My involvement on DESOTO was taking part in the Overlay, code name: Phase I of Operation DESOTO. I was with HQ at the time, and was a member of a rat-team composed of 3 other guys, Bill Casey, H&S Weapons/106s, F. "Wee" Weahkee from Kilo and one unknown Marine from either Weapons or Kilo company.

H&S 3/5 CO was 1stLt. Carey, Kilo 3/5 CO was Capt. Maresco and Cottage 1/7 was Capt. Walker. Our mission was to go to the site of a downed observation aircraft, rescue the crew members, recover any classified documents and destroy the aircraft. I was with the Alpha Command Group that was heli-lifted from some LZ in the Chu Lai TAOR to link-up with Kilo 3/5 at Duc Pho on the evening of the 26th of Jan. under beautiful flareship lighting.

We sacked into our positions. On the morning of the 27th, we came under intense small arms and .50 caliber machine gun fire from a bunch of bunkers along a railroad track and from a small hamlet. Lt.Col. Esslinger called in for 105 mm arty and airstrikes. We also had support from the USS Manley's five-inchers.

Cottage 1/7 was engaged with the enemy close by trying to get to the aircraft. With the support of 81s, we assaulted the bunker positions and destroyed them. Shortly after that, we came under intense fire from everywhere around us. We ended up back at Duc Pho. Oh yeah, the bunkers had a real good tunnel system behind them for escape and protection from bombing and shelling. Our rat-team ended up TAD to Kilo.

The terrain in the Duc Pho area was predominately flat, rice paddy land that was still wet and hard to move through. There were numerous small streams with steep banks about four to five feet high, but with no more than one to two feet of water. Hedgerows bordered 90% of all rice paddies, and there were some cane fields that were over five feet high and bamboo growth scattered through the area. Route 1 and the railroad track that ran through the area was built up higher than the paddies and offered good fields of fire across the paddies in most places. The villages that were shown on the map did exist, and were occupied. The entire area is very populous.

Except for Duc Pho itself, all hamlets in the area were definitely VC influenced and VC dominated. Bunkers that were destroyed by air one day were found to be rebuilt on the following day. This was believed to be the result of civilian labor groups. During one strike on a series of trench lines in the vicinity, enemy fire was directed towards civilian women and children who were running from their huts. No reason could be determined for this action and it is the first time it had been reported in this area. VC strength was estimated to be one battalion. There were at that time two confirmed local force companies operating in the area surrounding Duc Pho. Heavy
automatic and semi-automatic small arms fire was received from two different positions. Well-directed moderate to heavy fire was received from snipers and from fortified emplacements. Some booby traps made from M-26 frag grenades were located.

The enemy units engaged were well supplied with ammo and were a very aggressive force, who at the time seemed to have no intention of leaving the area. The well-constructed bunkers were built low to the ground and were concealed with sod, etc. Bunkers were found mostly on the railroad tracks and across (north of) the rivers while fighting holes and trench lines were found throughout the area in hedge rows around the huts and in the small groves of trees.

The bunkers had a good tunnel system for escape and protection. The VC had radio monitoring capabilities in the area since a large number of ARVN PRC-10s had been captured in that area. Radio interference was encountered.  It was found that the maps of the area were very helpful in picking out details, and were accurate.  Aerial photo coverage of the area was adequate.  Information received from Duc Pho District HQs confirmed that the enemy units were well fortified.

On 31 Jan 67, Mike Company, 3rd Bn. 5th Marines was heli-lifted into Duc Pho, Quang Ngai Province and placed under operational control of 3rd Bn. 7th Marines during Operation DESOTO. On 23 Feb 67, Mike Company left Duc Pho and returned to 3rd Bn. 5th Marines.

From 5-8 Feb. India, Kilo, and Lima conducted extensive long range patrols in the northwestern and southeastern sectors of the TAOR. From 25-28 Feb. companies Lima and Kilo patrolled the western and southeastern sectors of the TAOR (Tactical Area of Ops).

During the first two weeks of Feb., Lima company provided security for 3/11 Arty on Operation RIO GRANDE. Lima and Kilo exchanged combat bases and commenced the improvement of their respective defensive positions on 11-12 Feb. D 1/26 came under the operational control of 3/5 on 1 Feb. 67, and replaced Mike company during its participation in Operations TRINITY and DESOTO.

Supporting Forces

Batteries A and B, 1/11 Marines and Batteries D, F, W, 2/11 Marines. At no time during the course of the 75 miles covered as the Battalion without artillery support.

Fixed wing support was utilized well during the earlier phases of the operation averaging two per day. One strike by UH-1Es from VMO-6 was conducted during the first week.  However, on 13 and 14 May, 3/5 coordinated and controlled 16 air strikes in a period of 20 hours against NVA troop concentrations resulting in a significant number of confirmed and probable KIAs as well as 38 structures destroyed.

The fire support that was available to 3/5 on Operation UNION was artillery from five different batteries, fixed wing aircraft of all types, 81mm mortars and 60 mm mortars.

The enemy forces that were expected to be encountered were elements of the 3rd NVA Regiment, the 2nd NVA Division HQs, and an unknown number of local force guerrillas.

The early part of Operation UNION was spent sweeping the mountains to the south and west of Nui Lac Son in pursuit of elements of the force which hit Foxtrot company 2nd Bn. 1st Marines.

The area in which 3/5 operated consisted of many types of terrain which were divided into four main groupings. The first was in the lower elevations and rice paddies which afforded some cover and concealment for troops;  all hamlets encountered possessed extensive trench and cave systems to afford protection from aerial observation, air strikes and artillery fire.  The second was in the mountains and river valleys along the area going west. These mountains provided a great number of hiding and staging areas for NVA troops. The third area was in the populated area of Hiep Duc which was controlled heavily by the enemy due to no ARVN or PF activity in that area for several years. The area provided food and living areas for the enemy with an abundance of trenches and caves in the area.  The fourth was similar to the first with many hedgerows and fortified hamlet areas.

Operation UNION was a totally successful, and fruitful endeavor. For over three weeks the 3rd Bn. 5th Marines maneuvered deep into enemy territory in pursuit of VC and NVA units and sustained relatively light casualties while inflicting considerable damage to the enemy and gaining a valuable psychological advantage in having free movement in solidly held enemy areas. Upon finding and fixing the large NVA forces on 12-14 May,  3/5 was able to close off the enemy's escape routes and effectively destroy the majority of a reinforced NVA battalion and capture much of its equipment. 3/5 moved well throughout the operation. The decision to remove our flak jackets considerably improved our fighting effectiveness by giving each Marine a lighter load and increasing the freedom of movement.

Operation Union started April 25, 1967.  I only speak of the events that took place during the time period mentioned above because they are the most momentous days of this operation that remain with me till this day.

    On May 12th, 1967,  the order of march was Delta 1/5 leading out followed by India and Mike 3/5.  The CP was with Mike. Kilo was not in the column with us but proceeded across country direct.  Around noon Delta was first to encounter the NVA.  They turned into the enemy, but were stopped by intense semi-automatic, automatic fire and mortars.  India and Mike, who were directly behind Delta, started to Delta's North, but on order moved around to the rear and on down to their South flank where they received intense small arms fire and mortar rounds.  India then regrouped and set up in a 360 degree perimeter as by this time it was dark.  Kilo on order turned South to link up with Delta.  Kilo was able to evacuate the last of their WIAs in the evening hours.  Even the KIAs.

    I was with Mike 3/5 providing security for the Command Group. On the night of the 12th, we were catching shit and giving it back. India, Kilo 3/5 and Delta 1/5 were around us getting some and giving it back.  The Nva were relentless.  It was like New years Eve.  Bugles, drums, cowbells, screaming, the whole nine yards.

    That night until the morning, I was close enough to the RTO to hear the reports.  The other line companies were reporting the status of their engagements and the WIA and KIA counts.  It was surreal. Automatic fire, mortars, yelling and screaming permeated throughout the morning hours. We were ordered to hold our positions and we did.  We wanted to do otherwise.

    The morning of the 13th of May the fight, which had not really let down from the night before, resumed very early with Kilo engaging a large enemy force and attacking them relentlessly.   Mike Company spotted a company-size NVA force and, with our 81 bros walking all over them, gave us our chance to cut them down. India got hit while looking for bodies. They made us proud and kicked some ass.  Delta and Kilo got some too. The rout was on.  The NVA knew we smelled blood, no doubt.

    Then for good measure, had Phanthoms and Skyhawks drop  their ordinance on entrenched enemy mortar and 30 caliber machine gun positions.  A Spotter along with Mike spotted another large NVA force, and Lt. Col. Esslinger called in for Arty and air strikes. Our 81 bros went ballistic, and threw any and everything they had.  Mike  firepower finished the job.   Delta 1/5 was with India and Kilo stirring it up and dishing it out. That PRC-41 was working overtime.

    India then engaged a very large NVA force. Delta and Kilo were in the area, and the noise was deafening.  There were reports coming in about hand-to-hand engagements. Kilo was getting hit and Lt. Col. Esslinger called in for more Arty and air support.   81 bros did their thing, and the NVA were forced out of their positions into the open, where Kilo firepower cut them down.  Mike spotted a large NVA force cutting across an open area. We took them out permanently. Then I remember Mike charging across the paddies at high-port, up a hill and down the hill to purgatory.  It was madness at its highest degree.

The night of the 13th was just like the 12th, only greater in magnitude.
Thank you my brothers.

Saepe Expertus, Semper Fidelis, Fratres Aeterni

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Left: Randy Summers, KIA May 13, '67
Right: Robert "Woody" Watrous, WIA May 13, '67, KIA Aug. 16, '67
H&S 3/5 Wpns/106s

Sgt. John T. Carota, K/3/5
WIA  May 13, 1967
KIA  September 6, 1967

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Cpl. Biggs

Cpl. Bruce Boyer

Cpl. Costas

Hastings Gang

7 July-3 August:  Operation Hastings
Locations:  I Corps;  Quang Tri Province;
Dong Ha Mountains;  Song Ngan Valley
("Helicopter Valley");  "The Rockpile";
Hills 208 and 364;  Cam Lo;  Dong Ha;
LZs Crow, Dove and Robin.
Type/Objective:  Search and Destroy.
The goal of Hastings is to drive the NVA
back across the DMZ and thus preempt
and disrupt the enemy's plan to mass and
attack Quang Tri and Thua Thien.
Units:  USMC---1/1 Marines, 2/1 Marines,
1/3 Marines, 2/4 Marines, 3/4 Marines, 2/9
Marines (more than 8000 Marines participate)
VNAF---1st ARVN Division, VNMC (Lam Son---289) (more
than 3000 VNAF troops.)
NVA/VC---324-B NVA Division (90th, 803rd.,
and 5/812th NVA regiments) (between 8000
and 12,000 enemy troops estimated in the
area of operations.)
Events:  15 July---"Battle of Helicopter Valley."  The assault
into the Song Ngan Valley is a tough one for the Marines.
Fifteen hundred enemy soldiers from the 90th
NVA Regiment lie in waiting at two key
Landing Zones:  E, G, H-2/4 Marines at LZ
Dove and I, K, L-3/4 Marines at LZ Crow.
Fire is so intense that two helicopters taking
evasive action collide and crash.  Firefights
rage all day throughout the valley.  More
than 36 Marines are KIA and at least 27 WIA.
18 July---More than 1000 NVA Regulars
attack the Marine rear guard, K-3/4 Marines
near LZ Crow.  K Company is reinforced by
I, L-3/4 Marines, thereby averting a disaster.
None-the-less, 14 Marines are KIA and 49 WIA.  The enemy
body count is 138, with hundreds more estimated KIA.
22 July---B-52s bomb the DMZ for the first
time, their target being a supply area one mile
north of the Ben Hai River.
24-25 July---I-3/5 Marines are ambushed by
the 6/812th NVA Regiment near Hill 362,
three miles northwest of the Rockpile.
Eighteen Marines are KIA in the ambush,
and 82 WIA.
Casualties---Total for Hastings:
USMC---126 KIA, 446 WIA;  VNAF-21 KIA,
40 WIA;  NVA/VC---882 KIA, 17 POWs.

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3rd BN. 5th Marines Commander
Lt. Col. D.E. Esslinger

Col. Esslinger and Raul Vasquez
Union Station Lounge, Chicago, IL
 13 May 2001

Col. Esslinger and Raul Vasquez coming up the escalator at union station.  Col. Esslinger was
wounded on Union, and again at the end of Union II. (Picture courtesy of Kathryn Capone).

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