| Day 14 continued... |
| After dinner, we convene for a seminar with David Taub of the Foreign Ministry. When the introductions have been made, Mr. Taub says, �Smashing,� and launches into his speech. The following are my notes from Mr. Taub�s presentation, which served as the other side of the coin to what we had heard the night before at the Rapprochement Center. There is a long history of peace efforts in the area: in 1948, the Declaration of Israel�s Independence called for all nations to make peace. The end of the Six Day War in 1967 renewed the call. In 1977 Prime Minister Menachem Begin and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat forge an Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty; later, the Camp David Accords expand on that attempt in an effort to include the entire area. In the 1980�s, however, prospects for peace looked bleak. The 1990�s saw the decline of the Soviet Union as well as the Gulf War, which factors contributed to a split in the Arab world between those willing to form alliances with western nations and those unwilling to do so. The rise of extremist Islamic forces caused others to seek moderation. In October 1991 the Malta Peace Conference was held, in which Israel sat with its Arab neighbors first to hammer out a multi-lateral peace process to address regional issues, and second, on a bi-lateral level, Israel met face to face with each of its neighbors individually to resolve problems from the past. The parties with which Israel met were Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians. The meeting with the Egyptians worked out in a manner satisfactory to both sides. The meeting with Jordan fared relatively well; they actually made the first overtures towards peace, but, Mr. Taub explained, Hussein walks a fine line�there is a delicate internal situation�so he wasn�t in a position to officially make peace until he saw real progress. This happened in 1994, and an agreement was signed between the two nations. Twelve or thirteen rounds of talks were held with the Syrians. Israel was not willing to withdraw from the Golan Heights without proof of peace; Syria was not willing to talk about peace until Israel fully withdrew from the Golan Heights. The peace process is still stymied, for the Syrians now say they will not negotiate until Israel hands over what the former prime minister hinted at�a very generous withdrawal. Since this is unlikely in the foreseeable future, so are peace terms Syria. Israel�s relations with Lebanon, Mr. Taub told us, are surprisingly friendly. There are no territorial disputes; the problem stems from the fact that Israel sees Lebanon as a puppet of Syria. There is currently an Israeli security presence in a security zone in southern Lebanon; it is not occupational, and is in place only to guard northern Israeli towns from terrorist attacks. This is a very difficult situation which has resulted in many casualties, and Syria is unwilling to loosen its influence on Lebanon. The 1991 negotiations with the Palestinians did not at first directly involve the PLO, then regarded as terrorists, but rather with representatives of the PLO. In 1993 Rabin opened up secret negotiations with the PLO, and in September of 1993 the Oslo (I) Accords mapped out a five-year plan for peace. An exchange of letters ensued between Yasar Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin in which Arafat recognized the right of Israel to exist and renounced terrorism. He changed the PLO charter and maintained that the destiny of the Palestinians would be resolved by negotiation rather than force. In return Rabin recognized the PLO as a legitimate entity. The issues that needed to be ironed out fell roughly into two categories: permanent status issues and temporary issues. The Israelis and Palestinians decided not to tackle the deal breaking issues right away, but to start with smaller matters and work their way up towards a resolution of problems surrounding the more problematic matter of Jewish settlements, borders and refugees. The five-year plan was to reach its conclusion on 4 May 1999. In the interim, Israelis and Palestinians settled on a test case of Palestinian self-rule of Gaza and parts of the West Bank. Accordingly, these areas were transferred to Palestinian authority self-rule in 1994. An interim agreement (Oslo II) was negotiated to arrange democratic elections in Gaza and the West Bank, and a Palestinian Council was elected to administer their self-ruled territories. Oslo II established spheres of Palestinian civilian authority as well as economic and legal relations between Israel and the Palestinians. It also set out security provisions: before the Palestinian elections of 1996, Israel would pull back some of its forces, and Gaza and the West Bank were divided in to A, B and C areas. A areas were completely under Palestinian control; B areas included some 450 smaller Palestinian villages where the civilians and some of the police force were Palestinian, but terrorism was still policed by Israeli forces. C areas were areas where only half of the population was Palestinian. In C areas, some of the civil responsibilities were administered by Palestinian authorities, but all security was administered by the Israelis. According to the plan, the divided areas were to undergo redevelopment, and the A and B areas were to increase while the C areas were to decrease in size until the point where the fate of what was left of the C areas (a few Jewish settlements and military locations) could be determined by negotiations. Things didn�t work out quite according to plan, however, and each side accused the other of outstanding obligations. Israel was to release some Palestinian prisoners it had arrested as terrorists, and was to continue redeployment of troops, but did not do so to the satisfaction of the Palestinians. The Palestinians were to officially and effectively change their charter and fight terrorist activities, but did not do so to the satisfaction of the Israelis. For over a year, little progress was made, and Israel refused to transfer more land when it felt the land would be used as a refuge for terrorists. |
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