Between May 1921 and November 1922, the Weimar government, now headed by Josef Wirth with the talented Walther Rathenau as Minister of Reconstruction and Foreign Affairs, discussed the appropriate response to the ultimatum. Most politicians supported Wirth in his statement:

The goal of our entire policy must be the dismantling of the London Ultimatum. It would therefore be a mistake if, by initiating a seizure of real values [enacting property levies] at this moment, we were to declare the Ultimatum to be 80 per cent possible.²⁰

ruin trade with England and America, so that the creditors themselves will come to us to require modification.²¹

The new French Prime Minister, Raymond Poincar�, who succeeded the indulgent Aristide Briand, suspected German evasion of the Ultimatum. He was a conservative nationalist who served as the chairman of the Reparation Commission until February 1920. Poincar� was convinced that the Germans “had intentionally devalued the mark and were going bankrupt on purpose.”²² His indignation was exacerbated when the Russo-German Treaty of Rapallo was contracted on April 16, 1922 between Rathenau and G. V. Chicherin, which provided mutual cancellation of all pre-war debts, war claims, and potential reparations accorded by Article 116 of the Versailles Treaty. Both nations regarded themselves, and were perceived, to an extent, by the rest of Europe, as pariahs, and this shared quality was instrumental in the development of sociopolitical bonds and cooperation. Well aware of Germany's awkward position in respect to France, an anti-Semitic youth group assassinated Rathenau on June 24, 1922.

In November 1922, Wirth, failing to meet reparations and stabilize the mark, resigned. He was succeeded by a right-wing government mainly composed of business executives, headed by Wilhelm Cuno. The self-assured businessman found the administration of the Weimar government much more tedious than he had expected, and by January 1923, 90% of annual expenditure was still paid by floating debt.

Footnotes
20     A. von Specht, Politische und wirtschaftliche Hintergr�nde der deutschen Inflation, 1918-1923, Frank am Maim, 1982, p. 75, cited in cited in Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I, Basic Books, New York � 1999, p. 411
21     Viscount D'Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace, 2 vols., London, 1929, vol. I, p. 193f, cited in Niall Ferguson, The Pity of War: Explaining World War I, Basic Books, New York � 1999, p. 398
22     Erich Eyck, A History of the Weimar Republic: From the Collapse of the Empire to Hindenburg's Election, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA � 1967, p. 230.

       

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