SECTION 2(a)

2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms:

(a) freedom of conscience and religion;

CHARTER DECISIONS

The essence of the concept of freedom of religion is the right to entertain such religious beliefs as a person chooses, the right to declare religious beliefs openly and without fear of hindrance or reprisal, and the right to manifest religious belief by worship and practice or by teaching and dissemination. But the concept means more than that. Freedom in a broad sense embraces both the absence of coercion and constraint, and the right to manifest beliefs and practices. Freedom means that, subject to certain necessary limitations, no one is to be forced to act in a way contrary to his beliefs or his conscience. The Charter safeguards religious minorities from the threat of the "tyranny of the majority". To the extent that it binds all to a sectarian Christian ideal, the Lord's Day Act works a form of coercion inimical to the spirit of the Charter and the dignity of all non-Christians. In proclaiming the standards of the Christian faith, the Act creates a climate hostile to, and gives the appearance of discrimination against, non-Christian Canadians. It takes religious values rooted in Christian morality and, using the force of the state, translates them into a positive law binding on believers and non-believers alike: R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.

To state that any legislation which has an effect on religion, no matter how minimal, violates the religious guarantee "would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature" (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599). It is arguable that under our Constitution this kind of concern should be dealt with under s.1, but as Wilson, J. stated in Operation Dismantle, "the rights under the Charter not being absolute, their content or scope must be discerned quite apart from any limitation sought to be imposed upon them by the government under s.1". Not every effect of legislation on religious beliefs or practices is offensive to the constitutional guarantee. Section 2(a) does not require the legislature to refrain from imposing any burdens on the practice of religion. Legislative or administrative action whose effect on religion is trivial or insubstantial is not a breach of freedom of religion. This conclusion necessarily follows from the adoption of an effects-based approach to the Charter: Jones v. R., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284.

As noted in Big M Drug Mart, supra, "freedom" can primarily be characterized by the absence of coercion or constraint. It matters not whether a coercive burden is direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, foreseeable or unforeseeable. All coercive burdens on the exercise of religious beliefs are potentially within the ambit of s.2(a). This does not mean that every burden on religious practices is offensive to the guarantee. Section 2(a) does not require the legislatures to eliminate every miniscule state-imposed cost associated with the practice of religion. The purpose of s.2(a) is to ensure that society does not interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one's conduct and practices. The Constitution shelters individuals and groups only to the extent that religious beliefs or conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened. Legislative or administrative action which increases the cost of practising or otherwise manifesting religious beliefs is not prohibited if the burden is trivial or insubstantial. Further, the freedom from conformity to religious dogma is governed by somewhat different considerations than the freedom to manifest one's own religious beliefs. Religious freedom is inevitably abridged by legislation which has the effect of impeding conduct integral to the practice of a person's religion. But legislation with a secular inspiration does not abridge the freedom from conformity to religious dogma merely because statutory provisions coincide with the tenets of a religion. The possibility should be left open, however, that such legislation might limit the freedom of conscience and religion of persons whose conduct is governed by an intention to express or manifest his or her non-conformity with religious doctrine: Edwards Books and Art Limited et al. v. R., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713.

A prima facie privilege for religious communications would constitute an exception to the general principle that all relevant evidence is admissible. Unless it can be said that the policy reasons to support a class privilege for religious communications are as compelling as the policy reasons which underlay the class privilege for solicitor-client communications, there is no basis for departing from the fundamental "first principle" that all relevant evidence is admissible until proven otherwise. The prima facie protection for solicitor-client communications is based on the fact that the relationship in the communications between solicitor and client are essential to the effective operation of the legal system. Such communications are inextricably linked with the very system which desires the disclosure of the communication. Religious communications, notwithstanding their social importance, are not inextricably linked with the justice system in the way that solicitor-client communications surely are. While the value of freedom of religion will become significant in particular cases, this Court cannot agree that this value must necessarily be recognized in the form of a prima facie privilege in order to give full effect to the Charter guarantee. The extent (if any) to which disclosure of communications will infringe on a individual's freedom of religion will depend on the particular circumstances involved, for example: the nature of the communication, the purpose for which it was made, the manner in which it was made, and the parties to the communications. In Church of Scientology, infra, the Ontario Court of Appeal recognized the existence of a "priest and penitent" privilege determined on a case by case basis, having regard to the four "Wigmore" criteria. This approach is consistent with a principled approach to the question which properly takes into account the particular circumstances of each case. This is not to say that the Wigmore criteria are now "carved in stone", but rather that these considerations provide a general framework within which policy considerations and the requirements of fact-finding can be weighed and balanced on the basis of their relative importance in the particular case before the court. Nor does this preclude the identification of a new class on a principled basis. In applying the Wigmore criteria to particular cases, both s. 2(a) and s. 27 of the Charter must be kept in mind. This means that the case by case analysis must begin with a "non-denominational" approach. The fact that the communications were not made to an ordained priest or minister or that they did not constitute a formal confession will not bar the possibility of the communications' being excluded. All of the relevant circumstances must be considered and the Wigmore criteria applied in a manner which is sensitive to the fact of Canada's multicultural heritage. This will be most important at the second and third stages of the Wigmore inquiry. The communications in this case do not even satisfy the first requirement of the Wigmore test, namely, that they originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. Without this expectation of confidentiality, the raison d'�tre of the privilege is missing. The Court of Appeal accurately described these communications as being made more to relieve the accused's emotional stress than for a religious or spiritual purpose. This view is based on the parties' statements and behaviour in relation to the communication and not on the lack of a formal practice of "confession" in the particular Church. While the existence of a formal practice of "confession" may well be a strong indication that the parties expected the communication to be confidential, the lack of such a formal practice is not, in and of itself, determinative: R. v. Gruenke, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 263.

Freedom of religion is inherently limited by a number of considerations, including the rights and freedoms of others. While parents are free to engage in religious practices themselves, those activities may be curtailed where they interfere with the best interests of the child without thereby infringing the parent's religious freedoms. There is no dispute in the case law as regards this principle, since even where the religious rights of the non-custodial parent in access disputes have been recognized, courts have nonetheless imposed conditions on their exercise where warranted by the interests of the child: Young v. Young, [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3.

In this case, the appellants argued that the Ontario Child Welfare Act, which deprives them of the right to refuse medical treatment for their infant on religious grounds, violates their freedom of religion guaranteed by s. 2(a) of the Charter. Like the other provisions of the Charter, s. 2(a) must be given a liberal interpretation with a view to satisfying its purpose. In R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, I observed that freedom of religion encompassed the right of parents to educate their children according to their religious beliefs. In P. (D.) v. S. (C.), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 141, a case involving a custody dispute in which one of the parents was a Jehovah’s Witness, L’Heureux-Dub� J. stated that custody rights included the right to decide the child’s religious education. It seems to me that the right of parents to rear their children according to their religious beliefs, including that of choosing medical and other treatments, is an equally fundamental aspect of freedom of religion. A simple reading of the Act makes it clear that its purpose is nothing more or less than the protection of children. But if the purpose of the Act does not infringe on the freedom of religion of the appellants, the same cannot be said of its effects. The legislative scheme implemented by the Act, which culminates in a wardship order depriving the parents of the custody of their child, has denied them the right to choose medical treatment for their infant according to their religious beliefs. However, as the Court of Appeal noted, freedom of religion is not absolute. While it is difficult to conceive of any limitations on religious beliefs, the same cannot be said of religious practices, notably when they impact on the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. A more difficult issue is whether the freedom of religion of the appellants is intrinsically limited by the very reasons underlying the state’s intervention, namely the protection of the health and well-being of the child, or whether further analysis should be carried out under s. 1 of the Charter. This Court has consistently refrained from formulating internal limits to the scope of freedom of religion in cases where the constitutionality of a legislative scheme was raised; it rather opted to balance the competing rights under s. 1 of the Charter. It appears sounder to leave to the state the burden of justifying the restrictions it has chosen. Any ambiguity or hesitation should be resolved in favour of individual rights. Not only is this consistent with the broad and liberal interpretation of rights favoured by this Court, but s. 1 is a much more flexible tool with which to balance competing rights than s. 2(a). This is not to say that an elaborate examination of the criteria established in R. v. Oakes, supra, will always be necessary. The effect on religious beliefs will often be so insubstantial, having regard to the nature of the legislation that Charter concerns will obviously be overriden. But in this case, it cannot be maintained that the effect on the rights of the appellants was of a minor character: B.(R.) v. Children’s Aid Society, [1995] 1 S.C.R. 315.

In this case, the respondent submits that the Human Rights Act is being used as a sword to punish individuals for expressing their discriminating religious beliefs. He maintains that "[a]ll of the invective and hyperbole about anti-Semitism is really a smoke screen for imposing an officially sanctioned religious belief on society as a whole which is not the function of courts or Human Rights Tribunals in a free society". The respondent's freedom of religion is manifested in his writings, statements and publications. These, he argues, constitute "thoroughly honest religious statement[s]", and adds that it is not the role of this Court to decide what any particular religion believes. I agree with his statement about the role of the Court. This Court has affirmed that freedom of religion ensures that every individual must be free to hold and to manifest without State interference those beliefs and opinions dictated by one's conscience. This freedom is not unlimited, however, and is restricted by the right of others to hold and to manifest beliefs and opinions of their own, and to be free from injury from the exercise of the freedom of religion of others. This said, a broad interpretation of the right has been preferred, leaving competing rights to be reconciled under the s. 1 analysis elaborated in R. v. Oakes. This approach was adopted by the majority in B. (R.) v. Children's Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto which refused to formulate internal limits to the scope of freedom of religion. The important thing is that the competing values of a free and democratic society have to be adequately weighted in the appropriate context. I need not further explore when or under what circumstances a more peremptory process may be justifiable. I refer to Dickson C.J.'s remarks in Keegstra that while it is not logically necessary to rule out internal limits within s. 2 it is analytically practical to do so. That approach seems to me compelling in the present case where the respondent's claim is to a serious infringement of his rights of expression and of religion in a context requiring a detailed contextual analysis. In these circumstances, there can be no doubt that the detailed s. 1 analytical approach developed by this Court provides a more practical and comprehensive mechanism, involving review of a whole range of factors for the assessment of competing interests and the imposition of restrictions upon individual rights and freedoms: Ross v. New Brunswick School District No. 15, [ 1996] 1 S.C.R. 825.

Any analysis of denominational school rights must take as its starting point the guarantees contained in s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867. If the rights claimed are not found in this subsection, I fail to see how other sections of the Constitution, in particular s. 2(a) of the Charter, can be used to enlarge upon s. 93's constitutionally blessed scheme for public funding of denominational schools. Section 93 is a comprehensive code with respect to denominational school rights. As a result, s. 2(a) of the Charter cannot be used to enlarge this comprehensive code. Given that the appellants cannot bring themselves within the terms of s. 93's guarantees, they have no claim to public funding for their schools. To emphasize, in Ontario, s. 93(1) entrenches certain rights with respect to public funding of religious education. However, these rights are limited to those which were enjoyed at the time of Confederation. To decide otherwise by accepting the appellants' claim that s. 2(a) requires public funding of their religious schools would be to hold one section of the Constitution violative of another - a result which Reference re Bill 30 tells us to avoid: Adler v. Ontario, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609.

Security and administrative considerations at a correctional facility may militate against an unrestricted right of an inmate to see a clergyman whenever he wishes. People of the cloth are becoming a rare commodity indeed and they are torn asunder by demands from everywhere in the community. To blame officials of a correctional facility for delays in affording an inmate access to a clergyman is simply not being realistic, as the duty on such officials is to allow the inmate freedom of conscience and religion within such reasonable limits as are feasible in the circumstances: Maltby et al. v. A.G. Saskatchewan et al. (1982), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 153 (Sask. Q.B.); appeal dismissed (1984), 10 D.L.R. (4th) 745 (Sask. C.A.).

The mere fact that an organization claims to be a religion does not bar the Crown or any other litigant from seeking the assistance of the court in the determination of either criminal or civil wrong. While it is not a function of the court to pass on the validity of religious beliefs sincerely held by any organization, the criminal law does operate to limit religious practices even when based upon sincerely or genuinely held religious beliefs. Freedom of religious practice or conduct is not absolute, and is subject to laws of general application established to protect public safety, order, health, morals, or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others. While s.2 of the Charter enhances the claim that communications made in confidence to a priest or ordained minister should be afforded a privilege, its applicability must be determined on a case-by-case basis. The freedom is not absolute: Church of Scientology et al. v. R. (1987), 31 C.C.C. (3d) 449 (Ont. C.A.); leave to appeal refused (S.C.C., June 25, 1987).

To paraphrase language borrowed from the concurring judgment of Douglas, J. in Sherbert v. Verner et al., (1963) 374 U.S. 398 at p. 416, the Charter is written in terms of what the State cannot do to the individual not in terms of what the individual can exact from the State. The fact that the government cannot exact from the individual a surrender of the smallest part of his religious scruples does not mean that he can demand of the government exclusion of his marriage from the provisions of the Divorce Act, the better to exercise his religious beliefs. The Divorce Act is not an enactment which operates so as to discriminate against religion as such: Baxter v. Baxter (1983), 7 D.L.R. (4th) 557 (Ont. S.C.).

To find a breach of freedom of religion there must be more than a religious component to the impugned law; it must be one that infringes a tenet or fundamental doctrine of a religion. A tenet of a religion is a belief that the religious group believes to be self evidently true and not open to serious debate, unlike a position taken by a religious group on a secular issue as a result of debate, discussion and resolution that may change from time to time. The freedom of religion and conscience clause in the Charter was not designed to protect a denomination's policy position on an issue merely because the underpinnings of that position can be linked to a tenet of that religious group. The proper forum for debate by religious groups on issues of this nature is the political one: R. v. Morgentaler et al. (1984), 12 D.L.R. (4th) 502 (Ont. S.C.); appeal dismissed (1985), 22 C.C.C. (3d) 353 (Ont. C.A.); appeal allowed on other grounds [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.

The freedom of conscience safeguarded in the Charter relates to freedom of conscience in matters of religion. As held by the Supreme Court of Canada in Big M Drug Mart, the right in s.2(a) of the Charter is a "single integrated concept": A.G.B.C. v. Board of School Trustees (1985), 19 D.L.R. (4th) 166 (B.C.S.C.).

It was argued here that a regulation which required religious exercises in public schools did not violate s. 2(a) since it included the right to claim exemption from Christian religious exercises. That argument does not reflect the reality of the situation faced by members of religious minorities. Whether or not there is pressure or compulsion must be assessed from their standpoint and, in particular, from the standpoint of pupils in the sensitive setting of a public school. While the majoritarian view may be that the regulation confers freedom of choice on the minority, the reality is that it imposes on religious minorities a compulsion to conform to the religious practices of the majority. The peer pressure and the classroom norms to which children are acutely sensitive are real and pervasive and operate to compel members of religious minorities to conform with majority religious practices. Harm to individual pupils need not be proved by those who object to the regulation. It is irrelevant to the real issue which is whether the Charter freedom of conscience and religion is infringed. Agreeing with Brennan J. in Abington School District v. Schempt (1963), 374 U.S. 203, "The State could not constitutionally require a student to profess publicly his disbelief as the prerequisite to the exercise of his constitutional right of abstention." The exemption procedure here has the chilling effect of discouraging the free exercise of the freedom of conscience and religion: Zylberberg et al. v. Sudbury Board of Education (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (Ont. C.A.); Russow and Lambert v. A.G.B.C. (1989), 62 D.L.R. (4th) 98 (B.C.S.C.); Canadian Civil Liberties Assn. v. Ontario (1990), 65 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.); Manitoba Association for Rights and Liberties v. Government of Manitoba (1992), 94 D.L.R. (4th) 678 (Man. Q.B.).

Monetary support by the State for the expression of minority views, however distasteful to the majority or to another minority group, cannot offend the conscience of those opposed to the viewpoint. No one is compelled to agree with the minority view nor forbidden to espouse or express a contrary one. While the statute here obliged the government to reimburse certain candidates and political parties out of the Consolidated Fund, that Fund receives revenue from many sources and out of it many expenditures for different public purposes are made. It would be impossible and inappropriate to say which item of expenditure was supported by which item of revenue. The financial support given to a political candidate or his party cannot be attributed to any particular tax or to a payment by any particular individual or group. The citizen pays a tax: the State uses it not as the citizen's money, but as part of a general public fund: MacKay et al. v. Government of Manitoba (1985), 23 C.R.R. 8 (Man. C.A.); appeal dismissed [1989] 2 S.C.R. 357; Prior v. The Queen, [1988] 2 F.C. 371 (F.C.T.D).; appeal dismissed (1989), 44 C.R.R. 110 (F.C.A.); leave to appeal refused (S.C.C., February 22, 1990); Mistusinne v. Outlook School Division, [1989] 5 W.W.R. 710 (Sask. Q.B.).

The Charter was not intended to eradicate all influences upon society which may have emanated from its cultural, religious or social history. The injunction against hunting with firearms on Sunday has existed in Newfoundland for well over a century. Apart from the fact that the ban has always fallen on Sunday, an analysis of prior legislation reveals nothing in the measures enacted over the years linking the ban to any intent to preclude the profanation of the Christian Sabbath other than what may be drawn or inferred from the fact that the ban falls on Sunday. The fact that hunting was not completely banned on Sunday is significant in the context of the inquiry into the legislative purpose. If the legislative intent was to discourage profaning of the Christian Sabbath and securing public observance of it, one would anticipate the activity of hunting to be banned and not merely one means of pursuing it. In providing for one day on the weekend during which no guns or other weapons may be used, it is a logical inference that the civil authorities set aside a day on the weekend when outdoor recreation could be pursued by non-hunters without the danger, or fear, of injury by firearms. Therefore, the inference that the impugned regulation has a safety purpose flows more logically than ascribing a religious purpose to it: R. v. Rice (1989), 49 C.C.C. (3d) 1 (Nfld. C.A.).

Section 2(a) prohibits religious indoctrination but it does not prohibit education about religion. While this is an easy test to state, the line between indoctrination and education, in some instances, can be difficult to draw. A school may sponsor the study of religion, but may not sponsor the practice of religion. It may expose students to all religious views, but it may not impose any particular view. The curricula in issue here fall into the category of indoctrination, and should be declared to be inconsistent with the Charter: Canadian Civil Liberties Assn. v. Ontario (1990), 65 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (Ont. C.A.).

Subsequent to the decision in Edwards Books, supra, the Ontario Retail Business Holidays Act was amended to expand the exemption from the general prohibition against operating a business on a Sunday. The exemption became available to any retailer who closed its place of business on any day other than Sunday by reason of the religion of the owner of the business. It was argued here that the legislation was unconstitutional, in that an owner might be obliged to declare his or her religion if questioned by the authorities, and that the definition of "holiday" included Christian religious holidays such as Christmas Day and Good Friday. It can hardly be said that the religious freedom of a retailer, who seeks to take the benefit of a provision of an Act expressly designed to accommodate such retailer for his or her religious beliefs, is significantly infringed if that retailer is required, if called upon, to state why he or she is entitled to the exemption. It is to be noted that there is no requirement for a prior public declaration in order to qualify for the exemption. In any event, it would be apparent to any customer of a retailer whose business was regularly closed on a day other than Sunday that it was by reason of the religious belief of that retailer. Further, while Good Friday and Christmas Day are also observed for religious reasons, in modern society they must be viewed as secular common pause days. The fact that a day selected for a common pause day coincides with a day which is a religious holiday for some does not render that selection unconstitutional. The court below held that the statutory option allowing municipalities to permit Sunday shopping would limit religious freedom. But its invocation would eliminate rather than create such a limitation. It is paradoxical indeed that a statute that the Supreme Court of Canada has held is a justifiable abridgement of a constitutional right notwithstanding the burden it places on non-majoritarian religious observers, should now be held unconstitutional because it places in the hands of municipalities the power to lift that burden altogether: Peel (Regional Municipality) v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co. of Canada Ltd.(1991), 78 D.L.R. (4th) 333 (Ont. C.A.).

The recent case law on s. 2(a) of the Charter indicates that: (i) the freedom of religion that is guaranteed by s. 2(a) relates to the tenets, practices and beliefs that are fundamental to the religion in issue; to attract the Charter guarantee, the conduct impeded by the impugned legislation must be integral to the practice of a person's religion, that is, it must be an essential of the faith; (ii) the court should also distinguish between a "tenet or article of faith" which has Charter protection, and a policy position adopted by a religious group on a secular issue, which has not; (iii) where the assistance of the court is sought by a person who claims the protection of s. 2(a), it is not only proper but is essential that the court inquire into the religious doctrine or practice said to be impeded in order to determine the true basis of the religious claim, and whether it attracts the guarantee; (iv) to attract the s. 2 guarantee there must be a threat by the state to a fundamental tenet or practice or essential of the faith; (v) if the purpose of the statute is valid, its effect may nevertheless constitute an infringement of a Charter-protected right or freedom and this must be determined by the court in any event; and (vi) notwithstanding that the impugned statute has some effect on the tenets or practices of the religion, it will not constitute a breach of s. 2(a) if the legislation is not shown to have an impact on the person's religious beliefs and practices that is more than trivial or insubstantial. In this case, the religious tenets and practices of the Salvation Army officers protected by s. 2(a) do not include the requirement that a retirement allowance not be a guaranteed allowance which the officer may claim as of right. Thus, the requirements of the Ontario Pension Benefits Act may be fulfilled without infringing s. 2(a): Salvation Army v. Ontario (1992), 88 D.L.R. (4th) 238 (Ont. Gen. Div.).

It seems that freedom of conscience is broader than freedom of religion. The latter relates more to religious views derived from established religious institutions, whereas the former is aimed at protecting views based on strongly held moral ideas of right and wrong, not necessarily founded on any organized religious principles. These are serious matters of conscience. Consequently, the appellant in this case is not limited to challenging the oath required by the Citizenship Act on the basis of a belief grounded in religion in order to rely on freedom of conscience under s. 2(a) of the Charter. For example, a secular conscientious objection to service in the military might well fall within the ambit of freedom of conscience, though not religion. However, "conscience" and "religion" have related meanings in that they both describe the location of profound moral and ethical beliefs, as distinguished from political or other beliefs which are protected by s. 2(b). The appellant has not raised a plausible argument about the imposition of a coercive burden on his conscientiously-held views which bridle at swearing an oath to anyone but a Supreme Being. He is not required to swear an oath to the Queen as he alleges, nor to anyone but a Supreme Being, if he chooses to swear. Moreover, he may decide to affirm rather than to swear, if that is objectionable to him. His real objection is not to the method of oath making, but to its content. His claim regarding freedom of conscience should, therefore, be struck out. Similarly, his allegation that the oath of citizenship restricts his freedom of religion since the Queen is the "Head of the Anglican Church" must be struck out. As the motions judge found, Parliament's purpose in framing the oath or affirmation was to require a statement of loyalty to Canada's head of state and its institutions, not to interfere with religious freedom. There is no mention in our Constitution nor in this oath of the Queen in her capacity as Head of the Church of England: Roach v. Canada, [1994] 2 F.C. 406 (F.C.A.).

While a religion may entail the active dissemination of religious viewpoints, the concept of "religion" connotes the beliefs of a group. The religious beliefs of the members of a group as a group are what informs the religion of those members. In the present case, if the defendant’s belief that her anti-abortion protest activity is required by her religion is not shared by the vast majority of the members of her religion, which is the case, it is difficult to conclude that her conduct constitutes the exercise, practice or manifestation of her religion. This is not to deny that she is motivated by profound moral considerations. Nor is it to deny that protest activity may be sustained by religious values. The civil rights movement in the United States, for example, was led by black clergy. But I am sure many who joined in that movement did so for reasons not based on their religious faith. One does not have to share a religion to be concerned for the just treatment of others. This analysis blends almost imperceptibly into a consideration of freedom of conscience because of the potential subsumation of "religion" by the reference to "conscience" in s. 2(a). A claim based on conscience is potentially more pervasive than that based on religion in that the circle of "activity" motivated by conscience will be much wider. But is "action" motivated by conscience intended to be protected by the Charter in contrast to "protection against invasion" of a sphere of individual intellect and spirit such as protection against officially disciplined uniformity on orthodoxy? I think not. In my view, the defendant is not being conscripted by an interlocutory injunction prohibiting picketing to a cause she fundamentally abhors and that being so, her freedom of conscience will not be adversely affected: Ontario (Attorney General) v. Dieleman (1994), 117 D.L.R. (4th) 449 (Ont. Gen. Div.).