Mouli, the need to fill 120mm mortars with CR was identified, he said, and R65 000 was budgeted for the 1986/87 and 1987/88 financial years to empty 120mm shells for this purpose, with R16 000 per year being budgeted for the same purpose in 1988/89, 1989/90 and 1990/91.

Records of 91 Ammunition Depot at Naboomspruit show that in 1996, 1 002 81mm mortars filled with CR were issued to Special Forces before all other CR-projectiles in the SADF arsenals were destroyed. Ferreira was unable to find any further records of the issue to Special Forces or the destruction of 81mm CR mortars. His records show that 11 966 hand grenades filled with CR were delivered by Swartklip to 91 Ammunition Depot, from where they were issued to various SADF units, including the Logistics wing of SAMS, which was responsible for training combat troops in the use of the grenades. The SADF still has 987 of these CR grenades in stock, along with 2 987 rifle grenades loaded with CR. In addition, about 20 blue drums containing 30kg each of unweaponised CR are still to be found at 91 Ammunition Depot, Naboomspruit.

During Angolan operations Modular (November 25 to December 12 1987), Hooper (December 13 1987 to March 8 1988) and Packer (launched March 8, 1988) Ferreira was in charge of destruction of all unserviceable and confiscated ammunition brought to Rundu and Oshakati from Angola, as well as at Cubelai in Angola. Not a single chemical weapon was destroyed nor, to his knowledge, was a single one recovered from enemy forces during the ongoing campaigns. The aim of Modular was to halt the advance of Fapla at the Lomba River, Hooper involved the final battle of Cuito Cuanavale and Packer was the start of withdrawal of all South African troops from Angola. Ferreira never saw a single protective CBW garment during the three operations. In fact, an NBC suit shown to him by the prosecution on the day he came to court, was his first physical sighting of such garment.

During cross-examination, Cilliers cited Floris Laubscher's testimony about an urgent request from Basson for CR projectiles (81mm mortars) which had to be delivered directly to a waiting aircraft at Ysterplaat. Since the SADF records produced by Ferreira did not reflect this and other similar consignments, Cilliers contended that not all the CR projectiles produced had found their way through official SADF channels. Ferreira, disputed this saying he was fully aware of the Ysterplaat deliveries - on one occasion, 216 mortars were supplied and on another, 168.

The court adjourned until Monday 21 August to allow the prosecutor time to consult with Bernard Zimmer who will appear as the next witness.

This report has been prepared by Chandr� Gould and Marlene Burger. Chandr� Gould is a research associate at the Centre for Conflict Resolution working on the Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. Marlene Burger is monitoring the trial as part of the CCR Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project. The Chemical and Biological Warfare Research Project is funded by the Ford Foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and the Norwegian Government.

Centre for Conflict Resolution, UCT, Private Bag, Rondebosch, 7701, South Africa Tel: (27) 21-4222512 Fax: (27) 21-4222622 Email: [email protected]